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iP R E F A C E
It Is usual, in u preface, to tell the re tier what the 
writer intends to do, and why he does not intend to do something 
else* So we be in with what we intend to do* In very broad 
ter a, we intend to explore soue problems of Christian dialectic 
in the light of Hegel9s dialectic of lord and slave, hie 
dialectical philosophy of spirit, or Geist. and so ne recent 
develop erita in dialectioal thinking* We are not atte pting a 
oo ipreheneive re-ir:terpretotion of Hegel, not even of dialectic • 
we are not going to diecuss Hegel9s later work, except wnere a 
passage can throw light upon hio earlier position* Consequently 
we shall not be discussing the Hsgel of the British Idealist 
tradition, which is alnest exclusively an interpretation of the 
mature Hegel* Ho t do we study Hegel by way of his predecessors, 
as t roner does in his 9 Von - ant bis He»;el9 • Apart from the fact 
that a work of this length could hardly offer a complete account 
of anything, we . ust recognise at the outset that the tiae is not 
yet ripe for a complete or definitive interpretation of iiegel*
This is true of the dialeotio as veil. Kegel is rarely seriously 
disoussed, and even more rarely understood* The dialectic ia 
regarded with suspicion and so eti ea with profound abhorrence*
It is rarely comprehended* Consequently, it is high time that 
a sympathetic, though critical, exploration of the dialectic 
were undertt ken* One of the nost definitive, and certainly one 
of the taoat influential for iul at ions of dialectical thinking is 
to be found in hegel, and in Hegel9e earlier work in particular* 
This/
i i
This study la undertaken in the belief that the dialectic is 
of profound significance not only for social* economic and 
politioal theory* but for theological* philosophical, and psyoho-> 
analytic thinking os well. ie do not attempt to follow all the 
patha along which dlaleotioal thinking ..light lead us. Our 
discussion is severely confined to one important example of 
dialeotic only; although this* of itself* leads us through 
philosophy to theology* sociology* psyoho-annly s i s and other 
related disciplines. The dialeotic of Lord and slave* together 
with the notion of spirit* hold our attention tnrough luoh of 
this study* and provide us with -tore than enough to reflect upon.
.vost of what we have to eay about Hegel conoerns the younger 
tiegel* because it is he who explored ore deeply than anyone the 
posslbilltiesand the limits of dialeotlcal thinking. Wot.re 
concemec^vith Hegel up to and including his * iheno .enolQigy of 
Spirit*, that is* up to and including 1807* Consequently* we 
owe a great deal to nu*erous interpreters of Hegel*s earlier work* 
and particularly to interpreters of the * a- henoiaenology * ♦ «e 
must mention* in particular* Alexandre Aojeve* whose * Introduction 
a la laoture da tiagel (1947) provided ua with an exciting 
controversial impetus* and Jean Hyppollte* whose detailed 
commentary on the heno enolo/ar called Aeneas et etruoture de la 
j'heno .enolocle £j> I’eajaJLIi i£ ii££Sl’ <1946) ha^*een of oonaiderbl* 
help. Although it is obvious how much X owe to thsss important 
interpretations of Hegel* I have not entered into more than the 
briefest discussion with any of Hegel9s interpreters* though not 
for the sa * reasons as scholars like Findley and Kaufmann.
Because our pri ary concern is with the dialectic* not only in 
Hegel*/
i i i
Hegel, but in Feuerbach, arx, Freud, Lukai a, Sartre end erleaft- 
ionty aa well, we oannot enter into detuilec^arguaent over the 
minutiae of scholarly interpretation of Hegel alone* tfe snail 
raise detaile^fcoints of interpretation only when this is essential 
to the argu ent* The pri ary aim of this work is to explore the 
structure end significance of dialeotioal thinking* We stay with 
Hegel, and the thinkers just mentioned, only for as long as is 
necessary to achieve a working oo ^ prehension of what they say* 
Ho-onefod.ll find this an exhaustive account even of the dialeotic 
of Lordfend slave, not to mention Hegel9e philosophy*
We have achieved, here, only a tentative and incomplete 
contribution to the study of dialeotic* We have devoted nine 
chapters to the nooning of 8uoh difficult encompassing conceptions 
•b alienation (entires uixg). aelf-ooiiaolouanesa (at 1 bettxswusatae in 1 
truth (wahrheit). phenoienology (phaposaologts). spirit (Geiet) 
and Hotion (behalff)* not beoause we enjoy becoming bewitched, 
under uegel9a influence, by general ideas, but because these 
conceptions are integral to dialeotioal thinking* ie devote 
nine chapters to Hegel, not beoause we entertain an historical 
interest in his ideas, but beoause he, above all, oan throw light 
on the task of dialeoticel thinking in our own time*
Dialeotioal thinking, in the simplest terms,is a 
philosophical attempt, requiring oo crete action in accordance 
with it, to give coherent and enduring leaning to our experlenoe, 
in an age when our experience is no longer self-evidently 
intelligible* Dialectical thinking, whether in Heraclitus or 
Hegel, Lukoco or erlean^Ponty, is ©nrttempt to restore e*nln& 
to experience. In dialeotioal thinking, we struggle to face up 
to the problem of Aoyos in an age of violent yeveois. In on 
ags/
iv
age of traumatic disintegration, through war, change and social 
fragmentation, an begin to ask the oli question of Aoyes, of 
meaning, of value, of intelligibility* We hear aany saying that
nothing means anything to the a any toret they work hard, but do 
not know to what end* life does not sees worth living any more* 
There*s no purpose, no point to it all* In other words, life 
has beoo-ae divorced from meaning, and the old meanings ere no 
longer live options* We experience a traumatic loss of nerve, 
an inourable anxiety, a profound despair* So sties this leede 
us to withdraw fro a life into closed circles of meaning, whether 
of opinion, class, colour, race, religion or something else*
We are willing to e&orlfloe life for the leaning* We need the 
security, and ara only too happy to let life go on without us*
At other times, we throw ourselves into Ilfs, forgetful of meaning, 
unable to remember; and consequently we are dismembered, 
dislocated, or destroyed* Dialeotioal thinking struggles to 
restore meaning to experience* It strives to integrate life and 
meaning in an enduring, though flexible, changing • It
does so, recognising that the meaning truly worthy of our whole­
hearted trust,in a time of violent beeomlng, will not be a 
meaning we shall comprehend in a single proposition, or even from 
a single point of view* No particular truth oan comprehend the 
whole truth* What we really desire is a completeness which 
contains our pain, our bro&ennese, our despair, - holding us 
without absorbing and eo destroying us* We dealre completeness, 
but we do so from a pos tion of radical incompleteness* The 
dealre for completeness is the deelre for rationality, for 
encompassing intelligibility* Tet the claim to have achieved 
this completeness in some final solution, or absolute standpoint, 
oonstitutesfthe extra eot form of irrationality* Dialeotioal 
thinking/
Vthinking undertakes to go by way of the narrow path, the "path 
of doubt” or "highway of despair” Hegel oalled it, between•*. $ r - / y* . ••.
inoonpletenesafewd completeness, between the world and God, the 
path which was once called the Via <e;atlva. It is here that 
humanity must seek the integrity of life and meaning for which 
it longs eo despairingly*
fe have devoted a chapter each to Feuerbach, <arx,Lukacs, 
Sartre end lerleau-Ponty, not because they alone can help us to 
find our way about, but beoause they represent both a variety and 
a continuity of approaches to the problems* Once again, our 
disoussion makes no attempt to be exhaustive, but merely to 
deepen our explorations into certain ever-reourring issues. fe 
give special attention to the dlaleotlo of Lord and Slave, not 
only beoause it is of great interest on it^bwn account, but 
because, through Marx, it has shaped, ancjfwill certainly continue 
to shape, numerous events in our time, and because, through 
Feuerbach it has dominated much of our most significant theological 
thinking. This is certainly a broad canvass. We have chosen an 
exploratory method, in order to cover it with some measure of 
continuity and consistency. We shall return again anc^gain to 
the eane issues, so eti es from one angle and so eti ios from 
another. To some, our method of writing will appear repetitive. 
It is intentionally so. There is no question of solving the 
problem of life and neaning, for example, onoe and for all.
No simple argument can lead to the kind of enduring conclusions 
that we seek, a philosophy of Aoy®* , or of the Be^xlff as Hsgel 
calls it, must return again and again to the same age-old issues, 
not in order to achieve a final solution to them, so that we may 
shelve them once and for all, but in order to renew, in our own 
time/
v i
time, end anew every day, the living struggle to comprehend the 
forgotten caning, the lost cohere ne, which, in God, men la 
created to make hie own# We ought not to hove to offer an 
apology for exploratory repetition# Least of all, ought we to 
apologise for the broad nature of our exploration, for as 
erlean-Poaty aaya,
"All the great philosophical ideas of the past oentury - the 
philosophies of i arx and 2<ists80he, phenomenology, German 
existentialism and psycho-analysis - had their beginnings in 
Hegel: it was he who started the attempt to explore the 
irrational and Integrate it into an expanded reason, which is 
the task of our century •" (1)
1# uerlean- ontys Hotel's existent!alient Janae and iionaenee
pgs 63
1.
C H A P T B H I
Au XH£ LOGIC OF SPIRIT I 
HBOSL*S APOPHATIC ^THOD.
Hagai calls Nphsao isnology " the "science of the experience 
through which consciousness passes" (1)# This definition of 
his phenomenologloal method will not become clear until we have 
mad* soam preliminary points concerning Hegel9o apophatio method* 
She fundamental axiom of Hegel9 • philosophy § or so it see is to 
ate, is that nuan is the being who above all else desires 
completeness. She paradox of man9s being is that he remains n*» 
only as long as he faile to achieve the completeness he desiree. 
lor should he arrive at that encompassing completeness which is 
the tcXoa of both his thinking and his action, he would no 
longer desire it. Hegel cells desire the negative. He chooses 
phenomenology as his method beoause pheno menology le concerned, 
for him, with the experience of consciousness, which is the 
experience of negation, of notion, or negative notion. 
Phenomenology is neoeeearily dialeotioal, for Hegel, because, 
os we shall see in detail later in this study, only dialectic 
can "oomprshend" the situational oharaoter of experience (2).
In the simplest ter a, we understand dialectic to be a way of 
speaking/
li Phano enolo^y of 3 j 4 m  pg: 96. Froa here on we shall refer to the Fheno enolo, y of Spirit aa P.3.
2t iha term ooaprahand is our tranalation ef liege I9 s "bet relfen". 
Grelfen £;ieune graap, take possession of, grip, enjoy, 
encompass, with the added strength of the prefix. nagriff,which we sometimes translate as notion, at others as enoompaaaing conception, has similar meanings. Like the Hebrew yada_ it CiJinot be understood within the formal framework of a rigid eubjeot-objeot dualism. To comprehend means to gather, to oneself, to grasp completely, to possess, 
to fulfil a desire, rather than to perceive the way things an
•peaking vthich begins only after we have acknowledged that no 
•ingle proposition can express the whole truth of our experience* 
Hegel calls hie dialeotioal phenomenology & "path of doubt"* 
or ’highway of despair" (1)* which is "conscious ineight Into 
the untruth of phenomenal knowledge" (2)* We hope to make this 
olear in the course of the following chapters*
Hegel1 ^ phenomenology is not coneernedwlth immediate setters 
of foot, hut with the task of co uprc heading the facta which we 
already know in a variety of familiar ways* He describee a 
"whole succession of the s^ odes or attltudec of consciousness" (3)* 
as just so any ways of coaprehending experience* The subj< ct~ 
matter of phenomenology is the history of hu on ex eriencej the 
eventual goal of pheao enologioal thinking le a complete 
awareness of what we ./ere not conscious of when we were in the 
grip of experience iteelf (4). No single attitude, state of 
ind, mode of discourse, or proposition, con be wholly true, for 
Hegel, because truth entails a co ipletenees which no single
expression can attain* Hegel argues, for example, that no
single proposition can be *ore than partially true, because no
single proposition can express more than a part of the situational
complexity we call reality* We shall discuss Hegel9e notion of 
truth, and his attempt to distinguish truth fro:* correctness, 
later on (5). Of course, we recognise that the correspondence 
notion of truth prevails In most contemporary philosophical 
discussion today, and consequently it le often difficult to give
•/
it P.S. pg: 135.
2« P*S* pg* 136*
3. ?*3* pg* 144*
4* P*S. pgt 144*
3* He distinguishes richtigkeit from Wahrheit cf. vz. 103f
3a fair hearing to thosje who think Wat truth as eorret^o ndenee 
is not the only conception of truth open to us* Het;el argeeo 
that the corrtsponde ce theory of truth has an important and 
legitimate place in human thought and action, but it would not be 
legitimate to make the absolute and exclusive claim that truth 
as correspondence is the only kind of truth there is*
hearing in tind, then, that we shall be using the notion 
of truth in a sense not immediately familiar to contemporary 
philosophers, though it is familiar enough in ordinary language, 
we oontinue our exploration into hegei9s phenomenological thinking* 
hegel describes his phenomenologioal method as a 
othodological scepticism directed towards the whole coapase of 
phenomenal consciousness, a scepticism which qualifies us for the 
first tl e to test what truth is* (1) Xt entails a negative 
orttlngie leading to a "despair regarding what are called natural 
views, tho ghts and opinions"♦ (2) It proceeds by way of negation* 
We call this procedure an "apophatio method" for thie reaeon.
It entails a despair regarding all conventional attitude^and
perspectives, however well-established* or hegel, every
customary way of thinking, every deeply learned logical .rr.ctice, 
every coupon sense opinion is relative to the truth of the whole* 
"Das Wahre let das Gunze"* "the truth is the whole", he argues.(3) 
Our correct opinions are partial truths, reflecting, or 
indicating, tut not encompassing the truth of the whole* For 
truth Is "essentially a result; only at the end is it what it
is in very truth".(4).
Consequently/ ______________ ___ _ _
It P*3* pg* 136
2. Ibid pgt 136.
3. 0»r -an ££• 2tiai PS* 21 Lngliefa pg. 61
4. P.S. pg. 62.
4.
Consequently, he gel is arguing against our making absolute 
truth olai a fro i the vintage point of our natural attitudes and 
conventional frames of reference. True, he seeks, like Freud, to 
make the unconeoious conscious, so that the truth of everything we 
are «perienoing, and have «perienoed, is not forgotten or left 
unrecognised. But every finite way of being conscious of our 
experience is, for Hegel, incomplete, Ve cannot, therefore, 
claim exhaustive comprehension of all that is the oases we 
comprehend less than we experienoe, and our experience itself ie 
limited by the timeundapaoe of our culture and the shape of our 
human world, So single ode of consciousness comprehends the 
whole, for Hegel, yet, "consciousness knows and comprehends 
nothing but what ftills within its experience** (1), For Hegel, 
no speculation beyond our experience is legitimates the task 
of speculation, in iiegal's sense of the term, ie to work toward 
an ever more adequate comprehension of experienoe, **The object**, 
he continually reminds us, "appears only to be in such wise for 
consciousness as consciousness knows it" (2), Consciousness
cannot go behind the object to test whether its knowledge of
the object corresponds to the real nature of the object. The 
thing in Itself oan only be the thing we experienoe, what it ie in 
itself for consciousness (3/• Hegel refuses to work within the 
nouaenon-pheno enon dualism of Kawt beoause he hae chosen a 
phenoaenological starting point. Consequently, there can be no 
talk, for him, of what transcends experienoe,
 1 1 / ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It P,3* pg* 96* Y<e shell disouss the notion of be^reifen comprehend, in full later on,
2t P.S, pg, 141*
3* Ibid pg. 141,212,142, 96, eto.
It might appear that Hegel*a refusing to depart fro a 
concrete experience entails the view that philosophy leaves 
everything as it is. But nothing could be farther from the 
truth. For philosophy9 according to Hegel, only "wins to its 
truth when it finds itself utterly tom asunder" (1), For 
philosophy, as Hegel conceived it,follows the same negative way 
as the ohristien, from death to life, from bondage to freedom.
It comes to the truth not by shrinking from Calvary, but by 
living it through. Philosophy is essentially a Christian
philosophy for Hegel, It articulates the same revelation as the
,/Christian tradition hallways dons; it shares the same <w
or end, na ^ ely redemption from death through death. Far from 
leaving everything as it is, it negates oomon sense, an^with it 
the feuniliar”. For what is familiarly known", says Hegel,
"is not properly known just for the reason that it is familiar"(2X 
By way of negation, therefore, thejbpophetic procedure of 
I egel * ^ phenomenology points toward the transcendence of all 
finite limits, revealing their te ipor&l, temporary nature.
Its TeXos. an ever more ade ;uate correspondence between 
comprehension and experience. For every individual mode of 
consciousness is partial, temporal anc^Lnoomplete; it makes its 
one fatal error when it makes the absolute claim to have achieved 
the Truth of the tthole. Only the 3pirit, the complete 
comprehension of all experience, lqfthe Truth of the Whole,
God, or the spirit of God, for Hegsl, is "abstract 
generality" when conceived as He is in himself apart from the 
"wealth/
1, P,S, pg, 93*
2* I S M  PS* 92
6.
"wealth of the developed fora” which i» the'history of concrete 
experienoe”• (1). Hegel shared Luther's istrust of abstract 
speculation concerning the being of God in his transcendent
a.city. Phenomenology! as Hegel conceived it, is negative or 
apophatic theology, which means that it proceeds by way of 
negation to reconstruct concrete experienoe in such a way as to 
disclose the eschatologioel tension which pervades every relation 
of subject and object in experience. Heir,ought to show how eooh 
partial hold on the truth of experienoe participates in the truth 
of the Vhole, even though the truth of the ..hole i^not yet, 
but ie essentially result (2)#
ilany have argued that Hegel loses the esohatological 
tension of his dialeotic when he settled down as the established 
philosopher of thePrussian State. Even in his later work, 
however, his position re aino ambivalent. In the 'Pheno enology 
of Spirit*, we do not find more than suggestions of this later 
ambivalence# It has always teen more difficult for the 
Hegelians of the right to build their position on the 
'Phenomenology' than on the 'Philosophy of Right* or the 
•Kppyolopa.dla gf thg PfeU MftR M a U  Sol.nc<8*. The left-wlnc 
Hegelians, by contrast, have made the 'Phenomenology' their 
happy hunting ground# As "purposive activity" (3)* 
r e a s o n ,  for the Hegel of the ' Phenomenology * at any rate, 
cannot be divorced from Action# Indeed, the unity of subject 
and object which Reason practically achieves, according to Hegel, 
is/
1• P # S # pg # 31#
2. Ibid pg. 81-82.
3# P#3# pg# 83#
7.
is obviously possible only when the subject actively penetrates 
objectivity, and is not possible if the subjeot passively 
observes objectivity at a distance* Re, is on is active, and 
dialectical* Kojeve calls it ’’negative action” • It is 
rivetted, therefore, to the hard raw material of the world, and 
in struggling to transform that world into a hu an world, Reason 
begins always with living experienoe end does not indulge in 
abstract speculation. Hegel9a oo-crlled rationalism encompasses
both laterlalis i and idealise, but it is not committed to & 
naive belief in evolutionary progress for as we have said, Hegel*a 
Reason le dialectical Reason* It doss not achieve its purpose 
immediately or direo tly, but only by way of negation* It is 
too ounnlng to be optimistic* It seeks for new life, not in 
life, but in death* It obeys the Way of the Cross* Reason 
wills life, but life is given not in life, but in death* Reason 
wills freedom, but freedom is given not in freedom but in slavery* 
Reason wills justice, goodness, beauty, trustv/orthineoa endao on, 
but it is in and through injustice, evil, ugliness and 
faithlessness that it achieves that end, or , Reason
hopes in despair because it has allowed the Christian promise 
that freedom is given in slavery, health in the disease, life in 
death to beoo ae the norm and criterion of all rationality* In 
this way, Reason can integrate irrationality into a broader 
rationality* This rationality is what Hegel calls Geist, or 
Spirit* We shall spell out the import^noe of dialeotioal Reason 
when we come to the Lord-Sleve dialectic later in this work*
We can already see, however, why Hegel oalls reason cunning*
We consider, now, in greater detail, Hegel9& notion of Gelst*
or/
or Spirit. In his 9*Mlaftas&X Si M M s a ' i  Hegel arguee that 
God is ( lystery) at ths level of ssnss experience,
perooption, mid understanding! but not at the level of self* 
consciousness. This might be mistaken for Augustine9 0 thesis 
that my awareness of God is of the same order of immediacy as my 
self-awareness, and I am an enigma to myself to the extent that 
God iejan enigma to me Cl). Kegel9s self-oonsoiousness is not in 
any sense an immediate self-awareness, but is the goal of the long 
and labourlous journey toward a complete knowledge of experience 
in reflection. Kojev© reminds us that sense*-experienoe, 
perception and understanding are all forms of cognition in the 
face of an exterior world (2). God is not experienced, perceived 
or understood for Hegel. God is essentially in the process of 
thought, he tolls us. In thought, we live through our living 
experienoe of the world, organising that experienoe in order to 
grasp or comprehend a creative tension between contradictory 
experiences, an integrated self-oonsoiousness in end through every 
experience. In thought, the philosopher recognises what is 
experienced (in cognition)• He thinks through his experiences, 
end those of others, when ell the facts are in one sense known, 
when empirical questions and logical questions have been 
adequately answere<^at the level of our natural attitudes, 00m ion 
sense and oommon usage. He lives through experienoe in thought 
in order to overcome the false, diseased polarities of 
subjectivism/
1. Augustine: City of God XI 26 pp. 468-9 of Hods edition.2. j^troducUon a k l 6£tu£c M  &££!■ Goaoi*ntary on ohs. 
I , II and I ir o fH tg e i 'a  •Thmxo itooIoct Spirit*.
subjectivism and objectivism in a new integrated totality, or 
3ftiole ( oXov ). God le neither Subject nor object, subjective 
nor objective, in the mind, In or beyond the world* For God 
eannot be confined to any determination* God will be who He will 
be (1)$ He ie the end (£«X<*t o»)# the Truth of every experienoe 
and the Truth of the Whole* Thought ia the reoolleetion of 
experienoe, for Hegel, and it le in this esohatologioal sense, 
as the Truth of the Whole, that God is in thought* In thought, 
our experienoe is, as it were, bom again, transformed, integrated* 
Spirit is experienoe raised up from death, from what it ie as 
experienoe, raised to a new life* The Notion (Begriff)* as 
concrete universal, is experience transformed in death to what it 
is, bom in reflection as Spirit*
Hegel is not, therefore, working from within the 
August ini on, Cartesian tradition when he equates spirit with 
self-consciousness* Spirit is no more present in Immediate 
self-awareness than in immediate experienoe, for Hegel* He 
deals with the Cartesian dualism of Kee Cogltans, Hes extensa 
dialectlcally, andjinotetid of refuting it, he shows its limits,
Its inadequacy, its inappropriateness* Spirit, for Hegel, is a 
new kind of awareness rather than a new Object of awareness, and 
it is an intersubjactive rather than intrasubjective spirit, a 
social rather than individual spirit, because for Hegel, Spirit 
is bom only in relation to others* It is in the mutual 
re-cognition of man with nan that Spirit emerges* Spirit is 
re-oognltlon remaking cognition* It is only in the struggle of 
life and death that the intersubjeotive Truth of the >&ole is 
bom/
1* Exodus 314*
bom, a8 we shall see later in this work* For the present, we
must justify our interpretation of Hegel*s Gelst concept as
through end through Esohatologioal •
riauf tann tells us that Hegel sent the first half of his
manuscript of the * henoaenology of Spirit* to hie publisher in
October 8th 1806 and the remainder the night of October 12th-13th,
the night before Hapoleon occupied the oity after the battle of
Jena • On September 18th 1806, Hegel completed his course on
speculative philosophy with the wordss “Ours is a significant
epoch, a time of ferment, when the spirit has made a jerk,
transcended its previous form, and is gaining a new one. The
whole mass of previous notions, oonoepts, the bonds of the world,
have dissolved and collapsed like a dream image, A new
emergence of the spirit is at hand* Philosophy must above all
welcome its appearance and recognise it, while others resisting it,
stick to what is past'1 (1)* 'Fe shall be discussing the notions,
oonoepts and bonds of the world which Hegel thought were
dissolved, in the course of the following chapters* The point
we are making here is that Hegel clearly thought that his own
time was a ti *e of deep orisie and violent change* Hejwae
clearly aware of the esohatologioal tensions as wall as the new
possibilities hidden within a period of widespread disintegration*
Thus, he read the all-pervasive dualisms of the reformation and
the enlightenment as symptoms of the dissolution of all familiar
frames of ilndand form of life, and ae signs that a new world 
atwas/hand. The one-sided subjectivism and objectivism of Besson 
and/
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and nature, God end the world, history and natural science, 
freedom and deter inism, was sympto letio of what divided the 
bourgeois world to breaking point, threatening it with growing 
fragmentation and disintegration* Hegel tries to 'change our 
iind* about everything we regard familiar, by taking as his 
starting-point the radioal te r orallty of man in history* we 
are not in full possession of ourselves, Hegel argues, because 
we are temporal beings* For Hegel, as for his fellow romantics, 
the world la a wilderness beoause there is no home, no stability, 
no security to be found in its relentless becoming*
Feuerbach had learned from Hegel that our ideas of God 
always correspond to our own social, cultural and political ethos* 
Our Gcd is all that we are not* mx Weber has deepened our 
understanding of the relation between the God's and our aooisl 
world in numerous studies, by showing that the God of a period 
corresponds to, or perhaps reflects, the needs and Ideals of 
dominantsooial groups* Hegel'a Geist, a conception of God
formulated in a period of traumatic upheaval, instability end 
disintegration following the French devolution and other wide­
spread social and technological change, is no exception* For
Hegel, God is the God of becoming, the only God that oan maintain
his life in the death of violent change* God is the God of the 
Wilderness, the God who is what he will be, the God who is 
always on tha way* God is who He is, not by re mining what
He is, as static and so supty identity* He is the God, who is 
who He is, only in beooiing what He is not* He is the God of the 
no iftd, of the man who lives in a desert of change, and who ounnot
put up his tentymd settle down for fear of losing his living
experience of an ever-o enging world*
For/
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For Hegel, Truth ie the Truth of *ieco *ing, not the truth of 
stable being* The truth of being, for hii, ie always partial 
truth, one-sided, exclusive of what it ie not, relative* The 
truth of becoming ie alwrystm the way, inclusive of what at first 
eight it ie not, end consequently it has never arrived* The nomad 
never arrives, and the God of the nomad ie the God of Israel even 
after the settle ent in the promised land* The prophets struggled
to keep this God alive for thsir own times their God ie the God 
who cannot be possessed, the God who eleots in freedom, the God 
who is nsver contained in any social, economic, political or 
oultio order* It was this that Hegel sought to grtep in hie idea 
of God as the Truth of the #hole* The truth of the Shole is the 
truth of becoming, open to the future, dial cticul* It is open 
to new experiences, new frames of tfind, new for ia|of life* A new
dialectical reason must take the place of old fixed dualisms, if 
we are to describe and eon unio te the God of new and disturbing 
experiences* Old frames of /mind with their familiar logical 
conventions, and old forma of life with their familiar sooial 
conventions, ust pass away, if we are not to 9go out of our i lnd9* 
For unless we forsake being for becoming, we shall become chained 
to our past and compelled to repeat* Kvery dualism from Plato 
to Fichte, and especially those of Luther, Desoartes, and Kant, 
threatens to tear men apart, according to Hegel* Fixed dualisms 
of the common understanding rend eelf from self, self from body, 
self from world, knowledge fro a reality, eplrlt from nature, end 
so on* There oan be no adequate correspondence between being and 
deed, faith and works, worac^nd action, promise and fulfilment, 
theory and practice in such ties* Lvery rule and convention, 
everything that appears necessary because it le f miliar, oist 
dissolve,/
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dissolve9 a*#® Hegel* in the death of the old world. The bonds 
of the old world have become dreads in relation to the new. tor a 
new spirit* a nesjlntegration.* is at hand. Thus* hetgel recalls* -S - %
the ancient iseosianio hope in the midst of the existing order* 
the social order* froa which both Hegel and his fellow reiimtics 
though perhaps in spite of themselves were becoming increasingly 
estranged.
There le now little doubt that Leasing1 s "qs% e^sgiaj ffomaflL11» 
and his belief that saen were entering the third Age^f the forld* 
the Age of the Spirit* profoundly influenced Hegel (1).
Kauf tann shows that Lessing9e MKduoation of the hu ian race11 
provides the starting-point of a nu ber of major theses in the 
9 hanomenolo^v of Spirit9. Hegel9e idea of phenomenology 
clearly follows Leasing* for whom* "every individual man - one 
eooner* another later* - must travel along the very same path by 
which the raoe reaches its perfection" (2). Lessing9e belief 
that we had entered the third age* the Age of St. John* was bom 
in hie enthusiastic appreciation of the eeohatological vision and 
revolt of the twelfth-oentury abbot* Joeehlm of Floria (Flore)* 
and the Franolaoan spirituals* precursors of the reformation (3,. 
"Perhaps some enthusiasts of the thirteenth end fourteenth
centuries had oeught a glim er oftthia new eternal gospel* and only
erred in that they predicted lts|arrival so near their own time ...
Perhaps their 9Three Ages of the florid9 were not so eapty a
speculation after all* and assuredly they had no bad intentions 
when they taught that the new Covenant must beoo ie as antiquated 
as the old has become" (4). But fir Lessing enlighten ent 
must/
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mat precede the Age of the holy Spirit, (the Age promised in the 
Book off . fcveletion Ch* 14 verse 6). leasing re ilnds us of the 
inscrutable way of > temal providence in seeming to go buokwerds 
so as to drive men to despair. BUT *'it is not true that the 
shortest line is always str ight", an insight Hegel mad# into a 
iiinciple of his dialectic (1; • It is well-known that both 
Fichte and dchelling spoke of their being on the tiireshold of 
the third Age, and many since the.i, such as hoseneweig, have 
sought to express thsir esohatological awareness by isuns of the 
idt;. • For Hossnzwsig, the Christian world 9post Hegel mortum* 
is identical with the Johsnnine Church (2;. Fichte had thought 
that a final regeneration of the world was about to take place in 
the fori of the lllenial kingdon of St. John, and Sohelling, 
in his 36th lecture on the philosophy of revelation, speaks of 
Peter as the Apostle of the Age of the Father, Paul of the son, 
and John of the Spirit (3). The f.rst age is that of 
Catholicism the second that of protestantise, the third a new 
order, the Age of the Holy Spirit. The Hussion iisgelien9* 
inherited this e chatologionl a arenass in their turn, and in this 
course of the nineteenth century, Kho Iakov, f.ranint»ky, 
erezhkovoky, Soloviev end others, formulated thsir understanding 
of Hegel9* Geiat with the ten sooomost. which Soloviev describes 
as the ’'synthesis of unity ttnd freedom in love'* (4)*
1. kauf uann liS/:el pg. 68.2. Altaann loid pg. 278.3. Lowithi eanlnn history pg. 2084. H. ioa.kys Hlatora o£ liuaelop hlxoaoito pga. 29-41s118 etc. For Khomiakov, Catholicism achieved unity
without freedo i, protestantis i freedom without unity.Sobornost, & ten he was the first to use, is the 
Synthesis of both.
In the thought of Berdyaev, we find many of theue ideas set in
0, position to He< el, a paradox we oowe serosa again and tigain in 
studying so-called opponents of Hegel. The liegel they attack ie 
e c riceture of tne later Hegel, a Hegel who ha^ little in oommon 
Aith the Hegel we discover in the ti neno^enolo - y9 and urlier 
works.
The point we have tried to make in this exposition of
Hegel9s use of Lessing and the esohatologioal awareness of
Joaohiu of lloria, is that for him, it is in our beco ling what
we are not, and not in our b ing what we are, that we become
spirit and achieve freedom. The life of spirit is bom not in
life but in death. This is the heart of the dialectio, Hegel's
"speculative Good Friday", of the essay on "Faith sad knowledge"
(1802), and hie "Golgotha of Absolute Spirit" of the
heno enolQKY (1807). Hegel warns us that the quantitive change
and disintegration with which we a m  familiar ie about to ieoo e
e qualitative change, like birth. "Our epoch is a time of
birth, a period of transition. Th& spirit of man has bro&en with
the old order of things hitherto prevailing and with the old ways
of thinking, and is about to let them sink into the depths of the
pest, and to set about its own transformation" (1;. as one
fragment after another of the previous world disintegrates, so the
new form of the world is bom. Hegel draw* our attention to the
eyaptoms of the gradual crumbling, - "frivolity, ennui, an
undefined foreboding of something unknown", - and he tries to
bring to view the form and structure of the new world as the dawn 
* /of a new ocuuw or Age. The point he is making is that the 
disturbing new experiences of his day were aynpto *s of the 
disintegration/
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disintegration of the old order end of old w  ye of thinking*
Consciousness must learn fx*oa new experience as well as from the
long history of past experience* Bast shapes and forms of
spirit aust pass away, fur e new world is already present in our
experienoe, known, though not yet comprehended* It ie in this
sense that the 9;hsno enology9 is Hegel#a "voyage of discovery",
hie "XtineraritUQ mentis ad deum ” (lj. Lowith calls hegsl9e
, his ambiguous conclusion end fulfilment, a "destroying
reconciliation", a final step before a great turning, and break
with Christianity. writing at a tias when "everything is in the
throes of dissolution andstruggling toward soiething new", (2)
»/Hegel9s coX«ctov is the "end of the history of the Christian 
Logos" (3* "The philosophy which perfects itself beco es the 
birthplace of the spirit, which tnen presses on to a new real 
configuration " (4).
Legel9saccount of the birth and death which nade his ti ie a 
ti e of crisis arttiaee out of what Lowith calls hie "fundamental 
estrange ent from the existing order", an estrangement he shared 
with his friend Holderlin(5> • Hegel eharee the fragmentation 
mid disintegration of the self and of the world which is at the 
heart of the Ro antic's experience. Yet, as early as September 
loOG, Hegel decided in the last sentei.ee of his Outline of a 
system that a bold "agreement with the Age” was the only way he 
could reconcile himself with reality (6,. But it was to his earl; 
estrange ent that arx, Feuerbach, Bauer and the rest of the young 
left-wing/
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left-wing Hegelians returned, and with our experience today being 
what it is, we cennot but follow then, if vie are to comprehend 
the alienation which gave rise to Hegel*a own philosophical strugjs, 
In the passage we are discussing, however, Hegel warns us 
against thinking that the new world, in which Spirit, Reason, and 
freedom, will be actual (afirklloh i, Is already actual (1). The 
new viorld is real enough but it is no tore actual than the newly- 
born baby* A building is not finished when the foundation ie 
first laid "just as little as the attainment of a general notion 
of a .hole, is the whole itself" (2,, The new world is etill in 
its initial stages, the "outcome of a widespread revolution in 
anifold forme of spiritual culture". But the "crowning glory 
of the spiritual world....” "comes after a chequered and devious 
course of development, after much struggle and effort" (3).
The new world is present "in general outline", as a "whole lying 
concealed and hidden within a bare abstraction"<4) .kauf mnn 
reminds us that elsewhere in the preface, Hegel rejects 
edification as a legitimate philosophical activity? he rejects in 
henomenolo&y what later in life he began to do. The later Hegel 
could writes "The insight to whioh philosophy should help us is 
that the actual world is as it ought to be •••• God rules the 
world; the content of his government, the execution of hie plan, 
is world history" (5). By contrast in 1793 Hegel wrote in a 
letter to Gohelling, "Let reason and freedom remain our watchword, 
and the invisible ohuroh our point of union" (6). "rhiloaophy has
goV
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got to stirt with the Unconditional • ••• the alpha ynd the omega of 
all philosophy is freedom" (1)» replied oohelling, a few days Is ter
lowith describee the .otive f^rce of Kegel*a philosophy 
as the attest to "discover end establish the aid-p^int between 
subject end object, between being oro se and per ae, between the 
internal snd the external" by mediation"* Subetenoe was to 
become subject and subject substantial" (2)* edlation transfer a 
what is bekannt. Into what is erkannt j it tr nefor e fixed 
concepts into fluid notions, filled, that is with living 
experience (3>« In this way Hegel sought to overcome alienation, 
the divorce between subject and object, which, for hi i, made en 
into a sick animal* Whether or not he thought that a subject* 
object Identity was attainable within history or at Its end, (and
his osition ehan&ee|* nu bcr of ti .es in the course of his life),
he did think that the fixed dualisms of the bourgeois intellectual 
world, whether of the German reformation, the enlightenment or 
the French revolution, could be overcome in dialectical thinking* 
Through continual negation, nothing re mains what it is; it 
becomes what it is not, and in becoming, oo-inheres with everything 
else* It ie the unification of form and content*
"Unit is contradiction in the reels of the dead, is not one 
in the realm of life", said Hegel, in his early eseay on the 
*Spirit of Christianity*(4)» Hegel** first concept of the power 
of healing integration was life; only later did he ohooae to 
use the ooncept Gcist or oplrlt* Hegel was, and remained, a 
Ho antic in his yearning for the integration of ell opposites, 
and/
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and for the reconciliation of ell contradictions. Hegel also 
employed the notion of love in his early writin^to express his
hops that reconciliation *11 be achieved. But in his notion of
spirit, with its broad inclusive reference, he sought to
integrate the split between the Spirit of God and the Spirit of
man, and he eventually decided that no other notion could do it
as well. Gelst refers to both life and death, death and
resurrection, slavery and freedom in an inclusive way, but not so
as to oonfuae opposites in & onistic 'One9. For Heist is a
dialeotioal notion, employed dialeotlcally by Hegel. Dla-lectlc.
1)1 a* leffein originally leant to speak or oolleot or explain
through division or separation; for Heraclitus, dialectic enables
us to speak about reality as totality, or the tfhole, in and
through change, in and through contradiction. For every particular
contradiction can be shown, through dialectic, to fuse with every
other, but only, according to Hegel, if dialectic is a "plastic
discourse", employing what Lukacs called "floating oonoepts1* (1).
The language of Spirit hasjalways teen, in the Christian t 
tradition, the language of the new Kulw , the Lo/gos of 
resurrected life. Spirit in the old testa ?ent was that which 
gives life, it was breath, or wind, andjonly Inter on became 
associated with the knowledge that gives life. Hegel's 
eachatalogical use of the conoepts Life and Spirit had no 
immediate connection with the biological conception of life. In
this Hegel aay be following wurthenberg pietism, especially 
J. A. Bengel and F. ctinger. oltnann points out that when 
Otlnger introduced the concept of Life into theology in his 
’i'boolOKla exldcft vitae deduct** (1765), he m e  attesting to
jake/
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a*ako t o o .a for thinking of a co .prehensive kind* His concept 
of life was not naturalistic but had an each; tologicxl 
orientation* dth it he sought to oreroo as the antithesis of 
subject>vity and objectification which prevailed in the 
echenietio world picture of the natural science of the 
^lightennentf and in the idealistic subjectivism that went with 
it* "History", he ^intalned, according to <olfcuann, "should 
not be regarded as a collection of dead facte existing outside 
aan, but should be understood us a 'stream of life9 which 
9organically9 surrounds urn" (1)* oilman* does not argue that 
iiegel necessarily owes this use of the conoept of life to the 
pietists9 but Hegel *ay have done so* In any oose, the whole 
purpose of his work see as to lie in the aae direction at this 
point*
If Spirit is the power of new life in the Judaeo-Cnris11an 
tradition* then the oonoepts of life and spirit have an undent 
association* Si dlerly, for the same tradition9 the epirit 
makes us free9 it ie liberating and rede nptive, it ore ate a e tew 
world in the death of the old9 new life In death9 freedom in 
suffering* Spirit is that which gives new life and freedom* 
it le that which breathes life and health into the dying9 the 
creation of wholeness in a broken, dislocated hurnity. It 
gathers together the frag ante of the finite and joins the a again 9 
healing till dualis is, all contradictions, and all antagonist*
Hegel9a philosphy synthesizes the romantic yearning with 
the messianic hope for the incarnation of Aoy©* f of aetmlng, of 
intelligibility* It ie not only a phenomenology of the Holy 
Spirit in the world, but is also a logic, (though not a purely 
formal/
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tonal logic*, of meaning* of o , of the Word. However*
for Hegel* Spirit ie ultimate* that le esohctologlo&l* and ie 
not therefore disclosed in in ediete experience. There ie no 
euch thing as cognition of spirit in Hegel9e philosophy* for 
Spirit ie bom in re-oo/mltlon* reflection and recollection*
For in reflection* we represent not only what we aperience in 
immediate sensory experience* but also how we experienced it*
The subjective component of the subjeot-objeot relation in all 
experience aust first co m  into view* But to reflect is not to 
leave the experience as it is. To include how we experience as 
well as what we experience into the mature philosophical self* 
awareness involves what Hegel called mediation* It is to
add the meaning of the 9how9* to the content of tlr 9what* of
immediate experienoe* in negation* In this way a new coherence* 
a new set of integral meanings and connections emerge which 
transfer i experience into the notion (Betariff). The notion is 
conceptual reconetruetion of experience*
annhei * argute that the strength of the Hegelian concept of 
Gelst or Spirit lies in it© grasp of the "social dimensions of
meaning" (1)* Originally* annhsim reminds us* Geist did not i
have its present connotation of an objectified and socialised 
set of meanings; it referred to what he calls a "gripping and 
eostatic experience whose roots go baok to early religion" (2>* 
Hegel*s Geist reflects the a.*bivalent double meaning of sooial* 
and in that sense objective meaning* and subjeotive meaning* 
the ecstatic experiences which give new life to old sooial 
noras and customs* It was in the course of the enlightenment 
that the Lutheran dualism of the freedom of faith and the 
bondage/
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bondage of all en In the old order beoame the duallem of the 
freedom of reason against mechanistic deter ini sm to natural 
forcee (1)* Spirit, in the enlighten wit becomes Reason, . ind, 
iens (2)• For this kind of rationalism, the early 1 ecstatic 
components of the terra are more and more equated with conscious 
reasoning” (3>* In the romantic reaction to rationalism, 
however, the older connotations are revived, Geist ie conceived as 
the animus of history, as a higher reasoning which involved 
contemplation, volition and action, as well os technical 
components* In Hegel9s concept of Gelst* we have a synthesis 
of the classic and the romantic view, a synthesis which included 
both the subjective, ecstatic ele e ts, and the eoclal and 
objective elements, in a new dialectical movement* Geist* for 
Hegel spans both the socially established meanings established in 
custom, logical conventions, norms of behaviour and so on, as 
well as the disturbing yet invigonratlng experiences of 
individuals which eun transform the for er* For ;&ny people, the 
use of 9total9 notions in this cnner can only lead to intolerable 
confusions* Thlngajare what they are, and not another thing* 
Logical rules are limitsj things and meanings, facts and values, 
substance end form are all distinct* This objection to Hegel9s 
dialeotic, and to his use of total notions like spirit, has been 
aade repeatedly* But it is a aisunderstending of dialeotic to 
think that it blurs distinctions, or that it ignores contradiction 
in abstract conceptualization* It servea rather to hold 
contradiction in oreatlve tension, without frag entation. It 
enables us to stay with contradiction without breaking* Zt 
prevents/
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prevents complete disintegration* For disintegration in 
perception and understanding necessarily connects with the 
disintegration of the self, andjof the sooial world*
When oo nunol values and traditional conventions radically 
disintegrate, we .nay so eti es be driven to the point where it ie 
no longer possible to distinguish reason from unreason, sanity 
from insanity, dream front reality* There may come a point 
when our power to create new values and conventions crnnot be 
held in oreative, healthy tension with the flux of new and 
disturbing experience* The balance is lost, the tension broken* 
At such a time, and our own Age ie such a tie, the boundary 
between sanity andjinsanity is lost, and a whole olviliaction 
enters a period of instability* It can become difficult to 
know when one ie dreaming and when one is awake; reality can 
seem unreal, impossible, too terrible to live* Ideally, 
perhaps, our values and conventions should be giving way to new 
onee} we would be keeping pace with our experienoe with new 
forisof life, new values and new conventions* Ideally, In the 
field of linguistic conventions also, we should be creating new 
Unguistio for s to describe and communicate fresh experienoe* 
Unless our logloal for .sjknd social conventions oan develop in 
creative tension with on-going experience, something aust break* 
What we do ought to correspond to what we are, deed with being, 
but this is not the oase* Similarly faith has become divorced 
from deed, words from actions, values from facts, pro ise from 
fulfilment*
any of us have com it ted intellectual if not .liysloal 
suicide* We abstract ourselves from living experienoe, isolating 
ourselves from what consequently appears as a cruelly contingent 
world* Hegel9s notion of Spirit ie an attempt to prevent thl8 
by/
by coming to ter s with experience in reflective organisation 
and re-organisation of experience* it is true that any have 
followed Hegelve tendenoy to relapse into an increasingly 
abstract conservatism, relinquishing his hold on living experience* 
Hegel was well aware of the pervasive and dangerous disintegration 
we have been describing, and his logic of Spirit, his 
phenomenology, and his dialectic, are tools forged by his to use 
in the task of describing and communicating an integrity within 
disintegration* Total notions are an attempt to overcome the 
insane subjectivism and objectivism which characterise the age of 
fragmentation •
any of us retire behind re-enforced barriers of class or 
persuasion, nation, colour or oreed* We desperately try to 
prevent experienoe from penetrating our ideal formations, our 
closed and formal abstractions, and our established conceptions 
of what ought to be the case* Consequently, we confuse abstract 
possibilities with real possibilities, beoause we can no longer 
tell the differenoe between fantasy and reality. We seek 
stability anywhere but in the free co amend of new experienoe, 
or in & realistic description of experiences and ao we fail to 
communicate to one another, we fall to establish new meanings in 
new social and linguistic forms* Within the old 11 tits of 
custom and language, adequate description and ao communication 
is no longer possible* Bx, erience see ;e to be too vlolentjand 
too destructive to organise* We therefore ding like children 
to old oonfigurationa, old patterns of experienoe, old logical 
conventions, old sooial forms* Hegel diagnosed our disease, 
and tried to find a remedy* If we could only live through our 
experienoe without recoillng^nd turning aside into abstraction, 
we/
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we could then recognise (a -Know) wh; t we experience (Know) 
as the truth* But we are, he said afraid of the truth (1)*
We do not ^co^urehend* what we 9know9.
Hegel recognised that we have lost the one really fundamental 
metaphysical belief in the intelligibility of things. We no 
longer feel it to be aelf-evident that our experience ie 
essentially intelligible9 nor that contradiction can be 
comprehended w~thin a broader• stronger coherence. Leaning9 or 
Aoyos , seems no longer self-evidently present in either nature 
or history. Bo our etruggle to organise experience, to describe 
it, and to con .unicute it, in order to establish meaning in our 
sooial world, is undertaken within a violent insecurity, 
upheaval and conflict. Our experienoe of beco ming ie so 
threatening that we no longer feel safe or at ho e in our 
experience. Reality e nnot be distinguished from a bad dream 
and consequently we no longer have any 9solid ground9 over which 
to build our world. Instead, our politics and our technology, 
our economics and our culture, become perverted. They become 
a flight from reality, an evasion of the truth of experience.
We oscillate between insane polarities, between subjectivism and 
objectivism, Lordship and Bondage for example, and there aeeas to 
be no way out of our despair.
Hegel shared the nostalgia of the ro antic whose w rid is 
our world of violent becoming end yet who refuses to give up 
hope. For the roi&ntio yearns and hopes to the point when 
reality either breaks his idealism, or he tuxnsjbn reality with the 
fury of revolutionary violence. But the mystic turned 
revoluti onary/
U  .3. pg. 138.
revolutionary oannot regain his lost experienoe, his lost 
reality, by struggling to realize his ideals through violence.
His idealejwere conceived in escape from reality in a kind of 
insanity; end when realised, merely reproduce the broken, 
dislocated lentality of his disease in i**»9s social world. He 
merely externalizes his sick, broken consciousness. lie may 
feel so ie relief from so doing, but the world is hot transformedCll 
Hegel eventually chose reality and not revolution; though his 
work shows the continuation of a dialeotioal, apophatlo mysticism. 
He ohose nevertheless the Prussian State, hie home; and many make
a ai ilar move today. They regard the contradictions of left*■
wing Hegelianism as stages on the way to a conservative 
reconciliation with reality. But they do not redeem what they 
lost on the way. They shrink from death, unlike those who 
follow the Way or Spirit. For Spirit does not shrink from 
death, it finds life in death, freedom in bondage, hope in 
deap&lr (2).
1. I owe this point, as well as iueh in this study to Victor 2itta9s brilliant analysis of the Hegelitinism and larxism of George Lulcaee int »Geor«e Utidcv. erxlo allenatloa. 
and revolution9 1964.
2. P.3. pg. 93.
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C H A P T E R  IX 
DIALECTICI
EXPOSITION AJK1 ANALYSIS OF HEGEL9S PREFACE TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY
OF SPIRIT•
Hegel9s Logie of Spirit is a dialeotioal toid not formal 
logic* it does not conform to the rulea and conventions of 
f rial logic* Consequently, neither the form nor the content 
of hla Logie are fa lllar to us, for the fore departs from 
establish'd convention, logical as well as empirical, and the 
content includes every kind of living experience* His Logic 
of Spirit, the uubject- atter of the * heno enolo^ &£ Spirit*, 
is a logic of hu rn experience in general* It is dialeotioal 
in form beoause its content, living experi noe, cannot be 
deaorlbed in any other way* The content of Hegel9s philosophy, 
no ely human experienoe, deter ines the form of his philosophy, 
which is a dialectical logio of spirit, just as the form 
pervades the content* The for i of his logio ie the Aoyos 
of the Christian tradition; indeed Hegel9s philosophy is a 
.etaphyslce of the Christian A©y©s# a philosophy of life, death 
and resurrection* It seeks to show how this form pervades the 
content of every living experienoe by showing hov* spontaneous, 
natural life beco :es spirit and achieves freedom through death* 
My way of the incarnation, the /Veyos of God has entered history, 
so that the task of the Christian net physician, according to 
Hsgel, is not only to speak of the Christ, but also to speak of 
the spirit, the Aoyo* hidden in en9e sooial end historical 
life, as he . roceeds towards hie , the end which defines
both the being, and the meaning of w n 9 froa the beginning*
The/
The *a&in tsak of this chapter ie to outline- the 
philosophical9 theological, sociological and psychological 
contradictions which are involved in Hegel•o Lordship-bondage 
odd, and in order to do this, w© shall have to look closely at 
so e passages which tell us what Hegsl was trying to do in his 
philosophy, and how he proposed to do it* »e confine ourselves 
in the lain to the preface of the *2heno enology of Spirit*, 
though the Introductions and Prefaces to the * >clenoe of Logio* 
and the * hilo^ophy of Right* will be relevant also*
We found in the course of the previous chapter that for 
Hegel9 Truth is not to be found in stable i>elng, but in instable 
Becoming* Like Heraclitus9 Hegel lived in an age of social 
revolution, and like Heraclitus, he began with the living ex­
perience of en In such e ti e. Hegel once clal ed that he hod 
incorporated every proposition of Heraclitus* philosophy into his 
own, rndjthere is no doubt that Rsraolltus greatly influenced 
Hegel(1)* /ore has shown us the Aristotelian foundation of 
Hegel*a thought, but little work hi^been done on hie relation to 
Heraclitus* For both Hsraolltus and Hegel, everything is in 
flux, no thine: re oins what it is, nothing stable can be relied 
upon* The only sure point in the flowing river of change, is 
the Aoyos f the co . ion easure of oil things, the coherence 
in all chenge* Heraclitus believed in the od-lnherence of 
opposites in continual becoming* For hin nothing remains what 
it is, nothing rests, nothing abidesf yet there is identity in 
and through difference, there is coherence in change* ie ah 11 
be returning to these ideas throughout this chapter, bearing in
ulnd/
1. al Jtlloayphy I pg. 279 (teens Haldane).Heraclitus the .hilosophio Idea is to be iiet with in itsspeculative fora; the reasoning of I ar senides nd Beno is
abstract understanding* Heraclitus was thus universally
esteemed a deep philosopher im, ^Here we see l#nd* there * no proposition ox fieruoXTfus which I have not aaoptecT - myLogic** •
ilnd that they c?nno^be understood apart froi the experienoe 
which gives rise to them, the experienoe of drift which 
accompanies the disintegration of stable conventions and for is 
of sooial life* Heraclitus faced the disintegration of the 
Greek tribal aristocracies, with their ancient conventions and 
well-established for is of sooial life, and the birth of 
dc ocrtcy* Hegel faced the upheavals of the French R< volution, 
together with the widespread sooial and industrial revolutions 
that were taking place in Europe in his ti ie• Fopper speaks 
of the sense of drift expressed in Heraclitus9 philosophy, and 
Ti l ion of the sense of "irretrievable drift" which followed the 
breadown of instinctive certainties and unreflected habits in the 
violent sooial changes following 1789 (1)« Both en experienced 
the collapse of at ble relationships, together with traditional 
values and conventions, and consequently both oaae to nature 
through history, rather than history through nature* Both 
experienced the divoroe between subject and object in tian9s 
scolo-historio life, an experience which le out of piece within 
the solentifio fra e of reference as traditionally understood* 
Boolal fseta^re not natural frets, for there ie a unity between 
subject and object in the case of the former which would be out of 
place in observation of natural facts. Historical and sooial 
facto are not things but deeds, they iay resemble natural facts 
in that we i&ay appear fatalistically determined by them, but 
unlike physical nature, hu an nature has a human essence, it can 
in principle regain* That essence, for Hegel, is freedom, ^ It 
is Qelst* or Spirit*
In hla '..e-sthe tic Question &£ ..ohiller had argued that
.an only akes progress toward a health or wholeness in Culture 
through/
through the "fragmentation of human nature"; for the 
"antagonist of forces is the great instrument of culture* but 
also no iore than an instru ent* For as long as it persists* 
one is only on the way to culture" (!)• That which furthers
na .ely contradiction and suffering# also cripples hi i and makes 
hi ; diseased* We recall £liot9s words 9Our only health is the 
disease* ••• to be restored* our eloknese uat grow worse9 (2)* 
dohiller9s critique of Kant9s bijuro&Uon of man into sense and 
Reason ie the first principle of Hegel9e Logio of Spirit (3)*
From Schiller* Hegel takes over the conception and terminology 
of "moments or stages of development"* which the individual 
must live through to achieve freedom of splrit(4)» And 
3ehiller98 dualism of vlifev and 'form9* which for him ought to 
give way to 9living form9* ie reflected in Hegel9a philosophy 
of the notion* of spirit as the integration of life and form*
For Schiller the opposites are sublimated* sublated ( aufgehoben:
aufheben )* that is* e&noelled or negated as opposites* and
.  </saved or preserved in a new integrated «?hole ( oXov ) or
Totality* Hegel employs this as one of the principle ideas of
hio philosophy*
In the pref . oe to the *. heno lenology ^irif. 1‘egel
argues th&tjwe should not be repelled by the contradictions which
pervade philosophy; we should not be worried by the fret that
philosophers never eeem to achieve any significant measure of
agreement* We ust "recognise In what see us conflicting and
Inherently antagonistic the presence of mutually necessary momenta
(5).For/
1. Schiller, Aesthstio 2l -fi&» which Hegsl firstread at 24* quoted Foufmattni pgs* 48ff*2* 1 0 S. Eliott Collected oema pp* 2ol-2 from East Coker*
an in his Ion, struggle toward the ie\os of his existence*
3.4*
5.
For Hegel* contradiction between philosophical viewpoints 
reflects the tensions and antagonisms in experience itself* and 
is the sign thnt philosophy has not departed fro* living 
experience* "Everything is inherently contradictory.... 
contradiction Is the root of all move -ent end vitality; it is 
only in so far as something has o contradiction within It that It 
oves* deaircajnnd sots*" (1)* argues Hegel* In the * Science of 
logic *. According to Heraclitus *’TToA€.^oi the father of 
all and King of all; for it is strife and war* antagonism and 
opposition* which constitute perpetual becojiing, uking some 
Gods and others an, so m  slaves and othera free (2). lio.er's 
wish that strife dght cease was really a prayer for the 
destruction of all things (3). For strife keeps everything 
in becoming* strife ie the one sure point In continual change* 
the place where oppoaitea gather together Into a living unity.
For Heraclitus* the strife that threatens to tear our world 
apart* disintegrating every form* convention* structure and 
rule* is also the Xoyos that gathers the opposites together* 
holding them in healthy tension without frag cnthtion. For 
Hegel* it is the Aoyos which takes wholeness* and Wholes oneness* 
possible in the Truth of the tVhole (4). For Heraclitus* War
y /  'lioXfc^.ps
( /s ) or strife* is peaoe* and it ie also just (5).
Anaximander had argued that strife ia injustice which requires
vexpiation (6,; whereas for Heraclitus* is that just
struggle/
Logic» iller translation pg. 439$ Johnstone and Struthers vol. 11 pg. 66. For Com ante aee carouses Reason and 
Revolution pg. 147.2. Heraclitus rag ent 215 of Kirk and Raven* The Ireaocratio:hiloBophere. Burnet i Stott *r. 44*
pg. 136* and 158-9.3. Burnett* i.arlv Greek Philosophy pg. 159.
4. P.S. pg. 81.5. Kirk and Raven* Ibid pg. 195 Fr. 214. Bumet Ibid pg. 16 7.
6. Kirk and Raven Ibid pg. 117
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struggle which shows that everything belongs together* It 
unites opposites by gathering them and holding the.* together, as 
well as .alnttining the struggle which keeps things in being (1). 
Heidegger rt indB us that A©y«* (legein, lego, legere) 
originally ©ant to gather, collect, glean, to put one thing with 
another, to bring together; and strife is precisely that which 
brings things together, albeit in conflict (2)* In discussing 
Lukacs’ Marxist dialectic, Zitta re indo us that dla-lectio
(I)ia-Legeln, acens to gather what ie separate, to bring together 
mtiFt is divided, to colleot together what was dissociated, 
fragmentary, and without fora or coherence (3)* For Hegel, as 
for Heraclitus, it is the unity of opposites which is real *nd 
True, tor He&lity and Truth are the «hole• Thus anything which 
continues to have an opposite, anything which can in principle be 
contradicted, cannot be the Truth of the tihole* It is in 
Wholeness alone that the health of mankind le to be found; the 
Truth of the Whole is the TtXos of the strife which maintains 
all being in booking* The Logio of Spirit is the A©y©*. 
of the Truth of the Whole*
*hen Hegel argues that "everything depends on grasping and 
expressing the ulti ate truth not t s substmce but *.a subject as 
well", C4), he says he means by this that "being is Thought"* 
Being and thought though opposites, belong together* Their 
opposition, writes ore, is constituted in their coinciding, 
that ie, in their ultimate inseparability (3)* Kaufmnnn argues 
correctly that, for Hegel, the Categories of Being and Nothing 
ere/
1* ofs Heidegger* Introduction to netaphyoloa pg* 102-118*2* Heideggert Introduction to metaphysics pg* 105 *
3* Zittai G* Lukacs Ibid pg* 200
4* P.S* pg* 80*
5. Mure: Thje Philosophy of Hegel pg, 8-9*
are the "poorest and moot abstract Categorico", and that any 
modem attempt to return to Parmenides would have seemed to him 
"utterly perverse" (1)* Thus# according to *aufnann, Heidegger's 
mystlolea ox Being is not to be 04*nfused with Hegel's Logio of 
Being and Nothing* Hegel's dialectic of being and thought# 
though terainologioally similar to Parmenidesv belief that Being 
and Thought essentially belong together, oust not be confused with 
it* For liegel argues that we must learn Truths of this sort 
by learning from the long history of human experienoe* "The 
length of the journey has to be bom with"# argues Hegel, "for 
every moment is necessary* we must halt at every stage, for 
each is iteelf a complete individual form, and is fully and 
finally considered only in so far as its determinate character is 
taken end dealt with as a rounded, oonorete whole, or only in 
so far as the £hole is looked at in the light of the Special and 
peculiar charaoter which this determination gives it" (2)*
For heidegger, on the other hand# the long history of human 
experienoe ie a "fall fro* grace" (3), end the task of philosophy 
is to forget it, and to return to the Presooratioa themselves, 
and in particular Heraolltus and Parmenides*
Propositions such as substunoe is subject, (4;, the Truth 
is the fthole (5)# Being is Thought, (for thought is being and 
being a ortegory of thought) (6), the actual le the Universal (7), 
and 'Vhat is rational is actual and what la aotual is rational'(8), 
do not for Hegel, conform to the conventions of common sense, or 
the common understanding* Hegel odls these conventions the 
conventions of dogmatism. "Dogmatism as a way of thinking, 
whether in ordinary knowledge or in the study of philos phy, is
nnthlng/________________________________________________________
6* P*3* pg* 113, alsot Hurei Philosophy of Ueisal, pg* 97* P*3* pg* 121*8* Preface to Philosophy of Right pg* 10 of knox translation
jr*©* pg* «u# 5* P.3* pg* 81* 762-3, 730-1# 801 and 803, eto*
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nothin*; else but the view that truth consists in a proposition 
which is a fi-xed and final result, or again which is directly 
known" (!,• "It is not difficult to see that the method of 
propounding a proposition, produoing reasons for it and then 
refuting its opposite by reasons too, is not the form in whioh 
Truth can appear" (2 . , The propositions quoted a ao «nt ago 
cannot be understood other than fron within the Logic of Spirit 
whioh is dialeotioal* For Hegel, opposites belong together, 
for the Aoyos holds them together, but this ocnnot be argued 
fr ra logical principles, or from the point of view of an 
isolated onad* Nor is it a i erely edifying belief (3)*
Nor can it simply be verified or falsified once and for all*
We iuat learn it fro:a experience. We root live through every 
moment or stage of the long, painful, history of human experienoe, 
regarding every moment ae a neceserry resting-place on the 
journey toward the Truth of the Whole. For every moment 
represents a valid though partial view-point in relation to the 
whole* "Every particular individual", saye Hegel, "is 
incomplete And, a concrete shape in whose existence taken as a 
whole, ons determinate characteristic predominates, while the 
others are found only in blurred outline" (4)* henomenology, 
says Hegel, is the "science of the Experience cf Consciousness", 
it is a "science of the experience through which consciousness 
passes" (5). As such Phenomenology avoids what Hsgel colls the 
"materialised/
1* F*S* pg, 992, P*3* pg, 106
3* P*3, pg, 73, 81, etc,4* P*3* pg, 89*3, P,S. pge. 96 and 144*
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"materialised thinking”, which la absorbed in matter, and 
“rclaonne ent”. (I.e. Argumentative thinking), whioh takes up 
e conceited and superior tttitue to the content, detaching 
Itself fro * all content in the fortuitous struggle to be free, 
feet Is needed, says Hegel,1s not the arbitrary freedom which 
directs the content anyhow, but the freedom "to sink Into and 
pervade the content", letting itself be directedjand controlled 
by the particular experience in question (1} • fe must abstain 
from interrupting the immanent rfayth of the loveoent of 
conoepturl thought", not because our conceptual scheme Is more 
valuable to us than living experience, but because as conceptual 
construction of living experienoe, subject taking hold of 
substence, regaining itself in Its own projects, needs, desires 
and experience, philosophical thought hue a dialectical life of 
its own which is only Interrupted by the rigid conventions of 
com on sense and the stctlo conceptualisation of the detached 
understanding. Hegsl describes the truth of living experienoe, 
the truth which Heraclitus, t>o, argued could not be expressed 
other than dialeotically. Hegel calls it "the bacchanalian
revel, where not a ember is sober.... a member no sooner 
becomes detached than it eo ipso collapses straightway". The 
revel, consisting of explosive change, relentless opposition 
and irrerist tie becoming, le in the light of the ot strife,
"just as iuoh a state of trensparent unbroken oal " (1). Tor 
Hegel, as for Heraclitus, there Is no rest from the instabilities 
end uncertainties of yevee-is or becoming: for both men, the
trau a of sociel revolution, and far-reaching change,rendered 
all things relative and provisionary. The only genuine rest, 
the only reliable Truth, is the Truth of precisely that which 
makes/
l .  r .s .  pg. 105*
.ekes rest Impossible, end every truth relative to the situ&tion 
which deter Ineo it, nc ely the trau atic experience of deep, 
though widespread social change* It io the (Truth of living 
experience, the /Voyo-sof beco .ing#
We now hrvc aone idea of Kegel•© "unity of the notion”, 
or Aoyos , in which all fixed dualisms and oppositions are 
integrated into a coherent tension, a tension strong enough to 
regain faithful to living experience without loss of self, 
and yet to re aain true to the eelf-deter ining f eedo i of self 
without losing the reality of living experience# We hove seen 
that the Aoy©s which gathers together the frag ented elements 
of our world in end through 'KoXe^os , or the war between 
opposites,transfor e all being into bee .ing, all dead 
abstraction into spontaneous life* Subst nee and subject, 
particular and universal, life *nd fora, being and thought,
Kcooon and Ileality, ict and being, though opposites, co-inhere. 
Hegel is at one with the Churoh Fathers in regarding Heraclitus9 
doctrine cf the as the philosophical precursor of the
doctrine of the Fourth Gospel 'rologue# Heidegger 
asks us to forget this identification (1)# But for Hegel, it 
io nly in "recollection” that the Truth of hu an experience 
is to be revealed, not in forgetting (2)# lor in Hecolleotion, 
we live through the necessary experience which makes us wh&t 
tve ere# without recollection, 1 .ere c-n be no unity of the Aoy©* 
notion or be. riff# The Integration of the Heraclltian end the 
F urth Gospel Aoyos doctrines has hid iaoense influence 
throughout the history of Western Civilisations e cannot 
ignore it without plaolng ourselves outside the life of 
dialeotioal thinking, by which we seek to learn from our 
experienoe#
X. Introauotlon to ^ta.jiyalce pg. 107
2. F.S. pgs. 007-8.
experienoe#
Following dchiller, Hegel argues that the individual must 
learn from the history of hu in experienoe by following the 
“path of doubt", or "highway of dee air" which reveals the 
"educational o enta of the general spirit"# (1)# This 
discloses to hi a the Truth of the Whole# To put it another 
wayt "What ie iost real is after all only the unrealised 
Notion" (2), The notion is the Truth of the Splrit^hioh la not 
yet, though even now le partially revealed in every significant 
o ent in the historical life of mankind# The individual aust 
pass through "shapes once assumed by spirit end now laid aside"
(2)# *'e learn of these past modes of experience as "information,
exercises and even pastimes for ohildren"# These bygone 
modes of existence and experienoe have become an "acquired 
possession of the general ; lnd" or spirit, "whioh constitutes 
the substance f the individual” # In Requiring the culture 
or the development of the general ind C lldun>, , the individual 
becomes a human beingt for being hu,:n consists in precisely 
this self-creation of man through the active transformation of 
the hu an su stance, whioh ie situctionally determined, into 
complete self-consciousness (4 •
We have begun to grasp what Hegel was trying to do in his 
philosophical rctivity: we now turn, for purposes of
clarification, to what he tells us quite clearly he is not doing# 
For, it is in his sad that we find his
best/
1# Ibid pg# 132f and 89, of also Kaufmsnn He* el pg# 312. 7737 pg. 136.
3* F#S# pg* 894# P#£># pg. 90#
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best philosophical polemic \ though once again# he wrrns us 
that unless we have learned frou the experienoe which each 
philosopher conceptually reconstructs 9 our philosophical work 
will be in v; in*
It le easy to pass judgements on the solid# substantial 
content# says Kegel# it ie far ore difficult to grasp it# 
and to give systematic exposition to it* en have always 
struggled to trtnaoend the ‘’unbroken immediacy of naive psychic 
life” by for ulatlng and so constructing universal principles 
and points of view* The task of philosophy is not to pass 
judgements on the # not to find reasons for them# but to live 
through the experience which gave rise to them (1 • This 
activity# Hegel calls ^issenschaft or Solence# which means for 
Hegel# a developing system of experienoe reconstructed according 
to the unity of the notion# or the ao-inherence of contradicting 
opposites in ceiqt or spirit* Hegel oalls hie Logic of Spirit 
science# and contrasts it with SchleDsraacher#s theology of 
intuitional awareness or feeling (2)# and with the philosophical 
edification which philosophers in his time were being reuired to 
produce* en were trying to restore through philosophy "that 
sense of s lldity and substantiality" they had lost in the 
violent sooial changes which followed hard on the heels of the 
French Revolution of 1789 (3)* There was a time# says Hegel# 
when ” an had a heaven# decked end filled out with an endless 
wealth of thoughts and pictures’*# to whioh he was always looking# 
instead of "dwelling in the present here end now"* How man's 
interest is so exclusively earthly# that he again see .s to 
r quire an awareness of what transcends the "mud and water of 
earthy existence"* Philosophy# for Hegel# will not meet this
K s T m T T T  
r*s* pg* 71
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need* It ie not edification (1>*
N r is philosophy to follow Sohelling in his gathering of 
everything within the compels of the Absolute Idea* For that 
is erely to oarry round on "inert abstract fowa"# into which 
anything and everything is dipped* Sehelllng's philosophy ie 
monotonous# for it works w th an abstract absolute in which all 
things are one* It is an empty knowing# "the night in which# 
as we say# all cows are black" (2>*
Hegel's wissanachaft* on the contrary# speaks of God only 
After it has first spoken of the "seriousness# the suffering# 
the patienoe and the labour of the negative" (3)* God per se 
is abstract gener lity* Only when the "entire wealth of the 
developed for," is "grasped and expressed os really actual" 
is genuine talk of God possible* Substance must be grasped 
as subject* Spinosa's conception of God as the one eubst nee# 
in which "self-consciousness was si ply sub erged and not 
preserved" (4)# uot be transformed# ao spirit knowing Itself 
as spirit# into the notion of God courscious of self in the 
whole sum stance of hu an history end experienoe* All otherness# 
objectification and reification ust be overcome* The 
alienation of eubetanoe from subject# life from form# experience 
from consciousness# thought from being# is to be overco ie in the 
integrating# healing power of dialectical Reason.
»ve recall that for Heraolituc TCoXfc^os is the father of ell 
and the King of all; strife creates becoming# strife makes soae 
Gods end others en# some slaves and others free (5)* All 
things/
1. P.S. pg* 73#
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tiling* are changing and nothing r< mains what it is C 
Xu>^»et voit (Afes»et ). ict it la precisely in the
contra dictions of beco ming that githers everything
together, the durliea of Lord and bIpvw, oonetituted in the 
ea e disintegration of everything into opposites go the 
separation of Gods fro en, la overco e in the integrating, 
heeling poser of the Aoyos, Hegel*s Logio of Spirit $ with 
his notion of dialeetlcul rceaoa, regains the self of man, 
freeing hi frcm> the external objectivity in which he was 
Imprisoned, This ie tLe philosophical background whioh gives 
riee to the dialeotic of Lord end Slave to which we hove chosen 
to give particular attention in this study. We would do well 
to bear in Jjid that Heraclitus* esnoept ITdxt^os 9 emerging 
fro 1 his struggle t co prehend his experiences of trau atio 
sooial change and dlt integration, is of first importance to 
Hegelf particularly in connection with his discussion of the 
relation of Lord and slave.
We are beginning to understand what philosophy is not9 
according to Hegsl*s dialectic of spirit. It le not 
edifloatlon, for it is not concerned to substantiate the validity 
of an intuitive awareness of an infinite God in a finite world, 
nor is it oonosmsd with preserving the divinity of G d from 
the 1 purity of contingent existence. It is not a description 
of Categories, of that without whioh our world would not be 
as it is, nor an exa JUiation of the conditions of our experience 
of the world, Philosophy is notional thinking, the mediation 
of the immediate, for God is only what he is as result, in the 
end, as the Truth of the Whole (1), Philosophy is concerned 
with the problem of meaning ( A£y&») in an age of violent 
beoo ing/
becoming (yevt«t-s). there is a sense in whioh Hegel ie 
seeking to shoe that the Cosmos, whioh appears to Heraelitue, 
and to many in Hegel*8 own time of violent sooial change, to 
be “at best like a rubbish heap scattered at random” (1), is 
in reality ordered according to a hidden A o y o r  enoompaaeing 
Notiont Begrifft which does not immediately appear* For 
her? olitus “The real constitution of things is aooustomed to 
hide itself” (2)* “If one does not expect the unexpected' one 
will not find it out” (3), for things are not as they appear*
Ti ere isf for Hegel, as for Heraclitus, a con-ectian bet..sen 
opposites whioh does not at first appear* If we do not expect 
this, we shall fall to notioe it* According to Hegel, -ant 
had noticed it in his antinomies, but failed to draw any 
adequate implication from it* Kant tells us that the antinomies 
(such as 9the world has a beginning* and 9the world has no 
beginning*) first stirred him from his dogmatic slumbers and 
drove him to the critique of reason •••••• in order to resolve
the scandal of the apparent contradiction of reason with 
itself (4)* But to Hegel, Kent was not radical enough* For, 
oontrary to what may appear, Opposition brings things together, 
or as Heraclitus put it, that whioh scatters ga triers* The 
hidden connection, for him, is stronger than the apparent one (5)* 
Heidegger argues that the A©y©s of Heraclitus means 
”colleoted presence” (6), or “permanent gathering” (7), for the 
word originally mean gather, collect, glean or read, to put 
one thing with another, to bring together(8)* For
Ua&sU.____________________________________________________________________
1* Heraclitus* Fragment of* Popper Open Society I pg* 12
and pg* 204, Note 2*2* Kirk and Haven« Ibid Fragment 211*
3* Ibid Fragment 213*4. Quote from letter to C* Carve, 21st deptember, 1798, quoted
by Topper, Coniopturea M i  gefutatlone pg. 177, note 10.5* Kirk and Haven Ibia 1 recent 210*
6. Heideggeri Introduction isfltagtoglM PS* UO.7. Ibid pg. 109
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Hegel, l>ia-Leotic Cdl: -le,:eln) ecna to grther whi t ia 
separate, to bring together what ie divided, to int grate 
what ie dissociated and fragmented. Heidegger quotes from 
Heraclituss "Opposites ove back and forth, the one to the 
other, fro out of themselves they gather the selves” (1); 
a notion of dialectic which Hegel sought to articulate on 
almost every page he wrote*
The setting apart ia also that which gathers together*
For Hegel, the Cupido do inandi of all things brings thc-.a ell 
into conflict and contradiction* hut declination of one over 
another can never last, beoause there lo always a hidden 
connection between the one and the other, & connection which 
tends toward teoo dng, a relation whioh threatens the 
stability of being, the bting of the one who dominates and the 
one who in do minated* Fur Heraclitus, the goal of the 
dialectic of whioh scatters and gathers is balance
between opposites, f.r beco ing is cyollos tShsreas for Hegel, 
the A o f  beeeaing Is the Christian A©yo* who calls a 
quailtively new spirit Into being, the logic of which can 
only be understood in on esohatologioai perspective* For 
Hegel the A©y©* which gathers In the Christ who gathers all 
en to hi ©elf in a new unity and a new free do im Heidegger's 
shepherd of being is not the shepherd that concerned Hegel, 
though Hegel woe interested to find, as any fathers of the 
Churoh were before hi , that Heraclitus had said so n.uoh which 
could illu inute the thinking of the Christian concerning the 
Ao y©s of God* Hegsl** A4y©> (Bmrriff) * too, is "collected 
presence", a "per mient gathering" through opposition*
I V
1* Ibid pg* 111
It will be .aniftet to everyone that Hegel advocates a 
view of philosophy, and of Logio, whioh io not to be easily 
accepted, for it de and a our forsaking nuoh that appeared 
self-evident. He likens the 'iheno penology' to a ladder which 
he has constructed for us, to help us achieve a way of thinking 
which io not natural to us (1), be are reminded of 
Wittgenstein*s reference to the ladder which we uot throw 
away once we have recognized his elucidating proposition 
ao nonsensical, for certain very sensible re aeons* "hereof 
one cannot speak, thereof one net be silent" (2)* Hegel's 
ladder, on the other hand, not only silences particular ways 
of speaking, but leads also to a new language and a new logio, 
the Logio of Spirit*
A few sentences later, Hegel re larks that the "natural 
consciousness", far fro a requiring a ladder, ay be attracted 
to his dialectloal Logio, "attracted by it knows not what, 
to walk for once on its head" (3)* In fta? capital (1873),
*.farx takes up this reference, and suggests that Hegel's 
dialectic did indeed proceed by walking on its headj what he 
sought to do was to set it on its feet again* ( >auf non 
remarks that did not say that he had act Kegel on his 
head (4).
Hegel then tells us that pheno enolgy le a "long and 
lab rioua journey" (3); it does not begin immediately with 
Absolute knowledge* heno enology "leads the individual from 
hie/
1* l'*3* pg* 87*2. Tpcfr tug iOiiefl.- 6, 54 * * PP. 151. of.also kauf annt Kenel Cpf* 399. and 415/ who notes that 
Sextus Eaplrlous, as well as Wittgenstein, used the laage of the ladder suggested by Jaoob's dreamt Genesis 28t 12.
3* F*S* pg* 87* Kaufaann translation of 1 refaoet j|le/^ l 
pg* 398-9.4. £euf utam ite^l pg. 401.5* iJ*S* pg* 80*
his uneducated standpoint to knowledge*' (1)* The length 
of the journey ust be endured beoause nothing ust be 
forgotten, everything it3 necessary; or in Goethe's words, 
"What fro i your fathers you received as heir, acquire if you 
would possess it" (2)* The long history of human experienoe, 
what Hegel calls eubstanoe, ust oo e to self-consciousness 
in us, the "in-itself whioh is neither raw any ore, nor 
ia ereed in existence, but something recalled, needs to be 
transmuted into the form of the for-itself" (3). Hegel colls 
this the "eutli ation of existence" (in Kauf ann's translation), 
a ode of thinking which beginning with immediate experience, 
transforms it to aooord with the unity of the Notion* What 
is known in a familiar way le not truly known* tfe think we 
know that subject end object, God and naturej the
understanding and sensibility are "fixed points of departure
and return", "valid foundations" of knowledge (4). But this 
is to be illuned by appearances* There is & hidden connection 
between them which does not appear to sense experience, 
perception or the oon on understanding, a belonging together 
of these apparently separate Categories, which con be revealed 
only when Reason beco es truly dialectical* Logic, in this
sense, is the science of the hidden c nnection.
Hegel then argues that the "Activity of differentleting", 
which le the work of the Und ere tending, is an essential toent. 
"It ie only beoause the concrete differentiates itself and 
ekes itself what ie unaotual, that it is that which aovee 
itself" (3)* Change and beoo ing would be 1 tposolble without 
strife,/
1* Kauf ann translation of Preface pg* 402 of 'Hegel'*
2* Ibid, pg. 403*3* Ibid pg. 404.4. Ibid pg* 406*3. Kaufmsnn Ibid pg* 406*
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strife, opposition, differentiation. The analysis undertaken 
tv the Understanding cannot be omitted, its work of thinking 
fixed, fa iliar and static thoughts is the source of move ent, 
the essential to ent on the way to dialectic. But for Hegel, 
"Spirit alone is the actubl1* (1), that is, it is in the 
interconnectedness or co-inherence of things that a new ration­
ality and a new Actuality comes into being. God cannot be 
spoken about i mediately, or directly for Hegel. The logic of 
Spirit is an apophrtic logic, a way of negation or "mediation" (2). 
The unoctual, which Hegel chooses to call death, is that which ia 
fixed in a rigid stability of being what it is, and not so ethina 
ele. Whereas the Actual is that which is liberated from being 
wii? t it is. The Actual is Jpirit which does not shrink from 
deetii but looks it in the face, preserving itself in death, and 
le thus boro to a new beco ing (ya^ec-Ls) (3). la&ediaey is for 
Hegel, Abstract. In an essay entitled “Who thinks abstractly ", 
Hegel argues that “this Is abstract thinking: To see nothing in the
urderer except the abstract fact that he ia a .urderer, and to 
annul all other hu an essence in hi * with this simple quality"(4). 
The Understanding thinks abstractly and to that extent is 
uneducated. people naturally think in ter e of fixed deter inatiaoe 
but they are blind to lived reality. The JUialectioion, on the 
other hand, " lakes fixed thoughts fluid" (5). He sees the hlduen 
connection which relates one fixed determination to another, he 
sees it in living experience. A an cannot oe 11 ited to any one 
of hia deter Unations, he is a continual unrest, a continual 
becoming. Only the dialectician whose thinking is also a 
beco in^ . can understand this (6). Kant works within a fixed
distinction/-----------------------------------------------------
1. r.S. pg. 86.
2* ^bic pg. 823. kf'ux ifian translation Ibid pg. 406-8
distinction between Reason and Inclination; Hegel seeks to 
transcend this bifurcation of :an in describing the Actuality of 
tan in a dialectical thinking infused with spirit*' •
In an analysis of for** of consciousness and truth, Hegel 
argues that at the level of i mediate consciousness, subject and 
object are fixed in a relation of separation* This sept ration 
is on the one hand that whioh keeps experience fresh end alive, 
and on the other hand th&t whioh tends to become fixed in one 
deter in&tion or another* False knowledge is, for Hegel, an 
inadequate relation of c rrespondenoe between subject and object, 
but it is not on that account irrelevant to phenomenology, the 
'‘eoience of the experience of Consciousness" (1)* For error 
is an essential o -exit in knowing* Truth and falsity osjnnot be 
polarised into fixed opposites if we are to be true to our 
experience* «'e know fro a experience that the true and the fclse 
belong together* Usually, the true and the filse are considered 
to be “determina te thoughts •••• i .motile separate essences, as * 
if one stood here and the other there, without community, fixed end 
isolated' (2)* The trouble lies in philosophy's having considered 
-aa thematic el knowledge the ideal whioh philosophy should try to 
imitate* <ve have already noticed that for Hegel no philosophical 
truth can be expressed in the fixed fora of a proposition (3).
1 hilosophicrl truths are not, on the other hand, like the 
“accidental and arbitrary" truths of history (4)* -Philosophy's 
concern is w;th the actual; and the i mobile, empty, lifeless 
propositions of *ethe atios, and the accidental and arbitrary 
propositions of history are unable t grasp the Actual (!>;*
Error/
1* ibid pg* 412 of* Baillie translation pg* 96*2* Buf ann translation pg* 414* ?*3*3* of* Baillie translation pg* 99* *•••
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Error is an essential :0 »ent on the way to philosophical truth, 
it ia not ao for other disciplines. *e reust not forget our 
errors; we aust re ember the i and learn fro i thei. The error 
which divorces us fro a living experience cannot be bypassed; 
because we learn froa it what is true. Error divides and 
separates; Truth gathers together what we have learned through 
division and separation. Hegel is conscious that what he ie 
saying may sound "boastful or revolutionary"; he assures us 
that his "tone is altogether different" (1). He ia concerned 
to criticise formalism, all external for ts of knowledge, beoause 
they h^ve "lost hold of the living nature of concrete fact". In 
the a ' we have u erely dry bones with flesh and blood all gone" (2). 
Hegel is ooncemed that philosophy is not deprived of life end 
spirit (3).
Kegel puts his view clearly when he argues that a schematizing 
formalism" alwayc looks over the whole snd stands above the 
individual existence of which it speaks, i.e. it merely overlooks 
it " •••• "instead of entering into the immanent content of the 
material" (4). Parmenides• doctrine that thinking and being 
belong together is for Hegel the heart of his own undertaking.
If thinking io abstracted from being, it is formal, empty and 
lift less; end if being is divorced fro^ thinking (that is 
dialectical thinking,, it cannot be comprehended at all (3 •
True Philosophical knowing "is not that which handles its content 
as so ethine strung* , .... it is not th^t idealise that replaced 
the dog etis * of assertions with e dogmatism of assurances or a 
dog i&tisa of self-cert* inty" (6, • The Cunning of hea&on (hie 
list der Vemunft oonsiots in itfj/appeoring to abstain from 
activity/
1. ibid pg. 426
2. Baillie translation pg. 110. Ibid
3. Kauf ann ibid pg. 4324. Kauf aim I old pg. 4345. Ibid pg. 434 also baillie translation pg. 113.6. Eauf 21 nn Ibid pg. 434.
activity whilst the strife between opposites in living experience 
continues9 but in reality b* ing the hidden power ebs rbed, though 
hidden, in every living contradiction. "Reivsonableness’', says 
Hegel "is a beco dug, end as such* becoming, it is rationality." (1). 
Genuine oi^enBchaft, or science in Hegel's sense, lives through 
the inner necessity of every mount of experienoe, its tom ie not 
its own, but that of the content, living experience. In this way, 
the fixed dualism of life and fora can beco it a 'living fori*, the 
content is liberated fro i alienation end restored in its rightful 
place. Life is rsg ined, repossessed by the subject from whioh It 
had beco it divorced. Experience is given a new integrated and 
coherent A 6y©s or meaning. .tau stance has beco me bubject. With 
this the ladder of pheno ecology o n be U  ken away, for the new 
language, th? t of a Logic of spirit, has been found.
To those aoousto ed t argumentative thinking, rather than 
the thinking that co prehends (Das Berrelfende Senkan > • the Logic 
of Spirit, or of the unity of the Notion, will appear as an 
interruption (2). To fornalis ., also, the conorete actuality of 
Hegel's Notion will appear as a loos of freedom. To the !io..antio, 
for whom so e kind of intuitional awareness is the only way to 
Truth, it will appear over-dialectical, for he seeks truth in 
i aediacy, not by way of ediation. Hegel gives special attention, 
however, to /rgu entetive thinking (das :>asonnieren .^ The letter 
is "never in the *aatter but always beyond it", says Hegel. "It 
i magines that with its olei i of emptiness it is always ore 
advanced than contentful insight". "In the thinking that 
comprehends , on the other hind, "the negative" - th**t is 
distinction/
1. Kauf ;&nn Ibid pg. 4362. Kauf .ann translation pg. 440. Ibid.
49.
distinction, identity* contradiction etc. - ''belong to the 
content itself" (1). The negative ia in this sense a positive 
tent, the only way to the Truth of the Vhole.
Hegel gives as an example of the 'thinking which co prehends*,. 
a dialectical analysis of the proposition "God is being". The 
relation between subject and predicate in a proposition understood
■ :^v': tSdialeotically is not that of conventional thinking, nrgu tentative 
or otherwise. Hegel argues thr t there ie a connection between 
subject end predicate whioh does not at first appear. The real 
constitution of things, for Hegel, aa for Heraclitus, nor ally’ i* \ ? M V
hides itoelf. If one does not expect the unexpected, ne will otiss 
it altogether. Vhat appears as static being is in reality 
beco in • There is ove ent, in the dialectical proposition, 
between the subject and the predicate. "In this iove .ent, the 
resting subject perishes" (2). Subject and predicate are not 
fixed; nothing is fixed, everything becomes what it is apparently 
not. The subject " oves into the predicate and has thus been
eubli iated", (negated and rest red in e new form • (3) Thus,
"the n ture of the judg ent or proposition which involves 
distinction between subject and predicate, is destroyed by the 
speculative proposition1 (4 • In this floating of subject into 
predicate, there ie a unification of the one and the other.
Neither regains alien ted fro* the other. They ere integrated,
ade whole; and in the wholeness, the unity of the notion is 
c nstitutec.
The subject of the proposition *God is being9, is God, tiie 
predicate is being. Hegel argues that the predicate is really 
the/
1. Ibid pg. 440-2.2. Kauf’-Aftim Ibid pg. 442.
3. Ibid pg. 444*4. Ibid pg. 444.
the substance of the subject, though this does not immediately 
appear, and never will appear unless we learn to expect it to 
become ao. The purpose of phenomenology is to help ue to expect 
what would otherwise remain hidden. »‘e can substantiate the 
proposition: * God is being9 only if we can conceivejthe predicate,
being, as the substance of the subject, God, The proposition la 
true only if what appears is not in reality the case. "God 
ceases to be the firm subject, in spite of hie position in the 
sentence. •• the subject gets lost and thinking feels Inhibited, 
and missing the subject is thrown back to the thought of the 
subject"• Thinking, thus, "finds the subject in the predioate, 
and instead of attaining in the predicate the free position to 
argue, it ia still absorbed in the content - or at least the 
demand is present that it ought to be so absorbed" (1).
We are beginning to see the way a dialeotioal logic 
understands propositions, for in the interest of life and meaning, 
it sees the predicate not as something alien to the subject, but 
as that suLject9s very substance. or subject becoaes substance, 
and substance becomes subject. In the sense o ’ yevtcrLS or 
becoming, substance *& subject, and subject substance.
Similarly, when Hegel argues that the "Actual la the 
Universal", "the actual as subject vanishes into the predicate"(2). 
The Universal expresses the essence of the Actual, and "thus 
thinking loses the firm objective ground it had in the subject 
whenever the predioate throws it back to the subject, eo that in 
the predicate it returns not to Itself but to the subject of the 
oontent" (3). In other words the subject does not remain 
withdrawn and detached from what it ie (its subutanoe); it9a 
self/
1. Xaufmann Ibla pg, 446,jbid pg, 446, B&lllle pg, 121,
5. +hld pg, 446,
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•elf ia present in its action in a way that tiie conventional 
understanding of propositions cannot allow for* The subject can 
be relied upon to be fully present in and through what it ia, 
in and through ita actuality; it ia not to be found elsewhere, 
as though it ware afraid of entering into what it is* -ha 
subject is in this sense worthy of our trust, it is true to 
itself, it ia in full possession of itself in its substantial 
actuality* It is what it is, not in static, or abstract identity 
with itself, but in its Act* It is s dependable unity*
Subject is itself in its substance, it is self-conscious, self­
integrated, true, in the sense of trust-worthy* it is true not 
in a formal sense, but true in and through its existential, 
experiential content, its actuality* -it is true to itself, 
in becoming what it is apparently not* Substanoe ia subject in 
becoming, end aut stance is subject in becoming* Becoming need 
not destroy integrity, it need not destroy our trust, it need 
not make truth impossible* Indeed, the only trustworthy truth 
is the truth of becoming* This can be understood, says Hegel, 
only if we can overcome ourselves, and an ter into the living, 
ever-changing content, there to find, through dialeotioal thinking, 
the contrary to what at first appeared* There can be a
dependable Integrity, a truth worthy of all our truat, in the
apparent instability and insecurity and relativity of Becoming*
Only a really flexible, plastic dialectical logio can disclose
this to our thought and comprehension (1)*
The relation between eubjeot and predicate in the case of a 
philosophical proposition la not, than, according to Hagel, that 
of other kinds of proposition* It ie the content of the 
philosophical proposition, not any arbitrary choice of form, whioh 
makes philosophical method dialeotioal* A philosophical work
sasi----------------------------------- -- ------ --------------------------
1, P.3. (Balllle trans) pg* 122*
nay appear unintelligible, or at any rate, difficult reading; 
but, says Hegel, one must learn "that what one supposed, was not 
what one ie supposed to suppoee" (1). Uhdialectlcal, argumenta­
tive thinking has its legitimate place, as long as we do not 
confuse it with dlalectio* For in Hegel9e philosophy, "the 
dialectical movement of the proposition itself" takes the plaos 
of what "proof was onoe supposed to accomplish" (2). dialeotic 
is not proof* dialectic gathers together whet appeared separate 
by disoloslng the co-inherence of substance and subject. On 
the one hand it appears to stand aside, observing the connectedness 
of things from afar* lut it is cunning* For in truth, it is 
Itself that becoming whioh gathers together everything, both 
opposing and opposed* Reason works through the irrational,
Truth through untruth, life through death; this is the hidden 
ooni-eotlon whioh is far stronger than the apparent ones (3)*
Hegel does not pretend to prove his claims to us; he will try 
to show us what maybe we had missed before* For we do not 
always heed what we hear, nor do we always notice what ws see*
» ■ * * • »■>. ' * -y
Our language, too, misleads us* For instance, it would bs 
better, says Hegel, not to use the word God, if by that we 
Intend to refer by proper name to a fixed subject which is at 
rest* For that would be to confine God to some fixed 
determination, a static, abstract being, who is not himself in 
the Act of his beooming* Ho one determination defines the One 
true God, for God is infinite* God can be relied upon in his 
infinity only beoause as sum, He remains in full possession of 
Himself* Ho finite determination threatens Him, for He Is God* 
As/
1* kaufmann translation Ibid pg* 446*2. Ibid pg* 448*
3* oft Heraclituss kirk and Haven Hr* 210 pg* 193 in the
ireaocrntlc -UUojoph«f
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As God, we oen trust Ilia, beer.use He Is always present in his Aot, 
in his becoming what at first He appeared not to be* His 
subjectivity io not imprisoned in his substantiality, it is free 
and alive in it* It is not lost in his Actuality, whether as 
man, or as genuine human community, for bhe Actual is opirlt 
just as the Spirit is Actual* God is the Universal, but Ks 
does not lose this, or become alienated from it, in his 
particularity as ths Aoy«s u.ade flesh dwelling among men*
Where the common understanding breaks down, dialeotioal 
comprehension must begin its work.
Argumentative thinking ia not the only eerious hindrance 
to genuine phllospphloal activity* Hegel assures us* "Ths 
study of philosophy is obstructed no lees by a conceit that does 
not deign to argue", but judges and condemns on ths basis of 
well-established truths (1)* "Philosophy is often considered a 
merely formal knowledge, void of content, and the ineight ie 
sadly lacking that whatever content of knowledge or science is 
truth does not deserve this name unless it has been produced by 
philosophy" (2)* Without philosophy, no discipline can "contain 
life, spirit, or truth" (3).
hegel acorns the unsduoated, who claim the "immediate 
revelation of the divine" to.be Absolute, exclusive Truth* For 
him, the olaim to immediate revelation is abstract, beoause the 
one who makes it oould not make it without abstracting himself 
from the long and laborious history of human experieneeC4>* He 
is abstract because he has withdrawn himself from, or forgotten, 
or failed to notioe, "the seriousness, the suffering, the 
patience/
1* Kauf&snn Ibid pg* 450* Baillie pg* 124*2* keufmann tbtd pg. 4503* Kaufmann Ibid pg* 4524* Aaufmann Ibid pg* 452
patience and the labour of the negative" (!)•
Similarly, Hegel acorns the way "healthy common sense has 
never troubled or educated itself" (2)* "Flowing along in the 
calmer bed of healthy common sense, natural philosophising 
entertains uu with a rhetoric of trivial trutha" (5)* The 
truths of healthy common sense can be found in the catechian, 
or in popular proverbs* "It is not difficult", says Hegsl 
"to show how indeterminate and vague, or how misleading, such 
truths are, or to show to consciousness how it contains 
diametrically opposite trutha (4)* On the other hand, "those 
who invoke feeling ae their internal oracle are finished with 
anyone who does not agree" (5)* They trample under foot the 
roots of humuiity, according to Hegel, for it ia tiie nature of 
humanity to struggle for agreement with others* It is 
community which constitutes the humanity of man, only the animal 
regains bound to the level of feeling which admits of no 
adequate communication at all* Genuine philosophy, however, ie 
that educated thinking whioh has learned, from experience, that 
things are not what immediately they seem; for mediation alone, 
the way of negation and dialectical gathering together again, 
it alone con disclose the hidden truth of living experienoe* 
Without it, we fail to heed what we hear, to notioe what we #
see, to remember what we have experienced, to comprehend what we 
know* For when all the facts are known, the task of philosophy 
in comprehending them, has not even begun* "The Owl of 
Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk" (6)* 
Hegel/
1* haillic translation Ibid pg* 01 2* Kaufmann Ibid pg* 452*3# Ibid pg* 452*4. Ibid pg* 452.5. Ibid pg* 454.
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tie* el is aware, then, that hie view of philosophy and of the 
nature of truth differs quite radically from the conventional 
views, and from the views of other philosophers, logicians, 
social theorists and theologians (1). he tells us that in his 
time, "general participation in the life of the spirit "has been 
greatly strengthened", and what the aotivity ^ of any one 
Individual in tills becoming oon only be small. I he individual 
should in one sense "try to forget himself", for this reason (3)* 
His freedom is best spent in his immersing himself in the living 
content of the experienoe of hie time, in an attempt to eduoate 
himself toward that integrated self-possession which alon,e 
liberates him from alienation. "Whatever happens, every 
individual is a child of his time; so, too, philosophy is its 
own time apprehended in thoughts" (4).
ft might summarise the formulation of a dialeotioal logic 
of Spirit that we have teen diaouselng, in Hegel's o.«n words 
as followsz "What we have to do with here is philosophical 
'science*, and in such science content is essentially bound up 
with fora" (5). Form is usually considered to be "something 
external and indifferent" to content} for even the philosophloal 
understanding distinguishes formal from factual questions in such 
a way that the living unity of conceptual description and living 
experience in the notion is shattered. Hegel seeks to ovsroome 
the alienation which results from a false objectification and 
subjectlfloatlon of oonoepts, Indeed the ~reko& of dialeotioal 
reason is the integration of form and content in the 'living form* 
of/
1. i auffeann Ibid pg. 456.2. Ibid pg. J W3. Ibid pr. 458
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of the notion* hotiomxl thinking ie Hegel 'c attempt to take 
account of the ftet that, in Eliotf» words,
"There ie, it seems to us,At best, only a limited valueIn the knowledge derived from experience*The knowledge impose0 a pattern and falsifies,
For the pattern ie new in every moment And every moment ie a new and shocking 
Valuation of all we have been (1).
For Kegel, dialeotioal thinking begins with living experienoe,
but is aware that even when all the facta are known, there ie
still much whioh has not been comprehended* For the conventional
forms of knowledge are not adequate to the content, living
experience can never be exhaustively described* Form must
renou.ee its rigid shapes and enter Into living experienoe, for
unless form is adequate to content it imposes a pattern and
falsifies* Kew experienoe threatens all that we are and have
become, unless our becoming can remain unshackled to rigid formal
schemes of knowledge and organisations of past experience* For
every new moment calls us in question, life challenges our
established conventions of rationality and meaning* If we
divorce form from content, meaning from life, then the alienation
of the one from the dther, .an from himself, ensues* Whet we
need, according to Hegel, ia a new Logic, a new gathering
together of life and meaning, content and form, which will prevent
them tearing apart* We must negate what we know to remain alive
to experienoe in the thinking which eoaprchends* Spirit ie a
new frame of mind, a new form of life, a new language* The
Logio of Spirit is Hegel's atteapt to find an adequate way of
comprehending man's temporality, his historicity, his becoming*
an io never in full possession of himself, he ie always in some
measure/
1. Eliot Collected Poems pg. 199 (East Coker).
measure out of his mind, or beside hiieelf, in that hie 
spontaneous living experience tol forever transcends the 
descriptive fora, or configurations of meaning that he gives to 
experience* i:e ia olwa s ahead of himself, always on the way, 
forever struggling to catch up with himself, Hegel's philosophy 
is an attempt to face up to the traumatic sooial revolution 
whioh was beginning to sweep over Western Europe after 1789; it 
is an atteapt to grapple with ths problem of asanlng ( A©y©* ) 
in an Age of violent becoming ( yevewis).
The search for a method which has absorbed the time and 
effort of numerous philosophers in the Age of becoming, is the 
search for that which prevents disintegration, for a wholeness 
and Wholesomeness of form, meaning, evaluation and language.
For without it, we shall be condemned to remain outside our 
experienoe, withdrawn from our incarnate life and world, unable 
to enter into our own action and becoming, we must enter the 
oontradiotione of experienoe, despite our fear of the
irrationality and incoherence whioh appears to prevail in it.
We cannot afford to divorce form from content, how we know from 
what we know, how we perceive from what we perceive, unless
alienation le to be acoepted, and complete ontological
dislocation be allowed to distort the meaning of all things, 
Hegel, like Freud, sought to make the unconscious conscious, 
in order to break out of our oompulslon to repeat. He sought 
to overcome the form that was inadequate to its content, the 
meaning which falls to correspond to life. He sought to bring 
the unconscious to consciousness by showing to us how our 
partial, inadequate, insecure, rigid frames of mind, and tho 
claims to abeolute end exclusive truth whioh accord with them, 
cannot/
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cannot comprehend our experience* Hegelfe unconscious, however,
is the long, painful, laborious history of human experience 
which makes us that we ere, and which else, though we arc not 
conscious of it, threaten# to prevent us from entering freely 
Into our becoming* I an is a aiok animal, according to Hsgel*
The struggles of history are the struggles of man in searoh of 
himself* He seeks to find himself in every vain abstract 
determination, una are of the hidden yearning for his original 
cohesion, unity, health and meaning, whioh should have been his 
inheritance*
The language of Hegel9s dialeotic is neither purely formal 
nor simply factual, it is both performative and descriptive, 
evaluative and critiOf.il, but cannot be confined to any one class 
of game, or games, as we now conventionally distinguish them* 
Dialectic is a language-game In one sense, namely, It has Its 
own logical rules, one of which le that logic must not be dlvoroed 
from living experienoe if thinking is to be wholesome, - capable 
that is, of comprehending the truth of the Whole* Life and 
meaning belong together, however muoh they tend apart* The 
mala purpose of the * ijtenoaenQloCT °1 Satttt* *• to uhow us that 
these is a living connection between thought and being which 
cannot be broken if philosophy is to think life, spirit and truth* 
Hyppolite is ;uite right to argue in hie bookt "Geneae et
etruoture do ia g & m m a A s i F M  is is U946), 
that phenomenology and logio are complementary. For Hegel, 
logical rules are social conventions, conventions whioh are 
sltuatlonally constituted at different periods of man9s social 
history* Logical convention appears necessary beoause it is 
deeply/
deeply learned social practice • It ia a fora of life* a way
of being in the world f a way of ordering reality in coherent 
fora* To Hegel, logio ought to be the servant of philosophy, 
beoause aa "scepticism directed to the *vhole compass of 
phenomenal oouaciouaneo" philosophy oust evaluate oritioally 
every Inherited logical fora, every established sooial praotioe, 
if it ie to be Qualified to test what truth ie " (1), Hegel*e 
argument is that if there ie one rule whioh genuine philosophy 
cannot afford to break, it is that form and content oaxmot be 
divoroed: they belong together*
»ve have deliberately confined our attention to the younger
H.gcl, ia particular the hagcl of the ben<m«nology or opirtt". 
in this chapter, ae throughout this study* But in ease British 
scholars, who are accustomed to eee Hegel only as he presented 
himself in his mature works, feel ae Walsh does that "something 
le lost by playing down hie mature philosophy" * beoause the 
paradoxical character of Hegel's philosophical entrepriee as a 
whole oennot then be brought out (2), we conclude this chapter 
with a brief consideration of the Logic (1812*16)*
"The fonas of thought are, in the first instance", says 
Hegel, "displayed and stored In human language"* "Into all 
that he (man; makes hie own, language has penetrated, and 
everything that he has transformed into language and expressed in 
it contains a category •••• so much so that logic le his natural 
element, Indeed his own particular nature" (3)* normally, we 
separate form end content, in that we attend to content whilst we 
are/
1* P.3. (Baillie) pg* 136*
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are unconscious of the fret that entegorial forme "have ue in
their possession" (1)* Hegel seeks to make the unconscious
conscious, that is, to become aware of what we Instinctively Ao
when we use language* "The broad distinction between the
instinctive act and the intelligent and free act is that the
latter is performed with an awareness of what le being done (2)*
"When thinking ic&n instinctive activity, spirit is enmeshed
in the bonds of its categories end is broken up into an
infinitely varied material" (3)* Spirit must come to know not
only the relation of "What it is in itself to what it ie
actually, but the relation of what it knows itself to be to what
it actually is" (4)* Beoause "Truth ie the declared object and
aim of logle" (5), thinking whioh seeks to understand by
distinguishing form from content, and by employing the principles
of identity and contradiction, cannot be truly logical, despite
all appearances to the contrary* Such thinking has its
appropriate plaoe, Hegel never tires of reminding ue* But it
"cannot serve higher, for example, religious truth", because
generally speaking it is concerned only with "the correctness of
the knowledge of facts, not with truth itself" (6)* Thus Hegel
comes to his main point i "The inadequacy of thie way of
regarding thought, whioh leaves truth on one side, oan only be
made good by including in our conception of thought not only that
which is usually reckoned ae belonging to the external form, but
the content ae well"* For, "the content in itqhwn aelf
possesses form, in faot it is through form that it has soul and
meaning"* "With thie introduction of the content into the
logical/
1*2*
3.4*5.6*
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logical treatment, the subject-matter ie not things but there 
import, the Hotlon of them" (1). The notion, argues Hegel, 
ie the "logos, the reason of that which le, the truth of what 
we call things; it is least of all the 1of;o3 which should be 
left outside the science of logic" (2)* *e have already seen thd 
ti ers le no doubt that for Hegel, word was made fleah, logic le 
inoaznate, meaning cannot be divorced from experience, how we 
know from what we know* Genuine philosophical truth le not 
formal, nor le the be griff, the Aoyos divorced from life* It 
ie in the broadest sense empirical, and at the same time, 
universal. Logic must be a "plastic discourse", demanding e 
"plastic receptivity and understanding on the part of the 
listener" (3>* For if we are to comprehend what appears to ue 
in living experienoe, we must remain flexible and sensitive to 
what appears, to content* Hegel confirms, here, what he had 
maintained in the iarcXaoe to hie '.henoaenolog/* namely that 
being and thought belong together, fora and content are a 
living unity* ohllst faleh is oorreot to say t at for Hegel, 
"Existence took precedence over essence"; that "opposition 
and reconciliation instead of applying pri arily to the 
abstractions of Logio, were for him vividly experienced features 
of actual situations" (4)# it would be misleading if we were not 
also to say that for him, content has form, it accords with the 
Aoyos . Thie may not Immediately appear, and it was as far 
from obvious in Hegel's own day as in ours* It must be shown. 
Thie is the task of Logic* Being and thought belong together, 
that la, they ought to be comprehended ae a living, ever-changing,
tona-Ao/___________________________________________
1* Ibid pge* 38*92* ihid pg. 39*3* ifeH pg* 40 of alao P*S* pg* 1224. falah Ibid pg. 353 ( m i .  Quarterly Vol. 31953).
dynamic unity* Hegel la not an Idealist9 if by that it ie 
oeont that, for him, being ie absorbed by thought* nor ie he 
on empircist, if by that it ie meant that-thought oust slavishly 
follow being* Esther, being and thought oo-inherei they belong 
together* ihus "it ie quite inept to eay that logio abstracts 
from all content, that it teaches only the rulee of thinking 
without any reference to what ia thought” (1)* For when logical 
dofini lions” are taken ae fixed de terminations and consequently 
in their separation from each other, and not ae held together in 
an organic unity, then they are dead forme, and the spirit whioh 
ie their living, concrete unity does not dwell in them •••••
But logical reason itself le the substantial or real being which 
holds together within iteelf every abstract determination, and 
ie their substantial, absolutely concrete unity” (2)* The 
”dead bones of logio” oust be given life by spirit, and ao 
”become possessed of a substantial significant content” (3)*
But in case these extended quotations, designed to support our 
view of Hegelfs Logio of Spirit, appear conclusive, we retain 
the enormous ambiguity of aegel98 thinking, when we reaembor that 
only five pages later, ho writess "The eyatea of Logio ie the 
realm of shadows, the world of simple essentialities freed from 
all eeneuoue oonoretenses" (4)* elly le surely sensitive to 
thie insurmountable ambiguity in Hegel when he wrotet "Ko 
single slant on Hegel ie the truth about Hegel” (5)* Or ae 
Berth observedt "From page to page Hegel doea in foot wrest from 
ue the possibility to compromise for ourselves e tranquil picture 
of/
1* Lo/flo ?£• 44 Loftic Pg* 46
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of hie views* With him we are only 
again, and anyone who thinks he sees 
quantities and relationships, is not 
ie seeking to show us" (1),
to look, end look again end 
stable points and lines, 
in faot seeing what Hegel
X. Karl Barth! Froa IS. ■vVtfftMi PS. 283
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C K A P T h R III 
THE INTEGRATION OF SUBSTANCE AND SUBJECT. LIFE ABO kEANIBO IN
3ELF^C0.*£CI0US SPxHIT.
Self-oonooiousneso* according to Hagai's use of the term* 
emerges in the event of our coming to know the long history of 
human experience which has made us who we are, in suoh a way 
that experienoe beoor.es our experienoe 9 consciously integrated 
by ue into a coherent Vhole or Totality ( oho* )0 The 
of philosophy was* for Hegel9 the ^x^tov of human history# 
the Truth of the ♦hole. Cod the holy Spirit* Ae philosophy 
of history* hegel9s philosophy thinks through the long9 painful 
history of human experience, end it ie only in thie active 
thinking that history becomes actual and rational* Hegel'a 
dialeotioal Reason begins with experience 9 and in thinking 
through the history of human experience 9 achieves a new freedom 
from that history, a freedom for new historical activity*
Reason ie negative Action whose t£ao* is freedom* Thus9 Hegel 
seeks to overooue the dielooation whioh has taken piece between 
life end meaning* The world and God have been tom asunder* 
Living experience has become devoid of Aoyos 9 meaning9 or 
intelligibility* i en have withdrawn in a multitude of ways 
from the disturbing, overwhelming beooming of new experienoe* 
withdrawn into some mode of being or other* in order to find 
stability and rest* Hegel tries to describe the relation 
between these various ways of being in the world ae ways of 
being conscious of living experienoe* modes or forme of 
ooneciouaneae which have achieved a more or less* though usually
less* adequate knowledge of living experienoe*
Life end meaning are severed in that each mode of being in and 
conscious of living experienoe has settled down to be what it ie* 
and not somethine else* Each rests in the false certainties 
which derive from their claim to the absolute and exclusive truth 
of their position* According to Hegel* the severance of life and 
meaning oan be overcome only by way of negation and dialeotic*
For Truth oan be achieved only in our becoming what we are not* 
only* that is* in our refusing to eettle down to be what we are* 
and not something else* Truth is in Beoomlng* not static* 
stable Being* Only that Being whioh is Becoming con be on the 
way toward the New Being whioh is spirit* The dangerous flux 
of living experienoe is not self-evidently Intelligible* for Hegel* 
as we have already argued CD* keening oan be found in living 
experienoe only in death to what ie* and continual rebirth* 
continual birth* change end becoming* Life and meaning* the 
world and A6yos are integrated* according to Hegel* only in the 
dialectic of ronsf or^ation•
We have seen that as genuine human community* Geiat or Spirit 
is* for Hsgel* theTeVo* of philosophy and the esx^^of history* 
But slnoe the concept self-oonsoiousness spans both man's 
individual and sooial Becoming* the one in indissoluble relation 
to the other* it le also the goal of eaoh individual's personal 
striving* thinking* working and hoping* This goal* tiiat of 
self-integration and personal wholeness* involves a correlation 
between subject and objeot whioh oannot be determined by ue a 
priori* beoause formal determination of meaning apart from life 
necessarily/
1* Immediate certainties* but not intelligibility (l*e* notthe rationality* actuality* and the universality of spirit)* 
are possible at this level of immediate living experienoe*
necessarily biases the oonorete content, which is living 
experience* ®e cannot formally define the neoning of either 
individual or social »holeneeu9 integrity, or health# Truth 
le essentially iieoult, A©yo* appears gradually in its becoming*
y fIt is the truth of the «hole only in the end9 (the eoX^Tc>^  
in whioh all our struggles to achieve it are finally oonsuoaated)* 
That means9 or ought to mean, not yet* Hegel ia ambiguous on 
this point* Did Hegel ever believe we had achieved the truth 
of the Whole even now? I am unable to answer this question, 
not beoause it oan be shirked, or beoause it lies beyond the 
agenda of this study, but because there is evidence that Uegel 
refused to make up his mind on this uestion* He refused for 
some Important reasons* $e shall continually return to them* 
later in life, Hegel said many things whioh encouraged the 
caricature whioh is still, to this day, the Hegel of most 
histories of philosophy* Well end i&ox have each argued tiiat 
Hegel is not the apologist of the Prussian 3tate and muftoonn 
has refuted Popper9s shallow accusations (1)* * al d* re arks
in oonueotian with Popper9 s chr.pter on Hegel in his 90nsn 
Sooiety ila Smlsa' (2): "01 this laswntabl* porforaanoe, 
whioh mars an otherwise serious book, the less said the better" 
(3)* We shall return to ?opper9s critique of Hegel later (4)«
We stress, here, that our reading of Hegel leads us to tiie 
conclusion that his position remains ambiguous, an ambiguity 
whioh ie due to the nature of dialeotic* For on ths one hand, 
Hegel wishes to argue that dialectic aust take the place of every 
other/
other philosophical method by learning from each one of then*
The long, laborious history of human attitudes, and philosophical 
anewero to the question of the meaning of human experience, 
culminates, saye Hegel, in that philosophy whioh learns from 
them all* That philosophy, Hegel9s own philosophy, is 
dialeotioal in that it gathers all perspectives together, and 
shows how there io a hidden corr ection between even the moat 
contradictory* Opposing attitudes inter-relate, and beoause 
they inter-relate they ooalesoe, although thie does not 
immediately appear to be the case* rhenonenology, argues 
Kojeve, transforms immediate certainties into truth, and truth 
for Hegel conslets in the adequate correspondence between the 
rational and the actual in apirit* Thus, his philosophy 
appears to begin with an absolute claim* On the other hand, 
the aim of dialeotic is freedom and truth, involving a genuinely 
new openness to fresh, living experience* Indeed, without 
dialectic, with its "flexible”, "plastic discourse" and "floating 
notions", the indeterminacy or continual becoming oan never be 
adequately described or comprehended*
Hegel*s philosophy is an atteapt to oall in question every 
premature, static, conventional common-sense truth, and thie 
entails the relativization of every claim to absolute truth*
Hegel appears to be putting an end to every form of absolutism, 
or exoluaiviam, on the basis of one final absolute truth ololm, 
namely, that the A*yos cannot be owpaetoended except 
dlaloetioally, according to the Logie of Spirit* For Hegel, 
the truth of experienoe is hidden at the level of immediate 
experienoeg it ia only In recollection that Gelst is dioolosed, 
and this only in the integration of all opposition and 
oontradlotion*/
oontradiotion. The ambiguity lime somewhere here*
We have argued elsewhere that for Hegel, philosophy arises 
only when meaning becomes divorced from life, and life from 
meaning, when becoming threatens to destroy the static Logics 
of Being whioh we formulate in tines of stability, security 
and rest* True philosophy is dialeotioal, aooording to Hegel* 
For when life ia severed from meaning, and becomes alien to man, 
external to him, objectified} meaning beoomes empty and lifeless* 
It becomes formal, devoid of faot* The separation of form and 
foot is a sign that meaning (Aoyo*) ie divorced from life, from 
becoming ( y£v/e<r»s} from the oontediction "whioh is the root of 
all movement and vitality" Cl)» Phenomenology ie the ladder 
which leads beyond the silencing of diseased tallc, with its 
fixed, rigid dualisms, to a new language, a languageof lotions 
in which fora and icx faot, meaning and life, language and living 
experienoe are integrated* For Hegel, as for Heraclitus, 
strife is just, oontradiotion necessary, because it is only 
through it that a living integration is at all possible*
For strife and struggle ensure that nothing retrains what it ie, 
that everything le becoming what it le not, and this ie how 
things ought to be, (it le just and right) (2)* 1 an is
alienated from himself when life is divorced from meaning, fact
whsnfrom form, /vrobstanoe has taken on en estranged, alien, external 
existence divorced from subject* ft) an oazxnot regain himself 
until he recognizes, and eventually comprehends, what is hidden 
to him, what does not immediately appear, namely, that there is 
a connection between substance end subject, fact and form, 
life/
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life and meaning, whioh he had conventionally understood to 
he opposites* To regain himself, man must gather what had 
been scattered, he must join together what had separated, he 
must redeem his alien self from alienation* Only then oan man 
actually become what he potentially is*
For Hegel, phenomenology negates established reality in 
order that man9a potentiality, (what he essentially is and 
ought to be), can become actual, in order that what he happens 
to be con become rational, that existence might become essence* 
ian neede the education whioh only a dialeotioal phenomenology 
oan give him, beoause he no longer knows who he is* He acts, 
but is not present in his action* He speaks, but he is unable 
to mean what he says* He oannot understand his own action, 
for he oannot do what he wants, and does tiie very thing he does 
not want to do (1)* He oan will what is right but he oannot 
do it (2)* lie is not himself, nor can he become himself, 
however much he wills to be himself* He is 9beside himself9, 
•out of his mind9, alienated, estranged from his essence, 
(namely, what he ought to be)* Hegel argues that when man 
is in this oondition, being and thought, knowledge and truth, 
no longer belong together; they are divorced and fall apart* 
They no longer interact, or coalesce, or interweave* : on is 
unaware of what he ia, unconscious of whet he truly desires*
He claims that his knowledge exhausts what is the oa^e, and 
that his claims to truth are well founded* Hut Hegel seeks to 
show him that his certainties are not well founded, that the 
way things are hides itself* There is a connection between the 
half-truths/
Houans Hb.
2. Kid tlS*
half-truths we erroneously claim to be The Truth, a con eotion
which gathers all things together, contrary to what appeared to
be the case. The way thingsjseem is not the way things are,
consciousness has no adequate correspondence with reality.
It is a great mistake to thin* that we oan reduoe thie problem,
the problem of man, of alienation and bondage, to a problem
concerning what is or is not the case. For even if all tiie foots
were known, which they are not, we would still not necessarily
comprehend what we know, notice what we see, heed what we hear,
recognize what we experienoe. Substance has become severed from
subject, though we are unaware that this is the case. Indeed,
only at the end le man what he is in truth. For example,
although all men are equal (essentially), there has never been a
time when they have been equal. There have always been lords
and slaves. Thus, we should really say, substance has always
been alienated from subject, though this will not always be the
oaae. For man is, essentially, what he is not, in foot; he
is essentially self-consciousness (eelbotbewuastsein). self-
assured, free in his integrated self-possession, present witn
a whole mind in every thought, word and deed. For him to
become what he essentially ia, but is not in fact, man must
become aware of himself in his otherness; auatanoe must
become eubjeot (1). That is to say, what is implioit (in-
itselfy must become explicit (for-itself)t what was hidden is
to be revealed, 9e must learn to expect the unexpeoted, and
to learn this requires a long educational development, both
individual and social, psychological and historloal. Self-
other ia the opposition which defines both the psychologloal
(internal) dimension of the problem of man, and the historical 
l external J
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72.
(external) dimension of the problem of man. For Hegel, 
psychology and history belong together? the interaction or 
interplay between them Is the condition of creative beooming, 
their separation the condition of alienation. The problem 
of aelbetbewusstsein is both psyehologlo&l and historical, it 
is the problem of disclosure, of the disclosure of the long 
history of human experience, the history whioh has made us what 
we are (both as individual men and in our sooial being,, the 
history we normally fail to integrate with our conscious 
rationality and tsohnioal mastery of nature as raw material. 
Disclosure is necessarily a “path of doubt'*, a "highway of 
despair*(1), for if we are to come to expect the unexpected (2), 
we must die to our conventional understanding, that a new 
thinking and a new language be bom in us. "That which is 
confined to a life of nature is unable of Itself to go beyond 
its immediate existence", but we are not so confined, says 
hegsl (3>• Our goal is the point "where knowledge is no
longer compelled to go beyond itself, wi.ere it finds ito own 
self, and the notion corresponds to the objeot, and the object 
to the notion" (4>. Hegel argues that to achieve this, 
consciousness must be wrenched out of its natural setting of 
alienation, an alienation with which it la rarely anything but 
at ease and at home. Hegel calls this a death, the violence 
of whioh may result in consciousness struggling to preserve 
its life from truth et any cost.
The moment in the life of spirit regaining possession
of/
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of itself in every word, thought and deed, to whioh we give 
special attention in thie work, le the opposition of Lord and 
slave. With the help of this model, Hegel is able to foous 
upon man9a sooial and psyohologioal life and the point when hie 
natural oonsolousness becomes self-oonsoiousness. Kelly argues 
perceptively that Hegel was struggling to comprehend a paradox 
whioh threatened to fragment the reality of human being. The 
paradox whioh we shall look at in detail later, is that the 
Greeks in Antiquity had genuinely sought to understand man's 
self-enalave.aent, his alienation, yet sanctioned slavery as 
the very basis of their society? and the enlightenment, though 
it attacked slavery in its social forms in sooiety, forgot 
the spiritual dimension of man's eelf-estrcngemsnt (1). Hegel's 
dialectic ie hie attempt to bring theee two dimensions together. 
By means of it, he tries to Integrate the internal and the 
external, the psyohologioal and the hletorioal aspects of man's 
alienation. This la the oonorete result of his Logic of 
Spirit, in which formal and factual questions interact, in 
which life and meaning are an interwoven unity, in which form 
and content are not dlvoreed.
Hegel believed that the traumatic social disturbances of 
his day, and in particular the growing self-awareness of men 
through ths German Reformation and the Enlightenment, culminating 
in the French Revolution of 1789, were signs that the spirit 
was at hand, that subject was entering into suistrnoe, that men 
was at the point of regaining himself. The Age of dlsintegratla 
was right, just, and neosssary, in that through his experienoe 
of such s time, men oan beoome aware of the truth about himself. 
He/
1. G. A. Kellys Notes on Hegel's Lordship end Bondages
iiudLtx ai 1965-6 pg. 794.
He le a divided, unhappy ooneciousnese, alienated from himself, 
bifurcated, truncated, severed, split. The ssverence of life 
from meaning threatens to make man's experience unintelligible, 
unless he is abls to regain a living tension between them, a 
genuine coincicientla opposltorua. Hegel's philosophy of 
identity, so-called, is precisely this struggle to bring opposites 
together, so that their strife oan regain a healthy tension, 
capable of creative becoming* It is the attempt to dlsoloss 
the hidden connection which holds things together, despite all 
appearance to the oontrary* For dialeotic is designed to 
show us that the way things seem is not the way things are.
Dualietic opposites, in spite of what appears, interconnect as 
moments of becoming. There is hope, legitimate hope, that in 
the end, (at the the dualisms which sever man from
himself and condemn him to alienation and despair, will become 
momenta of a redemptive becoming. Hegel's probelm was that of 
formulating a logio oapable of comprehending the contrary to 
what we ordinarily know, of noticing the oontrary to what we 
are taught to see and of heeding the oontrary to shat we 
normally hear. For truth is in beoomlng, in dying and being 
bora again? not in being.
Before we begin our exposition and orltioal discussion of 
ch. IY of Hegel'8 'phenomenology p{ Spirit', the chapter on 
aelf-eonsolousnese, we shall try to show how what was said in 
ths previous chapter concerning the living unity of form and 
content relates to our own particular problem, the problem of 
life and ae fining.
We sow, in that chapter, that the notional thinking of 
Hegel's dialectic, ia not abstract. Notions are form and 
eontent/
content united according to the logical conventions of a Logio 
of life, or of spirit. The notion of something is something 
thought in a particular way, it include® our living experience 
of the thing in such a way that its being (what it is^  is not 
divorced from how it is known. The way a thing appears, 
its form, species, or eSeoc , oannot be separated from
what it is, for a living thought cannot, for lisgel, remain fixed 
in a rigid form of conceptual expression if it is to be sensitive 
to, and capable of describing and communicating how a thing is 
experienced as well as what is experienced. Kroner tells us 
that Hegel's Logio "deviates from all former conceptions and 
schemes of logic: it moves. Thought is mads mobile. Indeed,
it is always mobile as long as it is living thought, and not a 
dead classification of terms. A stable Universe, a changeless 
definition, a fixed proposition, can never grasp the truth.
For truth is a living truth. The new logic which penetrates 
into the innermost mystery of Life must be a living fluid 
logio" (1). Word must become flesh if it is to be living word, 
the Word of spirit* The Logos incarnate ie Hegel's metaphysical
7/starting point, the beginning because it is the e*x«tTos/, whioh 
le the meaning of all that comes between. Only in this word 
made flesh is the cleavage between subject and object whioh 
results in the alienation of man, integrated. The goal of the 
dialectic is indeed the dissolution of alien objeotivity in 
the subject-object identity? but thie is easily misunderstood. 
Identity, here, does not mean a monistic confusion or abeorbtion 
of one in the other, but a living interaction, or interplay, or 
mutuality/
1. Kroner: Introduction on Hegel's ihllosophioal
development in 'L&rla: P«* *>•
mutuality between them* Hegel's subject-object identity le 
not to be confused with certain forms of mysticism, though it oan 
be related, if we ao wish, to the "limitless narcissism" which 
Freud believed to be one of the principle aims of the human 
spirit (!)• What Legal sought was freedom of spirit, whioh 
he correctly associated with social and personal integrity, 
and thi Rental Is a community of self and environment whioh is 
anologoua to the community of self and environment experienced 
by the child in the womb or at its mother's breast*
The passages we shall study from the 'Phenomenology' are 
through and through dialeotioal* Kora and content are treated 
as aspeota of an integral becoming, the truth of whioh is not 
disclosed until the final chapters, in which the opposition of 
inner and outer, psychological and historical, in trasubj active 
and lntersubjectivc, are overcome in a living connection, or 
conjunction, which holds them together* In chapters VII and 
VIII of the 'Phenomenology' * the content, the living history of 
human experienoe, is no longer at odds with the form, the 
self-beooalng of spirit* The 'Phenomenology' ie a series of 
eonceptual expressions of the experienoe of alienation, of 
being alok, dia-eased, unhappy andjwithout hope; and its fora is 
the therapeutic, redemptive becoming whioh discloses the way of 
healing and of liberation from within the alienation of each 
moment in the development* This philosophy of history is not 
a detached philosophical reflection on history, but history 
transformed (mediated), by way of the experienoe of consciousness, 
into philosophy* Thus, philosophy discloses the irrationality 
of/
1* of* Norman ^rownt Life against Death pgs* 45-6*
of historical realities in the course of its negative way, by 
showing that only the aotual, (namely the actualization of 
men's potentialities for reasonableness, goodness, freedom 
and justice), is rational, although the irrational, reality is 
not to be forgotten on that account* The Irrational is, 
after all, one of the 'moments* through whioh we must pass to 
achieve actuality, and rationality* Error is a moment of 
truth (D*
The faota with which we shall be dealing in this work are 
real enough, though Hegel will be treating them as moments, 
as that which appears, - not as the truth, the actual or spirit* 
This is not because he is some sort of abstract idealist, if by 
that it is meant that he attempts to deduce the world from 
* certain formal principles of pure thought* It is because we 
do not immediately recognise in immediate cognition, what we 
learn through experienoe; namely, that there is a co-inherenoe 
of subject and object in every experienoe, which ia not apparent 
when we are Immersed in experience* The foots with which we 
shall be dealing are psychological, historical and social faota, 
not natural facts; they are deeds not things* : raxia* not 
observation, is constitutive of their fora and content*
Substance may appear to be fatalistically determined by laws 
beyond the control of man, and this is indeed the oase* It is 
'real* enough* But appearance is deceptive, for the substance 
which is to become subject, in the course of the phenoraenologioal 
disclosure, is the human substance* Human substance, unlike 
natural substance, has in principle, an eaaenoe to regain* 
we oan only speak of alienation in the oase of human nature, 
not/
not of physical nature*
This point is similar to that made by George Lukaos, who 
argued that i arx shared Hegel*s coherenoe theory of truth and 
knowledge, which Engels, who extends the use of dialeotic to 
nature did not* The latter relies on a correspondence theory 
of knowledge and upon an epiatomologioal realism, and this makes 
nonsense of the dialeotic. Zltta writes that, for Luktics, 
"Engel's attempt to apply the dialectic to nature was a serious 
mistake vhloh led to its neglect beoause the subject could not 
be identical with the object, theory could not unite with 
practice; •••• The correspondence or reflection theory of
knowledge had to be admitted which accepts the exletenoe of an 
objective world t at is different from and Independent of the 
subject" (1)* Lukacs criticizes the subjeet-objeot dichotomy 
which ie definitive in all thinking dominated by bourgeois 
objectification, and he rejects the model of observer or 
experimenter, who is artificially abstracted from the objeot, 
whioh thus appears subject to external determination like a 
meohanlsm, as the model for all eplatemology (2)* Ungels had 
argued that experiment is practice oapable of penetrating the 
thing-in-itaelf* To Lukaos the experiment le pure contemplation
in which the subject is "juxtaj>oeed to, rather than united with, 
the Object" (3)* Engels confuses the thing-for-us with the 
thlng^for-ltself, says Lukaos* To Hsgel, the opposite of the 
thing-in-itself 1b not the thing-for-us but the thing-f or-i toelf• 
It ie in the thing-for-itsolf that subject and objeot unite and 
praotloe/
1* Zltta: George Lukaos: Harxisa, Alienation, Dialectics
and Revolution pg* 123*2* Zltta: Ibid pg* 135*3* Zitta Ibid pg* 156*
practice comes to its true self* "The objeot one thinks of",
says l.uk£cs, "is simultaneously the consciousness of the objeot
about itself" (1)* Por Kegel, every thing'-in-ltaelf is a
thing-for-us, in any case* To relate this discussion to our
ooncern with Hegel, we nuot recognise, aooording to lukaos,
that dialectic is not applicable to nature, but only to
"socio-hiatorio reality" (Dilthey'a term) (2), which means that
the substance whioh he speaks of as becoming subjcot, is aocio-
hlstorlc, not that of physical nature as we observe it as natural
scientists. It is man in alienation. To say, therefore, ae
Hegel does, that substanoe must become subject (3) is to say
that man's human substance must become subject. In other
words, what man is in-hirnself - whioh we, the philosophers,
oan know (4), must Itself beoome conscious of itself; what it
Is Implicitly, must become explicitly what It is for-iteelf.
The unoonsolous must become oonsolous. .that man la in hlaself
as substance divorced from his hidden eaaanee or potentiality la
real enough, but man la not yet aotual* To become actual, he
rnuat be what he is for himself, fully manifest to himself in
assured self-awareness, or In other words, subject at horns in,
and In full possession of, his human substanos. He must have
aohleved ths unity of self with self whioh is what Hegsl means,
as we shall see in a moment, by aelf-ooitsoiousness. Thus,
only on condition that notions like alienation and dleleotlo
are used of socio-hiatorio reality, and not of external nature,
oan ws understand expressions like the following: "The object
one thinks of, is simultaneously ths oonaolousnsse of ths objeot
about itself* (5)#
It/
T.— zTt~a- jg i4' pgT 15 Z--------------------------------
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It would follow, If Luk&os is right, that we must be careful 
to olarify the context in whioh we intend to apeak dialeotically. 
It would follow that .© are confining dialeotic to certain areas 
of experienoe, namely the social, historical and psychological; 
and that if wo bring to these areas, or to the dialectic, an 
alien epiatemology, we shall fall to understand the kind of 
language being used. If, for instance, a materialist or 
empirioist who rejected on principle the coherence theory of 
truth, and subscribed to the correspondence theory along, 
came to study the Lord—slave dialeotic, it follows that he 
could hardly fail to misunderstand it. We shall bear this in 
mind in what follows.
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C H A P T E R  X?
SELP-INTEQRATXOtf 
PART It SHL?-ca*3CIQUSNESS
"Hegel*s philosophy» in itsjdeepest intuitions, seems to 
have been a philosophy of time* And consequently a humanistic 
philosophy, And deatIte the effort to Join tims to eternity, 
or more exactly, thanks to the Boehmlan notion of nontemporal 
evolution to introduce time within eternity and eternity within 
time" (1). So writes Xoyrc, who initiated the lecture oourse 
on Hegel at the 'hcole pratique dee haute a Etudes* in 1931# 
the course whioh Xojeve took over in 1933, and oontlnued until 
1939* * oyre had grasped that for Hegel, the problem of Aoy*s
(meaning; in time, and in history, cannot be comprehended unless 
temporality, * freln,-ln-tlac * is understood as leoomlng, as a 
being and not-being fused together in life* hojeve formulates 
the A on/os of interoonr.ee ted oonoepts whioh ere integrated in 
Hegel*e conception or notion of Gelat (epirit), the all- 
encompassing, ao follows t work and Struggle » Freedom • Tine « 
history • Tranoolenoe • Hothing ■ Man, an, says hojeve, is 
mortal, finite, free, historic individualM (2), koyre extracts 
a marginal note from Hegel*s Jena lectures of 1603*4 that sayst 
*Gelot 1st £elt* (3)« helly remarks: "on this frail reed the
splendid theory rests"(4), beoause for Kelly, Gelst le not i£ll. 
because Uelet exceeds the acre censure of man end is the unifying 
spirit/________________________________________________________
! •  A. Koyre a  is m  Pg; 455 cf Kellyi Idoallan.olltlco ciioHTatory pg. 513.2. Kojdvei Introduction 5 la leoture de ♦. cf Kelly
Ibid pg, 513# 
?• A H U M  DQ& Hlatory pg. 5144, Ibid pg, 314,
8 irit that links bln with the objective movement of the eternal" 
(!)• Kelly quotes he&elt "Only the natural is subjected to 
time, in so far aa it ie finite| but the true, the Idea* Ueiat 
la eternal. • The Concept of etemality must not, however, be 
taken negatively aa the abatraction from time ao that it would 
exist outside of it, ee eoially not in the sense that eternity 
would cone after timet that would make eternity into a future, 
a moment in time" (2). ue continue this debate, as we do every 
debate between differing interpreters of Kegel, by directing our 
discussion to what Kegel himself said.
Our task, in this chapter, ia to understand what Hegel meant 
by the term aelbatbewusatsein (conscious self-awareness), in order 
that our exposition and discussion of the relation between self and 
other oan be seen in Its true light. have dieoussed thie in
general terms already. tie have discovered that to become self- 
conscious, in Hegel's sense, is to have achieved self-integration 
through conscious comprehension of living experienoe, and this 
enoompaaaing comprehension is a new Wholeness end >hole a oneness.
In immediate experience, we see, touch, hear and emails we
perceive end understand what we perceive. But we do not
comprehend. fe are the slavee of our oategorlal schemas by 
whioh we understand, we are in bondage to our perspectives, our 
conventional attitudes, our so-called logioal rules. Ve make 
premature olaims to absolute truth on the basis of the relativity 
of our personal, or social, or cultural standpoints. For Hegel, 
truth is a task requiring an integrated comprehension of our 
experienoe (Yemunft thinking the he^riff). Ae must be willing 
to apply the effort of comprehension (44, Anetrragung & £  lie, ril’fa)
H L __________________________________________________________________________
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if we are to achieve a resolution of the contradict lotus of the 
understanding, or to heal the brokennesa of men, eplit by the 
divisive dual isos of their consciousness. Self-consciousness is 
the goal of philosophical comprehension, and we will achieve it 
only in the struggle to encompass all opposites. For opposites, 
says Hegel, interoon ect in their conflict; they interconnect,
In spite of what appears, as momenta of becoming. This hidden 
interconnection oooura, according to Hegsl, precisely at the 
point where we would least ezpeot it, namely at the point where 
opposite a conflict, That thie ie not immediately apparent,
le obvious, Ve neither experienoe thie, nor perceive it, nor 
understand it, Thie ie the argument of chapters 1 to 3 of ths 
•iliaasaBBfllaat'* But, in the eomrgmnoe o eelf-oonoolouaneae, 
it is disclosed to those who are willing to make the effort to 
comprehend* Hegel’o \i££aa£fiBfllaffl' 1® lmdder he designed 
to help ue to do so (1), To comprehend may seem like walking 
on our head (2), but that is the price to be paid. It is the 
price of healing, "To be restored our eiokneea must grow worse"
Unlike ths dimension of consciousness, in which men achieve 
the apparent certainties of sense - experienoe, perception and
self-consciouaneso is the threshold of the encompassing integration 
of ths knowing subjeot and ths known objeot and consequently, 
what is known and how it is known, the fact and the way it appears« 
Self-consciousness rlono is the truth of these attitudes", says 
Hegsl, although "it is not yet so for ths consciousness Immersed 
in the experienoe" (4), Or in other words, "with self-conscious-
(3).
understanding (ohe, 1, 2, and 3 respectively), the dimension of
2, Ibid, pg, 67*
3, T, S, Eliott4, P,3, pg, 212, fr&g.t Sanaa 1V re* 202
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self-consciousness, we have now passed into the native land of 
truth, into the kingdom where it is at home" (1)*
The Truth, for Hegel, ie God ae spirit, « «  ecauac God is 
neither subject nor objeot, knower nor known, but that whioh 
encompasses both and integrates them* Self•consciousness ae
"consciousness of self in its otherness" (2), is the promised land, 
the end of the long journey through the wilderness of human 
experience. The truth of eense-experience, perception end 
understanding, the truth which ie hidden in the life of 
Immediacy, ie thati "Consciousness of a thing ie only possible 
for a self-consciousness" (3)* Unless we learn to expeot the 
unexpected, we would never notice it, or find it out (4). With 
the emergence of self-consciouaaesa", mere certainty vanishes 
in favour of the truth" (3)*
Consciousness distinguishes other from self, self- 
oonsoiousness brings what is distinguished together again (6),
For self-consciousness being •in-itself* and fbeing-for-anotherf 
are the sai*, for the in-itself ie in thie oase consciousness (7)* 
The modes of consciousness described as eense-experienoe, 
perception and understanding are now gathered together as 
"moments of self-oonsclousnesa", (0) and the activity of 
gathering what had been separated (whish is, as we have seen, 
the purpose of the dialeotioal method) is oailed, by Hegel,
"the return out of otherness" (9)*
 to/._________________________________________________________
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In oase we mistake Hegel9s conception of self-oonsoiousness 
for a "motionless tautology, Ego is Ego, 2 am X", Hegel tells 
us that unless self-consciousness has the "shape of being, it ia 
not self-oonsoiousneaa" (2)# Was arx right to accuse Hegel*s 
account of the genesis of self-oonsoiousness of being "merely 
formal", because "human nature Itself is treated as merely 
abstract, thinking nature, as self-consciousness?"^). This 
is a very difficult question to answer. il&rx thought there was 
an "uncritical positivism and incritic&l idealism" implicit 
in the *Phanoftenology of hoirlt* . like a gem, "a potentiality 
and a secret" (3). heoause Hegel9s conception is "formal 
and abstract" according to -arx", the annulment of alienation 
becomes a confirmation of alienation" (4). But Hegel9s abstract­
ness is as ambiguous as his refusal to depart from experienoe.
He does not say that the otherness of the objeot ie an illusion 
or unreal| for "otherness io a fact, it does exist as a 
distinct moment" (5). If his conception of self-consoiousnese 
were re porously idealist, he would surely have argued that the 
apparent externality of the object was an illusion and 
alienation unreal. He could then have overcome alienation by 
right thinking. But Hegel did not choose to do this. He 
emphatically retains every 9moment9 of his dialeotioal encompass­
ing as distinct, reel, and unforgettable. The moment of 
consciousness in whioh the alienation of subject and objeot ia 
a fact ia not obliterated, it is retained. But the second 
moment,/
1. Ibid pg. 219#2. EcQRp-qg ♦hiloaoiihioftl .^anuacrlpta 1844 pg. 214 3t Ibid pg. 201.ibid pg. 214
5. P.S. pg. 220.
moment, in which subject end object ore Integrated in self- 
consciousness, ie shown to encompaee the first, for it ie the 
truth of the first. Hegel oalle tiie fomer appearance and the 
1? tter truth9 not beoause the former is unreal and the latter real, 
but because the former le real and the letter actual. The 
former is irrationally unable to fulfil its potentialities (it 
is existence divorced from essence)9 the latter le rational in 
that it is the fulfilment of all potentialities9 (existence united 
with essenoe) (1). «e shall have to return to this distinction 
between the real and the actual in a moment.
Marx thought that Hegel was correct to conceive "labour ae 
man's act of self creation (2). Hegel believed9 as we have seen, 
that the truth of men's relation to what he does and has done9 is 
that the product of man*a labour appears as an external faot; it 
is in truth a deed. It appears in alienation aaa thing, but the 
truth of the natter is oontrary to what appears to be the oase.
The thing ia a thing donef it is human substance from whioh the 
human subject ia absent. Such facts are deeds. A hidden unity 
of subject and object distinguishes them from things. The 
philosopher, for Buarx, is "an abstract form of alienated man, 
who seta himself up ae the measure of the alienated world" (3).
For Hegel the philosopher ie ths one who lets the oat out of the 
beg. He deliberately leaves the oave9 he shows the fly the way 
out of the bottle (4)* He discloses the truth whioh hides 
itself, the truth we were not aware of when our pre-occupation 
was with knowledge rather than with comprehending what we knew 
but/
1. P.S. pg. 220.2. ^oonoal.0^ d  phlloaoi/Uloal aianuacrl.ta pg. 213.
4! of Plato: Republic; Wittgonotoini ifrlloaopfalcalIiivestlgattona.
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but had not grasped*
Georg Uikaoa conception of eelbatbemiaetweln. ooneoioua 
aelf-&>vareneca, or the self-possesoed presence of the subject in 
his actuality, ay prove helpful in clarifying; what Hegel meant 
by the oonoeption. we give an extended quotation from Lukaos9 
work 9TAktik» ea hthika9 1919 (1).
"The concept of eolf-oonsciousness has first appeared and 
been olarified in classical German Philosophy* It elgnlfies 
that a pec if io oase of knowledge when the knowing subject and the 
knom objeot are in essence identical, when therefore, knowledge 
cornea from within and not from without* (The simplest example 
of thie ie man9a ethical self-awareness, his sense of 
responsibility for example, in the fact of hie oonsoientiousnesa, 
in contrast to knowledge of natural science, where the known 
objeot, despite complete knowledge of it, remains for ever alien 
to the knowing subject). The primary significance of self* 
oonsoiouaneso ooncusta in the faot that a mere acquisition of 
this knowledge brings about a significant change in the known 
subject; that tendency, which has still operated in It previously, 
become more forceful, stronger, than it was before, in 
oonsequenee of this knowledge without whioh it oould not be* But 
it also signifies that in this manner every differenoe between 
subject and objeot oeasee, and in oonsequenoe of thie, the 
differenoe between theory and practice also oe&ses* Theory 
without losing a thing from its purity* its objectivity and truth, 
transforms itself into praotioe* Insofar ae knowledge is the 
self-co sciouaneas/
1* oft Zitta Georg lukaos Ibid pg* 177
self~oonociouaneoa of the knovm objeot, it gives greater force 
and certitude to the lawful development of the objeot than it 
would be possible without it”.
When we reflect upon oognitlon in the face of en exterior 
world, the world of physloal entitles, material objects, or things 
in general, there is no sense in speaking of the need to unite 
eubjeet and object* Hegel9s dialectical thinking, the reasoning 
which aohievce s oonoeption or notion (Begriff) of living 
experienoe, is a method of comprehension which encompasses both 
subject and object in the living truth of the whole* £e have 
argued in previous chapters for an interpretation of Dlalectio 
which sees it as the kind of thinking which gathere together what 
it seta apart, Integra tee what it diesociates, and reconciles 
what it differentiates* what appears at the level of sense 
experienoe, perception and understanding is revealed to be 
untrue at the level of the Kotion (Begriff;, for only in the all* 
encompassing comprhenslveneee of the Notion, or living, integrated 
oonoeption, is th* truth of what is the oase adequately 
comprehended. It does not, of oourse, follow that what appears 
is illusion, or that our senses deceive us all the time* Hegel 
is no conventional idealist* Like Heraolitus, Hegel will neither 
depart from experienoe nor evade the task of comprehending what we 
experience* Heraolitus tells us that "the things of whioh there 1 
seeing and hearing and perception, these do I prefer", (1), and 
Hegel that "oonsoiousness knows and comprehends nothing but what 
falls within its experienoe" (2)* Findley calls this "ths 
inelimlaabl# element of smplrleism in Hegel9s philosophy" (3) j 
no philosopher, except possibly Aristotle has produced thought 
with a trifle of Hegel9s empirical richness" (4)* Appearance 
is not illusion, for Hegel, nor ie the external world unreal*
86.
adequate, We do not ooaprehend the truth, indeed our fondness 
for premature clalas to absolute truth, and to the general 
validity of our oategorlal schemas or explanatory hypotheses, 
gravely hinder any comprehension of TEE Truth* Thus in thie 
connection Heraolitus can also say that we must "expect the 
unexpected" (1), namely that "the way things really are hides 
itself", that "the unapparent connection is stronger than the 
apparent one" (2). For oontrary to what is apparently the case, 
it is opposition that brings things together (3), oontradiotion 
reconciles, that ehloh scatters gathers, Ho a ***<>* and Aoyos 
belong together in the Truth (4)« Thus, for Hegel, in thinking
through the Aoyos whioh ie 7T©x*|*«>s , "we have to think ^ .
pure flux, opposition within opposition itself, or contradiction" 
We have to think dialectioally, whioh is not to reooll from 
distinction into an abstract unity, its opposite, but to enter 
Into the brokenness of differentiation, and to achieve integration 
in and through the brokenness (6)* Dialectic, as a truly
comprehensive thinking, "only wine to its truth when it finds
itself utterly tom asunder (7)# The "truth of the tvhole" CO) 
le THE truth, and that only at the end of a long educative 
development, which is far from edifying, for it is the 
"seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the 
negative" (9)«
lukaos argues, in the passage quoted, that it le in self* 
consciousness that we achieve this encompassing, comprehensive, 
integration/
1, Heraolitus kirk St Haven X’oid Fr* 213 pg* 193*
2* Ibid Fragments 210 St 211 pg» 193#3* Burneti Early Greek Philosophy Fr* 46 pg« 137*4* Heideggeri Whet is tietaphyslos pg* 51, 105*110'
3' P«S' pg' 206'6. Ibid 206ff.
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integration of the objeot known with the knowing subject* The 
Notion of aelf~oon3ciouaneas* which is closely related to what 
iiegel oallo Gelat or Spirit# encompasses both the individual 
(and so psyohologioal aspects of man)v and the aooial or oolloctive 
^an# (whioh embraces the history of human experienoe as a whole)"* 
In aelf-oonaclous ess* we are on the threshold of returning out 
of otherness# of redemption from alienationi for it is in the 
all-enoompassln* oelf-oo .aolousness# or community of Inter* 
aubjeotive spirit# that both persons and communities enter into 
a new healing# and integrating becoming* But before we try to 
explain the meaning of this hope# and this faith# (for it la a 
future in whioh we may believe and hope# not an actual faot# 
oapable of being described in propositions subject to immediate 
verification), we must clarify the meaning of alienation# and 
the estranged otherness of the objeot under the dominion of 
alienation*
For Hegel# the otherness of the objeot at this level of 
experienoe is the alienated self of men* It is the word spoken 
by men# whioh he does not really mean* It la the cot in whioh 
he is not present* It ia the product he does not poaseoa*
It ie the home in which he oannot live* It ie the metaphysio in 
whioh he oannot think* It ia the deed he did not Intend to do 
but did# it is the deed he intended to do but oould not do* It 
is the alien substance of man# both real and ideal* It is aon*o 
heaven and his hell* Both good and evil# as fixed ethical 
oategories# participate in this alienation of man98 substance*
For every fixed dualism ia a diseased fixation# a stabilization 
of a dislocated# unbalanced# alienated state of affairs* Lvery 
certainty,/
certainty* every exclusive truth* every act of self-assertion 
in this state of alienation, is onesided $ and in relation to ths 
wholeness of the truth of the whole* untrue (1)* But only 
dialeotioal thinking oan comprehend this* For only dislsotloal 
thinking out comprehend that sum is on the way* that he is 
continually becoming what he was not, and is continually becoming 
what he is not* Only dialectic graepc the given as that whioh 
is living* for it along grasps being as a * being-in-time• or 
becoming* It alone notices that being and not-leing belong 
together in becoming* for it ia alone in its having learned to 
expeot the unexpected*
The TfeNos, of dialeotioal thinking is that substance cocoas 
subject, that the alien substance of man be regained and 
re-entered* to the end that it become alight and alive with 
Spirit* Alienated man is only implloltly (ln-hlmself) what he 
io in truth (namely spirit), but in the redemption of his self 
(in hie becoming for-himself what he is in-himeelf, he is 
explloitly what he is in truth* (namely spirit)* Hegel believed 
that the first free man* the first man who as subjeot entered into 
his substance# was Jesus* the Christ* Ths Christian /\©y©* 
as the of all things from ths beginning and forever*
is the truth of all things* beoause in him subetanoe becomes 
subjeot* human reality actual and so rational* If we live this 
through, says Hegel* we shall begin to comprehend the truth 
whioh was hidden to man in alienation* We shall regain the 
human substance we had lost, and become what essentially we are* 
Only aasubote ee is redeemed and given back to subjeot, is man 
given the freedom to do what he wills, and the freedom to be 
present in what he does, with a whole mind* unltedjwith his body*
W
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In integrated wholeness* In Christ, taere begins ths long, 
painful history of redemption, the history of God ca Spirit, the 
God who is present to us as he will be present, even now Immanuel, 
God with us, but not yet what Ue *111 be* Kegel9s struggle to
think God in his Aot, in his actuality, as Spirit, entailed
thinking God as Person, and living, - that is, as being-in-time, 
an integrated, self-detsmlnlng Becoming, - and at the same time 
think God aa eternal and infinite* Thie ia the overarching
framework of his phenomenology of the experienoe of man* For
hie 9Phenomenology of Spirit9 ie an attempt to recall some of 
the principle moments in the history of God as Aot, as that 
actuality whioh is spirit* It is the all-encompassing rationality 
of spirit that Htgel seeks to comprehend in his dialeotioal logic 
of spirit* Hegel explioltly tells us he will on no account 
indulge in abstraot speculation concerning the "undisturbed 
identity” of God (1)* It ia the Activity of God, namely ae 
Spirit, Geiet* that concerns Hegel$ for only when we have 
oonoelved God through the ”entlre wealth of his developed fora” 
oan we "grasp and express (God) as really actual" (2)*
To put this another way, Hegsl9s phenomenology of emerging 
self-eousolousness, ae subjeot regaining its alienated substance, 
is a description of the way given reality (the in-itself) is 
negated and transformed into oetuality, which is rational* It 
Is rational in that, as actuality, it is spirit, that which 
accords with the A©yo* * The God who le present only as He 
will be present, who is what he will be, and who is what he does 
in the long history of hie activity, this God Is "essentially 
result" (3)* For until the real (substance) is rational in the 
fulfilment/
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fulfilment of all potentiality (until essence and existence are 
united) God le Implicit only, not actual# "Only in the end ie 
it (spirit) what it ia in very truthi and Just in that coaiats 
its nature, whioh ie to be aotual, subject, or self-becoming, 
self-development" (1)* God ae Alpha, in himself, ia only 
implicitly what he will be ae Omega, at the end, explicitly 
(for-hiaself)• Substance must become subjeot (2),
fe shall argue that it ie only in the context of thie 
eeohatologioal romise of God ae m F P  , given in the wcll-knoma 
passage Exodus 3**, that we ehall understand the key propositions 
of He£el*e dialectical thinking, God ae Omega, present 
explicitly, for himself, is tiie Truth of the Whole, infinite 
through time, the living: God comprehended in the truth of a 
living oonoeption oapable of encompassing both eternity and time. 
For when Hegel tells us that the truth is the Whole (3), that 
spirit alone ie the Actual (4), that the Actual ia the Unlversal(5) 
and that what io rational is aotual, and what is actual is 
rational (6), we shall fail to understand him unless we comprehend 
that "Absolute truth aust be a result" (7). If we are not to 
confuse the real and the Aotual, (and we shall argue this in 
detail in Ch, VII part 3), because the Spirit alone is the 
aotual (8), then we shall see that Hegelfs proposition that 
whatever is rational is aotual and whatever le actual ie rational 
makes sense* He means that whatever Is rational (whatever accord! 
with the all-encompassing A£yo*>; is Aotual (God as Aot, becoming- 
in-time, present in what he does)* and whatever le aotual - or
--------------------------------------------------------------------
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spirit - whatever is done in the Spirit of 9I em whet I will be*, 
or fI nm present only ae I will be present9, ie rational, namely 
in accordance with the A©y©^ , who ia the rfpXfl • *h® Alpha, ae 
well as the eoX°LTo>' * Omega of God,
heedless to say, what appears is real enough, our senses do 
not deceive us most of the time; but the real Is what happens to 
be the oase. As such, it ie not Aotual, it does not accord with 
the Aoyos or Kotion (Begrlff)* It is not rational* Zt is not 
spirit but letter, it is not Grace but nature, it is not Gospel 
but law* It ie only implicitly, in-ltaelf, what it ought to be, 
for oxistenoe is not essenoe* It ie explicitly, for itself, what 
it ought to be only in the Actualization of essence, in the unity 
of essence and existence in a new integrated becoming, whioh is 
spirit*
We quoted noyre#s view that Hegel's philosophy was, in its 
deepest intuitions a philosophy of time* ae oan now see that 
Hegel9a encompassing notion of deist* or spirit, remains a 
oonoeption of temorality even at the point where it negates and 
transcends finitude* His notions of Act, Activity and Actuality, 
related as they are to the those of Time, Heoomlng, Subject, 
Freedom, Universality and Integrity, cannot be comprehended with 
any fixed oategory, such as being or not-being* Actuality both 
is and is not* It is not yet what it will be, nor is it now 
what it was* Spirit Is what it does, but is not yet, for that 
reason, what it will be* It is becoming* This explains our 
enigmatic reference to the distinction between what happens to be 
the case (whet exists, or what is real) and what is actual* 
Actuality is a temporal notion; it is, in becoming only what it 
is/
la not, and it la not now what it will be* It also explains 
the difficult notion of otherness* Self-oonsoiousncss ia the 
overcoming of otherness not in its obliteration or aboorbtion, 
but in its negation and transformation* It x-emaina fact, (real, 
objective) as a necessary, unforge&able noaent* But it is 
encompassed in self-co :soiousncsa* It ia x-edeeaed from 
alienation* reality is real enough, it is not illusion* But 
it ie not rational* Only the Actual, as the unity of essence 
end existenoe in becoming. Is rational*
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Hegel's pfaenomenologioal deocriptlon of experience of the 
emersoE.ce of the truth of self»oonsoious;iees from the premature 
certainties of consciousness (os the oert inties of sense • 
experienoe» perception and understanding) begins with a denoription 
of Desire (Be, ierig; • Drown write a i "Existentialist scholarship 
is discovering a more human Hegel, Hegel the psychologist, Hegel 
trying to transcend the traditional paranoia of philosophers end 
find the essence of nan not in thinking but in human desires and 
human suffering H (!)♦ I'e oan be more exaot, and at the sane time, 
go further* It is in desire9 the manipulation of the environment 
so that it meets our needs9 end not in the knowledge of that 
environment however adequate, that eolf-ooriaclousncas er.ergce* It 
ia in -rcxls. not theoria. that the genesis of eelf«consoiousnees 
ie to be found • -he olaasioul and oomaon«sease vie a that »£»•• 
dealre la a desire for happiness, is aooeptable enough at this 
point9 though the paradoxical fact that prior to that wholeness and 
wholesomeneee which Hegel calls splrit9 men does not really know 
what he desires, in that his desires are all in some measure 
perverted (though never completely), complicates the problem later 
on*
*an desires to be happy, which means he desires the 
satisfaction of his basic needs (food, drink, shelter, companion* 
ship, security, sexual satisfaction and so on)* But reality 
frustrates him* It is as though reality resists his deelre and 
opposes/
opposes hiut so that a relation of conflict and struggle ei^rgoo 
between subject and object* self and ths raw material of the 
natural environment* tim seeks to overcome reality, to master 
it and subdue it* through labour and work* For Freud* the 
pressure of reality* which he ouH* the power of the reality - 
principle over twin* forces man to repreaa and subdue some of his 
desires to satisfy others* His repressed desires manifest 
themselves obliquely in dreams and neurotic symptoms* For Hegel* 
the Tekos of men's struggle and work le self-oonsclousnesa* for 
in self-oonsclouanesc the hostile* alien appearance of reality 
is overcome in the redemption of substance from Otherness* But* 
as we have seen* that doeu not mean that this appearance was 
unreal or illusory* or that is no longer real* It lives on in a 
sublated form* transformed but present*
The encompassing of subject and objeot "breaks asunder into 
the opposition of self-consciousness and life" (1)* For life* 
as continual becoming* as that being which is insecurely balanced 
between the no longer and the not yet* is flux* change* insecurity* 
Obscurely* Hegel calls It "absolutely negative or infinite unity" 
(2)» an idea expressed later on as that infinite whose very 
subsistence is diremptlon (3). His essential point is that life 
ia flux* and at the saia time a totality which oannot be broken 
do.m into ita constituents (4)* Consciousness eaergea from life 
and achieves selfhood only in the struggle between it and life*
It loams from practiced experience that the object is independent 
of it* and it learns that "certainty exists through cancelling 
this other" (5). But It is not* as we have seen* satisfied 
with/
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with this certainty# since it ie not yet a certainty of celf, 
but only of the object* For# " self-coi isciouene as attain® its 
satisfaction only in aftOther self-oci-ocioiAO^eBO"# (1). "4
self-oonsaioumiese has before it a self-consciousness"# - this 
sets the scene for the drama of redemption fror* alienation*
For self-consciousness io aetual only when it has tecoiae actual# 
and it becomes actual only in confronting and desiring another 
self-consciousness• Only when the object is another subject oan 
we apeak of the "unity of iteolf in its Otherness"' (2). This 
unify* when uotutd# 1b spirit* It enables the individual to say 
•We* for the first time# and oorrelatively# for a plurality of 
E,pos to say I (3)* It ie the intersubJeotive unity constituted 
in the gathering together of v?hat w j > separated in the conflict 
and opposition of desire* Here we leave the "parti-coloured 
show of the sensruoius immediate"* so well ao the "dark void of 
the transcendent and remote super-sensuous" * and step into the 
"spiritual daylight of the present"* (4)*
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the immediate existence of man9 according to Hegel9 is 
nature* not spirit* "Immediately9 raan it only a living being, 
who has the capacity to become aotual 8pirit"f but who ia not 
yet in fact what he essentially ie (1)# " an ia thua not by
nature this particular in whioh the epirit of God dwells; «»an
is not by nature v.hat he ought to be. The animal ia by nature 
what it ought to be " (2/> -an is x;ot. He lives between what 
he is in faotf and wnat he ought to be9 a divided oousciouanesa, 
a being*in-time 9 self-transcending. For Hegel 9 the truth which 
raises man from nature to drace9 from being -what he ie* to 
becoming what he is not9 is the Truth "that in Christ tiie Ao^os
has beoome flesh” 0 ># in the Holy Gpirit which e .ergea in tne
ie> arture of beaus9 a new being* in-time* a new decoding ( ye'/twca) 
ia co stituted, .vhioh gathers being (To w/ ) and not-being 
( To |u*\ o^ ) together* For it is in that being which is 
becoming9 that being which becomes what it ia not9 by dying to 
what it ist that human being as nature becomes huz,sn ; eiug es 
spirit (45. It is the Understanding which proceeds »ith fixed 
determinations, believing that everythine is what it is and not 
something else. Hen son9 on the other hand9 ia flexible end 
subtle enough to think the living flux of change and becoming, 
without/
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without disintegration or frag: Natation* e0el argues that if 
we are ever to comprehend our own living ex tiieioe, we j&ust 
recognize being (T© ov ) and not-being (To o>/ ) ae
abatractions from the coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of living 
experience. irit ie the truth of living experience* Grace 
redeems nature. oub. ect regains substance and takes possession 
of it for itself* For oontrary to what appears to be the case, 
and oontrary to the conventions of common-oenee, man ought to 
become what he is not in s^ch a way tn&t his coming-to-be and 
his ceasing-to-ie belong together* Death and resurrection belong 
together9 united once and for all in the all-encompassing 
integrity of the incarnate , and preserved in the unity of
the spirit*
Our purpose in the following discussion is to clarify that 
Via9 Veritas, et Vita, whereby natural life become spirit, and 
achieves freedom through death* It entails a hermeneutic of 
the Christian notion of Spirit as a new integrated being-in-tiue, 
in which the belonging together of coming-to-be and oeasing-to-be, 
birth and death, Is comprehended* It is also, cults obviously, 
a thoroughly eschatological metaphysio, capable of comprehending 
the temporality of incarnate man without becoming dislocated or 
deranged by tiie contradictions of the * no-longer* ■ the * even-now *, 
and the *not-yet* of Christian temporality* It ie a philosophy
y ^ y yof ycvcfft*, in whioh and tfMtxos are united in the truth
c/of the uhole ( oAov ) * And it must comprehend that the truth 
of the Whole is aotual (tVirklioh) only as the coming oilLsj 
of God* For only what is Aotual, namely the Aotion of God, 
and oo io the living presence of God,ia rational! Only the 
Aotual, in whioh God is what he is becoming, io spirit*
Selbatbc.aast-iqin./
belbstbewuswtseln. as Hegel used the Concept, means the 
freedom to integrate what appev.ro to be looked in irreaemable 
opposition* birth and death are not the aa^e, yet in the 
gathering together of all thing sin the^H-encompassing Aoy©3 , 
birth and death belong together* The birth of aelf-oonsciousness 
is a kind of death* Similarly the opposition between self and 
other which is an essential moment in the birth of self* 
consciousness, is overcome and yet preserved in the freedom to 
be itself in its otherness (Bei-aloh-aelbst-sain lm Anderaaein(l)* 
le have to bear in mind that the geneais of self-consciousness 
as described by Hegel cannot be understood apart from the 
temporality of the Christian Aoyos, in whioh a living unity of 
opposites is achieved in becoming* nojevefe failure to bear 
this in hLnd is the main reason «.hy his interpretation of Hegel 
is onesided*
Belf-coi aciousneas is a fluid or floating conception, which 
c m  be employed in both of two essential moments, both the moment 
of immediacy or the in-ltaelf, in which caae it is impliolt, 
and the moment of mediation, or the for-itself, in which case 
it is explicit* For the natural position of self-consciousness 
is alienation, or self-estrangeuent* Both the independence and 
the dependence of self-consciousness suffer from estrangement or 
self-alienation* Both are diseased in that they seek the stable 
security of being, rather than the unrest of becoming, the birth 
and the death which together constitute the self-transcendence 
which distinguishes man from the animals* It is right that man 
should be & aiok oniaal and a divided consciousness, because 
man alone is assaiiti&lly self-conscious* if a man chooses to be 
what/
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what ha is, and not ao^athing else, if ha chooses to regard «hat 
he ia in faot9 aa what he ought to ba in essence, then he ia 
in flight from hie freedom and humanity. He ia gere animal*
For man only truly jj|9 whan ha is becoming what he ourlit to be 
but la not yet* his true being la a becoming9 an existence 
without an essence in which he immediately inheres*
le have reached the point where something must be said 
about Hegel's notion of truth as true becoming, in which being 
and not-being belong together in living communion. It la 
oloaely related to his notion of ^e^bstbewuaataein or self- 
oonaoiouenesa*
First9 the simple meaning of the latter conception ia 
self-awareness9 aa ^aufmann points out (1)* But for Hegel it 
has many profound and far-reaching connotations* It eon mean 
a maturity and wholeness of personality9 self-assurance, self- 
integration* self-possession. It denotea authentic9 genuine9 
trustworthy human selfhood9 in such a way that both the 
payohologioal ?nd the aoeial dimensions of healthy becoming are 
encompassed* It ia of significance to the philosopher only 
because9 os we hove already seen9 "with self-oonsoiousness9 we 
have passed into the native land of truth" (2)* Things become 
clearer when we remember that Hegel distinguishes between wahrfaeit. 
which he calls Truth, and hlohtlftkelt which he calls correctness* 
rnhrheit la that whioh accords with its notion or be^rlff* or 
which is what it ought to be, a unity of essence and existence*
Only that whioh ia actual ia true in this sense* Jure observes 
that Hegel's ..ahrheit ia in many respects similar in conception to 
rlato'a lu , though we must add that it ia impossible to
understand wshrheit except we understand it as that whioh aooords 
with/
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with the incarnate* Hurt argue* that Truth in thla
sense belongs to the objeot, and is a value, a good (1)* Mure 
offers • genuineness• as a preliminary translation of the concept* 
Self-oonsoiousness is the truth of human life in this sense* It 
aeans authentic existence, integrated self-determination, freedom 
in and through becoming, and a genuine communication between 
eelf and not self, or otherness, in every thought, every intention, 
every deed*
Hlohtlgkelt, ( ©otri'r^ ;, on the other hand, consists in the 
adaequatlo, correspondentia, or oonventia, between intelleotus 
et rei* Truth as correctness, ae conceived in aooordnnoe with
the correspondence theory of truth, can be formulated in the 
traditional way* Veritas set adaequatlo intelleotus et rel*
Truth consists in the agreement of proposition, conception or 
knowledge with its objeot, or with the facts* A proposition 
ie true if it corresponds to the way thingajare* Our knowledge 
or ideas are true if they accurately reflect what is the oase* 
Hegel is happy with this conception of truth at the level at 
whioh it is appropriate* For sense experience, perception and 
understanding, truth must be oon.eeived within the framework of 
the dualism of subjeot and objeot* But the correspondence 
theory of truth cannot claim touuqtioi comprehend the whole 
story, for it ie essentially conservative. It oonoeives of 
man aa knower as opposad to doer* It rests upon the metaphysical 
belief that man la the creature who must accept the way things er* 
and who must leave everything as it is, even if this ia 
unconsciously presupposed* We know from experienoe that man is 
not suoh a creature. He changes ths way things are through 
work/
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work, proceeding from judgments sbout the way things ought to be* 
&an is actively present in his active relation to the world*
As Homo Agena, he actively transoends his passive existence as 
the det&ohed observer who seeks to desorlbe and explain how 
things are* kan is, of course, appropriately homo patlene In 
certain legitimate moments of his becoming* But la is as homo 
agene, the active worker who transforms the raw material of 
nature into a hunr.n world, that we know him today* His 
technology, his industry, and his culture all speak of his 
activity, of his responsibility for the way things are* When 
hegel tells us that substance is subject, he is telling us that 
we are responsible for the way things are* he is telling us 
that our true being is a becoming in which human reason and 
human freedom actively create a world, however much we may be 
mystified by the objectivity of our own products* «»'.an Is not 
homo patlens, a subject poised as mind In a world of external 
objsots, however r.uch this may appear to be the case* The 
truth is that^oi is responsible for that social and historic 
world he produces* It is his freedom which is Lord of the way 
things are* The fncta are his deeds* There is a living unity 
between subject and objeot which comes about everywhere, whenever 
human praxis oomes to grips with things*
Selbatbewusstaeln is consciousness of self in otherness; 
it entails that consciousness of the active responsibility and 
freedom of men which is the hidden 9truth* of his products, 
which is disclosed only when we have learned, with the help of 
the phenomenological ladder (1), to expect the unexpected*
Truth as the oo-inherence of the objeot with its notion, aeons 
the/
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the truth of that becoming in which essence and existenoe are 
united, and alienation overcome. Truth ie here a value. When 
things are ae they ought to be, they are true. Truth and 
goodness, untruth and evil are in this sense closely related.
For Hegel, substance appears alienated from subject. (By appear, 
we do not mean that the appearance of substance as alienated from 
subject ia an illusion). Substance •la* alienated from subject. 
But this is only a "moment”. In becoming, everything changes, 
nothing can regain what it is. Everything becomes what it is 
not. The truth of substance ia subject, substance becomes 
subject. Truth is bom in that coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, 
that birth which is also death. Birth and death belong together. 
Together they constitute that yfcMfcs-us which alone actualizes 
truth. Christ, as the Truth, unites birth and death in death 
and resurrection. All things are true, for Hegel, only in so 
far as they accord with the Aoyo^ • "To Hegel", argute ‘ure, 
"knowledge of value and knowledge of self are one and the same, 
and error is the belief that an object experienced as alien to 
the subject is, as so experienced, true in the philosophic sense 
of 'genuine•" (1). Truth is coherence, or co-inherence of the 
say things are in spirit. Truth means 'self-accordance9, and 
entails a belonging together of being and thought, in which 
seae-experience becomes understanding, and finally Reason.
Reason thinks by integrating what is separate, by gathering what 
is scattered. The truth of Reason is the truth of the Whole.
S&3 lahre lot ang Cange (2), Merlean-Ponty's comment is relevant 
in this connection. It was Hegel, according to »erle&a-?onty, 
"who/
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’’who started the attempt to explore the irrational and integrate 
it into an expanded reason, .vhich remains the task of our 
century" (3) • The rational io the actual« that which aa truth, 
or the Ao^oi , with God, aa God, in the beginning end forever, 
enoompaoses all things. But not immediately, Hegel is no 
pantheiet. The world ia not God, Nor is man God, Qn the 
oontrary, as the TeAo* of becoming, God is the eeX^rrov , the 
Omega of all things, the God who is only in the end what He ie in 
truth. Only as reality is transformed into the healthy, 
integrated becoming of actuality* or epirit (Geist) is the 
irrationality of reality annulled, and the truth of the whole 
revealed as the end toward which all things are striving.
Truth ao ahrhelt remains a • beyond* as long os reality is not 
rational, or actual.
Merlean~2onty continues* "He (Hegel) la the Inventor of 
that Reason, broader than the understanding* which can respect 
the variety and singularity of individual oonsclousneaseo, 
civilisations, ways of thinking and historical contingency, but 
whioh nevertheless does not give up the attempt to master them 
in order to guide them to their own truth" (1), We are now 
in a position to understand truth as the ooming truth, as the 
rational and the aotual. For our only truth, the only truth we 
oan trust, is ths A&yo* of God* ths oomlng God, ths God who is 
who hs will be, the final truth of the tVhole, Truth is related 
to self-consciousness beoause it is not actual as long as substance 
is alienated froa subject, and self not itself in its otherness, 
With this In mind, we oan prooeed to Hegel9s description of the 
genesis and growth of self consciousness.
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"Self-coasciousneas exists in-itself and for-itself, in that, 
and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; 
that la to say, it is only by being acknowledge or • recognised f,,(l)«
The in-ltself of hunan self-oonsolousness entails the 
oontradiotion bet.teen what we are in faot, or by nature, and 
what we essentially are, or ought to be* For although man la 
bound to a multitude of finite determinations, (he Is this or 
that); he is also, even now, in the sight of God, a new man, 
what he essentially is* His essence and exlatenoe are divided, 
he is not by nature what he is in Grace, he is not in faot whet 
he ought to be* His being and his self-consoiousnesa are 
divided* &an is not yet wh&t he will be, and is, even now, 
before God*
Hegel tells us that Nthls double meaning of what is 
distinguished lies in the nature of self-oonsolousnesst- of its 
being infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinete&eas 
in which it is fixed” (1)* <Vhen man is becoming for-hinself 
(self-consciousness in its fulfilment) wh&t he is in-hlmself, he 
suooeeds in surpassing those finite limits which constitute his 
faotual existence* He is in-finite, in the sense of self- 
t ranee ending* Wan is that being who only becomes what he 
essentially is, (or le in Gr&ee), when he is dying and becoming; 
for/
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for unlike animals and things he cannot be defined as the one 
who ie who he ie in remaining who he is. He le unlimited, and 
H  free, in the sense that he is the sue who, in uniting coming- 
to-be and ceasing-to-be in self-transoendlng becoming, cannot be 
bound to any one of his finite determinations. Han ia divided 
ln-hiaself between his essenoe, whioh is to bs free and in this 
eenee, not limited to any of his finite ways of being-in-the-worldj‘'An'* • * f, * *-' •* i  ^ '*•* ** " •’ & * ” ’* r. '• ,1 . *v
end his existenoe, is a kind of enslavement. Thejin—itself
is, therefore, self-estrangement, or self-alienation.
Hegel's striking thesis is that man can overcome alienation 
only through hie living inerutlon with other men. tie describee 
the H process of Recognition" as follows (1).
"Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousneas .... this has a double significance. First, it has lost its own self, since it finds Itself as an OTHER being; aeoondly, it has thereby 
sublated that other, for it does not regard that other aa essentially real, 
but sees its own self in the other ••••Through eublation it gets back to itself, 
because it beoomes one with itself againthrough the cancelling of its otherness,
but aeoondly, it likewise gives otherness book again to the other self-eoneolousneas •••• it lets the other again go free" (2).
Hegel notes that this interaction of self-oonsciouanoss with 
self consciousness has been viewed from the point of view of one 
alone, whereas the aotion ie taking place from the points of view
of both. For just as the struggle between opposing forces
discloses a hidden connection between them, so here the solipsist 
independence of each self-consciousness breaks down to reveal a 
living unity, self-consciousness as a sooial or intersubjeotive 
cohesion/
1. P.S. pg. 2292. Ibid pg. 229*230.
cohesion between the one end the other, A living connection 
encompassing both self-oonuciousnesses emerged in what appears to 
be violent antagonism (1), Self becomes other, other becomes 
self, their opposition brings them together whilst appearing to 
set them apart. Their separation is real enough, it is no 
illusion. But opposition brings thin o togethsr, despite the 
conventions of the understanding whioh would prevent us from 
noticing this, For contrary to what we fknowf to be the o&oe, 
Hegel asks us to reoogniee (re-know) that "Conscious ess finds 
that it immediately is and ie not another consciousness, as also 
that this other is for itself only when it cancels itself as 
existing for itself, and has self-existence only in the celf- 
exiatenoe of the other, Bach is the mediating term to the other, 
through which each mediates and unites itself with itself" (2), 
ICegation, negativity, and mediation (Vermittlunr) are unexpectedly 
the only true way to the positive, death the only way to llfef 
for all things eocord with the incarnate Aoyos , forwhoa there 
was no resurrection except through calvary. Redemption froa 
death is redemption through death ♦ "It is not true", wrote 
Lessing, following the negative way of the Heraclltean as well as 
the Christian Aoyos , "that the shortest line ie always straight"
(3), Influenced by Schiller, as well as Leasing, Hegel looks to 
the prologue of St, John*8 Gospel, and to the dark saying of 
Heraclitus, for that dialectical thinking which alone oan master 
the contradictions of our human experience. Where the 
understanding/
1, P.S, pg, 230,
2 , Ibid pg. 231 .3, Leasingt The Bductttion o f the huucn raoe pi*ra 91 pg, 97 o f
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1780 , c f  kaufmann Hegel pge, 46- 56 , 67- 70 ,
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understanding (verstand/ breois down, dialectical reason (vernunft) 
finds the unapparent connection which is strong enough to hold 
things together* Our living experience does not immediately corns 
to us as integral, coherent or meaningful; nor io integration 
possible when subject is detached from object. Isolated and 
withdrawn* For meaning is possible only for that consciousness 
which is inearnate-being-in-the-world, though it is disclosed to 
us not directly, nor immediately, but by way of negation (or 
mediation)* The Interdependence of self and social environment, 
their living interconnection, ie not an immediate fact but a task, 
for Hegel*
We are perhaps beginning to grasp what hegel means when he 
tells us that self-consc lousinesses only "recognize themselves as 
mutually recognising one-another"(1;• The immediate empirical
self, though real enough, is not yet actual* It must become 
actual, and so spirit, not only through action, or its o m  action, 
but through mutual interaction also* It needs recognition to 
become self-consciousness* It is only by way of the moment in
which the aslf is a stranger to itself in alienation, that
alienation is revealed to be the natural position of consciousness*
we may be tempted to interpret hegel in tsraejof a simple 
dualism of self-as-subject and self-as-objeot, the self as free 
agent, the self who aots, and the self who is the product of the
conditioning of the natural end social environments* The
dualism is resolved into a new synthesis, if this ie s correct 
interpretation, when the self succeeds in making the transition 
from a date rained to a self-de terming mode of existence in the 
world* When the self as so ted upon becomes the self who acts, 
self-002 leolousness/
1* P.s* pg* 231*
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self-consciouoness as independence rather than dependence ie 
achieved* But this interpretation misses the point of the 
previous study of the dialectic el yeveeisof both independence 
and dependence, a dialectic which ie resolved only in inter­
dependence* Such an interpretation would be working within a 
fixed and abstract dualisn of aubject and object which is 
precisely the position Hegel noveo beyond in dialectic*
Tho need for recognition teaches us that the apparently 
fundamental distinction between acts done out of the unfreedom 
of immature dependence and acta done out of independent freedom 
or rational choice breaks down at the point when both are 
revealed as abstract* The distinction betv/cen self as subject 
and self as object may be appropriate at the stage when the self 
has & low threshold of security and faces an intensely hostile 
environment which threatens to destroy him* It might also be 
appropriate in the oaee of an adolescent self-understanding, or 
in the case of certain forms of aystioal or revolutionary self- 
understanding* It may serve to combat certain forms of scientism, 
psychologism or historlcism in which the freedom or responsibility 
of man for the way things are in his world, is i^iored, blurred or 
denied* Hegel’s point, however, is that because I am placed in 
a situation of dependence upon the other in my struggle to 
become myself, the subjeot-objeot dualism which dislocates 
subjectivity from its inherence in the world is an abstraot 
moment* .Ve will notice this, says Hegel, if we learn to see 
the dialectical character of our living experience* Hegel’s 
argument is that self-consciousness is the hidden condition of 
my consciousness of anything whatever, and interaction with other 
human/
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human eelf-oonsoiouonesses 3s the condition of self-consciousness. 
There ia an unappurent connection between things whioh at first 
sight appear ^uite separate. In my awarcnessof what is not-ae 
(other) I become aware of myself, but this only when the other is 
another self who in turn recognises me and is recognised by me. 
Abstract dependence and abstract indspendence break down, if v»e 
loom to comprehend our experience, into a living interdependence.
It is true that, for kegel, things as they are exist in 
untruth, in the sense in whioh we have understood this, and that 
the faots appear negative in relation to nan. It is true that 
aan is boro into alienation in that, as unfree homo pat lens, 
a negation of the negation ia the only way to freedom. Alienation, 
in which man is being-for-other (Anderaseln or Scin-fiir-Anderes 1), 
is untrue being, in whioh neither subject (self) nor objeot 
(world) yet aooord with the hotion (hegrlff). hut if we press 
the distinction between determined and self-determining, self ae 
passively conditioned and self as arbitrarily free, we miss the 
intersubjectlve oo-inherenoe of subjeot and object, subjeot and 
subject, whioh for Hegel, is present in living experience if we 
could only comprehend what we experience. For our thinking so 
often becomes fixated at the point of dualistio opposition, we 
become slaves to our own lifeless abstractions. Hegel is 
warning us not to hold on to these abstractions but, as we li&ve 
seen, to think living experience. For it is only by entering 
into the content that we avoid that dislocation and derangement 
of thinking whioh oooura when we abetriot from the contradictions 
of life and withdraw into the fixed contradictions of the 
o&tegorlal understanding. both idealism and eapiriolsm fail to 
comprehend/
1. lo^io pg. 157ff*
comprehend experienoe; both fail to encompass both subjeot and 
objeot in accordance with the truth of the Notion* Neither oan 
be truly Christian, in that they fail to think divine 
and incarnate humanity together* both fail to see that in 
authentic intereubjeotivity, arising from reciprocal recognition, 
being and thought belong together*
Hegel expresses the epistemologioal dimension of the 
dialectic as followst " vhat is, or real per ae (an aioh) only is, 
so far as it is an object for oousoiousness; and that what is 
for oo isoiouane8s is also objectively real" (1)* In other words, 
we are in oout&ot with a real world in every experienoe of it, 
and nothing oan be real unless it io in principle an objeot of 
experience* Merleau-*!onty ie in agreement with Hegel when he 
sayet "Metaphysics begins from the moment when, oeaslng to live 
in the evidenoe of the objeot - whether it is the sensory objeot 
or the objeot of sclenoe, - we perceive the radical subjectivity 
of our all our experienoe as inseparable from its truth value*
It means two things to say that our experienoe is our ownt both 
that it is not the measure of all imaginable being in itself and 
that it is nonetheless oo-extensive with all being of whioh we oan 
form a notion* This double sense of the Cogito ie the basio fact
of metaphyeioat I am sure that there is being - on the oondition 
that X do not seek another sort of being than belng-fer-me" (2)* 
Being and thought, the world and consciousness, subject and objeot 
belong together* All knowledge begins with, though does not 
derive from experienoe, for Hegel as for k&nt* Our task ia not 
merely/
1* P*S* pg* 274* In this truth, the ooneoiouenees of theobject aa objectively real, and the subjeotive ground of the objeot in its being essentially for oonsoiousnees if it is to be real, are disoloeed aa abstract moments*
2* Merleau-Ponty* The metaphysical in mans Sense and jjo-iscnae
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merely to understand our experience, (Kant)* but to comprehend it 
(Hegel). To comprehend it requires that dialectical flexibility 
which alone oan recognise the Identity of opposites in living 
experience, for the latter is a relentless, ongoing coalng*into~ 
being and oeaeing-to~be which will not wait, nor postpone its 
demand for our cognitive response* Fixated cognition, obeying 
rigid logical conventions, forever loses its contact with living, 
ongoing experience.
Our analysis of Hegel9s conception of recognition thus 
discloses in & preliminary way, the nature of hie notion of synthesis 
It also reveals the intersubjactive component of human subjectivity, 
without which neither consciousness nor the world, neither knowledge 
nor the known would be possible.
We take note of the faot that this notion of intersubjectivity 
as the sine qua non of subjectivity, and so also of objectivity, 
is echoed in many later thinkers, though in a multitude of very 
different ways. Feuerbach follows hie teacher, Hegel, when he 
argues that "The Ego attains to consciousness of the world through 
consciousness of the Thou" (1). Buber tells us that Feuerbach's 
1-thou philosophy was his own starting point. For iiuber, "Through 
the Thou, a man becomes I” (2). Husserl, in his f amour 5th 
Cartesian Meditation, tries to formulate a notion of "transcendental 
intersubjectivity", or an "open community of monads", a "mutual 
being •• for one another", without which the "constitution of an 
objeotlve world would not be possible (3)* Max Soheler argues 
that "man, the finite personal spirit, does not live a communal 
life with other finite personal spirits from pure accident, or 
only/
1. Feuerbach: 92. Martin Buber
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only do facto”. Rather, "it io inherent in the eternal ideal 
nature of on intelligent person that all its existence end activity 
as a spirit ia ah origins just aa :auch an outward-conscious, 
co-rcaponsible, communal reality, aa a self-conscious, self- 
responsible, individual reality, The being of nan is just ao 
originally a matter of being, living, and acting •together*, as a 
matter of existing for himself" (1), For Marx* it is above all 
necessary to avoid postulating 9society' as an abstraction 
confronting the individual, so that the individual is abstracted 
from his social reality. The individual man said :.arx "is the 
eocial being"(2), Amongst sooial psychologists, G, H, Mead 
confirms Hegel9s oonoeption with great penetration and insight.
The self, he tells us, is something whioh has a development,
"It la not initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of 
sooial experienoe and activity, that is , develops in the given 
individual a m  result of his relations to that prooess as o whole 
and to other individuals within that prooess, "The self la 
reflexive, it oan be both subject and objeot. In communication, 
the self oan become objeot to itself, and the self "as that which 
oan be an object to itself, is essentially a sooial structure, and 
it arises in social experience" (3), Another example of 
0 on temporary reflection in the Hegelian tradition is K, D, Lalng(4),
1, On the eternal in j|an pg, 3732, r.&rlyWrltlnrs t 3rd Manuscript pg, 156,
3, Mlnd. Self and applets pgs, 135-140.4, orM InierrcrsonJ perception especially pgs, 3-34*
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C H A P T E R  V
PART 2s
THROUGH INTERACTION WITH THE THOU, A M M  BECOMES !•
HtGLl AHB FICHTE.
«e have juat seen that for Hegel there ie no X without &
Thou | and that interaubjeetivity ie the looua of subjectivity. 
Before we discuss hie account of the struggle for reco^xition 
Ckenpf dee AnsrKennena>, we recall that Fichte had argued, ae 
we have seen Hegel do, that there ie no huiian ooneoiouanees of 
the world which ie not also self-consclousiness, and there ie no 
self-consoiouanesa without a plurality or coiaciunity of ueif- 
ooneciousneesee•
Fichte argues in book one of the first part of hie * science 
of Rights1 that rational self-ooueoiousness in man is self- 
determining activity (2)| and Mwilling is the real essential 
character of reason” (3)# According to Fichte, the many attempts 
to deduce the Ego in eelf-coneciousnese, ae the connection of 
many representations, for example, have failed because they 
must always presuppose what they wish to deduce, For it is 
not intelligence alone which constitutes rationality, but 
Intelligent practical activity (3)# The Ego is Act, and there 
ie no sense, says Fichte, in our imagining a substrate before or 
behind activity end calling this the Ego. The Ego is "sinply 
noting; it is what it acts, end when it does not act, it le not 
at all” U). Through Action, the Ego makes the Objects facto
ere/
1.2.
3.4.
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are deeds. Fiente is not Intonated in denying the reality of the
external world, but he ia attacking the conventional way in whieh 
we fail to take account of the faot that there ia a unity of 
subject and objeot in Praxis, Co raon sense claims on independent 
existence for both subject and object* end claims that the world 
would be* though it (common eenae) were not (1). The treno- 
cendental philosopher knows of the external reality of the world 
only as a limit to action* "The hgo"» argues Fichte, "is what ia 
in Aotings the objeot ie what ia in being" (2)* The hg© ia 
infinitely determinable as self •determining, the objeot, once and 
for all time, determined, Tne Ego ia “incessantly becoming, 
and there ia nothing pemanent in it* the objeot ia, as it ia, 
forever". It ia what it ia and is what it will be. Act la not 
being - not**being, no-thtng, The object ia what it ia, it la 
being. The aelf la not, not beingi and it ia free (3), The 
self is eelf-eh&n&e, active becoming (ytveet*,j the objeot 
racists change, not aotively, (by definition), but in its fixed 
determi ution of being (©£wc* )• *e see here the e. ergenoe of 
the modem form of the distinction between Being and Time,
Stein und loit. aegel'u concept of Spirit (Goiat)aa the actual 
(airklich) ia a notion of Tine and beoomi g, not a notion of being , 
Fichte &SK8 how eelf-coiisciousness aa Aot can be possible, 
ilia reply la that self-conscious:teas ia possible "when the rational 
being can ascribe to itself a causality in one end the same 
undivided moment wherein it opposes something to thle causality"(4), 
In other words, oelf-co; ociousncss la act, not being (not-being)*
it/
1.
2.
3.
4.
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it is negativity whioh must negate what is (being) precisely as 
it ie whet it ia aa Aot, as Aot which is not being. This 
oonoeption is difficult to grasp only beo&use ordinary language 
is too rigid and inflexible to describe Action, Its structure 
is adequate to the task of asserting true propositions concerning 
matters of fact (understood as independent object rather than 
deed) not true propositions concerning human Action, Aot is 
not being, yet there is action. In the undialectioal logic of 
conventional language, propositions expressing the action of a 
subjeot or Ago appear contradictory, or at beet paradoxical, 
beoause they are expressing that which 'is' (Act), only by not 
being 9being1 - for Aot is not being, subjeot is not objeot, 
the knower is not the known, the doer ic limited by the 
objectivity of reeletent externality. There belongs to this 
enigmatic concept of the 9self-who-acts • the paradox that even 
when it does not aot (do anything) it has chosen freely not to 
aot, and to choose is to aot. Language slithers uneasily, 
unable to discover a firm foothold. There ie nothing stable 
about becoming, or the self, or aot, and normally we would like 
to eay that what we oannot say clearly better not be aaid at all, 
Fiohte is not so foolish, Lven nihilistic silenoe expresses 
something, for we are silent beoause we think language incapable 
of describing the 9is9 end the 9is not9 of active yevtei* , 
Silence has ethical consequences. For in thie oase our elleuoe 
concerns what m  do, end perhaps even if what we say about doing 
in the language of matters of fact (telng) is, from the point of 
view of analytical logio, very unsatisfactory, we oannot afford 
to be ellent about something oo obviously significant. It is 
one thing to distinguish faota and values, it ie quite another 
thing to equate the meaningful with the factual, and to be reduoed 
to/
to alienee ooncorning values#
Klohte despairs of speaking of the Act (self-co. ociouaness) 
in ter^e of being (the object)) but he does not for that reason 
fall silent# lie chooses to speak of the Act in in terras of 
itself, or more particularly in ter&sjof the act of one in 
relation to another, or interaction# This enables him to 
transcend practical solipsism, and to speak of the subject only 
after he has first spoken of intersubjactivity. This, as we 
shall see, has many important logical consequences. tiegel, too,
makes this important move, a move we shall have to understand 
if we are to grasp the game they are playing, and the rules or 
conventions which give it its particular form. One rule must be 
observed from the start. ’en are not thingii. Language about 
men ie not the oaae as language about things. Propositions 
concerning being (•objcotlve* fact, that which is the oaos 
whether or not there ie e speaker, a knower, a sub, sot of 
experience), which if true are true in the sense of corresponding 
with what is the cose (adaenuatio or correspondent!*! jfitoUgQtllfl 
at rei), do not have the sane form as propositions concerning the 
Act. The way we distinguish between them is no easy task to 
describe. It ie. In any oase, one of the principle questions 
this study is concerned to explore. We ought also to explain 
that when the term ' becoming * is used In the game we are playing, 
it does not mean fnatural growth1, from like to like, but human 
becoming, the form of y i n  whioh the paradoxical 
coalescence of being (to ck/ ) and not-betng (To ^  ov ) 
must somehow be expressed. It is the becoming of self- 
determining freedom (or spirit), of the self-who-aots, that 
is/
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ia here being described,
Fichte begins to speak of the Aot (self-con so iouor.es a) 
in terms of itself, in Intersubjactive interaction, as follows*
" an becomes man only amongst men* and since he oan only be man, 
and would not be etjall unless he were man, it follows that 
IF UAH IS TO BE AT ALL, THERE FUST BE KEN" (1), In spite of 
the non sequitur, and the obvious circularity of this statement, 
the single proposition: man becomes man only among men, if man
is to be at oil, there must be men, is full of significance, 
Fichte argues that this proposition ia no arbitrary assumption, 
nor an opinion based on past experience or on other probability - 
reasons. It can be deduced from the conception of man. For 
Fichte, men must be educated to be men (2), It is in 
communication that man becomes man, it is as one who participates 
in a fundamental intersubjactive interaction that he becomes 
active self-co; solousneso. Or in the words of his 
'.laacnaohaftelehre of 1601, "No ftm bain* booo..oo conscious of 
itself without at the same time becoming conscious of other 
similar beings" (3)* The self relates to another oelf as an 
equal, yet the other is free, with the result that the equality 
of aelf and other is not necessarily, or securely assured. The 
other may or must restrict ay freedom (4)* Each treats the 
other as free, end ao restricts hia freedom, "Ho free being 
oan recognise the other as such, unless both thus recognise each 
other* and no-one oan treat the other aa a free being, unless 
both mutually thus treat each other "(5)* For Fichte, mutual
recognition leads to a common consciousness, which must be 
expressed in tenia of the Aot, ainoe "what X think, the other 
one/ oan not know" (6), It is in interaction rather than in
Sbal____________________________  .
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the achieving of a single consciousness, whioh le necessarily 
impossible, that we achieve a common mind* But for Fichte 
nI must assume that all rational beings out-side of me will in 
all possible cases recognize me ae a rational being" (!)•
The other le "bound or obliged to recognize ae categorically”, 
for hie recognition ie the condition of my self-consciousness* 
The uniting of opposites Into ons, in such a way that self 
and other cecome self-conscious, is the oategorial condition of 
there being rational, active, self-consciousness* But why is 
the other obliged to recognize me?
Fichte's analysis remains abstract at this point* By 
oontrust, Hegel gives us a concrete ontological description of 
an aotual (rather than merely formal) struggle for recognition 
whioh le, for him, a trial by death* Hegel describes the 
emergence of a concrete state of affaire of a self who refusee 
to recognize the other (the Lordi der Herr), and of another who 
recognizes him, but only out of tear (the slave, der kneoht). 
Hegel's discussion of the relation of Lord and slave, makes the 
Lord-slave relation follow from the condition of unequal 
recognition, a oonditlon whioh Fichte's notion of formal 
agreement (or contract) does not allow for* Hegel explores 
the form of self-oonsoiousness and so of the Aot (spirit, self, 
time, and becoming), with a penetration that Fichte fails to 
achieve in his thinking* For Fichte, self reoogaizea self 
as rational and free; they achieve a common consciousness and 
so a common law and sooial harmony, which finds its ultimate 
expression in a moral communityi Fichte's ideal community, 
in whioh each individual ie fulfilled in acting to achieve a 
common/
1. Ibid pg* 70.
•onman , founders at the point where he fails to aee the
oouorete consequences of hie conception of the world as the 
product of humnn action. For if recognition Is not mutual, 
then man end hie products bsooms divided, and it becomes possible 
for man to forget (compulsively) that he Is responsible for the 
way things are. The human product (the fruit of human activity) 
then appears as the inevitable, the unchangeable, the objeotlve, 
so that man9s self as acting subjeot becomes alienated from his 
products and deeds. Fichte saw that our human world, our 
environment and our soolo-historlc reality, is our own creation, 
however alien it appears to us. But he wae unable to hold 
this in tension with the concrete state of affairs, namely, 
man9a alienation. In Hegel9a language, subject fails to enter
e
into and regain its o.vn substance. Boer remains divorced from 
his deeds, and self from action. It ia here that Hegel deepens 
Fiohte9s discussion of the emergence of self-consciousness, for 
without our taking account of the fact that self does not 
reoognise self, that men enslave and use or.e-another, becoming 
alienated from their authentic existence (their truth: AhrheiO-
we will never comprehend its becoming.
Fichte, in discussing whether philosophy ought to begin with 
faot or deed, argues that it is "not at all so inaignif leant, 
aa someone may think, whether philosophy starts out from faot or 
from deed (i.e. from pure activity whioh does not presuppose 
an object but creates it itself, and where action turns 
immediately into deed). If it (philosophy) starts out from 
faots, it places itself in ths world of being end of fluidity, 
and It will find it difficult to attain from hers to infinity 
and/
and supraaeneualityj if it starts out from deed, it stande 
at the point whioh con ecta both worlds and from which it oan 
with one glance comprehend then”(l)* It le to Fiohte that we 
owe the deepening of the oonoeption of the Aot and the Deed, 
whioh a ant had formulated, and which Hegel develops in hie 
philosophy of Oeiat* And it ie to Fiohte that we must look 
if we wish to discover the immediate origins of Hegel*a thinking 
on the subjeot of self-oonsoiousness as act, and its related 
oonoeption, the need for recognition* if Hegel avoided 
Fiohte*a abstract argument, it was beoause he had a more 
profound awareness than Fiohte that the life of spirit 
(rational, self-oonselous* negative cotton) "la not the life 
that shrinks from death and keeps Itself undeflled by 
devastation, but ie the life that endures and preserves Itself 
in death0 (2)* If we love life more than freedom, we become, 
as we shall see in the following discussion of the relation of 
Lord and slave, the elave who seeks life in life* Reciprocal 
recognition is costly* It is a kind of death* This Fiohte 
does not appear to have understood*
quoted Sittai MUftj pg. 158
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"belf-co aciouaneos la prl arily simple existence tor self, 
self-identity, by exclusion of every other from itself. It 
takes Its essential nature and absolute objeot to be Ego* and 
in this immediacy, in this bare faot of ito self-existence, it 
is individual", But when "the other is also s self-co aoiouanesq 
an individual makes ito appearance in anti-thesis to an 
individual. Appearing thus in their immediacy, they are for 
each other in the manner of ordinary objects" «,«,, they "have 
not risen above the bare level of life11 •••• "They have not 
yet revealed themselves to each other as existing purely for 
themselves, l,e: as self-consciousness, Each is Indeed
certain of its own self, but not of the other, and henoe its 
own certainty of Itself is still without truth", Each must 
aim "at the destruction and death of the other", each oust risk 
its own life, if they are to bring the "certainty of being for 
themselves to the level of objective truth ,,,, The relation 
of both self-consciousnesses is in this way so constituted that 
they prove themselves and each other through a life-death 
struggle" (1),
In this extended quotation, Hegel speaks not only of the 
need for recognition, which we saw in the previous sections to 
be the condition of assured self-eonsclousneas, but also of 
what he now calls the struggle of life anddeath (kaapf auf 
leben und Tod), by which mere existence, natural existence, 
becomes existence for eelf (Furslchsein), Natural exlate ee 
is/
1, Hegelt P,S, pg, 231-2
is a kind of living death9 for without that negation of the 
givenneea of nature whioh distinguishes consciousness from what 
it ia not, there ia no freedom of spirit* «ant aeyo .ojeve, 
interpreting Hegel9 ie not a being who let he ie a nothingneeo 
who negates being* The negation of being is action* Freedom 
of spirit is negativity9 and ie unaotual except in aotivity9 
and that means, present only in that negative notion which 
negates the given* Hegel calls thie action a "twofold action - 
action on the part of the other and action on the part of 
Itself" (1)* Kojeve points out that initially one seeks to 
be reoognized without recognising in return. For when desire 
( e ierde) becomes desire for another man, the initial dee ire 
to negate hie freedom by making him on objeot of appropriation 
beco-es the dealre for the opposite* It becomes a desire for 
recognition* But the double irony of the matter le that 
"they only recognize themselves" ae "mutually recognizing one 
another"» (a£o m .KtaRM R SlSfai ale £ & &
anerkemiend) (2)* They become antagonists in a "trial by 
death" (3), beoause9 par&doxioally9 they need one-another to 
become what they are not yet9 but both struggle to become* <*>an, 
says Kojeve, is able to negate naturet even his own empirical 
(animal) nature* He oan will doath9 risk his life, for this 
is his negative being (4)* Thus, there ia for Kojeve, a living 
interoonneotlon between the following concepts. Work and
struggle • Freedom * Time * History • Transience » nothing « an.(5) •"There/
1* P*S* pg* «-OP*2* r.S* pg* 231* German ed* pg* 143*3* Ibid pg* 233 (engllsh ed*)4. Alexandre Kojeve; a la lcpturo <£ i.qkg!Paris 1947 (though delivered at thehoole dee Haute8 Itudeo 
in iaria be tv/eon 1933 and 1939 end distributed In 
mimeographed form during these years)* of Commentary on oh* iv of P.S* also pgs* 161* 493-4#
5. Kelly; fiflUUgfl i M  faAjlSMa PS* 313.
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"There must be this struggle", says Hegel, "for they must 
bring their certainty of themselves, the certainty of being for 
themselves, to the level of objective truth, and make this a 
fact both in the ease of the other and in their o m  oese us veil’* 
"It ie solely by risking life that freedom is obtrined")
(Is 1st allein das Oarcnaetsen dee Lebene, wodurch die 
Freiheit fcew&hrt wird), for selbstbejmsstsein is not dein. it 
is not being or bare existence, or itself in the immediate form 
in which it appears (1). Fcr the contrary to what is 
apparently the case to be made manifest, the negativity and 
freedom of aclbotbewusatsein must appear fro* within the life of 
ite opposite, pure identity, animal life, natural being*
"Each must aim at the death of the other, &9 it risks its own 
life thereby" (2), and in their trial by death, “cancel their 
consciousness which had its place in this alien element of 
natural existence" (3).
Thus, it is by way of conflict, antagonism, end a struggle 
of life and death, that recognition end affirmation between 
unproved, natural selves can come about* In recognition, or 
mutual ree- eot (Anerkennung) * a genuine interdependence could 
emerge, whioh oould have overcome the dependci oe-indepsndenoe, 
life-death dualism# But Hegel argues that the negativity of
consciousness in these phases is abstract* The antagonists do 
not maintain their opposition* Thus, they fall apart* For 
Hegel, as for Heraclitus, it ie opposition whioh brings things 
together* when opposition ceases, disintegration and 
fragmentation occurs* The antagonists fall back into abstract 
dependence/
1# ?#S* pge. 232-2332* F.n. pg* 233
3. Ibid pg. 233.
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depend® oe end independence*
In the ease of the two antagonist* in question* life 
becomes more previous than their froedoat immediacy than spirit* 
They become abetroot momenta (abatrtJttc moment*). "Tiieir 
Act"* says Kegsl* "is abstract negation*** and so their active 
opposition is not genuinely aufaehoben (negated or oaneelled* 
and preserved* eublated or sublimated)* The essential point 
Is that each of the antagonists becoes "aware that life is as 
essential to It as pure self •consciousness* (1)* They choose 
to return to the stability of immediate* natural Ilfs* rather 
than continue becoming what they are not* They choose to 
remain what they are* rather than die to what they are* In 
beoomlng what they are not* They choose perr*anenoe* security* 
life* naturet rather than negativity* death* freedom and 
spirit* They "1st one another go quite indifferently* like 
things"* says Hegel* rather than continue in the struggle which 
alone would have driven then beyond this abstract nonent toward 
a living* integrated reciprocity (2)* They fall back into 
"oonsolousnesa in the form and shape of thlnghood" (3)* They 
become lord and slave*
Hegel is arguing hers that the struggle of life and death 
does not destroy unity* but constitutes it* a point Hsidsggsr 
has sinos mads in his dlsousslon of Keraolltus' conceptions 
of Tto XfcfAos end A o y o  in fAp Introduction to tletaphyaios*
(4)* To the common understanding Cas for common sense and 
ordinary language; life is life* death is death* and never the 
two shall asstf and similarly* ep«-s or strife is strife* m l  
Aoyo* is Aoyo* • But for Hegel* as for Heraclitus* the 
oonfllot/
(Doubleday Anchor) pg* 51*
105 to 115.
conflict whioh leads to opposition and antagonism ia precisely 
that whioh brings the antagonists together. That whioh 
coat ter a gathers. Jesus is reported to have said 9 whoever 
cares for his own safety is lost) but if a man loss hlaself 
for my sake, he will find hie true self9 (1). To decide to 
choose life in immediacy, in natural existence, in mere being, 
is death. The direct way slways fails. For true life is to 
be achieved not in life but in death. If we are unwilling to 
risk death, or to struggle with the other, we fall back into the 
death of natural life. We are redeemed from this desth not in 
life but in death. This is THE truth whioh these two abstract 
modes of consciousness foil to comprehend. The life of spirit, 
says Hegel, does not shrink or shun death by keeping Itself 
undsflled by devastation, but is the life that endures death 
end lives in death. It only wine to its truth when it finds 
itself dismembered, broken nnd.omi when it looks the negative 
in the face and dwells with it (2). The way of spirit is not 
direot, it is the Umweg. the detour. The truth of spirit is 
the truth of the concrete 'Thole, not the truth of soae 
abstraction from the whole. Thus, in the words of 'arouse,
"the birth of truth requires the death of a given state of 
being ..,•••• it is not a faot but s task" (3).
It is, of course, obvious that the inhuman, or prehuman 
sxlstenoe of man, the reality of man prior to his self- 
actualization, is not death in the physlo-blologloal sense.
It is the death of abstraot deteralnaoy, a conditioned, finite, 
determined, unmoving pernanenoe, in whioh there ie no hops 
because there is no integration of coming-to-be end ceasing-to-be
la/
X* Matthew Ch. 16, verse 23.2. P.S. pg. 93*
3. M s s m  re* 26.
In becoming* Men aust transcend abstract life, by forsaking 
being for time and becoming* * Abstract1 for Hegel, means 
onesided, unmediated, disconnected, finite, static beingt 
Concrete, as its opposite, means many-sided, mediated, 
integrated, the truth of the Whole, and thus wholeness and 
Wholesomeness* Simple existence Is abstract, only the aotual 
is truly oonorete*
We must also notloe, here, that strife for Hegel le beyond 
good and evil* For Hegel, the life-death struggle ie just and 
right, beoause it alone brings all things together, end in 
achieving their living intercon action, coalescence and 
conjunction, finds the balance between them whioh alone le just* 
For Anaximander, conflict, opposition and strife are unjust, and 
domination must be atoned for by retribution; whereas 
Heraolitus deliberately contradicts this by saying *Wor ie 
common and right, or justice is strife; all things happen by 
strife and necessity9 (1)* Once again, Hegel agrees with 
Heraclitus*
In this dieeueslon of the struggle of life end death,
Hegel has in mind not only the division and integration whioh 
dialeotic alone comprehends, but also the empirical foot of the 
ftflaa&toa SmtBk S M m  ***<*& #>«• hand in hand with 
individualistic discrimination, sad whioh Hobbes intended to 
control in hie oonoeption of the Leviathan state* Hegel also 
has In mind the Inherent solipsism of the perspeotlval nature of 
immediate experienoe; for we can never transcend, or reduoe, 
or forget, that there is no experienoe, and oo no world, without 
an experiencing subjeot or 919. I am always the subjeot of my 
experiences;/
1* Kirk & Haven: Ireaocratios Fr* 112 pg* 117ff, Fr* 214 pg*
199ff.
experiences, no-one experiences ay experiencing for me*
For even if I empathise with another* or learn from another9• 
experience; it ie always 919 who empathize, 9I9 who leanu 
"There is"* says Uerleaa-i onty” a solipsism rooted in living 
experience which is unite lnaurmounteble"(l)* This is* of 
course* the age-old problem of other minds* We cannot formulate 
an adequate discussion of this problem in this study* is 
ought therefore to say little more than that Hegel9 s conception 
of the struggle for recognition in the trial by death entails 
the view that the other as Ego-subject oan never be experienced* 
for it is only the other as immediate faotlclty* or as object* 
that is in prlnolple * possible object of sxperlsnoe* For 
Hegel, this view la aufrchoben when immediacy ie overcome in 
mediation, for the latter has Its lnpllolt ~T6Xos in self- 
oonsolouaness* This means that solipsism is overcome if the 
Ilf e-death struggle is endured* and a new interdependence of 
antagonistic Egos* a new reciprocity is bom* for in self- 
consciousness, which is socio-historlc rather than natural* and 
comprehended rather then known* the alienation of the objeot 
from the subject is overcome* Substance osases to be what it 
is as other than what it is not| substimoe becomes subject and 
the eelf regains Itself in an integrated cohere; oe of life and 
meaning*
We have argued that* for Hegel* all oonsdousnese is 
psrspeotlval* not because no two consciousnesses oan experience 
the same object-environment from the same place at the same tloe* 
though this relates to our discussion, but beoause consciousnesses 
appear mutually exclusive even In the sharing of a common* 
intersub j ective/
1* kerlcqn- ontyi J ibnpmgQQlogy Perception pg. 358.
In leraubjective truth* Our truth ia possible only because it 
ie, first of all, yours or mine. The truth of oaa absolute 
6'isaen (absolute knowledge) is the truth of all perspectives 
at the point where they interconnect, the still point around 
which the truths of the “Bacchanalian whirl” and eostacy 
revolve, and without which they would immediately dissolve or 
collapse (1/* The point we must grasp if we are to understand 
Hegel is that we lo«e the still point, the A©yo& we can trust 
because it is what it is in a multitude of changing determination* 
if we lose the movement and the instability of becoming* There 
is much to be sai.d for koyre'a view that hegel's note in hie 
Jena lectures of 1803-4 is the truth of his esoh&tological 
metaphysic* eist 1st ~<eit (2,* Ie must xxot coxif .se, as 
Kelly does in bis critique of the Koyre-Kojeve interpretation 
of Hegel, Kegel's notion of Zeit with the conventional category. 
For Hegel, finite and infinite, eternity and time belong 
together; they are opposites whose interaction maintains all 
rational becoming, or actuality ( ar*liohkeit)* As such, 
namely in their being aui7:cheben. Kelt takes on a new meaning*
It aoea not mean finitude, but the living unity of finite and 
infinite in deist* For Kelly, Zeit has the conventional 
meaning, and eternal aeana that which is not temporal* If 
Hegel were using these concepts in this way, Kelly would indeed 
be correct to deny that deist 1st Zeit* But Hegel argues that 
eternity is not that wh-ch is not temporal, it is not the 
logical opposite of time in the sublated, or mediated sense, 
though of course it is in its immediate sense* Kelly quotes a 
passage from Hegel'a unovclopaedla which says precisely this.
The Zeit/
1. 1.3. pg4 105. < ,2. Aoyrdi Hegel & Je^a pg. 449.
The *eit which le Ceiat le the coalescence of tine end eternity 
understood as opposites by the common understanding (1)*
Kegel•» belt cannot be divorced from his system of interconnecting 
concepts. In which every fixed - and in this sense finite, - 
dualism is auf^ehoben. (transformed to become a part of the 
tfhole which encompasses all things)* Oeist 1st eit. because 
it ie only at the end what it is in truth. It is not the 
Alpha, but the Omega of Cod which encompasses the me ruing of 
our Christian oonoeption of Cod ae the living Cod.
ie continue to clarify this conception of llfe-death 
struggle in the next seotion, by comparing Freud with iiegel on 
this point.
1. of. Kelly: Idealism* politics and hiatoryi
Sources of Hegelian Thought 1969, pg* 313ff
CHAPTER VI '
PART 2
HISTORY AS tftlAT MAH DOES WITH i^ATHt HEGEL AND FKKUD
For Freud, aocording to drown (1) "Ever thing depends upon 
establishing the differenoe, as well as the continuity, between 
man and the rest of organio life". In the book "Civilisation 
and its dieoontents", Freud formulates his view on the matters 
e have been discussing, and in particular on the contradlotions 
in human nature described in the Ihenomenology as a Life-death 
struggle* Freud9s later dualism of the Life-instinot, Eros> 
and the death-instinot, Ehanatoa. derives from his study of one 
of the most fundamental contradictions of human nature, the 
sado-masoohistio complex. (Aggression toward others and toward 
self). man both loves and hates, he both loves and seeks to 
destroy others; he both loves and see? ato destroy himself*
why? Freud's first theory of the inetinots suggests that 
man is basically a loving animal forced by the reality principle 
to unloving behaviour* According to brown, (2), Freud 
eventually rejeoted this liberal optimist position that man ie 
inherently good and peaceful, and that his aggressive behaviour 
is therefore the result of environmental frustrations. He 
began to realise that environmental frustrations, though 
important, do not account for manfe very aggressive and 
destructive nature.
So Freud, seeking aa always to relate the psyohologioal to 
the biologioal, sought to explain the aabivalenoe between Kroa 
and aggression on the level of instinotual human life, in 
relation to the fundamental dualism of life and death at the 
level of organis life* On the biological level, "The goal of 
all life ia death" (3)I On the human level there ie the
fundaarotaX/-------------------------------------------------
X. Life i- i.lnat Keath pg. 99. ** owe thi. .xposltion of
Fwiui to aoraan Brown.
2. Ibid pg. 98.
3. do-vond Jfcg. pXeagure piAnqAPlg PS* 30
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fundamental dualism of i.ros and Thenatoa. the life-lnstinot 
and the death-lnstlnot* The sado-maaochistie complex derives 
from the death-instinct* He therefore posited a "primary 
masochism" - the death-instinot, end saw extroverted aggression 
(sadism) as an extroverted death instinct* Freud's biological 
dualism is thus formulated in such a way aa to explain both 
sadlstio and masochistic aggressiveness and destructiveness; 
the death instinct was the principle behind both*
Freud suggests, according to brown, that neurosis is a 
huiafn privilege, because the conflicts between the life and 
death instincts which cause neurosis do not exist at the organic 
level* There is a dialectical unity of life and death at the 
biological level; death is a part of life, the goal of all 
life is death (1)* Neurosis is flight from death, as well as 
flight from life and sexuality* Animals live with death as a 
part of life* It is man's flight from death that makes him 
man (Unamuno) (2)* Man's aggression toward others is a fusion 
of the life and death instincts which saves man from the 
self-destructive power of the death-instinct* A desire to 
kill replaces a desire to die* It is this principle of the 
death-instinct which, for Brown, links psychology to history, 
and incidentally Freud to Hegel (3)#
Brown rightly argues that Hegel tried to find the essence 
of man not in thinking but in human desires and human suffering*
Our exposition of the . nenomenology bears this out very clearly* 
The firat of Hegel's attempts to find the essence of man found 
it in Love, Lrosi the second, that in the 'Fhenoaenolojgy of 
Spirii',/
1* Brown Ibiu pg* 100
2* +rr../-ric oenac of Life pgs. 20 end 41
3. Brown I M d wt. 10U
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Spirit*. in death. It was only in thia second at Unapt that 
Hegel was able to grasp man as essentially a history-making 
creature. To have a history means to have a being hose 
existence is not eeasnoe; it means that history is what man 
does with death (1).
Freud suggests that the aggressive drive to master nature 
and to muster man is the result of an extroverted death-Juistinot• 
The desire to die has sen transformed into the desire to kill* 
destroy or dominate. Hegel postulates, says Brown, a 
transformation of the consciousness of death into a struggle 
to appropriate the life of another human being at the risk of 
one9a own life. This, as we shall see in a moment, becomes 
the dialectic of lord and Slave. similarly, argues Brown,
Hegel9e other fundamental category of history, human work of 
labour ie a transformation of the negativity or nothingness of 
death into the extroverted aotlon of negating or ohanglng 
nature. Time, for Hegel is what man makes out of death.
The dialeotio of history is the dlaleotle of timet time ie 
negativity, and negativity is extroverted death. Brown 
acknowledges a large debt to Kojeves interpretation of Hegel 
in his 9Introduction & la lecture de Kegel9 (2). Kojeve 
argues, as we have seen elsewhere, that for Hegel, man does not 
have a H hum an nature" onoe and for all. l*sn is a nothingness 
which negates, ae Time in spatial being. ban ie not identical 
with himself; he ie at odds with himself; he la a contradiction 
&an, for Hegel, ie sick. his being becomes what it ie only 
through the negation, or transformation, of the given on the 
basis of a future whioh is not yet. The future ia nothin&iesa
______________________________________________________________
1. Ibid pg, 102
1. kSjeve Ibid pgs. 11*34, 364-80, 490-513, 527-73.
(project); actualized only through aotion (iat)« struggle 
(katnpf) and work (Arbeit) (1).
uerllau-^onV agrees with kojeve that freedom, in Kogel, 
ie freedom for death, but warns us that this is not primary*
Fan9a being, says Merlean Fonty, ia a being whioh ia not, a 
nothing whioh oan deny end so become aware of things, an 
existence without an essenoe (2)* But the consciousness of 
death whioh discloses this to me is really a consciousness of 
life (3). Domination, sadism and violence destroy themselves 
just os consciousness of death goes beyond itself* I beoome 
aware of death in the life-death struggle with the other, for 
^erlean-honty as for Hegel, but oonsclouaness of self as death 
and no things 88 are deceitful, since they both contain an 
affirmation of being and of life* Similarly, - and we have 
discussed these points in full eleewhere - the death of self as 
subject in the other9s gaze cannot but re-afflrm the subjeot 
who experiences the gase, and my gazing at him re-affira hie 
aubjeotlvity* "I live not for death but forever, not for 
myself alone but for other people", concludes Merle nil-ionty (4).
Drown argues that Hegel (and therefore kerlean-ionty) 
needs reformulation in the light of peyoho-analysis• It is 
not oonsclouaness of death that is transformed Into agreesion, 
the will to live and to dominate others, it is the unconscious 
death-instinct (5). Bros and Ihanatoa* the pleasure principle 
and the Nirvana principle, cause a dynamic restless striving
in man because men, unlike the animals, does not have a 
balanced equilibrium of tension and release between them* 
depression/
-------- s----------------------------------------------------------------
1* hojeve Ibid p g *  175 of* also p p .  12, 30, 167, 178, 532 of*Habil: herle n-ionty pg* 78.2. Merleau Fonty: Sense and Nonsense pg. 66.
3. Ibid pg. 68.
4 *  S e n s e  and N o n s e n s e  p g .  7 0 .
5 .  Brown I b i d  p g .  1 0 2 .
Repression onuses en instinct-determined fixation to the 
repressed past; and ao produoos tiie effort to recover the past* 
Man9e historicity, according to Brown's interpretation of Freud, 
oannot be fully understood without this idea of fixation to the 
past* The refusal to (>ro« old is the point of contaot between 
fixation to the paet and repression of death* Repression 
produces unconscious fixation to the infantile past; both 
death and life instincts are forced into repression* Repression 
of life means that life oannot affirm death (as it does on the 
organic level); it must fly from death* Death oan only affirm 
Itself and life by denying life*
Brown's exposition of Freud's three forme of death, the 
Nirvana prinolple, the repetitlon-oompulelon (fixation to the 
past) and the eado-masochietio complex suggests that Hegel's 
philosophy of death laoks integration with the org&nio Pspeots 
of man's nature, beoause for Freud it is the destruction of 
the biological unity of life and death whioh forces the Nirvana 
prinolple into the pleasure prinolple, the repetition compulsion 
into fixation to an infantile paet, death instinct into aggressive 
negativity (1)* On the other hand, Hegel does say that "the 
nature of finite things ae such le to have the seed of passing 
away as their essential beingt the hour of their birth ie the 
hour of their death" (2)* The question raised here ie the 
relation between the death of the human organism and the 
"thought of death11 whioh Kierkegaard understood with suoh 
penetration in hie discourse on the decisiveness of death at 
the side of a grave (3)* If Freud is right that at ths 
biologloal/
1* Brown Ibid pg* 104
2* Hegel i Science of Logio I pg* 142 (Johnstone * Strutnerstranslation)*
3* Kierkegaard: pg. 75-115 of Thoughts on oruolal situationsin human life.
biologioal level death ia a part of life and la not opposed to it, 
and t at this ought to be the oase for man, but is not because 
man represses and flees from death, then what man may be yearning 
for Is some kind of biological unity, a return to organic 
equilibrium* To discuss whether this is the case or not would 
take too long, and anyway falls outside the scope of this 
preliminary comment on Hegel's notion of death*
tie shall return again to this queotion of whether a dualism 
of life and death, in which they are set apart as mutually 
exclusive opposites, or a dialectic, in whioh they are gathered 
together in Resurrection, is more in accord with the uaapp&rent 
Truth ( .,ahrit*m X &  e uoc ) of our ongoing experience of things* 
To answer it, our discussion appears to transcend the now 
sacred boundary between faith and knowledge which Kant so ably 
re-enforced, and whioh others have often uncritically and 
slavishly endorsed* It does so not out of blasphemous pride, 
but beoause the incarnation of the A ©y©s of God entails a 
gathering, rather than a scattering, of what appears self- 
evidently divorced* Faith and knowledge come together when 
they accord with the Aoyos ; they become a knowing faith, and 
a faithful knowledge, a living harmony ( <*f |*©vCu) in whioh 
they become the "thinking whioh comprehends" ('/crnunfti Das 
b.grelfendc denken). O /\oyoi brings not peace but a sword, 
only because it is In him that all things gather* If we are to 
begin with the Word made flesh, as Hegel doee, then our faith 
must think what this means with a reasoning whioh accords with 
it, rather than with a reasoning which accords to external norms* 
It must also be with a reasoning which proceeds in the freedom 
and confidence of faith* It is true that Hegel's attempt to 
unite/
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unite faith and knowledge in a reason which encompasses both* 
while retaining their creative distinction and opposition was 
dissolved by almost every thinker from Karx to Xlerkegaardf 
but does this dissolution still stand as valid? Can its 
consequences, such ae the rigid dualism of life and death» 
adequately express anything more sure than our subjective opinion? 
It io with Truth, not opinion, that wo ought to be dealing in our 
fides quaerens Intelleotus, If both natural life, end ths 
desolation of death were brought together and transcended in ths
resurrected, all-encompassing life of the lnoernate Aoyo* »
then the thinking whioh gathers these opposites together 
(Dialectic) is surely more in accord with the Truth* In that 
case, dialectic will be for us, ae it was for Hegel, the most 
faithful and the most knowledgeable - and so the most reasonable - 
way of comprehending THS truth, in and through the many truths 
and untruths, the urny correct and incorrect opinion** thoughts one 
attitudes with whioh men have sought to understand ths gods, 
thsir world, end God* To deny knowledge to make room for faith 
may make a reasonable faith impossible. We must surely deny 
the ultimate validity cf the opposition between faith and 
knowledge if we are to comprehend what we believe end what we 
know, Hegel was as sure as Kant that we do not reason in order 
to know, and as uure as Kierkegaard that we do not reason in 
order to believe, for our knowledge beglne with experience, 
and our belief with the A£y©s of God* 10 reason, on the 
contrary, in order to comprehend what we know and believe* If
the self both knows and believes, end nonetheless seeke to retain 
his integrity (the wholeness and health of an undivided self- 
consciousness), then he must learn to urns Hegel*8 ladder by whioh 
he/
he may climb toward an integrated comprehension both of what 
he knows and of what he believes* He must surely learn the 
strange dialeotioal speech of Hegelfs logic of Seiat (Spirit)*
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PAHS It
THE L0RL-3LAVK RELATIOK
The struggle for recognition (^amof dea Anerkennena) 
becomea the relation of Lordship and servitude Glerraohaft und 
knechtaohaft)when one of the antagonists renounces his claim 
for recognition, choosing natural life rather than negativity and 
freedom, and the other, the conqueror, refuses to recognize him, 
but uses him, inatead, aa a means to an end, the end being 
eelf-reoognition, being-for-aelf* (juraiohoein), The former, 
the slave, falls book from the payohologioal and social trial 
by death into immediate life, or purely natural, biological 
exlatenoe* he seek a life in and through life, rather than in 
death* he recoils from negativity, and loaee hla freedom as a 
result* lie chooses the stable positivity of being, rather than 
the creative negativity of becoming* The Lord gains rightful 
mastery over the slave by having risked hie life* hia life la a 
life in death* The Lord achieves self-recognition and so assured 
self-existence in the slave•e recognition of hia as his Lord* 
lie becomes for-himeelf (Fur aloh* or in French translation 
pour-soi) whet he ie ln-himself (An aloh - ^  sol)
The life-death struggle has ended* The victor end the 
vanquished take their place aa stable modes of being, belonging to 
an ordered psychological or social structure* At this moment 
or stage in their becoming, the scene appears to be at rest*
The Lord ie Lord, the slave ie slave* Lords are not slaves, 
neither are slaves Lords, Indeed, they are opposites,
A ■> A* A is not both A and not A, Everything is what it is and 
not/
J
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not another thing* We know where we are; there ie order9
there ere facts whioh cannot be denied. Only the deranged
confuse Lords and slavesv only the philosophers choose not to 
discriminate between what are so obviously dissimilar.
Conn on sense* speaking ordinary language according to its 
rules and oonventlons« distinguishes between Lords and slaves.
In this vein, Hegel writesi The Lord (or master) la the 
oonsclouaness that exists for itself (her Herr 1st das fur sioh 
selends Bewuastsein) (1). As such he is independent. whereas 
the slave Is natural* immediatedf conditioned life; he ia 
dapandsnt, being tor another (in atiS £j£ Si& Andrea). ia£ 
Kerr a the Lord or Master* relates to der /.necht* the slave 9 by 
way of two moments; the slave Is an object of the Lordvs deeire9
a thing; end he ia the sine qua non of the Lord9© self*
recognition. hojeve remarks tha t the Lord will never be 
satisfied* for the slave9s recognition is that of an enslaved 
consciousness* it is not free (2). The Lord relates himself to 
the slave directly* but to nature indirectly (»• He ie 
Independent in their immediate relation* for he has
the slave in his chains. But when he sets the slave to work 
(Arbeit) it becomes apparent that he ie dependent (unaelbatandig) 
upon him for the transformation of natural raw material (alien 
realityf the given) into a human world (the product of human 
work). The Lord holds the slave in compulsive subordination* 
but the slave is necessary to the Lord as the one who mediates 
between him and nature. But Lords are still Lords* they are 
selbstandigsi and slaves are slaves* they are •
M s a H
scepticism*
Hegel le not trying to describe or explain certain sooial 
and psychological facts. His purpose is not to achieve a more 
adequate knowledge of the faots as they are. The hano^enologr 
is not a conventional investigation* It ia true that Hegel 
begins with fact, with the facts aa they are already kno<*n* It 
is a fact that there does not appear to have been a time when 
men have not enslaved one-another* The Lord-slave dualism le 
also an important logical category of all social theory. It 
le a fact that the Individual is divided, that reason has been 
conceived both as slave of the passions (Hume) and as Lord of 
the passions (Kant), that a Lord-slave dualism is a 
psychological as well as a social fact. The Lord-slave dualism 
encompasses both the soolo-historic and the psyohologioal 
(individual) dimensions of human existence. There ie an 
opposition between HerrachaTt and .---leohtioWt. Lordship and 
servitude, whioh social and psyohologioal theory correctly 
describes. But Hegel is arguing that however considerable our 
correctness (Klohtigkeit -of&oTr|S ), however well our 
propositions accord both with the faots and with conventional 
usage, there are reasons for recognising or comprehending that 
correctness hides ae well ae reveals THE Truth (wahrheit - *- 
X^& cloO* Thus his intention in this dialeotioal account ie 
to dlacloae the Truth whioh hides itself even in correct 
opinions, and correct propositions, concerning Lordship end 
servitude, .Ve have learned in the course of our previous 
discussion that Hegel*s phenomenology is not analytical but 
dialeotioal. Analysis ( l s), mesne to act apart,
separate, discriminate, divide, spread out or dissolve.
Analysis le the method of the common understanding, whether it 
be critical of the conventions of ordinary language usage or not, 
when/
when it achieves philosophical articulation. Dialectical 
reason* on the other hand* recognises that a correct proposition 
may be untrue if it ia asserted or expressed in suoh a way that 
it becomes clear that there is no adequate comprehension of the 
living con vections * or oommon measure* or ongoing development 
of the vVfcole* of whioh the proposition is an integral part if 
it is even partially oorreot. Dialectic gathers* in notions 
like alienation (Kntfremdung). or Absolute Gelat (Absolute spirit) 
and Daoeinsnder Geist (Existing* finite spirit)* what Is 
conventionally set apart. We see dialectic in action in the 
treatment of what appears to be an absolute* truncated dualism* 
whether of a bifurcated society* or of a divided consciousness, 
in the following discussion. Hegel*a notions of alienation and
spirit encompass both the psychological and the social or 
historical dimensions of human-being, the Internal and the 
external. His psychology of development (Dildunftsroman) is 
through and through historical. It can be understood only if we 
begin to think dlaleotioally.
Hegel describes the Lord as the one «ho has overcome his own 
nature in his overcoming and enslaving the other; yet the 
natural world remains untouched by him* it remains alien and 
hostile. It is the slave who through struggle and work becomes 
master of the natural world, even though he is not master of his 
own nature. The Lord is master of his own and the slave9a nature 
but although, as Kojivs reminds us, the Lord con die as a man, 
risk his life in the struggle of life and death; he llvo^as an 
animal. The Lord fights end la willing to die like a men, but 
consumes like on animal, without having worked to satisfy his 
appetites and desires* The master lives in a human, hietorio 
world* the slave in the natural world. The slave mediates* 
through/
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through negative notion and work, between nature and spirit,
natural existence and history, the organic and biological
and the social and psychological* The smster9s satisfaction
is not secure, hie being-for- self ie onesided, abstr&ot*
He enjoya the produo tup f hia slave9 a work, but hia independence
ia quite obviously at the expense of the slave* So the Lord
is dependent upon the slave* He cannot be satisfied* But his
dissatisfaction is twofold* Because the slave is not free to
recognize the meter, but recognises him out of fear and anxiety,
the master9s eelf-reoognition is not fulfilled* nA form of
recognition ha ..arisen that ie one-eided and unequal", says Hegel*
"Just where the master has effectively achieved Lordship, he
really finds that something has come about quite different from
an independent consciousness* It is not an inde, endent but a
dependent oonsolouaness that he has achieved. He is thus not
assured of self-existence (being-for-aelf: Purslchseln. etre-
i>our-aoi) as hie truth) he finds that his truth ia rather the
unessential consciousness" (i*e: the one who ie bound to nature,
poaltlvlty, the slave) (1)*
The slave is the truth of the Lord* tfhat does Hegel mean?
He means that the Lord is slave of the slave* Lordaare not in
truth what they appear to be* The faote deoeive, they are not
true, they are not worthy of whole-hearted trust* We make
apeak of the Lord with perfeot correctness, but unless our
correctness, and our apparent certainty ie qualified in
dlaleotlc&l comprehension, our correctness and our certainty will
become divorced from truth (Wahrheit)* To assert that a
particular proposition is true or correct (riohtigkelt), or to
have a oorreot knowledge of a faot, ie no guarantee that we have 
comprehended/
1• P•8 * pgs* 2 36—7•
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comprehended Truth* Correct opinion docs not have the freedom 
to "sink into and pervade the content1* (1)* Lord and slave are 
opposites; but oontrary to what appears, opposites cohere, 
they interconnect, they fuse into one another. The content ie 
living* It becomes, Thereto a living unity in the becoming 
( yevcsis) of ongoing experienoe, between coming-to-be (Hegel9e 
dynamic reformulation of the abstraction To <w t being), and 
eeaslng to be (hie reformulation of the term To ^  t
not-being). If we allow our thinking to relax Into the freedom 
of dialeotioal Besson, we shall notice thie in the oase of the 
relation of Lord and slave. Lords are Lords, and slaves are
slaves* A - A, A ie not both A and not A* This ie the
first moment* But knowledge is not comprehension, nor hearing 
heeding, nor seeing noticing, nor understanding (Veratend)
Reason (Vemunft)* Reason oomprenends the hidden connection 
between the Lord and the slave, the oo-Inherence of the one In
the other, whioh is missed by those who remain bound to the
fixations of common sense, and to the unexamlned assumptions of 
the conventions of ordinary language. It may be oorrect to say 
that a Lord ia a Lord and not something else, and certainly not 
a slave, Hegel has no quarrel with correctness as such, for It 
has validity in its particular frames of reference. But 
correctness is not Truth, A correct opinion is true in oo far 
ao it is asserted with the awareness that it le not the whole 
Truth, but a partof the tfhole, A correct opinion is untrue when 
it claims to be the Whole Truth, and not a part,
Hegel describes the dialeotioal transformation of the 
apparent opposition of Lord and slave as followst We must bear 
la/
1, P.S* pg, 116-7; Kaufmann tranol* pgs* 440-442,
in mind that Herraohait and Kncohtsohaft a m  not oonoapta 
( v o n ^ n T *  ., whioh o n  fixed and inflexible, dimmed from 
conoret© oontent. They are living* oo crete forms ( etb^ 
ii> 4otL )* forms united with content* flexible and capable of 
comprehending ytv/eerus * temporality* the eooming of all being. 
"Just as Lordship showed its essential nature to be the reverse of 
what it wants to be* so* too* bondage will* when completed* pass 
into the opposite of what it immediately let being a conscious­
ness repressed into Itself* and change around into real and true 
independence" (1). The slave appears at first to be being-for- 
another* a reduced existence* void of all traneoendenoe. The 
slave fell from negativity to static positlvity* from spirit to 
nature* from transoendenoe to identity and immediacy, and so his 
oo; solousnees appeared to have the "essential character of 
thlnghood" (2). By choosing life in life, rather than life in 
death, the elave alienates himself from his essential negativity* 
he is a tool in the hand of hla lord* an Instrument of hie 
lordvs Will.
But* says Hegel* we have been looking at the slave only from 
the polntjof view of the lord (3)* This ia a valid perspective, 
a partial truth, a stage or moment whioh must not be forgotten.
But the slave is man* he is a self-consciousness. Bondage has 
within Itself the truth of pure negativity (Alleln ale hat dieae 
Wahifa.lt due relnen n.gatlTitat) and belng-fommlf (Fumlohacln). 
The slave fears death. It le not some particular thing he fears 
at a particular moment of time* but the angst of absolute 
nothingness. The slave, a ays Hegel* "hacjbeen in that 
experience (of the nothing of death) melted to its inmost soul, 
has/
1* P.S. pg. 237.
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has trembled throughout its every fibre* and all that was fixed 
and steadfast las quaked within it# Tliie complete perturbation 
of ite entire substance* this absolute dissolution of all its 
stability into fluent continuity is however the simple ultimate 
nature of self-consciousness* absolute negativity (die absolute 
M i  rativitat), pure self-referrent* self-recognizing being-for-
Mlf Ciaa saifit gCfralohealn) (1).
Am/at drives the slave to work* and in work* he negates his 
"dependence on and attachment to natural existence" (2)# In 
work* (Arbeit)# the slave transcends his natural life* and once 
again grasps that life in death whioh is truly human# The 
Immediacy of life in life* the undialeotioal immanence of 
organic life* is negated in him* and his natural passivity 
overcome# "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom"* 
because fear drives the slave to work* and "through work and 
labour* the consciousness of the slave comes to itself" (3)# 
Deoire* in the Lord* which ie essentially unproductive* and 
inoapable of transcending animal existence* beco .ee labour in 
the slave# "Labour"* says Hegel* "shapes and fashions the 
thing (4)# Arbeit blldet# The slave1a negative notion oauseo 
the negativity of sslf-oonselousneso to pees into the form of the 
object* the object becomes the human product* the thing beoomea 
a deed# The slave becomes self-conscious in work* by negating 
the way things are# The slave beooi.ee himself by opposing and
negating the facts# Where he had once trembled* he now labours#
In oontraat to what we might say of the slave from the Lord9e 
point of view* we might say of him from hia own point of view* 
that labour is a death in life and a life in death whioh transcend 
nature/
1# Ibid pg# 237# Hoffmeister 148#
nature and gives birth to Gels (spirit). Or in the words of 
Simone Well, "Manual labour Is time entering the body. Through 
work non turns himself Into matter, as Christ does though the 
Eucharist* Work ie like death. We hove to pass through death* 
m  have to be killed - to endure the weight of the world. Work 
Is like a death, if it is without an incentive, We have to aot, 
renouncing the fruit of notion " (i), The slave works, but the 
fruit of his labours, the product, belongs by right to the Lord, 
The slave98 self-consciousness actualized in what he does, le 
alienated in that both he and hie product belong to another, 
Aotlng la negativity, for Hegel, (2), for activity is formative 
(3), It opposes a given reality and shapes it in accordance with 
the will of the agent (hooo agens). In hie critique of 
capitalism and bourgeois individualism entitled 9self-ooneoioua 
individuals associated as a community of animals and the 
deception thence arising* £i£ aaohe selbet9 (4), Hegel argues 
that "An individual oannot know what he le till he had made 
himself actual by action", (Dae Indlviduum kann dehor nloht 
wlssen, was os let, eh ee eioh durch dae Tun sur Wirkllehkelt 
gebraoht hat) ( 5) • H e m  correctly observes that "Hegel 
conceives labour as man9e act of self-oreation", (6), and Kojeve 
tirelessly stresses the notion of negative action inherent in all 
Hegel*s interconnected oonoepts of fork, Reason, Spirit, Freedom 
and Time, "Kan", says Kojeve, "ie not a being who ie; he ie 
nothingness which negates being. The negation of being le 
notion" (7). Ae the negation of the given, freedom oannot be
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possessed* It "ia" only in notion* The being of freedom ia 
the negation of being* Jcrn Hyppolite’s commentary on thia and 
related passage© draws heavily on Kojeve'a introduction* aa on 
Jeon Sahl’a atud yof "Lg aajjtfug <& Aa oo^aoifmoe Aarta 1* 
afeUr^ gJiMfi, da iia&l" (1929) (1). For -ahl, Uagal's uniting 
of the oonoepta of negativity* freedom* subjectivity and the 
prooeea of Aufhebun>% ia an effort to rationalise a depth that 
reason does not attain* "tfhat was there originally* at the 
bottom of the soul of the author of the Logic was a Christian 
vision of the Cross* and a Boehmean vision of the anger of God" 
(2)* For ahl* aa for hyppolite* the division of Lord and 
slave* both in society and in oonsclousness* ie a recurring 
thoao throughout the *.henoacnolo^y a£ Spirit*. »  shall •peak 
about its relation to li&rx in another eeetion* Herzen called 
Hegel*a Logio the "algebra of revolution"* and Carouse remarks 
that Hegel9 a contemporaries called his philosophy a "negative 
philosophy" with good reason (3)« Hess called Hegel9a 
philosophy "a critique of everything that was hitherto held to 
be the objective truth" (4>* Kegel9a philosophy negates things 
as they are* it ie Reason whioh contains* aa Stahl said* 9the 
principle of revolution9* The poaltiviets* says i arouse* 
redacted against Hegel9a principle of negativity and revolution* 
Their orientation toward matters of faot* and to experience of 
the facts* entails their "giving up the reel potentialities of 
mankind for a false world"* in a "world where facts do not at 
all present what reality oan and ought to be" (5)* ojeve* who 
had/
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had written a dissertation of Solovyev* a philosophy» stressing 
its philosophy of history (1)9 was able to revive Hegel's 
negative philosophy in Prance in the 1950*s# connecting the 
Hegelianism of iolovye# and his predecessors among the Hussion 
Slavophiles such as Ivan Klreyvsky and Alexis Khomiakov, with 
that of Larx (or the young &arx of the Parly »anu3crlnte of 1844)# 
and synthesising these with Husserlian phenomenology, Heidegger*a 
existentialism, and psycho-analytic thinking* koJeve*e was a
brillian achievement* He leotured at the Hcole dee i .autos
✓Ktudes in Paris between 1955 end 1959# (he took over the oourse 
began in 1951 by another Russian Alexandre hoyre# whose work#
"liege 1 g ifiBft"# we have already mentioned)* Wilfred heean tells 
us that "Sartre learned to study Hegel in the olasses of Kojeve 
Just before world was XI" (2)* Habll doubts this, as Sartre 
does not mention Xojeve in *fjfeta& jyy\ KfttttafflWi* and Simone do 
Beauvoir says she began to read the "Phenomenoloiar* in July,
1940# and does not mention .Kojeve in her autobiography (3)« 
However, Srrtre ia overwhelmingly indebted to Hegel both for the 
terminology and for the aubjeot-.natter of lar^e parts of * Being 
and flothlnsnega* * and the terms he usee are those Kojeve 
translated in the oourse of these introductory lectures on 
Hegel (4)* . arouse has argued that *I>oin/; and Kothin^neas*
is in large measure a restatement of Hegel *s V hanoncnology of 
3riUt* and Heidegger'a ' M a e  ate SiSi' (5), though, as «re shall 
see, Sartre9s early truncated, irredemable dualism of lour-aol 
(Hegel*s fur aioh) en-soi (Hegel9a im  aloh) is radically opposed 
to/
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to Hegel’s dialectical synthesis of the two ia 
C$tre-an-soi-pour-aol) * ierlean-ionty and Hyp poly te both 
attandad kojeve*a oouree, and the former had oloaa personal 
contact with Kojeve (1)# This lively interaction between 
philosophical interpreters of Hegel has considerable relevance 
to our discussion of the Lord-slave relation* We oan already 
see disagreement over the question of whether redemption from a 
fixated Lord-slave dualism, or liberation from the lif e-death 
struggle ie possible in prinoiple. For Uerlean-Ponty, the
dualism is overcome in every aot of perception in the lived
subject-objectworld prior to the abstract dualism of oritatfeiftgE&j for the early 
dartre, the Cartesian dualism ie insurmountable* ie have 
touched on this important disouesion of Hegel, and especially of 
the Lord-slave relation at thie point, recalling that in Franoe 
the problems with which we have to deal here have been the heart 
of a lively exchange between philosophers, sooial and psychological 
theorists, and theologians*
The interpretations of Hegel inspired or influenced by
Kojeve have, however, recently oorae under attack in the English-
\speaking world* C* A* Kelly accused the Koj eve-inspired readings
of Hegel of a tendenoe to "distort Lordshlp-Boadags in the total
negelian structure" (2)* For Kelly, these readings ignore the
subjective or psyohologioal dimension of the Lord-slave relation,
and they lay too much stress upon the sooial and historical
dimension ao ably taken up by Karl marx in hia early manuscripts
(1644)* Kelly notes that Flamanata follows the Kojeve
interpretation aa though it were established or self-evident (?)•
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Kelly believe® that kojeve9* repeated dictum that the future 
belongs with the slave la "an unwarranted and romanticized . 
refraction of Hegel9a thought" (!)• For -here did hegal say 
that the future belong® with the slave? We shall try to avoid 
some of the moat obvioua pitfall® that lie in the way of 
answering this question* For we eould soon find ourselves 
falling behind one or another opposing ideology* unable to see 
the living connections between them* Kelly ia aware of the long 
history of broken communication between the so-called followers 
of i*mrx on the one hand* (the future lies with the clavea}* 
and Kietssche on the other* (the future lies with the Lords)*
Or as Fesaard puts it* Marx9 3 impoverishment of the dialectic 
of Hegel leads in its turn to the rise of its opposite* Fascism 
(2)* Whilst those who know the work of Marx and Nietzsche will 
be aware of the tenuous relationship between them and present-day 
communism and fascism, Kelly9s warning that the "delicate 
balance" between Lord end slave in the dialectic ought not to be 
disturbed has considerable significance for our political 
thinking today* Kegcl9a argument la surely that the Lord is the 
slave of the slave end the slave the Lord of the Lord* contrary 
to all appearances. Kelly wishes to argue that the slave and 
the Lord both create history* the future la shared by both of 
them* for the slave can only invent history after the Lord has 
mads humanity possible (3). Marx says something very like this 
whan he orltielzes crude communism*
Another point Kelly argues is pertinent to our dlsousolon 
here* He says that democracy and slavery were olosely 
associated/
k
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associated in Hegel*s mind* The paradox, ae Hegel saw it, 
(according to Kelly) was that Antiquity had genuinely sought to 
understand the extent and significance of man* a self •alienation 
and enslavement, yet eonotioned slavery as an essential 
foundation for demooraoy, (there oould be no * beautiful 
antiquity* for iiegel)| and the enlightenment had attacked 
sooial and political enslavement but failed to notice the 
spiritual, psyohologioal, and philosophical dimension of self* 
alienation and enslave ent. Kelly la suggesting that we aee 
Hegel as one who stands where the sooial and historical 
dimensions of alienation meet the psyohologioal dimensions 
of the divided oonsolouanese. It is interesting to not# that 
Hegel treats the believing Christian aa an example of the 
divided consciousness, indeed the example par excellence of the 
two-world dislocation which alienates man, and at ths same time 
speaks of the Christian Aoyo* as ths one in whom alienation 
ie overcome. The A£yo* oonneots what le divided, whether it 
be social or psyohologioal, external or internal. He le trying 
to show how the impasse of the former ie overcome by way of the 
uciweg or detour of spirit, and the latter in the emergence of 
intersubjeotlve reason and self-integration. His dialectic has 
a distinctively Heraolltean ring whilst at the same time moves 
within the great themes of slavery, redemption and freedom whioh 
constitute the essential structure of the ongoing life of the 
Judae»»Chrlstlan tradition. that the conventional Christian 
attitude falls to grasp, namely, that every division whioh leads 
to alienation ia re-integrated in the Christian Aoy0* » Hegel 
seeks to comprehend. For beside the Truth of the Aoyos , 
the attitudes of the Greeks and the Chrlstlansor of the Jewish 
end /
and the enlightenment world-views appear blind and uncomprehending, 
hech fails in his own way to comprehend the A^yo^ or the 
"hcirriff«.
Hegel's purpose, here, is philosophical* He is not 
offering formal definitions of Lordship, slavery or freedom, nor 
is he connecting concepts of the understanding* He is not 
drawing our attention to new facts either* Esther, he Xa trying 
to show us how a new account of the facts we all already know 
throws a new and strange light over everything, enabling us to 
comprehend what we had known but failed to notice, or what we had 
assumed but failed to ex&mine* He is concerned neither with 
knowing nor proving, but with comprehending what we know and 
prove* To comprehend means, for liegel, to sec and to aot in 
aocordar.ee with the Christian ALyo* •
Hegel is saying something which is deceptively simple, and 
which it would appear we already know* He ia saying that despite 
all the difference between Lord and slave, despite their 
antagonism, both are man* Both are Implicitly free, and both 
are inherently spirit* Indebted to Schelling and the Sohlegel's, 
Piohte had postulated, according to aelly, a dualism of fnormals• 
and 'savages* as an a prion of history* All men are not in 
principle equal* Kelly writes! "Since Hegel believes that the 
phenomena of mastery and slavery result necessarily from the 
struggles of awareness and recognition within the Hgo, and not 
from the absolute opposition of racial principles embodied in 
discrete historical individuals, he is defending a doctrine of 
original equality curiously denied by Fichte" (1). For Hegel, 
reason alone can comprehend that In principle all men are free, 
in/
1* Kelly: Idealism* j&LU&ga m l  k W & E L  P6* 241-2 and 340*
in x^rinoiple all men are spirit, for reason alone is 
dialeotioal. Dialeotic, here, uncovers a common measure 
between the many separate distinctions and determinations whioh 
divide men from one another, and shows how it is a stronger 
connection than the conventional connections of like to like, 
and the conventional distinctions tetween like and unlike. hut 
I f  all men are one in their common freedom, their common equality, 
why are some still slaves? Kant had said that "no-one is a 
slave, but the man who wills to be one, and only so long as he 
wills" (1). The slave becomes a slave, for Hegel, by choosing 
to give way to his fear of death, which means he chooses not to 
risk his life to gain respect and recognition. In the 
♦.'hlloaop.'iy of iugfat*. H*gel argues that, "If a man is a elave, 
his own will is responsible for his slavery# just aa it is its 
will whioh ia responsible if a people is subjugated. hence 
the wrong of slavery lie3 at the door not simply of enslavers 
or conquerors but of the slaves and the conquered themselves. 
Slavery occurs in oanfs transition from the state of nature to 
genuinely ethical conditions; it oocurs in a world where a 
wrong is still right. At that stage wrong has validity and so 
ie necessarily in place" (2).
Hegel is here saying that slavery is wrong, though a 
necessary stage in man98 development from nature to spirit.
He ie not saying that slavery ie right beoause it is necessary.
He ie not saying that beoause it le real it le rational. He
ia saying that though slavery is wrong, it was a necessary
moment of becoming. He is not saying that good and evil are
the same, but that goodness belongs with evil in life, whioh 
means/
1. kants Heli>:ion within the limits of reason alone pg. 76
2. Hegeli "SSSSS j^  M i T p j r a  5 7 7 ^ 7  T B T
means that if the good ia not to remain merely a pure ideal* 
it will become actual only in living relation with evil*
This ie what ie 9neoessary9*
4an, for Hegel* la not by nature in possession of himself*
He must take possession of himself* lay hold of what he io 
oapable of becoming* and transform what he potentially ie into 
actuality* This ie what Kegel means by bagreifsn* to Comprehend 
3y nature* sen is external to his Begriff* whioh aeons that ha 
is not by nature in possession of himself* or self-conscious*
Ons oan justify slavery only by regarding man as a purely 
natural sxistei.ce (1)* The argument against slavery rests* 
says Hegel* on the notion (Be/grlff) of man as spirit* as 
inherently free* But to argue in this way is* says Kegel* 
to confuse immediaoy with truth* Man is not immediately* or 
naturally free* Freedom is his truth* and truth is his task* 
the TtXo* of his work and struggle* Slavery is a false* 
comparatively primitive phenomenon which befalls man when 
"mind io only at the level of consciousness"•(2)• It is a 
form of alienation beoause the slave is not in actuality what he 
is potentially* "herein lies the possibility of the alienation 
of personality and substantive being* whether this alienation 
occurs unconsciously or intentionally" (3)*
We have already begun to explore the notion of the 
aliens ion of substance from subject in Hegel* and with it the 
notion of enslavement in this chapter* Hegel glvcm&s examples 
of the alienation of the kind of 9substance9 he calls 
"personality"* "Slavery* serfdom* disqualification from holding 
property/
-hlloaophy of axidxt* pg* 48* i ara 37*
2* Ibid pg* 48*3* Ibid* Par* 66, pg* 53•
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property, encumbrances on property, etc*" "Alienation of
intelligence and rationality", says Hegel, or of "morality,
ethical life and religion, is exemplified in superstition, in
ceding to someone else full power and authority to fix end 
prescribe what actions are to be done" •••• etc* I*, is clear
that to comprehend (barrelfen) * in Hegel*s sense of the word, 
la to beoome responsible for ones actions, master of one9s 
personality, in possession of oneself in every thought and 
deed* Hegel tells vis that to comprehend is to gain possession 
of being in negrtlve action* "The Aot thereby I take possession 
of my personality, of my substantive essenee, and make myself 
a responsible being, oapabls of possessing rights and with a 
moral and religious life, takes a<vsy from these characteristics 
of mine just that externality which alone made them oapable of 
passing into the possession of someone else" (1)* Alienation, 
on this account, is overcome in the actualization of 
potentiality* This means it is overcome when subject, the 
intentional self, encompasses suwstuno© so that all alien 
externality is negated* when subject comprehends substance, 
it includes it in the comprehensiveness of notional reciprocity* 
The objeot as 9that whioh is thrown in the way9, becomes that 
whioh helps me on my way, an extension of the intentional 
subject* In this way the uneasy opposition of subject and 
object in the alienation of substance from subjeot, is 
transformed into a lively reciprocal interaction and inter­
connection between subject and objeot* This is the meaning of 
Kogel'a notion of eelbetbe./usatseln.
Ilj lll be a kelp to see this by contrasting it with the 
problems/
1. I’httftMPfoy Si K./ftt. Farm 57, pg. 55
problems of Isolation, whioh the almost solipsist individualism 
of so many in our time, has created. In doing this, we 
anticipate our treatment of the problems Hegel raises in hie 
phenomenological description of the stoio, sceptic and Unhappy 
Consciousness. We have shown, in previous ohaptere, how 
what Uerleon-ionty calls the "insurmountable solipsism" of every 
experienoe is qualified for Hegel as it was for him, by the 
TMirn measure ( A^yo> ) between nan and man. fe have seen 
that this Aoyos le both the hidden condition and the goal of 
the Lord-slave relation in the multitude of ite phenomenal 
instances, and of the continuing Ilf e-death struggle by whioh 
the Intentional self regains possession of its substance in 
eelf-coneoiouanees. The true oontrary of eelf-oonaclousnees 
is not natural or animal consciousness, as might appear. It 
ie isolation, separation and loneliness. Self-oonsoiousness 
is ethle&l, social, and lntersubjeotlvef consciousness is 
pre-self-oonscloua rather than ite contrary. In a critical 
essay on Dostoevsky, Lukaos argues that "isolation, separation 
and loneliness reduce® the relation among men to a struggle 
for superiority or inferiority"• "By thie solitude, by this 
immersion of the subjeot in itself, the self becomes bottom­
less • •••• I, you, all men, disappear, turn Into shadows, exist 
only subsumed under the vide&'" (1). The lonely man appears 
oompletely dependent on hinself, living so deeply and intensely 
within himself that another person remains forever an "unknown 
country1’to him. "The other man is to (such men) a strange 
and menacing power whioh either subjugates them or becomes 
subjeot to them" (2). Here we discover that even the sooial 
relation/
1. Lukaosi Dostoevsky in Colleotion of Critioal essaye on 
Dostoeveky ea• by Rene Wellek pg. 150-151*2. Ibid pg. 150
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relation of Lord-slave is lost9 end the primitive domination - 
subordination of the life-death struggle returns. But it is 
now not a transition moment# but a permanent and de8perate 
impasse• There is a ooaplete incongruity between aotion and 
soul in the lonely man, according to lukaoa, «e shall see 
Hegel9a account of this condition when we come to the stoic- 
sceptic, For lukaos this inoongruity becomes a "panic fear of 
being ridiculous" • Such men "are constantly aware of this 
incongruity" (1), The more extreme the individualism# the more 
such a man loses himself in an inner void# out off from a 
meaningful environment* His world has become devoid of Ao^05 , 
Consequently# human relatedness and trust disintegrates# 
intelligibility and rationality lose any measure of coherence# 
me nlng becomes divorced from life. This is the real contrary 
of whet Hegel calls eelf-ooneoiousness# which ie a secure 
oongruanoe between self and action,
Lukaos thinks that "the self whioh submerges itself in 
itself# cannot find firm ground anymore; what seemed firm 
ground for a time turns out to be mere surface; everything that 
temporarily appeared with the claim of giving direction turns 
into its opposite" (2), When this individualism is complete# 
ooaorete aotion beoomee an experiment# a psychological 
experiment. The problem of Dostoevsky's "experiments" is the 
problem of the lonely man who fails to find an Archimedean 
point either in current social aims or in egoistical ambition, 
"The experiment with oneeelf"# says Lukacs# "the execution of 
an potion not so much for the sake of the contents and effeota 
of the aotion# but in order to know oaeself onoe and for all# 
in/
1, Ibid pg, 151.2, TFid pg, 151.
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in depth, to the very bottom, ie one of the raaln human problems 
of the bourgeois and intellectual world of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries’1 (1)* The experimenter could not ariee in 
a world with stable ideals, in a world where life was self* 
evidently meaningful * or permeated by A»y0* • Nor oould his 
attitude to the Thou be that of a pure means to his own ends, 
if the relations between man and man were secure in their 
humanity* MThe experiment is the desperate attempt to find 
firm ground within oneself, to know who one is - a desperate 
attempt to pull down the Chinese nail between the X and the You, 
betv eon the self and the world * a desperate attempt and always 
a futile attempt,11 writes lukaca (2)* In such a time, a time 
whan life has no meaning, when no intelligibility or Aoyo*. 
significance or intrinsic value is 9 given9, the "better people •• 
are almost all mentally ill"* This is because they are aware, 
as others, perha;s, are not, that person: 1 health is impossible 
without self-integration, or a congruence between self and 
aotion, and self-integration is impossible without a social 
life whioh has meaning and value* In other words, in an age 
of fragmentation, disintegration, and general loss of meaning, 
the essential connection between Aoyos and trie interhuman ie 
broken, which means that men is reduced to an existence without 
an essence, a contingent faotioity without hope* Disease 
becomes normal, and only those who are broken in the struggle 
against normality have any hope of achieving health or Integrity* 
For Luk&os, Dostoevsky was the first, - and still 
unsurpassed - in drawing the mental defornations that are 
brought about as a social necessity by life in a modem oity (3), 
and/
1* Ibid pg* 1492* Ibid pg* 1^2
3. i M i  pg. 153#isasm m
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and in particular, the alienation of the individual from 
the life of the people. The individual9a hopeleaa solitude, 
his isolation from genuine human relatedneas, forces him to 
turn in on himself to achieve self-consciousness. But he falls 
bsssuss, as Hsgel argued, self-conscious ess emerges only in 
genuine human interaction. His failure, however, gives rise to 
a vision; his ever-recurring atheism discloses the unapparent 
Aoyos hidden in the alienation of his life from meaning.
Lukace describes this vision as "genuine and harmonious relations 
between genuine and h&rmoneous men" (1). This co .es olose to 
what Hsgel means by deist. There is, for Hegel, an integral
C / C Jconnection between and wholeness, between <*ppi©>icoc
and health, between ip^os/C* and Geist. It is by say of 
contrast that we see what Hegel mesne by Geist. or by self- 
consciousness. We have shown that true self-oonaclousnesa
entails • whioh in its turn entail the gatnering of
life and meaning together. For Hegel, as for Dostoevsky, this 
vision oannot bo abandoned. "Dostoevsky9s characters", writes 
lukaos, "Know that this is a dream in the present age, but they 
oannot and will not abandon the dreem. They oannot abandon 
the dream even whan most of their feelings sharply oontrsdiot 
it. This dream is the truly genuine core, the reel gold of
Dostoevsky9s Utopias; a stats of the world in whioh men may
know and love each other, in which culture and civilisation 
will not be an obstacle to the development of men" (2). 
Dostoevsky9® vision is Hegel9® vision too. Is that why so
many have rejeoted his dream? Is it that ws prefer the
security of normal insanity to the dream of sanity whioh so 
violently oontradiots the faots?
1. Ibid pg. 156.
2. Ibid p g .  158.
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C H A ? T £ R  VII 
PAKX 2t
We have just seen that Hegel conceives his philosophical 
task to to oomprehend what we know, in the light of the Christian 
Ao^os • which he calls the * Be .riff*. This entails, he thinks, 
our seeing the history of Israel as a history of opposition 
between subject and objeot whioh produced again end again a fixated 
form of Lord-slave dualism* In his early theological study 
entitled or-lrit ytjlqUrMty ££& A M  ft-te* (1793-1799), 
we find Hegel meditating on the Lord-slave relation as the 
recurring structure of Jewish life, and the Jewish state of mind.
In the first paragraph of this long, end Interesting essay, he 
introduces the idea of the spirit of Abraham in the Hebrew peoples, 
the structure of which appears throughout their history either aa 
aggression or submission (1), The Hebrews are either involved 
in armed conflict, or submitting to en enemy who is stronger than 
they. War is the only alternative to fetters. They appear 
fixated to a rigid opposition that they oannot overcome (2),
Their state of mind la split into various kinds of inflexible 
dualism, such as the opposition between the ideal and the real, 
value and fuot, the people they are for God, and the people they 
ore for themselves and for others. For the Jew the world ie 
hostile, it will master him if he does not master it. His 
ideals contradict reality, spirit and nature are divorced from 
one another, life and meaning rarely if ever coincide, Koah 
builds a human world out of the raw material of his natural 
environment/
1. fr.wrjy theologiocJ. writing I Knox translation pg. 182
2, <e are oruy too aware that what we oall Jewish dualism - 
following liegel - is a caricature of Israel's faith. It omits all understanding of Covenant theology and the notions of election and Grace, When we speak of Jewish dualism,it is Hegel's caricature that we are discussing.
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environment, nnd so masters the natural realities of storm and 
flood. God is on his side against the rest of the world. The 
Jew struggles and works to transform what is always an alien 
objectivity, and as he oontlnually fails, he calls upon his God 
to overcome his enemies. Nimrod struggles to master reality 
through foroe, Noah by subjecting not only the world but also 
himself to the one that is more powerful than he, namely God,
Nimrod does not achieve mastery because he is himself a part of 
the reality he struggles to master. Direct mastery is impossible. 
The struggle to achieve Lordship directly falls, and Nimrod 
remains absorbed in nature, conditioned by his external environ­
ment. Noah fails because he makes himself a slave of God (1), 
Abraham, on the other hand, tears himself free from nature,, 
fatherland and family "in order to be a wholly self-subs: stent, 
independent man, to be an overlord himself" (2), "The first 
aot whioh made Abraham the progenitor of a nation is a 
disseverance whioh snaps the bonds of communal life end love" (3)* 
Abraham does not cultivate or improve the land, beoauae for him 
freedom entailed opposition to everything • "He wa4', says 
Kegel "^stranger on earth, a stranger to the soil and to men 
alike" (4). "The only relationship possible between hostile 
entities is mastery of one by the other." Because they were at 
home in the world neither Nimrod nor Noah achieved Lordship. 
Abraham achieved Lordship by simply regarding the whole world as 
his opposite. But his Lordship remains ideal, it is not real. 
Abraham stands in opposition to everyone and everything Ia an 
attempt to master the world. In this he ia supported by God.
But he was unable to make his mastery actual, says Uegel, it 
therefore/
1.2.
3.4.
pg, 183 
pg, 185pg, 186,
therefore remained ceded to his Ideal* God is Lord of the world, 
and Abraham la his servant, this enables Abraham to be at odde 
with the whole world whilst being at one with God in Grooe* But 
Abraham is not a Lord in his own right (1)* Only God as God ie 
Lord* 9There is one Lord* ••••••
Because it is only over death that unity hovers (2), the 
unity of the Israelite peoples is achieved only at the pries of 
accounting the world outside that unity aocursed, unworthy of 
love, with no rights, without even the right to live* The 
oollectlve lordship of Israel means death to the rest of the 
world| but their mastery is cowardly* "The Jews vanquish, but 
they have not battled" (2)* That is teoause their liberation 
from Lgypt had been "without the soul and the spontaneous need of 
freedom" (3), without a "heartfelt hatred of oppreaslon" (4)* 
Moses merely tricked them into leaving Egypt* The Israelite9o 
attitude was "alavelike"* The Jews are repressed within an 
order of universal enmity, an animal existence which con be 
assured only at the expense of all other existence (5)* Whereas 
for the Greeks, no-one is excluded from the holy place of the 
Gods, for the Hebrews, everyone is excluded* The holy was 
always outside them, unseen and unfelt(6)*
Hegel oalls the existence of the Jewish people and their 
mentality "servitude"! they are slaves, maintaining their 
physical existence and securing it against want* He described 
their mode of being as a "thorough-going passivity"* 9There is
one God9 means that the Jew is a slave to the Lord God* The 
Jews are dependent on God, and that on which a man depends cannot 
have the form of a truth* Truth is something free, whioh we 
neither/
neither master nor are mastered by; hence the existence of God 
appears to the Jews not as a truth but as a command • Truth 
argues Hegel, is beauty intellectually represented; the negative 
character of truth is freedom. This view regarding the nature of 
truth is as interesting as it ia anoient. It is not, however, 
abundantly clear what hegel aeana. The Jews, according to 
Hegel, saw no beauty in the world, so they oould not know truth, 
Ihey were slaves, ao they oould not conceive truth as freedom.
How oould they exercise reason and freedom, when they were either 
mastered or masters? he asks. The dynamics of domination and 
repression, whioh constitutes Judaism, follows from their 
slavery to a Lord God, God is everything for them, they 
the .selves are reduced to nothing. We shall see Hegel take up
thie point in his later writings; and we find variations of it
in Feuerbaoh, ;arx and Freud,
The fate of Judaism la to remain bound to the destructive 
dynamics of Lord and slave. Only Christianity, aa the 
reconciliation of Judaism with Hellenism, offers another way,
Ae long aa the Jews do not bcoome dependent on the world and 
worship other Gods, they will reaein slaves of a God who masters 
the whole world for them. On the other hand, their settling 
do.vn in the world aa a nation with land and law creates an 
irreoonoilable oontradiotion in their existence. Thus, their 
history lean uneasy development back and forth between Idolatry 
and belief, a loaajof their speolflo identity, and enslavement 
to their God, Hut God is their own God, They are masters of 
their world only in so far as they are slaves of God; but God 
is their God, Kojeve mentions the laicised form of this in 
oapitalistio societyi on is a slave of his capital, but it is
— ■I.— ■     I..-...  ■   — — — — ■■ ... ,1
!• Opus cit, pg, 67,
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The prophet# tried to restore Israel to its original 
undivided identity• the pharisees tried to integrate the 
contradiction in obedience to the law* Others yearned for s 
nessiah (l)f the sadduoess sought to distract themselves from 
their fragmented being in a variable life filled with nothing 
but fixed details, the Essence in the abolition of property 
whioh separated man from nan* They all struggled like men in 
despair, their aotion beoone the most impious fury and the 
wildest fanatioism (2)* Hegel completes hie phenomenology 
of the Jewish mods of being in the world with the following 
passage* It eonoludee a most vivid, though greatly onesided 
9tudy of the Hebrew state of mind*
"The fate of the Jewish people ie the fats of Kaebsth who
stepped out of nature Itself, clung to alien Beings, and so In
thslr servloe had to trample and slay everything holy in human 
nature, had at last to be forsaken by his Gods (sinoe these were
objects and he their sluvs), and be dashed to pieces on his
faith itself" (3).
Xo-ons will deny that Hegel ie not fair to the Hebrew 
religious attitude, still less to the God of the Hebrews, Hor 
is there any doubt that Hegel ie obliquely criticising the 
Kantian conception of Reason as Lord of the passions, and for 
that matter the Humean thesis that Reason is slave of the 
passions, because for Hegel, the Lord-slave opposition becomes 
a living synthesis in the Christ, The Aoyos ie the ochmi 
measure in whom opposite© unite• The A 6 yes is the hidden 
connection between Lord and slave, the oonneotlon we normally 
overlook* Our language and thinking prooced on their way with
•/
i.2*
3*
JT ICLttogft P6* 203
L pg* 205•
a structure of conventions and formal distinctions whioh hinder 
comprehension of the A©y©s , for we fail to notioe the Lord- 
slavef the suffering servant who is also resurrected Lord, the one 
whose death is lifs and whose life was a faithful dying to hinself, 
the light of the world we do not see in our familiar darkness.
For Hegel, there is a living interaction between the Jewish and the 
Greek dtltudes and traditions in the Christian A©vos • Jesus is 
the Truth, the uncovering of an unapparent, though enduring 
relatedness, the Lord who is Lord only aa a slave, and the slave 
who is slave out of the free decision of one who is truly Lord.
We shall oome to Hegel*8 description of three imperfect forms of 
Lord-slave integration whan we come to the stolo, and eceptlo 
attitudes, and to the unhappy consciousness of the orthodox 
Christian in Ch. VIXX parts 1 and 2. For Legal Kantian man is a 
sieve to himself just like the Jaw. His Lord is his reason, 
just as the Jewfs Lord was his God. Both are slaves, conditioned 
by a rigid Lord-slave dualism. hegel tries to break the dualism 
by opening it out toward a new reciprocity and relatedness.
This ia dlaleotlo. For Hegel, the reconciliation of this 
fundamental opposition is achieved, though this is never 
immediately apparent, in Jesus, the • The polarities of 
domination or subordination, aggression or passivity, Lordship 
or bondage, subjectivism or objectivism, tyranny or oppression, 
are all gathered together in the A£y0*, asking a new world 
possible. The severe.iee of man from himself, of men from men, 
continually issues forth into brokenness and suffering, unless 
there is some hope of the healing ACy«* gathering the scattered 
fragments of man together into a new and integrated whole.
But it ia essential to meo&ilze that for hegel the Aoyo* is a 
temporal/
temporal Ao^os , married to history, a living God, For it is in 
beoamlng ( ), end above all in Time, that what appears
separate, with no apparent connection, is gathered end joined. 
Differences are not obliterated but brought together into lively 
interaction. In the freedom of being-in-time, the freedom of 
spirit, the static abstractions of finite and infinite, temporal 
and eternal, are overcome. This .1 the meaning of incarnation.
In the spirit, a freedom to become ie bora, making possible the 
healing integration of every dissooluted element of our finite 
world. For in so far as being (ro ov ), and not-being (“td ^  ov ) 
(either this or that, either Lord or slave) are brought together 
in the unfettered becoming of the Ao'jo.s , man's world is not 
shattered into torn, dislocated fragments, dualistio oppositions,
anguished disintegration, and irredemable contradictions. It is
,/the established convention, habit and oustom ( e&’os ) to set 
apart, to analyse, to discriminate in such a way that the 
interrelatodness of things, their 00-inherence in A©^©s , is 
permanently obscured. We have learned to live with brokenness, 
Hegel's oritiolsa of our bourgeois world and the setting apart of 
what ought to remain a living unity, fooused here as a critique 
of Jewish and kentian attitudes, depends upon his use of 
encompassing oonoeptlona, such as Oeiat (Spirit>, Vemunft 
(Reason), Intfrs .dung and aelbat-ontfreir.dung (alienation and 
self-alienation). We mistrust general ideas, and with them, 
oomprehensive thinking. For Hegel's befiriff (notion) enoompassss 
too much, or so it secma to us. It achieves a wholeness of 
oonoeption at the prloe of olarlty. We shall return to his 
oonoeption of A 0^0s and to the difficulty just raised in our 
finAl chapter,
Meanwhile,/
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Meanwhile* we ah ell anticipate what we shall say there by 
spying that for Hegel* we do not ooaprehend the A&y0* » the Beiariff 
in isolated singularity (against Kierkegaard) ? nor oan ws apeak 
of God the Aoyojfr in single propositions whioh are either true 
or false t nor do we grasp or possess Aoyo* free e single point 
of view alone* Faith is not a point of view* If we relate this 
to what Heidegger says of th* Adyo** we eight esy that it ia not 
in isolated singularity* but in the "oolleoted presence" of 
enduring relatedness* that we comprehend the "permanent gathering" 
of Aoyo^ •
*
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PART Jt
ACTION, ACTUALITY, AND THE SLAVE'S TRANSFORMATION OR RLALITY IV
WORK,
So we now analyse v/hat is meant by the slave's transformation 
of reality into actuality, In an analysis of ths phenomenon of 
work.
Hegel's philosophy has usually been called idealism, but this 
oan be misleading. We shall illustrate this in an analysis of 
what Hsgel means by actual, (wlrklloh). as opposed to real, (real), 
iriiloh will throw initial light on what he meant by "faot"
(sac h e ) as opposed to "thing" (Ding) (1). Knox rightly 
suggests that by actuality Hegel means the synthesis of Essence 
and existence (2). Thus, the older translation of the famous 
passage in the Preface to Hegel's Philosophy of Right "Whatever 
is rational is real; and whatever is real is rational", is 
extre :ely misleading. This passage is not a plea for 
conservatism in politics (3), nor is it a form of the naturali8tlo 
fallacy, namely, the attempt to derive an "ought" from an "is", 
or more particularly, a complete equating of what "ought" to bs 
with what "is". Knox suggests, and all other contemporary 
interpreters known to me agree with him, that the abtve passage 
ought to be translated as "What is rational is actual and what 
is actual is rational" (4),
Thie/______________________________
1, Sometimes Hegel makes the same distinction with the terms
>. s a i a w v s g s r f e ,3* Ibid. or. aa Kaufmann puts it, a "sanctification of the 
status* Quo. 'Hegel' pg, 381, 397.
4* Ibid pg. 10, similarly, Hegel's sxpsotation of the new world1s birth, like that of the baby. The new world is real, but not aotual. P.S. pg. 73, also "Spirit alone is ths aotual" rather than "Spirit Is above reality",P.S# pg* 86#
This translation la valid provided we oan establish the 
validity of the distinction introduced above, between ftotual and 
real, faot and thing. Xarl Lbwith formulates the distinction 
in different words (or at any rate, his translator does), but 
hie point is clearly the sane as Knoxfs, Ke oalls it a 
distinction between reality and accidental existence, between 
real existence (as the unity of essence and existence (1), and 
what is merely transitory, meaningless, accidental, ephemeral 
and rudimentary (2), Hhat Lb with means by reality is what Knox 
means by aotuallty, namely the unity of essence and existence, 
and what Lowith calls accidental existence Knox oalls reality, 
Findlay translates the above passage as the "rational is the 
actual and the actual is the rational”, maintaining the 
distinction between what may happen to be, and what is true, 
rational, or actual ia what exists (3), Kaufmenn argues that 
Hegel does not believe that ”the actual world is as it ou^it to 
be” unless he redefines ”eotual” as only what “accords with the 
idea”, Vhat is ordinarily called actual (uirklich) is 
admittedly “rotten” (4), Marcuse argues that Hegel did not 
declare that reality is rational or reasonable, but reserved this 
attribute for a definite form of reality, namely, actuality (5), 
we therefore define the actual as rational, and the real as what 
happens to be. This gives us a starting point for a closer 
analysis,
Marcuse argues that for Hegel the real field of knowledge 
la not the given faot (things as they are), but the oritioal 
evaluation of them ee a prelude to passing beyond their given 
form,/
1, Philosophy of Right, deotions 187, 268,2, K, Lb with i 1 rcu he ul to I.iuL^aohe. pg, 138
3, Findleys Hegel? £ Pfc> 2°9t also3, H, hook: Froia he/rel to LagX pg, 20,
4, Kaufnann: Kegel pg, 262, of, also commentary onPreface pg, 3&1, 397,5, arouaei Ronaon auJ, Revolution pg, 157.
fora. For lie gel there is an intrinsic connection between the 
abstract formalism of a logio whioh derives its method and form 
from mathematics or the natural soienoesj&nd an uncritical, 
essentially conservative positivism, which affirmed the status quo 
in its wholesale acquiescence to the final authority of foot, 
Hegel's philosophy deals with matters of fact in order to transform 
them, aot upon them, work them into new faots. It is in this 
sense "negative philosophy1’ (1), Positivism, says Faro use, the 
philosophy of common sense1', appeals to the oertainty of facts”• 
But, Min a world where facts do not at all present what oan and 
ought to be, positivism amounts to giving up the real potential­
ities of mankind for a false and alien world” (2), Carouse uses 
the concept of ”potentiality” here, and this oorresponds to 
i egel's concept of Essence, What does Hegel mean by Essenoe? 
we cannot disouss the oonoept of Essenoe in the Logio, or in the 
henaaenologyt This would talcs too long and oauae us to depart 
from our subject. Briefly then, Essenoe for Hegel ie integration, 
unity of being; it is dialeotioal movement from a pure potentiality 
for integrated self-identity, to alien reality as that whioh 
merely happens to be, to an integration of potentiality and 
reality in actuality. We oan clarify this by analysing what 
Hegel meant when he saidt "The faot (die aaohe) "is” before it 
"exists" (5), The faot ia possible before it le actual,
"When all the conditions of a faot are present, it enters into 
existence"(4), Present faota are therefore what they are only 
as "moments"• Every one of us assumes, or consciously decides 
to assume, an answer to the question as to whether things, as 
thsy/
1, l.ioeea Hess 1841 of. SJarouse Ibid pg. 325
2. Karouse Reapon sad Revolution pg. 1133# Science of Logio II pk, 105, or new Biller translation
pg* 477.4. Ibid p g .  477.
they are, just are; or whether they ere on the way to something 
else* Hegel9e philosophy ia from beginning to end the asking 
end answering of this question*
In a more concrete exposition of the synthesis of essence
and existence, potentiality and reality, in actuality, Hegel
argues that the absence of adequate correspondence between idea 
and reality is disclosed in work* Here ths logieal connection 
between Essence and negativity is concretely argued* It ie in 
this analysis of work, whioh we are at present undertaking in 
order better to understand the logic of the slave’s expsrisnos of 
reality as antagonistic to hssenee, that we see the significance 
of the slave’s existenoe,
.Ye quoted, earlier on, the important passage whioh includes
the following proposition; "/on individual oannot know what he is
till he has made himself real by action " 11)* Heal, here, 
ought to be translated os aotual* It is implied that the actual 
ie present as purpose and possibility (namely, essence), tliat in 
this sense, the fact is before it exists* It is actualized in 
action, Hut to actual!se essence involves ths negation of 
sxistenoe, because the latter resists change. It is true that 
"action is nothing else than negativity" (2), but this is only 
because "it is present as purpose, and thus opposed to given 
reality" (3),
Hegel, at this point, defines "Aotuality (tlrkllchkslt) as 
reality (lie all tat) permeated by individuality" (4), Actuality 
is the product of Aotion (Absolute Negativity) whioh proceeds 
within the opposition between work end consciousness (5), This 
accords/
1, P.S* pg, 422,
2* “ Ibid pg, 420,
T b ld  p g .  420.
Jo id pg. 420.5, Pis, pg, 426.
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aooords with our definition worked out above. He aleo defines 
"fact" aa the actual, distinguishing thing from faot, "Dinff* 
from "saohe" (1). In work, says Hegel, consciousness realizes 
that idea does not accord with reality, that man9s essenoe and 
his existence are In utter oontradiotion. Work is the negation 
of reality, and the actualization of essence as purpose. Things 
become faots, reality becomes actuality. It is difficult to 
find the right words In English to express the distinction Hegel 
is trying to make. Hegel argues that *’a fact” is a real objeot 
for consciousness, an objeot bora of sslfroonsclousness as its 
own, without ceasing to be a free Independent objeot In the 
proper sense1' (2). A faot Is aotual whereas a thing Is merely
real, beoause the aotual is the "Interpenetration of individuality
end objectivity"•
Fact (factum) from face re, means a thing dons, a dead, ths 
product or result of active doing or making. In English, ths 
word • thing9 originally has a similar meaning. It once meant 
a meeting or assembly, a legal prooess, a prooess or transaction, 
and thus what is do^ .e or to be done, a doing, aot, deed, event,
* occurrence, incident. It io only much later that it acquires ths 
sense of "that whioh has separate cxistenoe", a "material object*. 
It is, however, in the latter sense alone that we are using ths 
word 9thing9, despite the faot that we ordinarily use the word in 
the older senses as well. Ie might use the word objeot, if it 
were not that the word originally meant something thrown or put 
in the way as an obstacle or hindrance, a meaning whioh aptly 
expresses the opposition of aubjeot-objeot in this connection, 
but hardly enables us to separate object from subjeot, as if the 
objeeV
1. Ibid pg, 431*2, F*3, pg, 4<-6,
object had nothing to do with the subject# Qbjioere a»eans to 
oppoeei the object Is the opposite, the other against whioh I 
am in opposition# Hegel*s use of the word *object* airfare has 
the conception of opposition oonneoted with it# Despite our 
difficulty here, it is clear that Hegel is distinguishing between 
the kind of being which merely ie, (realitat) and the kind of 
being whioh through the negation of hu^en action and work has 
become actuality (wlrkllohkelt)# Actuality ia permeated by time, 
by human temporality and negativity, it ia part of a dynamic 
becoming, in contrast to the static being of Reality# We see, 
here, the now familiar distinction between act and being, this 
time related to the being and aotion of the slave#
We also take note of the fact that Hegel at no point shows 
any tendency to deny the external reality of the worlds the 
world is real but not actual, real but not rational# Only the 
actual is rational and only the rational ia actual# We can 
distinguish two "moments**, both of whioh are brought together
that whioh will hinder me or destruot me on my way unless I 
oppose and aiaoter it# I am utterly at odds with my environment 
at this point# If I regain, passive, it masters :»e; if I 
oppose it, I move to the seoond moment, at whioh I take up an 
active, negative attitude towards it# HCUO ^ATISNg is man at 
the first moment! ACKHS# man at the second# Selbstbewusstwdh
ie a category whioh belongs to the second but not the first 
moment# Hegel*a phenomenology traces the transition from our 
passive consciousness of the opposing object, to active self* 
consciousness; from immediate certainties, to the Truth; from 
reality/
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reality to actuality; from to • Tiis
work of the slave, and the work of the struggle of self* 
oonaolousnsss in general, ia the work of the spirit effecting 
this change*
«e could draw a multitude of implications, philosophical, 
theological and sociological, from Hegel’s concept of work* #e 
shall confine ourselves to throe points* First, that Hegel 
oonoeivea of both Idealism end Empiricism as ssthodologioal* 
Empiricism is appropriate as ajphilosophy of ths first and passive 
"moment" of the truth af actualization and work* Empiricism 
in all its forms is an attempt to understand ths nature of 
experlenoe in a particular categorial form of the subject-objeot 
relation* Hegel’s analysis of sense-certainty, perception end 
understanding, in the first three chapters of the ’rhenouenolo^ 
of Spirit* are clear illustrations of this* In them, the 
preeuppoeltions of the realist’s orientation to given matters 
of f&ot, together with his passive, observational stance toward 
the facts, are analysed and criticized as valid but relative 
moments of truth* Empiricism ie valid as a method, not as a 
philosophy* Hegel stresses the iaportanoe of a complete grasp 
of the given faot* if they are to be realistically changed*
He criticizes the stoic-sceptic for his abortive attempt to 
change reality in abstr&ot thought, and stresses the futility 
of any flight from the real* But the reality must be changed*
Similarly, Idealism is a method, not a philosophy, for Hegel* 
It is transcended when the ideal la actualized through the 
negation and transformation of reality. Idealism corresponds 
to the second or active "moment" of truth, the moment when the 
facts are critically evaluated and changed* karx saw this 
distinction/
distinction clearly when he analysed the contrasting
eplstemologioal standpoints of Feuerbaoh and Hegel; but he
failed to grasp the empirical pole of Hegel*a complete dialectio. 
He froze hegel to a position of abstract, contemplative idealism 
whioh was as far from Hegel's true position as it was from hie 
own (1). Hegel's critique of the stoic-soeptic reveals olearly 
that Hegel rejected the position Marx thought he held, and that 
idealism as a philosophy, t .at ia as a claim to absolute truth,
would be as pathologically one-sided as the opposite but equally
metaphysical claim made by the realist. The two moments of
%truth must be held,according to Hegel, in oritiorJL, dialeotioal 
tension.
The second point concerns the relation of faot and value. 
Hegel olearly separates the concepts of foot and value, in the 
manner with whioh we are familiar today, in the first "moment" 
of truth only. Faots are logically distinct from value only 
at the otuge when the individual passively acquiesces in faoe 
of the massive objectivity of the facts. The individual oan see 
no connection betv.een faot and value because reality ie not 
rational, it merely happens to be. But in the oeoond moment of 
truth, the individual actively changes the faots so that they 
correspond to his values. In the seoond "moment", therefore, 
a genuine integration of faot and value is achieved. The deed 
is an actualized value; a man acts that his values *ay become 
faots (in the original sense of somethin; done), and hia ideals 
actualized. As long ae reality is not aotuality, a separation 
of faot and value is methodologically, epiateroologloally, and 
logically/
1. .heoee on -euerbr.ohi especially Koa. 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9. 11. It ie far from Hegel's position in the P.S., and as far as we oan make out, in the Greater Logic* Hegel's position may have changed to a more one-sided conservatism after his 
official appointment to the 1rofeesorshlp in Berlin.
logically correct. >or even if the actual is rational, so long 
as some reality is still to be transformed, there will be faots 
whioh bear no relation to value# There will be a place for 
work, and for negative notion# Ve are not considering here 
the problem of the naturalistic fallacy# We are not ooncemed 
with arguing from faots to valuee, or from values to faots, but 
with the human praxis which connects and unites faot and value#
In the first moment, of oourse, the premature fusion of fact end 
value may result either in unrestrained idealism no longer in 
touoh with what is the osse, or restrictive conservatism, 
openly equating what is the case with what ought to be the oase# 
In both oases, the premature confusion of faot and value derives 
from a flight from freedom, from the free aotion whioh 
authentically unites them*
The third point ooncems the relation between potential and 
actual, fe have already seen that the opposite of 'actual9 is 
'potsntlal9 not 'unreal9, or non-existent• The dlstinotlon 
Hegel makes is already familiar to us. It is the dlstinotlon 
between 'implicit9 and 'explicit9, belng-ln-ltself, (Anslohsein, 
ctre-en-aol), and being-for-itself, (Puralohaeln. £tre-pour-gQi), 
(potentia) and (actus, act, action, actual
actuality). The transition from being-in-itself to being*for­
eelf does not consist in any new content being introduced,
NyetH, says Hegel, "the difference la quite enormous" (1),
"It makes all the differenos", that kind of difference? ie 
have seen the revolutionary "difference" whioh has been opposed 
by numerous positivist opponents of Hegel, the difference 
between passivity in the faoe of being, and active negation 
of/
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of being* Our analysis of the slave's action and v/ork olearly 
amnifeste the • negative• dimension of Hegel's thinking* Hegel 
io saying that 'in-hiaself• (potentially) man io free, and 
rational* 1 ven as a natural existent, he ie potential spirit* 
Yet,in reality, there Is still slavery* The only differenoe 
between the Africans and Aeiana on the one hand, and the Greeks, 
Homans, and moderns on the other, is that the latter are fee 
•for themselves * t the former are free • in-themselves* but have 
not 'comprehended*• To oomprehend means to lay hold of, 
overtake or attain to, to Include and aeoonpllah* To comprehend 
is to act* Hegel's "thinking that oomprehends", (Das Degrelfende 
EenkanJ. ie neither knowledge nor proof* He is not oonoerned 
to discover any new faota, nor deduce something from premises*
For even if all the fuots were known, we would not be neoessarily 
any nearer comprehending what we know* Hegel's oonoeption of 
5uM*t^ws or potentla is usually expressed with the notion of 
belng-ln-itaelf, but in any oase, it means the possible, the 
potential (posse * to be able) or that whioh is capable of 
becoming* To eomprehend, for Hegel, means to lay hold of what is 
possible; to act is to comprehend and to comprehend ia to aot*
The concept aotual (aotualla) ia related to Act (Actus;i for 
Aj ere is the root verb, meaning to aot, actuate, to carry out, 
or do something, to perform, produce, execute, practice* 
Philosophically, the distinctions here are significant. The 
opposition between real and unreal (from Res: a thing) le
obviously not the same as the distinction between potential and 
aotual, and their confusion, for example in the famous 
mistranslation of the proposition in the 'Philosophy of Right' i 
"Whatever is rational.is real, and whatever ia real is rational" 
lakes/
moke© obvious nonsense of Hegel’s thinking* Hegel is not 
justifying the way things are, nor ia he seeking to know more 
about the way things ersi he ie seeking, on the contrary, to 
comprehend what we already know* Itialpntuile our regaining, 
overtaking, laying hold of the implicit potential Hidden ua 
being*in-iteelf, and by way of this comprehending aot, transforming 
it - and so reality * into actuality. We oan now see, perhape, 
why Kegel equates Actuality with Spirit,
C H A P T E R  VIII 
PART ll
THE ATTITUDE OF THE ST0IC~3CEPTIC
We pass now from Hegel* a phenomenological description of 
iierroohaft and Knechteohaft to three modes of being-in-the-world 
whioh mark the emergence of the freedom of self-ooneeioueness 
(Fr.ih.lt isa aelbatba-maata.lne) from the relation of lord and 
slave* In stoicism, the Lord-slave dualism ie not overcome, 
though a new connection between Lord and alave is comprehended*
The dialsotlo, here, gathers the Lord and the slave together, 
for both the Lord (Marcus Aurelius) end the slave (Epioetus) are 
atoioe* ’atoisismus’ (stoicism) is the attitude of "thinking 
consciousness in general" (1), The stoio argues as followst 
"In thinking I am free, because I aa not in on other, but retrain 
simply and eolely in touch with myself; cud the objeot whioh ie 
for me is my essential reality, is. In undivided unity, my self­
existence; and my procedure in dealing with notions is a prooess 
within myself"*
The prlnolple of the etoio attitudo and fora of life ie that 
"oonacious eaa is ssssntlally that whioh thinks" (2)* Freedom is 
a freedom to think* Consequently, the etoio takes up a negative 
attitude to both Lordship and slavery* When the Lord becomea s 
stoio, he negates hie dependence upon the slave, and seeks hia 
truth (authentic existence) in his own freedom of thought* The 
slave who becomes a stoio seeks authentio selfhood not in obeying 
the Lord’s will but in the freedom of his own thinking"* Ths 
essence of this consciousness", says Hegel, "Is to be free on the 
throne/
181.
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throne aa well an in Tatters" Cl)* But this entails what Kegel 
calls & "atolid lifeless unconcern which persistently withdraws 
from the aovtent of existence9 from effective activity as well as 
froa passive endurance9 into the simple essentiality thought"
(2). The stoic attitude ia not stubbornness* for stubbornness
is the freedom of "solid singleness"* The attitude of 
stubbornness remains un enslaved attitude* The stoic escapes 
from that fora of enslavement into the universality of thought* 
nonetheless* the stoio's freedom otn "ooae on the scene of the 
world9e spirit only in a time of universal fear and bondage* a 
time* too* when mental cultivation ie universal* and has elevated 
culture to the level of thought" (3)*
But Hegel new reveals that because the pure freedom to think 
laoke the "concrete filling of llfe% It ie therefore not true 
freedom* but the abstract idea of freedom* The stoic9e 
conceptual activity has lost contact with the life he ie living 
in spite of his attitude* hie notion of freedom is an abstraction 
"out off from the multiplicity of things"• The stolo has 
form but no ooutent; he has found meaning in thought divorced 
from life* Kojeve suggests that the stoic attitude ie 
analogous to that of the scholar or theologian* For he uust 
continue to satisfy his desires* and so ensl&vea himself to hie 
own nature and to nature in general (as opposed to freedom and 
spirit); he is free only in his thought* Kojeve oalls this 
a form of philosophical suicide* for the stoic thinks but does 
not act* He doee not actively risk his life* Ultimately his 
attitude leads to ennui (boredom)* and to a solipsist denial of the 
reality of the external world* She stole doss not negats nature* 
For/
1* •*S* pg* 244*2. Ibid* pg* 244*
3* ISIS Pg* 243*
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For Parcel, the freedom of the stoic enables hi-, bv thinking, 
to tr&nsoend the order of blind necessity, and thus all 
naturalism (1), Thus the stoic achieves a meaning, in thought, 
whioh free* him from necessity, chance, fate, or from the 
fortuitousness of existence, hut st this point Hegel wishes to 
show the oontradiotion in his existence, for thinking is not a 
real negation of nature, the stoic regains a slave to his own 
natural life, and his freedom ia inherently abstract.
It is perhaps ironical that the stoic attitude ie so similar 
to the attitude conventionally ascribed to Hegel himself, the 
abstract Idealist, especially as Hegel tirelessly criticizes 
the kinds of abstract or formal intellectualism which retains 
withdrawn from the struggle and tension of comprehending living 
experienoe. For example, Hegel criticises the speculative 
theologian who speaks of the A&elty of Cod with tiie confidence 
of the abstract thinker, because his thinking locks ’’the 
seriousness, the suffering, the patience and the labour of the 
negative” (2), Another example is the formal logician whose 
thinking remains rigorously coherent only by keeping within the 
8&me terms. But our living experience constantly introduces 
new ter^s, upsetting the strict, but sterile logic of his formal 
syllogism (3), "What is purely formal without reality is on 
ens intelleotus, or empty abstraction”, says Hegel, ’’without 
the internal diremption which would bo nothing else than the 
content” (4), To the question concerning what io good and true, 
the stoic gets embarrassed, because he oan only give an abstract 
oontentless thought as his answer, "The true and good are to 
consist in reasonableness” (5),
W  KMoeXt I W W W W m  J-Omraal Pg. 392. p.s. pe. el;
3. of. Lsfe'ovres aterlalloa pg. 244. P.S. pg. 329.
5. P.S. pg. 246.
The stoio does not deny his own naturef consequently he 
falls to enter into the free self-determining becoming whioh ie 
his and every roan’s unactualized potential. The sceptic on the 
other hand can and does deny what he naturally la. tils is a 
thorough-going nihilism. The sceptic realizes whut the stole 
merely thinks; his solipsism is complete. lie is more serious 
than the stoic in his detachment from the world* and reveals to 
us that* according to kojeve# suicide is ths only logical 
conclusion of ths stoio-soeptlc (1). If either allow their 
existence to continue* it is a self-contrtdictory existence. 
Loswsnberg stresses at this point that ths transition from 
stoicism to scepticism is logical rather than historical. tie 
is concerned to olarlfy the nature of dialectic (2). hut* a 
distinction of this sort is difficult to maintain unie3owe 
clarify the sense in whioh we use the concept of •historical*. 
Hegel tells us, in his *1}!story of Philosophy*. that in stoloism* 
"pure thought develops into a totality"* and if we make ths 
opposite of thinking spirit into a totality - natural being or 
feeling* we have Epicureanism. Explicitly* they appear as two 
opposing systems of philosophy! implicitly* "both are identical"* 
for scepticism is the union of these opposites. Scepticism in 
its turn turns out to be the annihilatlve attitude* whose 
opposite is the affirmative f "the Idea in relation to the Jiotlcm"
(3). This kind of argument is neither logical (in the formal 
sense) nor hletorioal (in the sense of a faotual account of the 
relation between philosophical schools)* but is the kind of 
reasoning which oonneota what we know of these philosophical 
attitudes in order to show their co-inherence in the total life 
of/
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of human thinking. Hegel's method ia truly philosophical, it is 
neither science nor logic* It ia concerned, not with describing 
the facts correctly, nor with solving the formal, or logical 
puzzles that trouble us, but with comprehending the long history 
of human experience couprehensi vely.
For Hegel, both stoicism and Epicureanism are positive 
philosophies; the former takes thinking as the determining 
criterion of truth, the latter, feeling, sensuous perception 
and observation* Both philosophies are one-sided; their 
opposition is balanced by their opposite, the negative attitude 
of scepticism* "Scepticism is the active negation of every 
criterion, of all determinate principles of whatever kind they 
may be, whether knowledge derived from the senses, or from 
reflection on ordinary conceptions, or from thought” (1)« 
Scepticism is nihilism, whose result is the "disintegration of 
all truth, and consequently of all oontent, end thus, perfeot 
negation ” (2)# Sceptioism, says Hegel in the VhenogenoloKy'* 
is "in itself and essentially the negative”; it's thinking 
"wholly annihilates the being of the world with its manifold 
determinateness" (3)• On the one hand, "by means of this 
self-conscious negation, self-consciousness procures for itself 
the certainty of its own freedom", and on the other, it Is 
"neither more nor less then an absolutely fortuitous embrogllo, 
the giddy whirl of a perpetually self-creating disorder" (4)* 
Xhis la whrt constitutes the sceptic's self-contradiction*
For consciousness, Hegel argues, is a "thoroughgoing 
dialectical restlessness”, a "melee of presentations derived
from/
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from 8enBe and thought9 whose differences collapse into oneness, 
and whose identity io similarly again resolved and dissolved"
(1)* The sceptic ie a broken consciousness, consisting of 
both freedom and necessity, but in such a way that self-lntegratl* 
is never aohieved* "Contingent, animal life" exists besides 
"universal self-saneness"; the sceptic continually falls from 
self-identity to contingency and confusion* In Hegel*a vivid 
language, the seeptie is "the aimless fickleness and instability 
of going to and fro, hither and thither, from one extreme of 
self-same self-oonsoiousness, to the other contingent, confused 
and confusing consciousness* It does not itself bring these 
two thoughts of itself together* It finds its freedom, at one 
time, in the fore of elevation above all the whirling complexity 
and all the contingency of mere existence, and again, at another 
time, likewise oonfesses to falling back upon what is unessential, 
and to being taken up with that" (2)* It aeeounces the nullity 
of seeing, hearing, and ao on, yet itself sees and hears"*
Its "deeds and words belle each other continually", in that it 
"keeps asunder the poles of oontradiotion within itself"* But 
in case we reject the eoeptlc*s neurotic condition as a worthless 
insanity, Kegel warns us that "in scepticism consciousness gets, 
in truth, to know itself as a consciousness containing oontra­
diotion within itself" (3) • For a new attitude, in which the 
two contradictory attitudes are brought together, teoomes 
possible when it beeo.eo aware that "it ia in faot ONE 
consciousness which possesses these two modes within it" (4)*
This new mode of consciousness, the unhappy, divided conscious­
ness of the Christian, has learned from scepticism to negate its 
own/
1* Ifcii pg* 249*2* P.S# pg# 249*
3* Ibid pg. 250.
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own nature in temporal freedom# and from stoicism to paee 
beyond the finite determlnateneeo of existence to the freedom 
of thought# but it is also aware of its self-alienation (aalbat- 
entfreadung. arid is consequently on the threshold of Integrated 
8elf-oo soiouauess (Bei-sloh-aelbst-aein 1 r. Andersaoln, ♦
before we disouss the unhappy consciousness and the notion 
of alienation# we must try to olarify some of the paradoxes whioh 
Kegel9a phenomenological descriptions of the etoio-soeptle 
attitudes have disclosed* We are not# here# oonoemed with 
whether Hegel9e evaluation of the etoio and sceptic philosophies 
is oorreot# whether# in other wordo# his account of thsa is 
factually accurate. fft are not interested (though others have 
a perfect right to be) in Hegel as an historian of ideas* 9e 
reoall# first of all# that whereas the atoie was merely apathetic 
or resigned# the sceptic actively doubts# and so negates his own 
nature* Kojeve remarks at this point that whereas classical 
philosophy had urged us to "become what you are"| Hegel# in the 
light of his reflections upon the negativity of freedom# urges 
"Become what you are not" (1)* For Hegel# "Acting is nothing 
else than negativity" (2)* But though to doubt is to aot# 
the sceptic9s doubt leads him into a deoperate withdrawal from 
his bodily existence and concrete being-in-the-world• 
"Individuality"# eeye Hegel# "is what lta world# in the sense 
of its own world# ie" (3)* but "an Individual oennot know what 
he la until he has made himself real (aotual) by action"(4)•
("Dae individual kann daher nloht wissen# was es let# eh es si oh 
duroh das tun sur Wirklichkeit gebraoht hat"). Everybody is 
given the task of self-oreation through negative action# and 
thoee/
1*2*
3.4.
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those who flee from this task, fail to achieve conscious 
self-integration. The sceptic seeks to ore&te himself in the
eotion of doubt, but he falls to integrate his intellectual 
Identity with his natural end bodily existence, he thus 
remains, for himself, nobody - a no-body; a self, with no body, 
with no connection with the world, no natural life. He remains 
olive, of course, but he is not present in hio living existence.
He experiences a loss of self whenever he beoo ea aware that he 
is a living body.
We hove said that the stolo struggles to create hi self and 
hio world in thought, the soeptle in radical, negative doubt, 
and we hove introduced the paradoxical idea that the self of the 
stolo-oceptio rejoins dlvoroed from hio nature, from his bodily 
behaviour, desires and appetites and hie bodily coutaot with the 
world. The object, as that whioh is thrown in hio way, does not 
exlat for hie., because hio way is a way of thought or doubt, not 
action. In dealing with the otoio-ooeptio mode of consciousness, 
we are dealing with a personal world, whioh as Jaspers argues, 
oan be investigated as a cultural, historical, psychological, 
or psyehopathologiool phenomenon. For the study of a personal 
world or "world-pioture" (Weltbild) does indeed reveal, as iisgsl 
saw, and Binswanger has confired, that the individual ie what 
hio own world is. For, as Jaspers argues, a personal world is 
a total frame of refere oe which grows into a world subjectively, 
as emotional atmospheres, feelings, states of mind, and 
objectively in opinions, mental oontent, ideas and symbols (1), 
The stoic-sceptic mode of consciousness is a weltbild of both 
subjective and objective dimensions, but the question whioh 
immediately arises is whether it is an authentic or a pseudo- 
solution/
1. Karl Jasporas General ^arohopathology pg. 201.
solution to the problem of being human in the world* erlem- 
Ponty argues, in this connection, that the pseudo-solutions of 
the neurotic are "recognizable from the faot that the being of the
4person never oo-inoldeo with what he aaye, what he thinks, or 
even what he does* False art, false sanctity end false love" - 
and we may add the false Weltblld - "give to human life only a 
borrowed significance, affect only an ideal transformation, a 
flight into transcendent ideas"*(1)* It is clear that Hegel 
conceives the atoio-socptio mode of being to be a ncurotlo 
pseudo-solution in this sense* The stoic-scepticfs thinking self 
is not even present in his natural being; his behaviour appears 
dislocated or dissoolated from his thinking or doubting* The 
stoio-soeptio is what Uerleao-i onty oalls a fragmented life of 
consciousness; it is as though his real self, the thinker or 
doubter, le never embodied or revealed in what he ia and says and 
doee* For Hegel, "the individual human being is what the aot 
isv'(2), "the true being of a man is hisjsot ••••*, individuality 
is real in the deed"; or in other words* "Individuality puts 
Itself forward in action as the negative essenoe which only is so 
far as it oancele being" (3)* Neither the stoic nor the soeptio 
negate being; they think but do not aot* But slnoe spirit is 
always aot not being, always self-determining becoming (coming-to- 
be end ceasing-to-be) and not statio being or not-belng, the 
stoio-soeptio fails to achieve the new unity whioh le spirit* 
Spirit is not another kind of being, but is the temporal aot 
whioh overcomes all statio forms of being* The latter merely 
exist, unconnected, dissociated; they are gathered only in the 
Aot whioh overcomes their fixed determinations, by negating and 
transforming/
1* ilerlean-Pontyi T^» 2.1fcD^ .t\gg 9l u E f a a Y P S *  2* P.S* pg* 350*
3* J & &  PE* 349*
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transforming them, Things case to be "either-this-or-that", 
and become "both-this-and-that", Spirit is the integration of
the fragmented in a living temporal unity, often mistakenly 
confused with another kind or olass or category of being. The 
stoio-soeptlo does not aot in order to beoome; he thinks or 
doubts. His self is not present in what he does; he is as it 
were, disembodied.
Our language, in this account, is somewhat strained and 
p&radoxioal, In order to describe the oontradiotions of the 
etoio-aoeptio's existence adequately, our language must become
flexible, or as Hegel suggests elsewhere, "plastic" (1), The
contradiction of the stoic-aoeptlo may be described in many ways, 
none of whioh, unfortunately perhaps, escape paradox. The 
stoio-soeptlo may be said to have a body, rather than be
embodied. He is for-hiaself a doubting, thinking self; but
for others he is what he does, he is what he appears to be from 
his bodily behaviour. But the stoio-soeptle cannot afford to 
onll his bodily behaviour Mils't he disowns his body. He is 
like the Gnostic for whom the body is a prison and the world a 
hell, Every contact with the world appears to hin to be a 
threat to his thinking, doubting subjectivity. He is like the 
divided self whioh Lalng describee in his study of sohisold and 
schizophrenic waye of being in the world (2), The stoio-soeptlo 
is a divided self, or as Hegel puts it, a "doubled contradictory 
consciousness" (3), and he appears to share with the sohisold 
personality pattern, an abhorrence of any revelation of himself 
in his bodily aotion, or behaviour, or speech, Because every 
aotion and every relationship threatens this kind of broken, 
divided/
1.2,
3.
pga, 87-88
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divided self, with a loss of identity, the polarities of 
separateness and relatedness, whioh for Lalng, accord with 
personal autonomy, become a violent antithesis between 
engulfment (a complete loss of being by absorbtion into the 
other person) and isolation (a complete separation from the other 
person) (1)* To be understood is to be engulfed. The action 
of the divided self is always the product of a false self; his 
real self must at all cost remain ungraspable, elusive, 
traneoendent (2), By existing for-himself with no body; he 
is nobody (3), He l&oks any self-validating certain ties, and 
has what Lalng, following Sullivan, Hill, Fromo-Heiohaann and 
Arleti oall a 9 low threshold of seourity".
world through his body, because he is preoooupled with preserving 
hie ontologioally insecure self from the threat of relationship, 
embodiment and involvement (4), the stolo-soeptlo does not do so 
because his self oonsist solely in thinking or doubting.
Whether or not he shares ths anxisty of ths divided self is 
another matter. There may be happy secure stoics and sceptics, 
but for Hsgel, this does not affect ths fact that their condition 
is unhappy, For the divided self, reality is implosive (5), 
and to experienoe the other as person is felt to be virtually 
suicidal, Beallty will empty him or suck him dry (6), the gase 
of another person threatens him, "Either", says Lalng,"he turns 
ths other person into a thing and depersonalises or objectifies 
his own feelings towards this thing, or he affects indifference" 
(7), He withdraws into a oitadsl to preserve himself, but ths
tragio/_____________  , ____________ ________________
1, The Divided belf pg, 44,
Wriereaa the divided self does not seek gratification in the
2,
3,4,
5,6, 
7,
tragic paradox la that the scourer his defence, the sore he 
destroys hireelf. Like the stolo-sceptic, the divided 
consciousness withdraws in order to be free* The stole-soeptlo 
is either indifferent to or violently negates his Lordship or his 
slavery, but only at the cost of s pardoxlcal kind of death*
He withdrew into thought or doubt in order to achieve freedom 
of spirit; ./hat he achieved was the death of the spirit, 
beoause the spirit cannot be divorced from nature, action, 
bodily behaviour and the concrete lived-reality of the world*
The divided self is olive but does not feel alive; he ia 
divorced from his life* his 'meanings* are isolated from life, 
enclosed in thinking or doubting, or in any kind of defensive 
withdrawal* -'or Hegel, this neurotic condition 1s of 
considerable significance beoause we leaxn from it the truth of 
the human condition as a whole* We understand the significance 
of sanity only by way of the lessons we leoxn from insanity, 
our own insanity, and as v;ittgenstein onoe said* "The . 
philosopher is the man who has to cure himself of many sicknesses 
of the understanding before he oan arrive at the notions of the 
sound understanding* If in the midst of life we are in death, 
so in sanity wo are surrounded by madness" (1)* The truth we 
learn from the divided self-or stoio-sceptlo doubled oonaeiouanesi 
is that consciousness essentially entails oontradiotion, wholenesi 
disease*
Hegel9s treatment of this subject teaol.es us one thing 
above everything else, and that is that the stoio-soeptio9s 
flight from reality, end the solipsist world into whioh he “ 
withdraws to preserve his tottering identity, are both the 
oonaequenoe of the Ilf e-death struggle and its delay in the 
static/
X. X. Wittgenstein* Vouaaatlona ££ -athea£tlea»
para 53, pg* 157*
static lord-slave dualism, whioh is itself the intersubjeotive 
nexus from whioh spirit will emerge. The contradictions of 
the stoio-soeptlo9a condition are the sine qua non of genuine 
rationality, which is in its turn the sine qua non of Geiat or 
Spirit, There are, for Hegel, many unepparent con..actions 
between health end disease, between spirit and self-alienation, 
all of whioh reveal to man the truth of his being and authentic 
becoming. We conventionally distinguish, both in ordinary 
language, end in our established forms of life, between health 
and disease, between s&nlty and insanity. Only the infinity of 
a schizophrenic or c^shlloeopher seas many hidden connections 
between the two, and only the perverse sae conventional sanities 
as thinly disguised insanity, Hegel's dialectic militates 
against our taking our apparently self-evident distinctions 
too seriously, for we are rarely aware of how easily our 
distinguishing becomes discrimination, and a dehumanizing setting 
apart. We set things apart when we analyse; we separate, 
dissolve, un-loose ( Ay4 - i itw ), Bo-one, least of all Hegel, 
will quarrel with us for doing that. But when certain kindapf 
analysis (or setting apart) are aoted upon, and become the 
structure of politioal, social and legal aotion, we must look 
very carefully at what we have un-loosed. Sometimes we mistrust
the gathering, integrating activity of dialectlo ( n u^»ckfevcrcvc^
> / /dialectics, from ot«t - ) so much that we lose the
integrity of personal and aooial life, whioh is the only true
alternative to oppression, repression, and the myrad of diseases,
injustices, sorrows aid tyrannies which threaten to overwhelm us.
We would do well to hoed erlean-Ponty' s warning that we cure
judged by neither intention nor faot, but by our success in
making values become faots (1), Our success depends upon our
Integrity/________________________________________________________________
1, Merle aa-Pontys 'Si/xia' pg, 72
Integrity, and our ability to hold together what tends apart, 
in integrated self-conscious action.
195.
C H A P T E R  Y I I I  
PART 2t
THE ALIENATION 0? THE DIVIDED AND UNHAPPY CONSCIOUSNESS.
"Das Ungluekliohe > ewruostseln"* the Unhappy Consciousness, 
is Hegel’s term for ths alienated self who ia conscious of its 
divided nature, conscious that it is a doubled and contradictory 
existence (1). Jean Hyppolite has called the Unhappy Conscious- 
ness the fundamental the ie of the >_heno^enolo _v of S irit'# (2), 
end one of the lending interpreters of ^egel in this country,
C. R. C. Lure, has called it its M^ain theme" (2). Jean bahl, 
whose outstanding study of the Unhappy Consciousness has had a 
profound influence upon French interpreters of K^tX, has argued 
that the scepticism whioh interested Hegel, and which we studied 
in the last chapter, is more akin to i ascal than I ontaigne#
That is, the seeptic'a problem is that of the irredemable dualism 
of finite and Infinite, exiete .ee and essence, is and ought* 
ihia brings us to the distinctively Christian mode of conscious­
ness as Ke^el conceives it, for the divided conscious eso of the 
Christian connects with the sceptic's desperate dualism# The 
Christian is divided by the dualism of Nature and Grace, Law and 
Gospel, Life and Upirit, dnrknesslpnd light, and conse uently 
shares the sceptic's dilemma# The differe ioe between the;;, 
consists in the fact that the Christian is aware of his divided, 
broken existence, whereas the sceptic is not# The Christian 
is aware that he is both nature and spirit, determinate and free# 
He is aware of what he is in-himself, (that is, what he ie 
capable of cscorning - potcntia, - or what he is
implioitlyj# The sceptic is not# But the Christian is not 
y .t/ ___________________________________________ _______
1# i#U# pg# 251# ^ . /2. J. Hyppolite: Genese ex a* ±Si1'esprit de iiegfilpg. 184.
kure* The Philosophy of henel . g. 5s 70 . 4 , 49-50,70-81, 06, 94, 101.
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yet for-hi..self (in actuality), what he ie aware he ie 
potentially* He ia not yet actual, not yet rational, not yet 
spirit* Hegel argues that once we have reached this point - 
the point where Christian faith reveals to man what hs potentially 
is - no new factor is needed* let a vitally aignifleant 
transition is still to be made* aan'a potentiality must be 
comprehended (be^riffen;* that is, laid hold of, regained, 
gathered to himself, attained or aohieved* Irior to the 
inclusive, comprehensive activity of comprehension, his potential­
ity remains external to him* The task of comprehension is the 
task of encompassing all externality eo that it beoomes internal, 
essence integrated with existenoe* rj 5\-*XaWTcvc^t dialectic, 
ie the aot of gathering or bringing together, which ie wh&t we 
mean here when we use the word 'comprehend9* It may have other 
meanings when it is used loosely, but its dictionary sense of 
lay hold of, include, encompass, grasp with the mind, comprise, 
is the sense in whioh we are using it here* To comprehend is 
to gather rather than eoatter, whereas to analyse is to separate, 
dissolve or unloose* This use of these terms ought by now to 
be very familiar* The unhappy consciousness is unhappy not 
beoause it is divided, but beoause it is aware that it is divided* 
It knows that its task is to integrate what ie divided in an 
encompassing comprehension, and it seems condemned never to 
achieve this task* It ie unhappy beoause between its hope and 
its fulfilment "there stands preolsely the absolute contingency, 
or immovable lndifferenoe, whioh is Involved in the very 
assumption of determinate shape and fora, the basis and founda­
tion of the hope" (1)*
1* P.S. pg* 255*
The unhappy ©o .soiousneas\is divided because it cannot 
think the ever-ohanging becoming of man in hie historic world, 
and the unchangeable infinity of God, toget er. ae el coxt.eots 
the contradiction of the ohriatian'e unhappy consciousness to the 
conception of the ohangeable and the unchangeable a* absolute 
opposites (1). For the Christian is again and again broken 
by this oppositionf he ia the slave of the dualist either/or, 
either God or the world, either God or hie fellow man. Of 
course we misunderstand hegel if we take him to mean that there is 
no real contradiction here, or that we cun dissolve this 
opposition into ct monistic 0>ne, sub specie aetemitutis, by meane 
of reason alone, "Thought", for hecel, according to Golrd,
"is always distinction; determine lion, the marking off of one 
thing from another, ,,,, unless things are definitely what they 
are, and are ke^i to their definition, knowledge end thought 
become impossible ««••* hut thought la not only distinction, 
it is nt the waae time relation. It maraa off one thin* from 
another, it, at the an e time, con cots one thing with another" 
(2;, In other words, thinkin* must be both a setting apart 
( o(v^Kuvi5/ and a bringing together ( £*-•<. X awn-vcry j it must 
show how tilings stand apart froa other things, and how they 
stand together. It must distinguish end connect, aometlaes 
the apparent con eotion must be broken end particulars set 
apart, in order for tne hidden oonueetion, w ion truly holds 
things together, to be exhibited to us, ^o eti .es a disti otlon 
or a connection is assumed in both what we do and whut we say, 
and is consequently hidden from view until ano ther kind of deed 
or speech brings it to our notice. For there ia much that vie 
know but do not comprehend, and there is much to the activity of 
knowing/
li Ibid M ,  2 i2, E, ?airdi he; el pg, 134-5,
knowing that we do not comprehend. Tiie same oan be said of
t
language.
The unhappy consciousness ie aware that its existence is 
defined both in terms of its relation to the unchangeable God and 
in terms of its historical contingency and temporal scorning*
But beoause it oannot hold these two 'worlds* together, it fails 
to achieve self-integration. Kegel describes the task the
Unhappy consciousness struggles but fails to aohieve as followsi
"Thinking, I rise above all finiteness to the Absolute, end I am infinite oo .sciousness - and yet I aa finite self-oonsoiousness, in full aooordanoe with all my empirical limitations*Both sides seek and flee each other* 1 aa, 
and there is within me ••• this antagonism and this reconciliation. I am the feeling, the perception, the notion of this resolution, and of this antagonism, and the junction of the antagonists; 1 am the effort of joining, and the labour of the mind to master this antagonism.I am the struggle* I am not one of the struggling,but 1 am both, and I am the struggle itself* Iam the fire and the water whioh touch each other,1 aa the connection and the unity of those that 
everlastingly flee e&eh other" (1)*
This is the predio&ment of the Christian who struggles to 
think in accordance with tiie Truth of the Word made flesh. For 
the Aoyo/> is the unity of God and man, the oo-inherence of the 
most definitive of all oppositions* In a truly Keraolitean way, 
Kegel speaks of the task of genuinely ohristologio&l thinking,
(the t&sk which christione unhappily fall to aohieve, with their 
fondness for the pagan dualises they raise to the status of 
absolutes;, as the tt.sk of uncovering the epis or strife whioh 
brings thin{ o together in the relatedness of a common l\ .
The unhappy consciousness is aware of what he must do, but he 
falls to do it* He is the "movement of an infinite yearning", 
condemned to hope for an unattainable beyond, condemned to despair 
of/
1. .hlloaophy a£. Belmont Forward (Slookner XT pg. 80).We note, here, the words of Hegel's olose friend, the poet Hblderllns "Near and hard to grasp is the God, yet where peril lies, grows the remedy too"*
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of an unbearable present, condemned to repeat the same words and 
the same deeds which forever break his spirit# he seeks a 
beyond that oan never be found, and so oomea upon the grave of 
its hope# He turns Instead to the world, struggling to achieve 
aeIf-integration through desire a d toil (1)#
The unhappy consciousness ia thus condemned to a "shattered 
certainty of itself"# It does not find that work and enjoyment 
confirm its identity\ the latter remains "tottering and insecure" 
(2)# For the unhappy consciousness is always outside itself} 
with the result that every effort to achieve healing and wholeness 
ia never more than another symptom of its disease# This is 
because the unhappy consciousness oannot enter into the condition 
of disintegration whioh is his disease# And sinoe, as Freud 
teaches us, our disease oan be healed only from within disease, 
the unhappy consciousness appears to have no remedy#
This doubly negative attitude of the unhappy consciousness 
derives, as we have seen, from a conception of God and of lean's 
temporal world as theoretically exclusive categories, and as 
practically exclusive moral ends# We distinguish finite and 
infinite# Neither we, nor hegel, nor any reasonable man could 
deny the relative validity of this distinction# But an absolute 
distinction would involve us in irrational self-contradiction, for 
it would entail our denying any relation between what was 
distinguished# There oan be no distinction between opposites 
w:ioh is not also a relation or connection between them# It is 
the tendency to make distinctions into absolute distinctions that 
transforms them into irreconcilable antagonisms# In the oase of 
the unhappy consciousness, the failure to think finite and 
infinite together in accordance with the logic of the Christian 
AoyoS ,
1. P.3. pg. 258-9.2. Ibi4 pg. 259.
Aon/05 , leads to a splitting, disintegration and dissociation 
of consciousness. It leads to the kind of divided consciousness 
Hegel describes in Ch* IV B part 3 ae the attitude of the Jew and 
mediaeval Christian, or as the Kantian conflict between rational 
duty and natural inclination (1), or ee the conflict between the 
individual and the universal in man's sooial and ethio&l attitudes 
in Ch* Yd, or as the conflict inherent in the revolutionary 
attitude in Ch* VI 32* In all these forms of unhappy consciousness 
we have the alternatives of Ilfe-death struggle, or of the 
dominance of one opposite, and the subordination of the other.
For this reason, Jean Hyppolite has argued that the unhappy 
consciousness is always an interiorized Lord-slave relation*
This is true, aa long as we recognise that the conflict consists 
in a flexible not a fixed dualism* That is to say, each 
antagonist is becoming Agens and patiena, Lord and Alave, 
dominant and subordinate in turn; there is no fixed dominance 
of one over the other* It is important, here to note that a 
fluid, dynamic dualism is not yet a genuine dialectic, because no 
true integration of opposites is achieved* They have achieved a 
kind of dynamic co-existence but no qualitative transformation* 
Consequently, the freedom of spirit oannot emerge* Nothing 
whioh remains determined by ite^relation to its opposite oan be 
8aid to transcend natural being* Spirit and freedom belong to 
the encompassing of every duallstio opposition, which means 
that the spirit we conceive as the opposite of nature, and the 
freedom we conceive as the opposite of necessity, is not the 
spirit or the freedom whioh accords with the Aoya> • The God- 
man is the Truth, the truth of the ^hole, or the encompassing 
Aoyos * In Ady«xs , the temporal and the eternal, the 
finite/
1* of* our discussion of the relation between Jewish andKantian dualism and the Christian dialectic in connection 
with Heg.l's essayt ’S M  lrU o£ C.faCia^iBBlU* 1798-1799.
finite and the infinite, the changeable and the unchangeable, the 
human and the divine, are gathered together in a qualitatively 
new relatednesa# No distinction between them is dissolved or 
oomfneed, for Reason does not negate but fulfils the understanding# 
But on the other hand, no distinction, however valid, oan destroy 
the living co-inherence of everything that comes to be or oeases 
to be, in the comprehension, or inclusive integration of A£yo& .
In contrast to this ohristologioal conception of Being, the 
oonoeption of Being held by the unhappy oonsolouaness ie 
dlssooiated and fragmented# For instead of the health and 
wholeness of resurrected spirit, the unhappy consciousness takes 
its abstract oonoeption of God in separation from the world and 
from man, and its abstraot oonoeption of the world apart from God, 
to be the norms and criteria of its truth# Instead of the truth 
of the Whole, it attaches itself to some partial truth oonoemlng 
God, or concerning the world, and affirms this as ultimate# It 
falls from Christian faith, to Idolatrous faith} from Reason as 
the true way faith may seek comprehension, to the mutually 
exclusive categories of the understending# God elects not to be 
the God of the unhappy consciousness, for in incarnation, death 
and resurreotlon, God gathers the whole world, both nature and 
history, to himself# Thus, Hegel's concern in this chapter is 
not to show that Christian faith alienates man, but that inadequate 
forms of ohrlstian faith and life alienate him# Nevertheless, 
even in its alienated form, as the unhappy consciousness, Christian 
faith and life is on the threshold of Reason, or that encompassing 
rationality whioh in its fulfilment, Hegel oalb Geist. or spirit#
The unhappy consciousness is closely con* ectedjto Feuerbach's 
notion/
notion of the Christian believer who ia alienated from himself 
beoause he ascribes to God the perfection for whioh he yearns, 
but fails to eohieve, in the world. By disclaiming "all power 
of self-exiatenoe (being-for-self) and ascribing this power to a 
gift froa above (1), the unhappy consciousness, according to 
Hegel, ia "stripped of its Ego", and reduced to "an objective 
external existence", like a "thing" (2), This ia the idea whioh, 
aa we shall see in a moment, Feuerbach takes aa hla starting- 
point, For Feuerbaoh, the unhappy oonsclouaness* conception of 
the Lordship of God entails the enslavement and alienation of man. 
For Hegel, alienation is overcome in the Intersubjeotive spirit 
of the religious communion, where subjeot achieves self-integration 
by regaining its own substance, (3)*
In his ilstory of philosophy, Hegel clarifies many of hla 
obseure references to mediaeval Christianity in this chapter.
The church of the middle & gee "exhibits Itself", says iiegel, "aa 
a manifold self-contradiction” (4), The onristi&n believes in 
God as external existenoa and aa absolute, he relates to God in 
worship yet the ecclesiastical authorities, not he, are in 
possession of the Truth, and the church claims to despise wealth 
and acquires enormous property (5)* To the orusaders, Hegel 
asks, why seek the living among the dead? He is not here but is 
risen (6), In the orusades, the ohurch "distorted and perverted 
the prinolple of ohristlan freedom" (7), These references, and 
others, (8), to forms of mediaeval Christianity are obscurely 
expressed in the 9 ihenoaenology*, Ve need not go into them 
farther/
1, -,8« pg, 266,
2* Ibid pg, 266,3, P,3, pg, 765-6,
4, Bhilosophy Of 4.4fitQgy Sibree translation pg, 396.5, Ibid pg, 397,
6* Ibid pg, 409*7. Ibid pg. 411,8, For example, Hegel discusses sin, asceticism, confession,Latin prayers and indulgences, God as judge and so on, 
iiia jgglnt is that the mediaeval ohristlan is alienated an'*
farther here, for they are beside the main point whioh oonerns 
us, namely that the Christian oonoeption of God as an eternal 
beyond, utterly transoendent, whose asclty ie unchangeable and 
whose being excludes the reality of the world, alienates man from 
what he is oapable of becoming. For Hegel, the fundamental error 
io the oonoeption of God as'jan opposite, or as that whioh ie not 
something else, and so limited to being what it ie, determinate and 
so finite. For God as opposed to the world, or man, is not
truly God, For Hegel, we ought to speak not of knowing God but
of knowing in God, Hegel would agree with karoel that Plotinus 
articulated this olearly when he argued that God is veritably for 
us only In so far as we participate in him (1), It is for this 
reason that Hegel argues that we cannot know God, for to speak of 
knowing God is to reduce God to the status of a finite entity, 
bound to the fetters of subject-object dualism. We oomprehend 
(be, reifen) God in and through what we know; we know in and 
through the encompassing comprehension (Be.-riffliohkelt) or 
: otion (Herriff) we call God, He do not know God os opposed to 
the world, or the world as opposed to God, We know the world in
God, whioh means t at it ia not in Isolated singularity, but in
the collected presence of enduring relatedness that we oomprehend 
the permanent gathering of Ao^os • There ie no queetlon, here, 
of the dualist either/or of the mediaeval Christian, To 
oomprehend mean to enoompass in aocordanoe with the dialectical 
both/and of Aoyos •
In connection with the Important duality of life and meaning, 
discussed at length in earlier cha:tere, to comprehend means to 
lay hold of both, despite their opposition in times of 
di s integration/
1. karoelt jQugi; 1 pg. 35.
disintegration and fragmentation, and to hold them together in a 
lively relatedness# "The Notion", aays Stirling, "ia 
Reciprocity" (1)| in its simplest form, it io eelbstbewueatseiB
(2). be/triff ia the living, concrete integration of sevn and 
we sen. The unha, py consciousness falls to integrate life and 
meaning; for him life ie unintelligible, and meaning is posited 
in an eternal beyond# His unhappiness is not unlike the 
unhappiness of the kind of revolutionary yearning of those who 
find the established order utterly unintelligible and who posit 
their meaning, their conception of the significant and the fitting, 
in a future whioh, however Immanent, is radically discontinuous 
with the present# It is : to be distinguished olearly from 
the happy consciousness for whom the meanlngfull is already 
aotual in the sum of all that io good in man as he Is# For the 
happy consciousness confuses the wholeness, and wholesomeness of 
the truth of the whole ( oXov ), with the sum ( tr*w ) of 
what is true and good and wholesome in what man already le#
Hegel's own position ia eschntologioal, poised between the 'even- 
now9 and the 9not-yet9 of the happy and unhappy consciousnesses#
He does not commit a form of the naturalistic fallacy, nor does 
he adopt the nihilism of a thorough-going dualism of life and 
meaning# His conception of Adyos ae Qalat is dialeotioal in 
that it brings together what the unhappy consciousness separatee, 
and what the happy consciousness falls to distinguish in the 
first plaoe# The latter confuses what for the dialectioian 
must be a unity in end through distinction# dialectic does 
not confuse the sum with the whole, consequently it will not 
confuse their opposites, the parts and the fragmented, or broken# 
Hegel/
1. The Secret of ne^el. Vol. I, pg# 203ff
2# Ibid pg* 209*
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Hegel has no quarrel with the understanding distinguishing between 
the parts and the sum of the parts; but he argues that the 
dlstinotlon between the whole and the fractured is of another 
order. The fractured must become whole in a way that parts can 
never become the sua* Wholeness is a living unity in difference; 
The sum, or totality of parts, ia a static absorbtion of the former 
in the latter. To comprehend (Be/rreifen) is, for Hegel, to act 
by laying hold of the alien object thrown in the way, in order that 
the alienation of the object is transformed to enter into a new 
reeiproclty and wholeness with the subject. To comprehend the 
not-I is to know in God, in the sense we used this expression a 
moment ago. Comprehension - or the laying hold of the alien 
object - is a new freedom, a qualitlvely new mode of being in the 
world, as different from the unhappy consciousness aa the latter 
is from the self-righteous conservatism of the happy consciousness. 
The one who comprehends achieves the integrity and freedom, whioh 
according to Hegel, liberates and redeems him from the dualistlo 
strife of domination and subordination, Lordship and Bondage,
Spirit has been bom from the contradictions and antagonisms of 
nature.
Thus, although we do not comprehend the A&yos • the 
in isolated singularity, or in isolated propositions, or from a 
single isolated point of view, we do oomprehend Aoyo* in the 
oolleoted preaenoe of enduring relatedness, into whioh we are 
permanently gathered in the community of Geiet or spirit. This 
comprehension, ia always incomplete, though it strives after 
completeness. Whether Hegel thought that he had achieved a 
completeness of comprehension is doubtful in the extreme, because 
he/
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he always refused to allow that philosophy could comprehend 
the future. The future remains open* Philosophy is like the 
Owl of klnerva (1)* Philosophy comes on the scene too late to 
instruct the world (2)* Philosophy is not s closed solution, 
but an open dialeotic, for Hegel* It comprehends the past, but 
is not, for that reason, abstract* The Aoycxs , or £iiKtf£» 
is enduring oo-inherence, the holding fast of an enduring 
integrity through the dismembering of time and the fragmentation 
of becoming* But Aoyos is oert&inly not that whioh
recoils from • A©y©s is the integrity of To ov
and To ov whioh oan withstand the tensions of life and
death, and consequently fulfils the promise with unwavering 
faithfulness*
1* i&£b&» Preface, pg* 13
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C H A P T E R  IX 
GOD AS LORD, AS SLAVEs 
FEUERBACH,
Feuerbaoh was familiar with the passages in Hegel's 
'Phenomenology of Spirit* we have been discia.ln0« The question 
he was provoked to ask wast How oan man beoor • free, (being-for- 
himaelf), from God, and so from that determinate existence 
(being-for-another) whioh he necessarily has before God? The 
description of alienation which we have discovered in Hegel ia 
transposed in Feuerbach to a naturalistic frame of referenoe. 
Human existence ia prin arily social and historical existence for 
Hegel, primarily natural existence for Feuerbach, The latter 
transcends naturalism only where he begins to formulate his 
philosophy of Love, Thus, his freedom from God, as the over* 
coming of the alienation of man is a freedom to return to a 
natural state of being, rather than a freedom to transform nature 
and ohange society.
The Lord, os we have seen, is being-for-self, by whioh ie 
meant freedom to be oneself, freedom from self-deception; it 
means having a mind of one's own. This is what we meant by 
self as sub ect; and we remember that such a freedom from one's 
own nature and from the determinate way of being in the world 
Involved a Ilf e-death struggle. Environmental conditioning, 
social and peyohologloal determination of the self, and the 
apparently inviolable objectivity of the way things are, are all 
overcome when true being-for-self is achieved. For Hegel the 
Lord deceives himself if he thinks he has achieved this 
independence and freedom. He ia the elave of the slave. 
Similarly,/
Similarly, the slave who becomes a Lord is  the slave of the slave* 
The dualism is not so easy to break.
If God is  conceived as Lord and man as sieve, then how can 
men become free from his reified mode of being before God?
This is Feuerbaoh9s question* Hegel was asking how man can 
become free in the transformation of his social and historical 
existence* Kan's true self lies in his power to negate the 
given and so transform it* For Feuerbach, man becomes h i.oelf 
when he returns to the pure, happy natural existence whioh he was 
meant to enjoy* This can be reformulated aa follows: I f  God
is being for se lf, i.e* subject, and man being for another, i*e* 
object; how oan man become free from God, and so able to be 
himself* Feuerbach's answer is that man should withdraw his 
projection of God, end realize that "in and through God, man has 
in view himself alone" (1). HC&O HO .DU DKUS LSTt *ian la the God 
of man (2)*
Feuerbach's theory of religious faith runs as followsi 
"Man projects his being into objectivity, and then again makes 
himself an objeot to this projected image of himself thus converted 
into a subjeot; he thinks of hlaself as an objeot to himself, 
but as the objeot of an objeot, of another being than himself"(5)•
aan, in other wordSf end not God is  tru ly  belng~for-»self* 
But man, for Feuerbach, is social man* "The essence of man ie 
contained/
1. fcasyioe a£ Chrlatlonlty. trenal. 8«orge i.liot H*rpor pg. 50. 
Ibid pg* 85, 281, 159, 271, 281* In a
work, recently translated, called 'The Lesenoe of Faith 
according to Luther*, Feuerbach substantiates this thesis in 
an extensive analysis of Luther's theology, and in particular 
of Luther's Deus pro nobis*
5. Ibid pg. 50.
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oontuined only In the community and unity of man with man; it  ia 
a unity 9 however* which reals only on the reality of the 
distinction between I and Thou". "Solitude ia finiteneos and 
limitation; community is freedom and infinity. an for himself 
ie man (in the ordinary sense); man with man* -  the unity of I 
and Thou • ie God" (1). Although Feuerbach rejects any monlatio
confusion of 1 and Thou; nonetheless man is free* for him* only
in so fur as he is  sooial man. Sooial roan is belng-for-self.
The unity of man with man is God (2).
Feuerbach asks us to negate the external objeotlvlty of 
God; or more significantly the idea of God as uubjeot by which 
ws are condemned to an objective* determinate mode of being* The 
being of man as subjeot is reduced to a reified existence* a being 
for another whioh alienates him from hie esse, oe* which is to be 
subjeot i .e .  free. So Feuerbach seeks to "invert the oraolea of 
religion" (3); for ths "antithesis of divine and human is 
altogether illusory" (4)* Man creates God in his own Image; 
man deceives himself i f  he believes God to have made him in his 
own image (9). "God is the mirror of man" (3)* In external* 
islng God* man actively alienates himself from his own essenoe. 
Feuerbach sees his anthropology as a therapy for alienation; 
by withdrawing his projeotions and becoming aware that Homo 
hoalni daua tuit Unn is the God of - an) (6)* man is free to 
become himself*
However* Feuerbach argues that his anthropology has a double 
significance, for in teaehlng ths identity of the human and the 
divine*/
1. rtnolilea of phlloaouhy £f j&g futurei Pare. 59 and 60, 
P£. 71.
2. f3gett|e^of^0|rlationJLty. pp* 66-7• 92* 110» 122* 155-8,
5* Ibid pg. 60*
4* Ibid pg. 13* Ch. VII.
5. fcaoence pg. 63* 118* eto.
6. Ibid pg, 159.
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divine, it  not only reduces theology to anthropologyt it  exalts
anthropology to theology, "very much as Christianity while
lowering God into man, made man Into God'1 (1) • He seeks to
persuade theology to give up metaphysics and accept an ethic of
love within naturalistic frames of reference* liis critique of
religious language, together with his not quite positivist
refutation of the believer's claim to consciousness of God,are the
negative aspects of the positive thesis that a chriotologioal
ethic must take the place of a metaphysical theology*
"The incarnation ia nothing else than the practical, material
manifestation of ths human nature of God", he writes (2)* He
agrees with the Greek Fathers and the tradition of Orthodox
theology trot the deification (Oosata) of man follows from the
divine tasvweis (3 /. Dsus homo factus eat* ut homo Deus fieret (4)#
said Augustine, (quoted by Feuerbach)* In Christ, according to
Hegel, the "immediate existence of aotual reality has oeased to be
something alien or external to the Divine" (5)* The divine being
humbles itse lf and so renounces its "abstract nature and unreallV*
(6>* God exists originally in essential thought, and at this
moment, natural existence and the self are denied* The next
moment the external reality of God ia denied and exlstenoe-for-self
(human freedom, and responsibility for the self and the world)
is affirmed* Hegel saw the aoute d ifficu lties involved in this
theological dilemma* He oalls it  s "fruitlessstruggle" ( 7 ; .
We reoognize here the form of the long debate about ths
transcends: ice of God and the secular world in reoent theology*
Hegel sought to solve the problem with his notion of spirit*
Feuerbaoh/
1. Kaaenoe pg. XV, Irinciples pg* 71.
2* v-aatnoe Qf Anlty pg* 0^*
5* Ibid eh* IV esp* pg* 50*
4* Sermon cud Pop p* 571 ol* Hsaence pg* $1
5. 1.3. p. 775.
6.  P.S .  p .  7 7 3 .
7 .  P . S .  p .  773*
Feuerbach, on the other hand, took the second alternative, namely, 
the denial of God and the affirmation of man•a existence for self, 
(which unlike liegel he conceivee to be a natural and determinate 
existence). The essential idea of the incarnation accordingto 
him la love* "love determined God to the renunciation of hie 
divinity" (1)* Feuerbach wished to retain tne predicate #Love*, 
and deny the subjects God* By withdrawing hla projection of the 
idea of e perfect love from the external subject (God), man ie 
freed to see that love ie the beginning and end of Chrletlan faith
(2)* Hegel*9 notion of spirit as universal aelf-consciousness 
embodied in the hletorio form of the religious communion, becomes 
Feuerbach*s notion of God &8 the unity of men with man, 1 and Thou* 
Love • God, eaye Feuerbach, so therefore the "relation of 
child and parent, of husband and wife, of brother and friend, in
general of man to man, -  in short all the moral relations are per
ae religious* Life as a whole is in its essential substantial 
relations, throughout of a divine nature" (3). The frealf 
though hidden subject-matter of theology is man; anthropology, 
by which Feuerbach means the human scienoes of sociology, 
psychology and so on* Faith in God oecomes faith in social man,
or the essenoe of man; and "the essence of man is contained only
in the community and unity of man with man" (4)* Keligioue faith 
becomes & secular, humanist ethic* For Feuerbach the unity of 
man with man ia constituted by Love* "Love", he writes, "is  
objectively ae well as subjectively the criterion of being, of 
truth and of reality* ffhere there is no love, there ie also no
truth, end only he who loves so ething is something; to be nothing
and to love nothing are identical* The more one is the more one
«
loves, and visa versa” ( )•
Feuerbach*©/
1 .  E s s e n c e  o f  Xnity pg. 53 • .
PP* 5©t58, also pg. 48.
y. T5IS pg. 271.
4. Principles para: 59, pg* 71.
5# Ibid i ara* 35» pg* 34* . ■c-nco • _* 4b*
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Feuerbach9a Vka&gfiffig 2l ShCLlttflrttil* and hie ' xlXLQlvl&X 
of the philosophy of the future9 contain many similar references 
to Love* His "reduction" of theology to anthropology oan be 
olearly seen in his exegesis of the text "Ve love God beoause 
he first loved ue" ( l ) . ( l  John 419;  "The love of God makes ms 
loving • ••• what then is it  that I love in God? Lovet love to 
man*...* The divine love is only human love* made objective* 
affirming Itself" (2)* In arguing that "God is the mirror of 
man" Feuerbach makes the distinction between faot and essenoe*
between man as he actually ia* and man as ht ought to be* i f  he 
la to be truly himself. God is not* for Feusrbaoh* a mirror of 
man9a factual bsing* but of his essence. God is what man ought 
to bs* and what sooial man* the unity of man with man* oan be.
Thus* the ontological distinction between the being of God and 
the being of man is understood by Feusrbaoh to bs a distinction 
between what oan be predioated of man9a factual existence and his 
unrealised essence. It is not a distinction between God as 
subueot and men as subject. For t. at kind of distinction leads 
to what Feuerbach calls a "formal subordination" of man to God
(3), Feusrbaoh agrees with the theologian who argues that God 
must be distinguished from nature* but the distinction between 
God and nature is nothing else than the distinction between man 
and nature. The theological debate between pantheism end 
pereoi&liam is a debate about the essenoe of man. Thus for* 
Feuerbach9s view of the matter is fairly straight-forward.
he has employed the Lord-slave model in his analysis and 
method/
1. hssence pg. 57 ofi 1 John Ch. IV esp. w  U* 19* 20* 21.
2. a T w ,  55-7.
3. essence pg. 64.
method of reduotlon, but In so doing he finds that hs has to dsflns 
what hs means by the essence of man* He is clear that i f  God 
is conceived as Independent subject, then men is mads formally 
subordinate to, and so enslaved to, a determinate mode of existence* 
for-anotuer* 3o he argues that in denying ths subjectivity of 
God he oan detaoh the divine predicates, and show how they are 
really predicates of the essence of man* The debate between 
pantheism and personalism must be transposed, therefore, into a 
different frame of reference* The debate becomes a debate about 
whether what man ideally ought to be, and so ought to become, 
is to be conceived in naturalistic, deterministic categories 
or personal historical categories* It is a debate about man*
What is man? Is he a natural being conditioned by his environ* 
ment and determined by certain instinctive ways of being in ths 
world? Or can he transcend his own nature, end free himself from 
his determinate existence? Can he at some point achieve the 
maturity of assured self-consciousness which will enable him to 
assume responsibility for the world whioh produced him? Does 
his •essence• lie  within the dimension of ths former, or the 
latter?
On the one hand, Feuerbaoh argues that: "Hs alone is the
true atheist to whom the predicates of ths divine being,- for 
example, love, wisdom, justice, -  are nothing; not he to whom 
merely the subject of these predicates are nothing" (1)* To 
deny the subjectivity of God (lordship) frees man to become 
whet he essentially is (l*s* free being-for*self, assured self* 
consciousness, etc*). To deny the prsdloates of the divine 
subject is to deny what man essentially is* Feuerbaoh tries to 
combine/
1. hasence pg* 21, also 16*19*
combine this doo trine of the essence of man with an empirical 
naturalism* This leads him to confuse fact and essence precisely 
at the point where consistency demanded him to maintain it* For 
he equates the essence of man, (ae that which man ought to be, but 
is not}, with his nature or genus, or the nature of the human 
species in general, or with the aggregate of all human individuals 
taken collectively, with, in other words, what man already is*
This involves him in a positivistlo confusion of faot and essence* -  
An all-too-oonfined empiricism will not allow him to hold faot and 
essence in oreative antithesis, but leads him to reduce the latter 
to the former* Thus, there is no oritioal negation of what is the 
oaoe, no idee of "what ought to be the case, but is not the o&oe'* 
Flth hie "sacred idea of the epeoiee" (1) Feuerbach has equated 
actual human nature, or what man, either Individually or 
collectively, already is; with what man essentially ought to be, 
("is" in a wholly different sense); thus he excludes that 
oritioal negation of the given natural and social realities whioh 
alone leads to their transformation*
On the other hand, Feuerbach departs from this view, when he 
seeks to define man*a essenoe (as distlnot from his natural 
existence) in terms of the divine predioates* It is true that 
his equation of the divine predioates with man's essence is part 
of a circular argument, and is , to this extent, typical of all 
reduotionlea* Its starting point and necessary condition is tne 
metaphysical belief that the independent, transcendent reality of 
God is an illusion* This belief conforms to the logic of all 
metaphysical overstatements, for it  claims indubitably to know 
that/
1* Essence pg* 151.
that something does not exist because we oannot know whether 
it  exists or not. I f Feuerbaoh, like Kant, confined the 
knowable to that which can in principle be an object of sensory 
experience and therefore argued that God oannot be so known, then 
hia claim to know what a priori he eould not know, namely that 
God does not exist, (and is therefore an illusion), rould be 
nonsensical. leaving this point aside however, his attempt to 
equate the divine xnredicates with the predicates of man9a essence 
introduces transcendent categories like Love, justice, etc. 
whioh are not consistent with the naturalistic reductionist
0 tlined above. "love", says Feuerbach "gives me consciousness 
that I a man •••••• Love is God himself; and apart from it
there Is no God. Love makes man God and God man" (1).
The Category of the Other, or the Thou, is integral to this 
notion of Love. "In another, I first have the consciousness 
of humanity; through him I first learn, I firs t  feel that I am 
a man: in my love for him it  is first olear to me that he
belongs to me and I to him, that we two oannot be without each 
other, that only community constitutes humanity" ••••• There is , 
nonetheless, a "qualitative, critical distinction between the
1 and Thou". (2).
It is , first of a ll, clear that Feuerbach agrees with Hegel 
that there is no consciousness of the external world which is not 
inherently a self-cousciouaneoe, and there is no self-ooascioua- 
ness whioh ia not the product of the relation of one self* 
consciousness with another. lor Hegel being for self ie 
possible only when being for another is  negated, mediated, and 
finally transformed in the trial by death. For Feuerbach there 
ie /
Lsoenoe pg. 48.
2. ibid pg. 158.
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is no I without a Thou. "The hgo", he says* "attains to 
oonsoiousness of the world through oonsolous-nessof the Thou" (1). 
Feuerbach does not* however* speak of the Life-death struggle.
The unity of sum with men ia not forged in the heat of 
Intersub jeotive strife * but in the loving warmth of the child's 
relation to its mother* or in the love of man and wife (2).
But like Ifegel* Feuerbach doee not consider the oonorete ethical 
problems of interaubjeotivity except ae a means to an end.
The end for Hegel was* as we saw* spirit knowing itaelf aa 
spirit (3)* The end for Feusrbaoh is the speoies knowing 
itse lf as speoies (4 ). "Man and woman*4* he says* "are tiie 
complement of eech other* and thus united they firat present 
the speoies* tiie perfect man” (3) .  In the Idea of the speoies 
Feuerbach employs a category whioh oonforms to his satisfaction 
with his naturalism and yet transcends the conditional* limited* 
imperfect existence of the individual man. .v.an oannot lose 
the consciousness of the species* for his self-consciousness ie 
essentially united to his consciousness of another than himself” 
(6). Unlike t e Christian* with his ”exoe8sive transcendental 
subjectivity" (7)* Feuerbach’ s man needs the others sexuality 
ie integral to human exists: oe (6). "My fellow man” * he 
concludes* "is per se the mediator between me and the saored idea 
of the speoies” (9). This is the hidden truth of the doctrine 
of Christ as mediator between the individual and Cod.
The/
1. Ibid pg. 83.
2* Faaenoe pg. 65ff; 247ff.
3. *.»>« cii. VIj.1 esp.
Feaence pg. 136
3# XHcTpi. 136P i d  pg. 1377. pjpnoc pg. 1678. ibid pgs. 92. 136-7* 167* 170 eto.
9. IkM P6. 199.
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The epeoiee ie perfcot men, the en8 realieaimus, id quo 
nihil majus oogltarl potest , (that than which nothing greater
can be conoeived)* Social man, man with man, la the "essence" 
to which ^euerbach reduces God* The species is holy; and all 
interpersonal relationships are holy, because the unity of I 
and Thou ie Cod* God does not transcend social man, though 
Hs transcends the individual* "The beginning* middle and end 
of religion is AN" (1)* Only eoelal man is free, only eoolal 
an transcends the determinate limits of individual man* The 
truth ie disclosed in intersubjeetlve interaction because any 
true way of being in the world (authentic exlstenoe) must be 
intersubjeotive* Thus, with his concept of essence, Feuerbach 
transcends his own naturalistic fraue of reference and enters the 
historical world of man's social existence* Freedom is a 
transoendenoe of all 'natural existence9, and cannot be u derstood 
with concepts such as genus, or spcoies, or even the universally 
frunan* For freedom negates and overoones nature; essence 
contradicts the realities of human nature, the two cannot after 
all, be equated* This ie the fundamental ambiguity of 
Feuerbach's "natural philosophy in the realm of aind"(2)*
What light can Feuerbach throw on the problems under 
disc- salon? It is dear, first of all, that Christianity, for 
Feuerbaeh, is the symptom par exoellenoe of man's aelf-nil©nation* 
Hegel had argued that oerteln kinds of Christian self-understand­
ing, and oertcin conceptions of God, were symptoms of his self- 
alienation; whereas Christian faith and life, the life, epeeoh 
and deed whioh accords with the A£yo* , rightly comprehended, 
is the remedy* But we have seen that Feuerbach's position ie 
ambiguous*/
1*2.
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ambiguous* Theology is anthropology, but anthropology thereby 
receives the significance of theology. Vhe meimiing of God 
ie the unity of man with man, but the unity o f man with man ia 
thereby given the ultimate significance whioh was onoe uocrlbed 
exclusively to God. Feuerbaoh has overcome the either/or of the 
unhappy consciousness in a form of huraanistio monism, a metaphyoic 
which ia often confusedly ascribed to Hegel. The difference 
between them lies in Hegel'a dealing dialeotioally with what 
Feuerbach reduces to a static noniam* Feuerbach thinks he haa
overoome the Icrd-al&ve dualism in ita theological dimension, 
and he may be right. But he faila to ace the wider significance 
of the dualism whioh Hegel exposes in hia phenomenology of man's 
social and psychological alienation. -arx, on the other hand, 
did see ita significance in man's social, economic end political 
l i fe ,  though he was unaware of the extent to which it  throws 
light upon man's psychological alienation. It was le ft  to 
Freud to f i l l  out this gap. ~arx does succeed, however, in 
giving the discussion a new shape, mainly because of his 
insistence upon praxis as the fulfilment o f Theorla. "The 
philosophers", he wrote, "have only interpreted the world 
differently, the point ia to change it" (1 ). Emat Bloch 
argues that "here primarily does . arxlsm distinguish itse lf 
<Aualitatively from all previous philosophy: hence also from
Hegel'a, to which it  ia moat akin. For with one leap forward 
to the new as history never experienced it  before, there begins 
through ^arx a transformation of philosophy -  through 
continuation and 3ublation of Hsgel'a -  into a philosophy of 
world transformation” (2). Here Bloch la right to show the 
living/
living connection between the work of Hegel end Man, a con* cot lor. 
whioh ia all too often oisoured by those *ho fail to see that 
thinking for Hegel is a comprehending or laying hold of alien 
externality which ia both praxis ae well ae theoria* An over- 
intellectual!st interpretation of hegel easily obsouree that*
For iiegel, to reason ia to eot; it ie to negate Irrational 
reality* 19hereae knowledge, even taking account of the 
eynthesicing activity of the subjeot, entails a passive, 
observing attitude to the way things are; reason, for liegel, 
ia active, negative, transforming* It Is not 1 significant 
that hegel'8 thought was called 'negative9 as opposed to 
'positive9 in relation to established realities, nor that it 
was called the algebra of the revolution* It is not 
lnal&xlficant that the first communist revolution took plooe in 
& country where Hegelianism had been a deep and powerful 
intellectual foroe for a long tine* Kegel's Ceiat participates 
in the evolutionary power which has always been present in any 
genuine theology of the Christian Aoyo* •
iVhen inrx criticises Feuerbaoh, he does so with Hegelian 
reasoning* We see this in the following passage, qucted in full* 
"The chief defect of all previous materialism (including that of 
Feuerbach) ia that things (gegenotond,, reality, the sensible 
world, are oonveived only in the form of objeoto (objekt) of 
observation, but not ao hui.on sense activity, not as practical 
activity, not subjectively* Henoe, in opposition to materialism, 
the aotive aide was developed abstractly by idealism, whioh of 
course does not know real sense activity as such* Feuerbaoh 
wants sensible objects really distinguished from objects of 
thought, but he doesnot understand human activity itself as 
objective/
objective (gegsatstandlloh) activity. Consequently* in ’JQyi 
Essence of Christianity' * he regards the theoretical attitude aa 
the only genuine human attitude* while practical activity ie 
apprehended only in its  dirty Jewish manifestation. He 
therefore does not grasp the significance o f 'revolutionary**
• practical-critical' activity" (1)# We have argued that Marx 
has misunderstood Hegel* i f  by abstract* he means that Hegel9e 
philosophy has no place for oonorete praxis. We shall leave 
aside the question as to whether arx's criticism is true of the 
later Hegel* and concentrate on his criticism o f Feuerbach.
Marx rightly sees that Feuerbach's naturdlstio-hunanisa is  
not far from a positivistic preoccupation with the facts* whioh 
is* in its  turn* perhaps* not so far from an absolutely 
reductionist aoientism as is sometimes argued. Lunaos 
convi singly argues that i arx was never a positivist in this 
sense* though Engels probably tended toward i t  in his inter­
pretation of arx as well as his own t: inking (2 ). Following 
Lukacs* Merlean-i onty argues that "a aarxlst oonoeption of human 
society and of economic society in particular oannot subordinate 
i t  to permanent laws like thoee of claaslcal physics* beoause it  
sees society heading toward a new arrangement In whioh the laws of 
olaesloal economics will no longer apply" (3 ). ucientism is a 
case of alienation (entfreiadung). for Lukaos and erlein- onty. 
This is  not to say that* for Marx* every subjeot-objeot relation 
ie a oase of alienation. Aline ie correct to argue that 
Berdyaev and dartre are misinterpreting Marx when they believe 
him/
1. First thesis on Feusrbaoh. delected /ritiiurs of &arxi 
Hubei and Bottomore pgs. 82-4. or also . arx anaun* clo 
•on Religion' pgs. 69*72.
2. Zltta* iukfcoo Ibid pg. 121ff.
3* Merlean-Fontyi "denae and Moncense' i Marxism and 
Philosophy pg. lsST“
him to be attacking objectification (Vorjie/^nat^ndi lahung) 
when he attacks alienation (!)• Marx is concerned to show, in 
Das /lanital, that the so-oelled laws of social reality are 
relative to a certain social structure (capitallain) • To 
absolutise "laws”, or to conform passively to the facts, is to 
revert to Feuerbach's mistaken eplstemology. Lukaos argues 
that Hegel's position is never, even in later life, a passive 
conservatism. He could not become a soolollst because the 
economic situation in Germany was not yet ripe for socialism.
He exposed the contradictions of ths bourgeois world, but it 
was not ths time for political notion (2). Hyppolite agrees 
with Lukaos that Adam Smith's 'wealth of Nations'* published in 
1776, and translated into Gera&n in 1794*6, exercised a "very 
profound influence" upon Hegel, though Hegel goes beyond Adam 
Smith, and in this hs anticipates karx, when he analyses the 
oontradiotione of the established oooial order (».
In conclusion, Feuerbach's thesis is that man is a slave of 
God in so for as he regains fettered to his projeotionst the 
purpose of his philosophy was\to show us how man oan be redeemed 
from this alienation, and allowed to regain the happy consciousness 
of natural existence. For Marx, as ws shall see in the next 
ohapter, man la slave to his social conditions, and his religious 
suffering is both on expression of, and a protest against this 
enslavement. Keliglon eases the pain of living in the oruel, 
unjust, Inhuman world of Capitalist society. It is the drug 
whioh enables man to endure the existing order without sharing 
its Insanity. For Hegel, religion la both an expression of the 
insanity./
1. Kline» Hedisoovexy of Marx and Hegel ini
i'hmQaeaQlony fi&P Existentialism. Ed. Lee and mdelbauaPg. 122.
2. G. Lukaosi Per Junra Hexel 19483. J. Hyppolitei Herel e^Iarx pg. 85.
insanity of nan's social existence, and the sanity whioh ia bora 
in and through insanity* It is both brokenness and wholeness, 
disease and health, alienation and redemption* The difference 
between the first form of religion and the second is the 
dlfferenoe ' comprehension1 makes to man, the difference 
being-for-self makes to being-in-itself, the difference self- 
consciousness makes to every thought, word and deed of man*
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C H A P TB B X
GOD MONEY AND THE ALIENATION OF MANi
MAHX*
"To be radical is to greep things by the root* But for man 
the root ia man himself" (1)* For Marx* aa for sooialiat man* 
"the whole of what ie called world history ia nothing but the 
oreation of man by human labour* and the emergence of nature for 
man* he therefore has the evident and Irrefutable proof of hie 
eelf-oreation* of hia own origins” (2)* To grasp the situational 
logic of human being ie for Marx to grasp that man becomes what 
he is through labour and struggle* Marx approves hegel*s 
conception of labour aa ":oan*s act of self •creation" (3)* Man 
ia a product of his "self •formation through practical activity"
(4). "As society itself produces man as man* so it ia produced 
by him" (5)* To grasp thingsby the root* we must recognise* 
ae Feuerbach does* that man ia the God of nan* man is all quid 
quo nihil moiua nihil cogitarl potest* Man ie one rcalisaimua 
(6>* that than which nothing greater can be oonoeived* man ie 
hie own highest being (7)* Man ie the root of things* Uan ie 
Marx's point of departure, and the thinking of the Karly 
manuscripts revolves around the esoh&talogioal question ae to 
whether we oan legitimately hope to see the f&otsbf our human 
situation changed to oorreapond to the valueawe hold most 
passionately* Or are the faots necessarily void of value* or 
unchangeable»/
1*2*
3*4*
5.6. 
7. ibid pg. 2b, a.lso pga* 38-9, 83* 159* 271. 281*pg. 34, 98, 198, 213.
unchangeable* and therefore hopeless?
We begin* then* with Marx'a analysis of the Lord-slave 
dialectic* and so with the logio of the human situation* erlomr 
lonty calls the dioleotio a "situational logio" (1)* which in 
Marx's hands grasps what man ie* in order to disclose the 
oontradiotion between what man ie and what he ought to be* It 
la an attempt to understand the faots in order better to 
oontradiot them,to understand alienation in order to overcome it* 
to understand the negation in order to negate it* It ie the 
"negation of the negation" beoause it is the negation and so 
transcendence of an order whioh alienates man* end le therefore 
negative in opposition to man's true being* Marxist theory is a 
theory of man's transformation whioh does not stop at theory| 
it is a theory whioh is also praxis, a philosophy of human action*
• Our starting-point is a fairly long* but important* passage 
fro» the second section of the aonuaorlot. entitled Vrlvaf 
property end Coanuaia ; (2). thie will introduce the eategorici 
frame-work within whioh we shall be working in this part of the 
treatise*
"Communism is the positive abolition of 
private < ro;erty* of human self-alienation* and 
thus the reel appropriation of human nature 
through and for man* It is* therefore* the 
return of man himself as a sooial le* a really 
human being* a complete and conscious return 
which assimilates all tiie wealth of previous 
development* Communism as a fully developed 
naturalism is humanism* and us a fully 
developed/
1* Marxism and Philosophy in Cense and Hoauenae pg* 129*
2* enuaoriUto 1044 pgs* 152 to 167*
developed humanism Is naturalism. It is 
the definitive resolution of the antagonism 
between man and nature, end between man end 
men. It Is the true solution of the oonfliot 
between existence and essence, between object* 
ifioation and self-affirmation, between freedom 
and necessity, between individual end opeoieo.
It is the solution of the riddle of history, 
and knows itself to be this solution" (1).
The connection between Mark's oonoeption of communism as 
the true coinoidentia opposltorua. the connection ( if ^ <»»U ) 
between the opposites - whose strife makes history both oroative 
and destructive, * and Kegel's dialectic, will be obvious to 
anyone familiar with the discussion undertaken so far in this 
study. Marx stands firmly in the Heraclitean tradition of 
dlaleotioal thinking, and it is in this context that we proceed 
to discuss his 'Economic and philosophical manuscripts' of
1844. We firs not, here, concerned with his economic theory,*
but with his philosophy. Even if all Marx's economic theories 
were superceded, we should still have his dialectical philosophy* 
We will not have time to follow his arguments into Fas apital* 
but will confine ourselves, for the purposes of this study, to 
the aspeots of the Early Manuscripts which are of importance to 
our subjoot.
Ths passags we have just quoted sum arises some of the 
Ideas we wish to investigate. We begin with an exposition of 
them. We shall then concentrate on the dialectic of Lord and 
slave in particular, in order to understand what light Marx 
throws/
1. anuaorJ^ta 1044 yg. 155.
throws upon our general problem of in teruubj activity*
tie begin with the passage we hove quoted* Marx, like Hegel 
and Freudt assumes a standpoint whioh entails some measure of 
freedom from the phenomena of the world and society he is trying 
to understand* "let us assume man to be man, and his relation 
to the world to be a human one”, he says* «e c<n assume
something to be the oase whioh is not the case; the point of 
view we adopt rests upon our reco&iltion that the real is not 
rational, that what is the oast ought not to be the case if man is 
to become man. If we assume man is man, we a an then cone to see 
the extent to which he ie not nan* an is not himself, for Marx# 
Man is "possessed", he does not possess hi .self • Both Capitalist*
Lord and Slave-Vvbrker are possessed, alienation pervades human 
existence#
The divine power of money, is, according to Marx, the 
prinoepe mundii Money is the deus huiua seouli* But money ie 
also the nlienated and self-alienating epeoles-llfe (Gattungaleben) 
or apcoie3-being (Oattungaweaen; of man# It is the alienated
power of humanity (1)# Money possesses man, though in truth man
is ultimately responsible for the life-si tun t ion in whioh money 
has come to possess him (2)# This can be seen only from a 
standpoint of critiquej for like Hegel, Marx finds it necessary 
to establish a standpoint whioh transcends the realities and 
rationalities whioh are "possessed", in order to disposaees or 
redeem them*
So Marx aske his readers to assume something whioh is not the 
ease, namely that man is man* If man is to be man, "love can 
only/ *
X* Mflmaogilirtfl 1844 PC. 1922* "Aa inhuman power rules over everything" - acid Marx*
Everything becomes other than its true "essence" wider the power of oapltoilet alienation* Even the Capitalist ie 
la bondage, fljBHMrtPtB PS. 178,
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only be exchanged for love, trust for trust"• Han, if he is to 
be man, is what he ie, quite apart from how much money he has (1)* 
He oannot buy love, trust or a place in the human eommunlty*
But beoause in reality men is not man, human values are forgotten 
and eoonomic "values" put in their place* In the real socio­
economic order, the more you have the more you ares without 
money you arc nothing* Marx le therefore trying to establish 
a standpoint from which the "being" of human being is not 
confused or equated with "having" money* In the present order, 
everything must be bought* Nothing oan be had without money* 
Money therefore possesses everything* That is why the Capitalist 
Lord very understandably, indeed neoesaarlly, seeks to repress 
and exploit the Worker-Slave. He needs the money* The 
princepa srundl* money, possesses and determines the world of men, 
nature and society*
To assume that man is roan, that the irrational ought not to 
be, that money ought not to be God, that human values are more 
important than economic o es, ia communism* Communism values 
"being", and relegates "having" to seoond place. In this 
sense, therefore, communism ie the abolition of human self­
alienation, according to Marx* The system of private pro. erty 
in ite alienated form le a kind of madness* Zt ie "poseeesion"* 
Man ornnot be himself* He le reduced to being a commodity* He 
does not fulfil himself in work, he denies himself* At v/ork 
he ie homeless (2)* In his human functions, he is reduced to en 
animal* Hie activity is suffering (3)* Work alienates him 
from the species, and so from himself, beoause he io a speoies- 
being/*
1*2.
3*
being. He is alienated from other men (1), from hie own tody, 
from external nature, hia mental life end his huuan life* Hie 
life is "servitude to the object" (2). The worker is a "slave 
of the object" (33. Communism is subject regaining substance* 
Thus, communism is man regaining his self-hood; it is 
liberation from universal bondage to the Cod i.&mmon, ths prinoepa
.’undl* "xoney", says :.arx, "abases all the Gods of mankind
and changes them into commodities* ioney is the universal and 
self-sufficient value of all things" (4;* Communism is the death 
of this God; and the rebirth of man as man* It is a naturalism
because apart from nature, and apart from his own huaen nature,
man is not* biail&rly nature, "t&iten abstractly, for itself, 
and rigidly separated from man, is nothing for mar" ( 5 / .
Communism is tnerefore, also, s transformation of nature into a 
human, historic world, in a human way, for human beings*
Co&munism is true community; it is the social order of communion 
of man with man* In this sense, tuen, it resolves the antagonism 
between man and nature, and between men and man* In this sense 
it is the true resolution of the conflict between exiate.ee and 
essence, because it calls man's essence into existeuce through 
"revolutionary praotical-oritic&l” notion (6j* Communism 
transcends the situational logic which necessitates the alienation 
of another in ay self-affirmation; it transfera the world in 
which the 1ife-death struggle of Hegel la the elne qua non of 
self-con&oiousness* It achieves freedom in the ohoice of the 
only "necessary" wuy, the way of proletarian revolution; in 
revolution, all past social "necessities", conceived as rigid 
natural/
1 *  i b id  pg* 129*
2* I b i d  pg* 12 2*
3* Ibl.d pg. 123.4* Ibid pg# 37*
5. Told pg. 217.
6. ITrst thej«.j gn Feuerbach.
natural laws, are dissolved* Finally, the individual regains 
hie social-being as species life; his conflict with other men is 
mediated into peaceful, classless, co-operation, and creative 
intersubjective interaction. it is for these reasons, then, that 
tferx called communism the "solution of the riddle of history" (1). 
we shall discuss this notion of "solution" in relation to 
dialectic towards the end of this chapter, for it is of obvious 
and profound significance.
We have introduced aone of the main the .es of the early 
writings of 1343 and lo44; and with the help of a brief 
exposition of one of the most definitive statements of what 1 arx 
thought communism ought to be, we take note tnat ;arx sought to 
liberate social iaun from egoisn, society from madness, the
working class from alienation and suffering, and the capitalist
andLoras from their legalised, state-protected killing/stealing.
iVe must now turn with more attention to the text of the manuscript!
The outstanding achievement of Hegel's '.henomenoloKY of 
Spirit'. according to i»arx, is that hegel greaped the self- 
oreation of man as process, to the result of his own labour, 
iie conceives labour as the essence, the aelf-eonfir;;ing essence, 
of man; but he saw only the positive side of labour. Labour, 
for <arx, is man's coming to be for himself within alienation, 
as an alienated man. Labour can be understood as a creative 
principle only within the fra lework of Hegel's "dialectic of 
negativity";. Marx therefore introduces the distinction between 
alienated and authentic labour (2).
For/
1. - anuscripta pg. 153*2. anuacripta 1344 pgs. 202-3*
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For both Hegel and arx, the labour and struggle of self- 
creation, or "self-formation" (1) in practical activity* produces 
two kinds of human being* two way^of being human in the world*
One* being-for-aelf, is independent* or apparently independent! 
the other is de:endent* in that it is being-for-another. The 
former ie the lord* tiie latter the Slave* *e have seen that 
according to hojfcve* Hegel believed that nan's historic future ia 
in the hands of the slave who becomes Lord of the Lords; the 
slave as stoio-soeptic* or as Christian* eventually beoomee the 
world-constituting agent responsible for the new world of the 
spirit* The slave is the man who worke toward the eschatalogloal 
fulfilment of all thinga for all men* For Atarx* “the whole of 
society divides into two classes of property owners and 
propertyleas workers"* capital and labour* Capital ie being 
for self* Lordship; labour is being for another* elavery* and 
so alienated labour*
According to arx, "labour is the essenoe of wealth"* (2)* 
"Capital ie stored up labour" (3)* Thus* the apparently 
absolute dualism of fctarx's class war between Lords and Slaves* 
capital and labour* is not absolute at all; it ia the result of 
tiie alienation of one single phenomenon* human labour* man as 
labourer* Private property aa subject* as "activity for itself*' 
is labour; labour is the "subjeotive essence" of private 
property (4)* Capital ia alienated labour; nonetheless labour 
is the essence of capital* Marx argues that "the worker is 
the subjeotive manifestation of the faot that capital ie man 
wholly lost to himself* just as capital is the objective 
.manifestation of the faot that labour is man lost to himself"
Capital/
1. Ibid pfe. 189 •
Capital is the human reality of the worker stolen from him, it is 
his own belli*; alienated from him, and so lost to him* Aa a 
worker man exists solely for the sake of capital, whioh is his 
own being alien to him as the property' of someone else* The 
old distinction between capitalist and landowner, between slave 
and free worker or hireling ie merely what arx calls an 
"historical distinction", not one "inscribea in the neture of 
things" (1)* "The final result", says Marx, "is that, broadly 
speaking, there remain only two classes in the population, the 
working class and the capitalist class" (2)* This simple 
dualism of Lord and slave in man#s social and economic life is 
the result of the complete triumph of ths "aristocracy of money”* 
For I£arx, the God of this world is money; all men are its 
servants* Hegel*s death of God, and rebirth of God as spirit 
in history, is, for fcarx, transposed into a vision of human 
reality liberated from money, the Lord of this world* The 
spirit of this world is Jewish, in that money has become, through 
the Jew, but also apart from him, a "world power" (3)* "Money", 
wrote Marx, "is an omnipotent being" (4); "money is the highest 
good, and so its possessor is good" (5) • Money is the "bond
which binds ms to human life, and society to ms", it "links ms 
with nature and man", it is the "bond of all bonds" (6)* "The 
divine power of money" oonfusesand Inverts all hu^an end natural 
qualities, it brings about the fraternisation of lnoompatiblee(7)* 
"Money ie the external universal means and power (not derived 
from/
1* Ibid t>£‘& • 113anu 140*2*
3.4. 3. 6* 
7.
from man as man, nor from human society as society) aauooodbd&fck 
to ohange representation into reality and reality into mere 
representation” (1)• what I9 as a man, am unable to do, and 
thus whet all my individual faculties are unable to achieve, ie 
made possible for me by money (2). whether I am ugly, lame, 
detestable, dishonourable, unscrupulous or stupid is of no 
Importances "that which exists for me through the medium of 
money, that which 1 can pay for, that I am, the possessor of 
money” (3). X am presumed honest because money eaves me the 
trouble of being dishonest*
The slave of the Lord of this world, Money, is despite his 
pleasure-seeking appearance, an asoetlc, whose principle ie the 
"renunolatlon of life and of human needs”• The God money
demands the renunciation of one's humanity; for everything whioh 
is taken away from men by way of their life and hu?nanity ie 
restored in the form of money and wealth* "The less you eat, 
drink, buy books, go to the theatre or bolls, the less you 
think, love, theorise, sing, paint, fence, etc* the more you will 
be able to save, and the greater will become your treasure whioh 
neither moth nor rust will corrupt - your oapital”. "THE LESS
m ARE • • • • THE .MORE YOU 11* VE. The less you express your
life, the greater is your alienated life, find the greater ie 
your saving of alienated being" (4). The morality of this 
aacetical ethic ie gain, thrift end sobriety (3); it is the
4. »anuaori:ts pg. 171. Compare Kierkegaard’s dictuai "The 
more you think the less you are", here Eierkegaord critic­izes Legel98 supposed reduotion of the real to thought.Marx thought that this kind of criticism did not penetrate the real problem. For intelleotualism is only a symptom of the deeper alienation of all human being in the oapitalist world of 'having9.
gift/
1.2.
3.
5. Ibid pg. 173.
gift of self to the God money. The world* for Marx* is an 
"enslaved world"* practical need* self-interest* egoism* 
competitive antagonism* dehumanization and suffering characterize 
it. The devout and politically free Hew Englander adores his 
idol mammon "not only with his lips* but with the whole foroe of 
his body and mind" (1). For hiu* the world is the stook 
exchange; end "he is convinced that ha has no other deatiny 
here below then to beoome rioher than his neighbour". Polities* 
in principle superior to the power of money* in praotioe ie its 
slave (2). The Capitalist lord and the \4brker-81ave are both 
alike slaves to lord capital* the God who holds both oaptive.
The dominion and power of money ie the negation of man's humanity* 
his freedom* his nature, his essenoe; Communism* for Marx* la 
the "negation of this negation" (3). Communism is the abolition 
of private property* the negation of ths sooial and economic order 
ruled by the God moneys It la in this sense the "positive 
abolition of human self-alienation". It ie negation* negative 
action* critique* beoause it is the "real appropriation of human 
nature* through and for man". Man in oapitalistio society la 
not hlL.self; he is ruled by another. He ie possessed. He is 
insane. .arx•a critique spreads broadly into the whole of 
human life; it ia not confined to the homo eoonomlous. His 
theory of alienation la a theory of madness* a theory of how 
humanity la possessed by a stranger to lteelf* who ia at tha 
same tine itself. It is also an esohatology* a Theorla of the 
future. It answers the third of Kant's three questions* tha 
three/
jHld pg. 35.2. Ibid pg. 36.
3. ^enuaorlpts pg. 176* 197* 215* 216* etc.
three questions which combine ell the interests of Reason, 
speculation, metaphysics, ethics, and religion* It answers 
the question ’What may I hope"? with a philosophy of human 
action* For Marx, the question "rfhat ought I to do?" depends 
upon the answer given to the question about hope* It does so 
because Marx believed in human nature, a human nature whioh is 
not yet, but whioh we seek to become through labour and action(l)* 
We saw that because eapital is stored up labour, and thus 
the essence of wealth, labour, ia the common intersub^active 
reality whioh is the "truth" of both capital and labour in their 
alienation* We set beside this conorete synthesis of ths class 
war another synthesis, which ia almost a theism, namely ths 
domination by the God Money of both capital and labour. Lords 
and slaves* However, before we turn to ths problems raised 
by both these aspects of Marx's thought, we shall state ths 
doctrine of the class war in a sum ary form*
ivory society, according to Marx, oonsiste of a governing 
class, and a class which is governed; every society knows class 
struggle as its own essential reality* There is always a 
class who dominates, and a class who is dominated, a olass who 
exploltaand a olass who is exploited* The state is the tool of 
the dominant class. In other words, all sooisties consist of 
Lords and Slaves, and the stats has always been instrumental 
in the exploitation and repression of ths Slaves by the Lords* 
Only some men oan be human, unfettered and free; the others 
must be things, instruments of the Lord*s will and desire*
There are only two broad classes in the population because the 
landowner, the Lord of Immovable property is transformed into a 
capitalist/
1. Kanti Critlcue of Pure Reason: The Canon of pure
Reason, oecticn 2 ofChapterII, Part II, pg, 635,
capitaliut or ruined; he beoomes a Lord of moveable property 
in the same social process that oauses the eerf9s enslavement 
to become that of the paid worker* In prinolple, the whole 
product of labour belongs to the man who works production* 
Capitalist accumulation is therefore theft* Everything is 
bought with labour, oapital is only aooumulated labour*
The cruel injustice of this legalised system of theft9 with 
its repression of the many by the fewtis for Biarx the sign that 
money is the Lord of the world* Human rights within such a 
world are only the rights of self-interest, the rights of 
eogistlo man, "man separated from other men and from the 
community" Cl)* It le man ae "an isolated monad withdrawn into 
himself" who prescribes the rights of the circumscribed individual, 
the oitlsen* It is pre-eminently the right to own private 
property which, for Marx, discloses the cruel selfishness of 
the cap!toilet order* Security in such an order is merely 
the assurance of its egoism (2)* ihe only bond between men in 
such an order is natural necessity, need, and private interest, 
the preservation of property and egoistio self-concern* In 
184?, **arx had already formulated this fundamental critique of 
capitalistic eooiety, hie later work fills out the formal 
skeleton with the relevant body of eoonomlo facts (3)* whether 
this substantially changes arx*a standpoint, so that we must 
speak of an earlier and a later Marx, ie etill an open question* 
Marx#s formulation of what man ought to be, namely a being 
in community, in communication and communion with others, seems
to/
1*2*
3.
rp£T?4-26.
the Jewish question* pgs* 3-40 of the Early anuscripts*
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to owe uomething to Feuerbaoh9a notion of the ”es*ence of man”, 
whioh he oalls God* It ie a concept of a&n9s essence, expressed 
as hie "species-being” (1), or ”species-life" (2)* The terms 
Gattururswesen (species-being) and Gattungsleben (species-life) 
are Feuerbaoh9s alternatives to Hegel9e Gelats for Feuerbaoh9 
man contemplates his species being in contemplating God* God 
is man9s human nature9 and is not therefore alien to man* nor 
man alienated from God* God is inen as a social, species being* 
The "necessary turning point of history”9 writes Feuerbach,
"is the open confession that the consciousness of God is 
nothing else than the consciousness of the species” (3)* "I an 
can and should raise himself above the limits of his individuality! 
but not above the laws9 the positive essential conditions, of 
his species”* Marx follows Feuerbach in defining the true 
nature of man as species-oonsciousness, and agrees with 
Feuerbaoh that self-centred Individualism is a denial of the 
true nature or essence of man* as are not going to dieouss
this difficult concept in detail at this point, though we shall
return to it* Our purpose in mentioning it was to throw light 
upon the reality of man9* social life whioh Harx understood to
stand in sharp opposition to his essence* The reality of man98
social-life is dehumanized, and has become a relation between 
things* Egoism has set every man against his neighbour, so 
that there la a war of all against all.(Bellum omnium contra 
cmnee (4))* an la separated from himself, other men, and the 
communityt his social being, his essence as species-being, is 
denied*/
1. Manuscripts pg* 128*2* lsi<ipg*13
5. ^eeyiee si pg. 270.
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denied.
Social strife is, therefore, the fundamental datum] the 
dualism of lord and Slave the Inevitable impasse of the 
established order. The class struggle is the fundamental 
ontological structure of man's being as it is; but, for fcarx it 
oan and must be changed. Marx subordinates political theory, 
(theory of the state), to sooio-eoonomio theory (theory of 
sooiety, and of man as a social being), because the class struggle 
precedes political structure. The state is merely a tool in 
the hands of the Lords in their struggle to dominate the slaves.
The egoism and individualism of the lords negates man's true 
social being. To change the world and to recover man's social 
being in a new world, the Lord-slave dualism must become dialectic. 
Marx is not, here, advocating a collectivism whioh absorbs ths 
individual or annihilates hia freedom and distinctive charnoter; 
he is very orltiool of what he calls "crude communism". Crude 
communism is the result of envy and the desire to reduce 
ever thing to a common level. It wishes to eliminate talent by 
force] and the role of worker, far from being abolished, is 
extended to all men. Women become common property, end so pass 
from marriage to universal prostitution. This reveals what Marx 
calls the "open secret of this entirely crude and unreflective 
communism*1 (1).
Crude communism whioh negates the personality of men is 
only the crude opposite of the system of private property. 
"Universal envy", says Marx, "setting itself up as a power, is 
only a camouflaged form of cupidity, which re-establishes Itself 
end satisfies itself in a different way" (2). Crude communism 
is/
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is not a genuine abolition of private property, nor ia it a 
genuine appropriation of the produota of labour by labour:
This io shown by its "abatraot negation" of the world of culture 
and civilization. It ie in fact a regression to the unnatural 
simplicity of the "poor and wantlees individual who has not only 
not surpassed private property, but has not yet even attained to 
it" (1).
Ken ae human-being ie species-being; he is a social being* 
Collectivism dehumanizes; man ae a social being is not therefore 
immersed or absorbed in any universal or oolleotive consciousness* 
What then does Marx mean by man's sooial being? Man, says Marx, 
is a unique individual in all his particularity, but it is 
precisely his individuality that reveals that he is an "individual 
communal being" (2)* Man, for Marx, is what he is only in hie 
association with other men* The individual as particular 
individual, ie therefore a "manifestation of sooial life"*
"The individual is the sooial being" "individual human life
end species-life are not different things" (3)* The individual 
is the "representation and the real mind of social existence" (4)* 
Because man io not to bs conceived as absorbed in eooiety, 
because society itself is relative to the individual's social 
life or being, society oannot be postulated as an abstraction 
confronting the individual* Society, unlike the God money, does 
not possess man or dehumanise him. like Hegel's Geiat. society
ia./___________________________________________________________
1* Manuscripts pg* 134*2* Ibid pg* ILQ* ofs also theses VI on Feuerbach, where Marx criticizes Feuerbach's conception of the essence of man as 
genus, ae an "inner and mute universal quality" whioh unites man in a purely natural and biological manner* It is not a trucly interaubjective, historical and social oitegory in Feuerbach.
ia. only in so far aa Jian ia a social being* Sooiaty la not a 
reality external to, and therefore alien to, the individual aa 
social being* If it were, it would be another God, another 
fora of human alienation* Only crude communism continues to 
dehumanize man, by collectivizing the individual*
How, in that case, did Marx conceive the way that man would 
regain hie own essential nature ae a social being? His answer 
to this question was that "the emancipation of society from 
private property, from servitude, take the political form of 
the emancipation of the workers s not in the sense that only the 
latter9e emancipation ia involved but because this emancipation 
includes the emancipation of humanity es a whole” (1)* For 
Hegel, the slave is historic man in that he masters the natural 
world and so frees himself* The slave knew that he was finite, 
he knew it through anxiety and fear* Thus, freedom ie possible 
for the slave, and not for the lord* For tiers, too, the 
worker-slave frees the whole of humanity, just as for the early 
Christians, their Lord was also the suffering servant who 
redeems humanity* Marx argues that “a class must be formed 
whioh has radioal chains" ••*•*, "a olass whioh is the 
dissolution of all olasses, a sphere of eooiety whioh has a 
universal character because its sufferings are universal”•
A "total redemption of humanity” is possible only as a "total 
loss of humanity”* The dissolution of sooisty, as a particular 
olass, is the proletariat (2)* Only through the proletariat, 
the elavee, oan the new order be oalled into being*
Unlike Marx, Hobbes and Spinoza thought that the struggle 
between egoistical individuals was permanent* It eonnot be 
transformed/
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transformed into a new eooial world where man oould be social 
man. The struggle oan only be held within bounds by the 
sovereign will of the state, that is, by law. Things oannot 
be fundamentally changed| but they oan be checked through the 
enforcement of obedience to a common law. A sooio-economic 
covenant reinforced by law is the only synthesis capable of 
reconciling non with man. For Hobbes, the bellum omnium contra 
omnea, the civil war of all against all, of individualistic 
society, could be controlled only if the sovereign. had sufficient 
power to enforce peace. For Spinoza, toleration and freedom of 
thought were far more valuable than anything an authoritarian 
eoverei&i could produce. The laws end oonventions of sooiety 
alone oan hold society together; and the rationality of law and 
society must be judged according to whether It promotes or 
impedes the free man's rational love and understanding of nature
(1).
Marx, on the other hand, did not think that the bellum 
omnium contra omnea was permanent. As a faot of all past 
social life, it must be understood, but understood in order to 
be changed. Hobbes' notion of obedience led onlt> to a 
re-enforcement of the status tiuo, and Spinoza lacked the theory 
of politioal or revolutionary action, without whioh a free 
sooiety oannot be realized.* For Marx, sooiety does not conform 
to permanent laws, like those of olassioal physios, because he 
sees sooiety as moving painfully toward a new order, where the 
laws of olassioal economics, as well as of the "nature" of social 
reality, will no longer apply (2). ihllosopfcy for -.arx, as for 
Hegel,/
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Hegel» ia idealism to the extent that it reflects about the 
essence of aan9 the 3hape of the old world in relation to the 
new9 and the means whereby man9a essential nature might be called 
into being. Gem an idealism had grasped the active roll of the 
world-creating subjeot in this task. and Feuerbach had grasped 
the material-sensual nature of the task. But idealism for 
arx» was too abstract to grasp that to change the world9 
nhu2*an sense activity" was essential» and materialism (including 
Feuerbach’s naturalism; is too paasive9 too theoretioal9 to 
grasp that far more than observation by the senses was required# 
"he does not grasp", Uarx argues, "the signlfioence of 
•revolutionary* ’prcotioal-oritioal’ activity‘(l). But
philosophy oannot9 ae a oonsequenoe9 work on its own. It must 
find its "material weapons" in the proletariat} juatas the 
proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy (2)# 
"When the proletariat announces the 
dissolution of ths existing sooial order9 it 
only declares the eecret of its own existence, 
for it is the effective dissolution of this 
order. When the proletariat demands the 
negation of private property9 it only lays 
down as a principle for society what society 
has already made a prinolple for the proletariat, 
and what the latter already Involuntarily 
embodies as the negative result of society" (?;•
We have now introduced enough of .arx’a ideas relevant to 
our di8ou8slon9 to begin to examine them in greater detail.
We/
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We begin with the notion of reciprocity inherent in Merx9s 
conception of man ae 9product9 and 9producer9* We have seen 
that for arx c»en is himself the product of his own self- 
creative activity; at the same time his "activity and mind are 
soolal in their content aa well as in their origin", which 
means that man9a being ia constituted in and by his social 
environment* Dialectic shows the multiplicity of interconnections 
between these contrasting conceptions, by describing the kinds of 
unapparent connection between Intentional self or subjeot end 
environmental structures. This is what hegel is doing when he 
traces the changing structures of the one dualism of Lord-slave* 
Marx ia speaking dlaleotlcally when he brings nature and history 
together in lively interaction, in conceptions such as a 
"realized naturalism of man", or a "realized humanism of 
nature" (1)* Human praxis transforms nature into a human, 
historic world* Nature becomes what it is for man, and so 
historical; and history enoompaasea the whole of natural 
existence* The proposition we are going to examine with 
particular attention, however, is one whioh is of more direct 
interest to this discussion.
"At SQCl.ty produo.a m k  m  M >  aa ii ia produoed by |&u"(2) 
For Marx, according to Herlean-Ponty, " an no longer appears as a 
product of his environment, or as an absolute legislator, but 
emerges as a 9Produot-Producer9, the loous where necessity oan 
turn into concrete liberty" (3)* Both Hegel and Heidegger, 
according to Ferleau-Ionty, make spirit or unity a future, end 
so a problem* They do not take unity for granted* Unlike 
Feuerbach, Marx, too, refuses to take unity for granted* Man, 
as/
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as produet-producer, is broken) his being is dislocated end 
fragmented by sooial antagonism* For socialist man, the 
conventional distinctions between oapitailst and worker. Lord and 
Slave, are felt as a violent separation of what ought to belong 
together* he would agree, for instance, with Hegel when the 
letter refuses to speal of man us aelbstandig (independent) or 
unaelbstandig (dependent), but speaks of as both independent 
and dependent, that is, of man as interdependent* Similarly, 
for Hegel, men are not products or producers, but both products 
and producers* They are not either free or determined, because 
freedom and neoessity belong together) necessity, in the oase 
of human being, rests on freedom, and freedom is no less free 
because it has to work its purpose in accordance with necessity* 
Freedom and neoessity, like product and producer, are Illuminating 
and important distinctions? but for ^arx, as for Hegel,they are 
essentially abstractions from the ambiguity of lived realitte*
We legitimately speak of product as distlnot from producer, 
but at this level, we fail to comprehend ths common measure or 
Aoy<?s whioh connects them* We fail to see that there is a 
unity here which our distinctions overlook* We do not notioe 
that analytical separation of one thing from another in thie 
oase leads to a separation not only in thought, but in politioal, 
social, legal, economic and religious life* In any oase, 
thought in this Hegelian context, means the kind of encompassing 
comprehension whioh will affeot every aspect of human life*
In this oase, analytic sets apart what essentially belongs 
together* kan is both product and producer* Ae product,
.nan ia substance (substanz), as producer he stands by himself 
on/
on his own account9 he makes up his own mind, he is self- 
subsistent (eelbetandlg). Substantiality (substantial!tat) is 
thus not to be oonfuaed with self-subsistence (selbs tandl; keit;* 
for otherwise we shall not notice the alienation of the former 
from tiie latter* Nevertheless, the 8elf-subsisting subjeot 
must regain, or lay hold of. or comprehend substance, if 
alienation is to be overcome. The relation between product and 
producer ie not a simple formal distinction, it is a living 
interconnect on.
For Marx, reification (verdingllohung) co .es about when, 
in Hegel’s language, subjeot is forcibly reduced to mere 
substantiality, when, for example, the worker le reduoed to the 
ontological status of a thing, or a tool, or a means. Here 
Marx reformulates, according to Carouse, the notion of 
alienation (hntfremdung). whioh Hegel had first formulated in 
his early theological works (1). The concept of reification 
has gained wider currency in recent political and eoolologioal 
waiting. For Berger. for example. xJurkheim’s famous dictum, 
sooial faots are things, reflects a reified view of sooial 
reality. In his analysis of the sooial construction of 
reality. Berger expands the product-producer conception into 
three moiaents of an irreducible dialeotic. First, sooiety is 
a human produotf second, sooiety is an objective reality? 
third, man is a social product (2). This is another way of 
saying that as society, in all its apparently massive and 
immovable objectivity, produces man as man. so. in turn, it is 
produced by him. In Berger’s view, any analysis of the sooial 
world which omits any one of these essential moments will be 
dl8tortive./
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diatortive* Conteaporax v A ericnn sociology, for Berger, is 
diatortive reification beonuse it does not take account of 
the first moment* "Despite the objectivity that marks the 
social world in human experience", writes Berger, "it does not 
thereby acquire an ontological status apart from the human 
activity that produced it"* (1)* There is a dialectical 
relationship, according to Berger between what arx oalls 
substructure (unterbuaJ and superstructure (ueberban)*
External!eation, objactivation and internalization are different 
ways of looking at the network of connections between man, hio 
knowledge, his eonsclous ess, his attitudes, his beliefs on the 
one hand, and his sooial environment, on the other* In 
Kemenkavs wordst "there is no logical discontinuity between man 
and his environment" (2)* Man is not either homo a/ran a or homo 
patiena but indissolubly both* We shall return to this aspeot 
of the dialectic again*
It appe&re, therefore, that arx is dialectical in Berger•o 
sense* He comprehends man in his situational being-in-the-world• 
But does Marx not rather bring the dialectlo to rest in human 
labour? Does he not think communism is the final solution to 
all man1a probalms? This, surely, looks very like an undialect- 
ioal absolutism* On the other hand, since labour Itself is a 
yi>feecs t * becoming, a dialectical prooess, then it would 
appear that there is still no sense in which, for Marx, man has 
arrived at a final solution*
It is olear from our analysis of the manuscripts that labour 
is the unapparent Aoyos which connects capital and labour in 
a common intersubjsotive world* This is ...arx'e theaiB* It a ay, 
of/
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of oourue9 bo true, even if every communist social order has not 
suoossded in achieving a oosraon Aoyos , or genuine intersubjeotiTO 
unity* It night, of oourse, be that every aotual communist 
sooiety haa failed to achieve what Marx oalls communism, Lvery 
oo^auniot regine nay still be a form of what iarx oalls "orude 
communism",(1), iierx argues, after all, that in oommunism, 
human self-alienation is overcome, and the liberation of nan is 
achieved* Presumably ths presence of alienation In a eoouunlst 
sooiety would therefore mean that that sooiety was not, or at 
least not yet, ooomunlst, In oommunlam, man's existence is 
united with hie essence, man actually beooues what he ou^it to be. 
So ns would say that this kind of unity of essence and existence 
ie in principle impossible as long as man remains a temporal 
being, with a future, and so radloally incomplete* This may 
sound bourgeois, but it io dialectical. Can the communist 
belief in the actual possibility of uniting essence and existence 
in present history ever be genuinely dlaleotloal? In 
communism, according to Marx, man is liberated from the God of 
this world, money, whioh, despite ell appearances to the contrary, 
is an alienated form of his own human being. Or in other words, 
the order of having is shattered in order that a new order of 
being may take shape. This Is ths Tikos of revolution. C m  
this be finally achieved, when the relation between being and 
having oan never be an exclusive either/or but always a living 
interaction in whioh each is related to, and so relative to, 
the other? In other words, is it not nonsense to speak of 
communism as a final solution in which the dlaleotio coaeo to a 
triumphant oonoluslon? It may be that in Kerleoo-Ponty' e words, 
"revolutions/
i ,  namfffficiate pg* 153,
"revolutions ore true as movements and false as regimes" • (1). 
Dialeotic means thst we do not possess ths Aoyos ? it is ths 
meaning which stands ahead of us or behind us. never exhausted 
in any partiol formulation, never wholly .manifest in any 
experienoe. If communism is a new universal humanity, latent in 
the enslavement of the proletariat, then it would, as an 
encompassing completeness, destroy the inoompletenesa of our 
human existence if it were completely realised. It is one 
thing to speak of the worker ceasing to be the "slave of the 
objeot". and becoming a subjeot repossessed of his onoe 
alienated substanoe. or a subjeot comprehending substance.
It is quite another to s eak of communism as a final solution to 
the problem of man's incompleteness, his brokenness, his 
disintegration. To do so would merely be to exchange one idol 
for another.
tiarx argues that the fixated antagonism of Lord and slave 
la overcome in communism. The dualistic Impasse le overcome 
in the dialectic, and an unfettered becoming is therefore a 
concrete possibility for the first time. But this, again, is 
a long way from saying that oommunism is the final solution to 
the riddle of history. Apart from the faot that all talk of 
final solutions oan never be truly dialeotioal. this kind of 
thinking allows the dialeotioal notion of the whole to beooms 
an undialeotieal totality, and so opens up the path to 
totalitarian, as opposed to dialeotioal polltios. We are
suggesting that 1 arx did not have a very firm hold on ths 
dialectic when he speaks, os he appears to do. of bringing the 
dialeotic to a close in a final solution to ths riddls of history. 
Despite/
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Despite Popper, for whoa all dialectic ie in some way totalitarian, 
or in league with the upholders of a closed society, dialectic 
is neoessarily open (1)* There are no final solutions for 
genuinely dialectical thinking* There is no question of bringing 
the dialectio to a close* There is no danger of any kind of 
totalitarian politics, whether communist, capitalist or 
ecclesiastical, when the dialeotio is maintained* Without 
dialectic, there can be no ©pen society* With it, there a an be 
no closed society*
Lenin did not always retain on alert dialectical awareness, 
but, as is well known, he loved to read Hegel* Perhaps he 
expresses what we are trying to say very clearly, when, just 
before he died, he wrote in Pravada* for 2nd i arch, 1923?
"The worst thing of all would be to rely on the assumption 
that we know anything, or on the assumption that we axe well ^
provided with the elements necessary for building a really new 
apparatus that would really deserve the name socialist, soviet 
etc*"* (2)* This is a genuine example of Marxist dialectic*
Qpsn Deo .cy and its one .iea** Two Volumes*
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C H A P T E R  XI 
ALTERATION» DIALECTICS AND REVOLUTION 
I1EGBL§ MARX AND LUKACS.
Aocording to Zitta9 Lukaos9 thought stands somewhere at the 
convergence of the Marxian and the liegellan tradition of thought 
(X). Lukaos9 main contribution to the problems aider discussion 
was to show the extent and depth of Hegel • s influence upon arx# 
This led Lukacs to lay greet emphasis upon dialectic in &&rx9s 
thinkingt and to crltioize Engel9s use of it* We have already 
touched on these matters earlier in this study* We recall that 
Lukaos9 thinks that ths restriction of die ectic to soclo~ 
historic reality is very important (2)* Influenced by Dilthey9a 
study of the younger Hegel in 1902 9 and David Xolgen9* 9 Ideas 
toward a Philosophy of Culture9 19109 and apparently also by 
Plenge9a 9ilegel , >;d jkarx9 19119 Lukacs "Kegelianlssd larxlem"9 
according to Sitta* "Lukaos9 Hegelianls&tlon of 2 arxism is 
really the elucidation of Marx’9® esohatologic&l and revolutionary 
component whioh is Hegel-inspiredj Lukaos did this chiefly by 
elaborating the oonoeption of alienation and the dialectic" (3/* 
Maintaining that Marx9a economic theorems and hypotheses are 
superoeded9 Lukaos argues that the essezxoe of Marxism lies in 
the oonoeption of alienation and dialeotio* It is for this 
reason that Lukaos9 thinking is of interest to us here*
Luk&os shows that Marx9 s thinking is always variation on the 
one theme 9 that of alienation* Zitta argues that it is with 
Rousseau that this concept begins to acquire ite modem dominance* 
Some/
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Some of the connected meanings associated with it ares "the 
experience of a certain nausea* a die-ease and diseotief action 
with prevailing manifestations of culture and oivilia&tlan, an 
experienoe of a loss of human substanoe and spirituality* an 
experienoe of depersonalisationt tomneaof inadequacy* whioh are 
often defined with a variety of terms auoh as * anomie9* •dcmoine* 
•reification9, 9objeotlfloatlon9* fextcxnalizationf etc.” (1)*
In his ♦Caaohlohtc und xacesanhewnaataaln' (1923), lukios quotes 
the passage which we have already recognized as central to 
Kegel9s philoso. hioal standpoint* "when the power of unification 
disappears from men9* lives'** writes Hegel# "and contradictions 
lose their lively mutuality and relation* and obtain independence# 
then the need for philosophy arises"• (2)* For Lukaos* as for 
Hovalis* philosophy arises with a feeling of homesickness) it 
is ths drive to be at home everywhere* -.ukaos writes in 1914* 
"Happy times have no philosophy) then* there is not yet an inner 
life of the spirit* for there is not yet an external world 
confronting man" (3)* Philosophy is oaUed upon* says 21tta* 
to overcome the cleavage between man and his environment 
(Plato9* "lie in the soul") an#is prompted by theeaperienoe of 
alienation*
Lukaos himself defines alienation as an awareness "that 
man's self created environment is no longer his home but his 
dungeon" (4)* When the world man constructs is a home* there 
is no alienation* when it becomes an "estranged complex of 
mannings which oannot anymore awaken inwardness"* then self* 
alienation/
alienation occur: # Dialectic for both ' arx and Luk£oa amounts 
to a way of salvation from alienation (1)*
Tor Lidriios, bourgeois thought ia condemned to alienation and 
objeotifioation (Verdingliohung), the Lordva counterpart to the 
sieve*s reification, or reduction to the status of a oostaodity* 
For lukacs, the question la "whether the facts of reality • •••• 
in their factualness, have to be accepted aa given, or whether 
their *glvenneas9 can dissolve into fora* of reason and can 
therefore be thought of aa being produced by our reason" (2)* 
Bourgeois thought views what it produces as a second natural 
it forgets that this second nature is a product of human reason* 
It applies the methods of the natural soisnoes to its under­
standing of society, so that the latter appears to it to be 
an inhuman, fatalistically necessary, unchangeable reality*
It is German Idealism that begins to discover the role of action 
or praxis, but it failed to overcome objectification when it 
cane upon the insurmountable barrier of the thing-in-itself* (3)* 
Kant had tried to show how ethioal praxis overcomes this barrier, 
and Flohte that a new integration could be achieved when the dead! 
and praotloal aotlvity become the centre of philosophy (4)* It 
was Marx, however, who grasped how objeotlfloatlcn might be 
overcome, and, for Luk^os, it is with Marx that we must come to 
terms if the fragmentation and meaninglessness of our experience 
ie to be overcome* Thus, for Lukiios, "history doss not «gr acre 
appear as a puzzling process which occurs to men and things, 
whioh can be explained through the intervention of transcendent 
forces, clarified and made meaningful through historically 
transcendent/
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trail so e dent values* History is9 on the one hand9 •••• a 
product of the activity of human beings themselves9 on the other 
hand9 the continuity of a prooess in which the forms of this 
activity9 these relationships of man to himself9 (to nature and 
to other men) undergo a transformation* History is precisely 
the history of uninterrupted transformations of objeotlfloatlone 
which ultimately constitute human existence” (1)* :»ian9 for 
Lukaos as for ^arx9 is the Aoyo* without whom nothing oan oeM 
to be that oo^es to be9 man is ths meaning of history* Maa9 
here9 is sooial man, or more particularly, the redemptive 
community who in redeeming itself from alienation9 redeems all 
men*
For lukaos, the proletariat is both the redeemer and the 
redeemed (2)* The proletariat is the olass of slaves9 men 
reduced to things9 relfled9 dehumanized* Reification occurs» 
for Lukaos 9 when "a relationship between persons receives the 
character of thingness9 and in this manner9 a 9ghostly objectaess9 
which eliminates - in its harsh end apparently closed-in 
rational regularity • all trooes of human relationships” (3)»
This is the condition we have seen Marx call “Fetishism”* The 
commodity structure of capitalism reifies the worker9 end so 
splits his personality into a double existence as person and 
thing* He overcomes this bifurcation of hie nature in self- 
consciousness"* The essenoe of Hegel9s magnificent world system^ 
writes Lukaos9 "consists in the faot that he perceived in nature 
and history a great and unified development based upon an ever 
increasing self-oonsoiousness of the same entity (whioh he called 
spirit)"• ( 4)* Marx9a "sober profundity has saved him from 
applying/
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applying this method to the investigation of nature" (1)*
Marx sees the proletariat as the redeemer and the redeeiaed in 
whom I egelfs spirit is aotual* The coming-to-aworeness of the 
proletariat is metaphysically important because the truth of the 
whole is hidden in its total reification* The proletariat is 
the class with radical chains* the slaves whose suffering becomes 
redemptive in and through their growing self-ooneolouaness*
When the slave gains possession of himself* he transforms not 
only himself but all reality* As intentional subject * he 
oomprehends hie substance* which means9 appropriates his alien 
existence from reified externality* He actuallsee hie eeaenoe* 
so that the cleavage between his essence and his existence is 
overcome* He achieves the wholesomenesa of self-integration 
through revolutionary aetlon by which he regains possession 
of his freedom and becomes self-subslatent*
We oan see9 here9 the integral connection between this 
oonoeption of Marxism and the ohrletlsn oonoeption of redemption* 
Prior to successful revolution9 the revolutionary shares the 
unhappy* divided consciousness of the Christlan9 and the letter's 
belief that new life is given only in death* For both the 
Christian and the revolutionary9 the present is an agony of 
estrangement* disintegration and fragmentations their only 
hope lies in a redemptive future* This leads in both oases* 
to a two-world dualism which will remain a dominant frame of 
reference until redemption ie decisively and finally achieved* 
Zitta argues that lukaos9 oonoeption of dialeotio rests 
upon three central oategories* 'floating concepts9* 9totality9* 
and/
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and Mediation9. "We require dialectic", says Lukacs, "in 
order not to succumb to social phenomena.*•• in order to enable 
ourselves to perceive behind their appearanoe to the essence” 11)* 
Ike essenoe, for Luk&os, aa for Feuerbaoh and :*iarx, is man, or 
the relation between man and man. "the determinative aspect 
of the Marxist method 1st to reduce all phenomena of economics 
and • sociology9 to the mutual soolal relationships of men" (2).
Floating concepts (Fliessen de Mrritfe) ere tndeajtwaoable 
to lukttos' dialectics, argues Zlttat they are the stuff of his 
9practice9 or activity (3)* Kant had noted the need to resort 
to floating concepts because they seemed to him the "only way to 
incorporate 9being9 ae the ultimately given into the definition 
of a thing" (4)* because reality always transcends what the 
concepts employed to comprehend it denote, our conceptions must 
be allowed to float. Thought la not a final replioa of reality, 
says lukacs. To float or alternate oonoe:ts can help us to 
approximate to reality in a praotioal manner. We saw that, 
for liegel, life transcends meaning * whioh means that our 
meaning structures must be kept as open and flexible as possible, 
liegel argues the case for a "plastic discourse", whose loglo 
must be dialeotloal if it is to distinguish the connections we 
normally overlook, and to connect what we assume to be self- 
evidently distinct. Lukacs writest
"The essenoe of this (the diaieotio) 
method, the significance of whioh is that 
it has revolutionized science, consists In 
the faot that according to it concepts are 
not/
1. Geechichte und Klassenbewusstsein pg. 18. Zltta pg. 203.
2. <jittc. pg. 203.
3* Zltta pg. 20%4. Zitta pg. 160-161.
not inflexible pigeon-holes which - once 
determined - do not anymore change their 
meaning! oonoepts are not isolated from 
one another* constructs of the mind whioh 
oan be grasped abstractly only* but they are 
a lively reality whioh brings about a prooess 
characterised by a continuous amalgamation 
and interfusion* Concepts thus oonoeived 
bring about such a prooess in whioh singular 
oonoepts plunge into the opposite of their 
original formulation* into their self* 
repudiation* then into the very opposite of 
this* to unite there in a higher union of a
negation of the negation* and so on ad
Infinitum** (1)*
This oonoeption of dlaleotlo is* of oourse* Hegel's* and seems 
in turn to owe much to Heraolitus* We shall be examining it 
again In the course of our concluding chapter*
The second category of Lukaos Hegellan-Marxiat dlaleotlo
la the Category of 'totality9* It is connected to the Creek
oonoeption of oX<*s * and to Hegel's Gangs. (Dae /ahre 1st das 
Ganze). For Lukaos* and this is a point of major importance*
’’the dissolution of the perspeotive of totality dissolves the 
unity of theory and practice" (2). "The essenoe of the dialectic 
method consists •••• in the faot that in every dlaleetioally 
correctly grasped moment* the entire totality ie oomprehended"(3)* 
The oonoept of totality is oloeely related to the oonoept* or 
notion/
1. Gesohiohte und iilfcas.nb.muaate.in pg. 30. 178, Sin» ?6. 206.2 h « " pg. 51 quoted 21tt. pg. 207.
3. « « M pg. lbl " Sltta pg. 207.
notion (be/ riff) * of A©»y©s » ae we have used it in this 
discussion* We shall be returning to it later on* For the 
time being* we take note of another passage* in whioh Lukaos 
contrasts this category with the individualism and the fragmenta­
tion of bourgeois thinking* "The standpoint of totality 
determines not only the objeot but also the subject of knowledge* 
Bourgeois science considers the appearonoe of eociety - consciously 
or unconsciously* naively or in a sublimated fashion - always from 
the standpoint of the individual* And from the standpoint of 
the individual no totality oan arise •••• The totality of the 
objeot can only then be posited when the positing subject la 
itself a totality; when in order to think itself* it ie 
compelled to think of the object as a totality" (1}» Totality 
in the sense Hegel and ftarx use the concept* is not static being* 
but temporal becoming; it is not a sum of a number of entitles* 
all of whioh participate in One Being* or totality* Totality* 
in the sense we use it here* is a category of time and becoming* 
Social reality oan be comprehended in no other way than 
dialeotioolly, because it is unrestrained becoming* and e living 
totality* %Len we objectivisms* we isolate moments of this 
total becoming into 9foots** and thereby lose the connection with 
lived experienoe of social realities*
The third oategory of lukaos9 di&leotic ie mediation 
(verbalttlung), For Zitta* lukaos uses the oategory of mediation
as a functional concept, its function being that of connecting or 
relating* For Hegel* all actualization ie mediation* for 
mediation is the unity or relatedness of being and not-being in 
ooming-to-be and oeasing-to-be* Geiat ie aediate not iumediate* 
because/
1* Gesohiohte und hlassenbewuss tsein pg* 40 quoted Zitta pg* 206*
beoaua© Geiat is not the isolated or individual but the Whole, 
and because Oeia t cannot be said either to be or not to be, 
but only that whioh ia coning to be and ceasing to be* It ie 
closely related to the conception of negating and transforming 
rendered, usually, in Hegel by the words aufhebea. auf^ehoben. 
and terns related to these* To comprehend (bearelfen). for 
Hegel, is to mediate; it is to connect in such a way that 
apparent connections and distinctions are negated and preserved 
in a new form, as elements in a new and lively connectedness, 
or relatedness*
For Lukacs, mediation is essential to comprehension of any 
and every given fact, event or objeot (1)* In mediation, we can 
comprehend the "immanent meaning" which is neither apprehended 
nor reflected in bourgeois society* But for Lu/.aos, mediation 
cannot get beyond social reality, whioh is, for him, the Aoyo* • 
Mediation is the not of transcending empirical immediacy in order 
that the immediately unapparent A m i g h t  be comprehended*
It is the aot whioh exhibits the intentional self in its 
indissoluble connection with the eoolal environment* It is the 
act which unc once ale the Ao^os from the meaningless flex of 
contingent faoticity*
We are greatly Indebted to Zltta9e exposition of xuk Lukaoa9 
"Cesohlchte und .laasenbewuastaain9* though we shall not be able 
to evaluate hie powerful critique in this study* To anyone 
familiar with Zltta9s work, it will be obvious that we disagree 
profoundly with his treatment of the mattere there discussed*
Our conoeption of alienation and diaieotio and of the philosophies 
of Hegel, Marx and lukaos ia very far from Zltta9s, though it will 
not/
1* Zitta Ibid pg. 211.
not be difficult to ehow that many arguments in thie etudy are 
directed against Pitta's negetlve critique of lukaos** albeit 
implicitly; just as there is some measure of agreement between 
us on matters of communist praxis.
tfe shall be raising all the principle questions arising from 
our exposition of Lukace In the final chapter* in a more general 
exploration into the dlaleotlo of Hegel*
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C H A P T E R  XII 
HEGEL Abit dARIRL.
We pas* now to Sartre's view of the Lord-slave dialectic, 
whioh he disouaaes in Part III, Ch. 1, entitled 'The existence
of thi9 major work, Sartre outlines hia philosophy of the being 
of man in an analysis of the ooglto, consciousness aa nothingness, 
and the structure of the For^itself. "Consciousness”, he says 
in the introduction, "is a being auoh that in ita being, ita
being is in question in so far aa this being implies a being
other than itself” (1), In the oourae of hia examination of 
the question of the being of consciousness, Sartre argues that 
through angst (anguish or dread) man becomes conscious of hia 
freedom, and thus hia nagativity in relation to being. The 
nothingness of the pour-soi la ths ground of negation, negation 
of being, and in particular of ito own past being (2). Thus 
he formuletee a second proposition whioh defines the queation- 
ability of the being of consciousness. "Consciousness is a 
being, the nature of which is to be conscious of the nothin&ieas
of ita bslng” (3)* Human being oan deny all or part of the
world beoauae it ia a 'nothing' whioh asperates its present from 
its peat. (4).
ly consciousness arises in the world as a "not". I oan 
not only negate the world, in whole or in parts I can also 
negate my own self. A thing is what it is and is not something 
else./
of others', of '1'ftre Ip lieant*. In the first two parts
1.2.
3.4*
pg* 28.
pg* 47*pg* 28*
else. The being of a thing is never anything but what it is* 
Consciousness of being* on the other hand* is 9outside9 being; 
it is a nothingness in relation to being* Descartes* following 
the Stoic!* calls this nothingness freedom. Man oan detach 
himself from the world in questioning* in systematio doubt* in 
soeptioal doubt* in the ctroXn » on the basis of this freedom 
from himself as a part of the world. For Hegel, man is free only 
in so far as he is mediation* i.e. the Negative* In his 
immediate existence man is a passive bundle of sensations* a 
being aoted upon* determinate* unfree* But since his essenoe 
oontradiots the reslity of his being* because men is essentially 
free* his essenoe is to be that nothing which oan negate* and so 
be conscious of the world*
"It is as a Not"* says Sartre* "that the slave first 
apprehends the Master" (1)* It is as a not that man becomes 
conscious of his freedom* It is as a not that he can separate 
himself from the being of the world in order to become conscious 
of it* But this negation of the world cannot escape the being 
of the world* it is a negation whioh discloses the world to 
consciousness* "Consciousness of being is the being of 
consciousness"(2)* Consciousness is always "Intentional"; it 
is always consciousness of something* "Perceiving is the 
perceiving of something* judging the judging of a certain matter* 
valuation the valuing of a value* wish the wish for the content 
wished and so on"* Each single perceptual act occurs within a 
potential field of perception so that oonsoiousness is always a
consciousness of being even if it involves a negation of being (3)* 
Sartre/
!• tbiq pg. 47*2. Ibid pg* 31 and elsewhere*
3. Husserli Ideas pgs. 242-3*
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Sartre quotes part of this passage froa Husserl with approval• 
“Consciousness"» he says, "ie thus a positional consciousness of the 
world" (1)* Consciousness always transcends itself toward the 
world*
Consciousness ie nonetheless not the world; for it is only 
from the emptiness of nothing that the being of the world can be 
experienced* For Sartre, aa for Hegel, this negativity of 
consciousness is disclosed not only in the structure of the for* 
itself, but also in ay being-for-another* It is here that the 
problem of the body in relation to consciousness arises, for the 
body is "essentially that which Is known by the other*' (2)*
Being-for-othere (Ltre-pour-autrui > is an essential structure 
in being-for-self, according to Sartre* The other ie defined as 
"the one who excludes me by being himself, the one whom I exclude 
by being myself" (3;* tfe cannot discuss why dartre thinks that 
Hegel makes significant progress over Hueserl and Kant at this 
point; we osn state only that for Hegel, and so for Sartre, the 
appearance of the other is the aine qua non of my consciousness ae 
self-oonociouaness* The "moment" of my being-for-another is a 
necessary stage of the development of self-oonsciousness* Ae I 
appear to the other eo I am* I am only what the other recognises 
me to be* Thus I must make the other recognise me as I need to 
be recognised; and risk my own life in the event* "To risk one's 
life is to reveal oneself as not-bound to the objective form or to 
any determined existence - as not bound to life" (4)* In spite 
of the faot that I pursue the death of the other, it ie in ay own 
death, in a y  risking being-for-another, in a y  venturing beyond the 
safety of a solipsist universe, that I achieve certainty of self*
Sartre/
1* Being and Nothingness pg. LI2* Ibid p0« 213*
3* 4bid pg* 236.4* Ibid pg* 237*
Sartre points to the solipsism involved in all positivist 
attempts to remain within the solid ground of my om  sense- 
experience, and describes Watson9o behaviourism as a psychology 
which, in trying to be exaot and objective, is only solipsism as a 
working hypothesis (1)• Neither traditional realism nor 
traditional idealism can truly take aooount of the other, 
according to Sartre, Whilst Hegel9s formulations do overcome
solipsism, they are nevertheless formulated in terms of knowledge, 
Sartre9s own formulations are, he thinks, ontological• We are
dealing here, he says, with a being whioh nihil at es Itself in 
its being and,whioh seeks in vain to dlasolve into itself aa a 
self (3), Hegel98 I aa I,or Me ■ e, whioh 1b his equivalent 
of aelf-conseiousnees, le abetraot for Sartre, and Kierkegaards9s 
opposition to Hegel was therefore justified,
Sartre marshals what he oalls a "twofold charge of 
optimism" against Hegel, both of whioh follow from his 
identification of being and knowledge (4)« Xhe first Is a 
eharge of e:istemologioal optimism, the second of ontological 
optimism.
Before we turn to Sartre9a orltlqua of Hagel, however, we 
shall consider an interesting point made by Hartmann in hia 
study of Sartre and Hegel, It amounts to a criticism of 
Sartre9s position by Hegel (5)#
Sartre is, of oourse indebted to Hegel for oonoepts such as 
being-ln-itaelf, being-for-itself, negation, being-in-and-for- 
ltself, Klaus Hartmann in his study of the relation between 
Sartre/
(2).
1,2,
3.4.
5.
L P€> 239d pg, 240
xoartre*s Ontology91 Klaus Hartmann,
263.
Sartre and Hegel defines the likenesses and differences between 
the two with hrave clarity (1). In an appendix, Hartmann 
argues that Sartre's views were anticipated at a number of points 
by 3olger, a philosopher of ths early nineteenth century 
oonsiderably Influenced by Hegel, whom Hegel once commentated 
upon in a commemorative article (2). doth Solger and Sartre 
conceived the subjeet as ths negation of being, and thus the 
oontradiotlon of the in itself and the for itself* Hegel comments s 
"Contradiction" (for Solger) "ia arrested in all its harshness, so 
that it appears as something that has coma to stay rather than as 
something essentially involving its immediate disappearance and 
dissolution, which alone makes it tolerable to the imagination 
and to thought" (3)* Hartmann adda that to Hsgel, Solger*s 
position is abstract, "unauited", says Hsgel, "to the riohneau of 
ths notions"* He has failed to grasp the true nature of 
dialectic* Hegel notes the "smptlnessof the abatreot 
determinations" applied to conorete content, the "static 
oontradiotlon", and the "absence of any necessary development" 
of thought toward the notion* Solger starts with a "presupposed 
dualism" (4)* Hartmann is not arguing that Sartre owes 
anything to Solger* But Solger9s key notion of irony, or the 
Inalstenoe on negative subjective freedom against rationalism, 
is obviously much closer to the existentialist revolt against 
Hsgsl stemming from Kierkegaard, and so to Sartre, than to 
Hegel himself*
Ve now turn to Sartre's critique of Hegel, in 'Being end 
Nothingness*/
1. Dartre'a Ontology i Study of Delag end i.'othlnwicee In the
Mt of Hegel'a Logic, pg* 149* pg. 152.*. Ibid pg. 153.
Hothin/mess* •
Sartre argues that Hegel equates being and knowing and so is 
guilty of epistenxologieal optiaisaV ’ According to Sartre* Hegel 
thought that an objeotive agreement* a true reolprooity can be 
realized between consciousnesses* Through the other's recognition 
of me and ay recognition of the other a universality of self* 
consciousness is aohleved* This intersubjective unity* which 
Hegel oalls spirit* is the truth of self •consciousness* Hegel 
agrees with Sartre that this unity* or homogeneity* does not 
exist in the beginning* and that the relation of a Lord and 
slave is not reciprocal* But the oorrect statement of the 
problem of others renders this passage to the universal impossible* 
for Sartre (2)*
Sartre's argument rests upon what he calls the "ontologioal 
separation*' of the for-itself and the in-itself* Is 'to appear 
as an objeot for a consciousness' still 'to be consciousness?' 
Sartre answers that it is not* The being of consciousness is 
defined as a being whioh exists in so far as it is not what it is* 
and is what it is not* Consciousness is the radioel exclusion 
of ell objectivity (3)* The drama of reflection consists in 
the foot that the being who reflects cannot be an objeot for 
himself* The being of consciousness is in question* it is a 
nothing in absolute con trad lot ion to being9 it ie freedom*
In the life-death struggle, self and other are each in turn 
pure* abstract self-consciousness and then bound to an objective 
form as determined exiatenoe or life* dartre's main argument 
is/
2 *  f t l U T  a n d 2$ t h i n K i ‘ C8a P P *  2 4 0 - 2 4 5 *
3« PP • 241, 301, 6toi
is that between the other-as-objeot and &.e-as-eubjeot there is no 
comnon measure* anymore than there is between self-consciousness 
and consciousness of the other* Hegel wishes to say that the 
other is object* and that I apprehend myself as an objeot in the 
other* This* argues Sartre* is oontradiotory* I do not appear 
to myself aa I am for the others I am always subject* newer 
object* His point* therefore* is that I am newer on objeot for 
myself| and thus there can be no dialeotic* only en absolute 
dualism* Hegel9e optimism rests upon a dialectic of subject-
objeot within the order of self-consciousness* as well as between 
self-consciousnesses *
Sartre supports his point by aocusing Hegel of confusing 
"belng-an-objeot" and "life” (1)* Hegel equates consciousness 
immersed in the being of life with a mode of existence as a 
determinate object* Sartre argues for their analytical 
separation* The direction of his argument is not at all clear* 
but we take him to mean that whilst I oan know that my own 
oonsoiousness is immersed in life* I oannot know myself as a 
subject* Consciousness is what it is not* and is not what it is* 
not least because it is embodied* a part of ths world as well as 
a free subjeot capable of assuming responsibility for the world* 
Ths fcot of my existenoe* in all its determinations* must not be 
confused with my free and negatiwe essence*
aPor Hegel* 1 am open to the other as subject in/way I oan 
newer be for Sartre* Hegel*e understanding of the relation 
between being-in-itaelf* being-for-itself end being-for-another 
does not become a rigid dualism as it does in Sartre (at least 
in the Sartre of 9Being end Nothingness9)* Hegelfs understanding
is/
1* Ibid pg* 240*
is dialectical and eo opens out onto a broader intersub jeotive 
synthesis t Peas on, and finally after farther oontradiotions ere 
overcome or reconciled9 spirit*
Sartre's first criticism of Hegel, then, is that I oannot 
know myself as objeot through the subjectivity of another because 
I can never apprehend the other in his subjectivity* Consequently 
no universal knowledge can be derived from the relation of 
consciousnesses (1)•
We turn now to Sartre's criticism of what he calls Hegel's 
ontological optimism*
As we have seen, truth for Hegel is the Truth of the *hole* 
Hegel places himself, says Sartre, at the vantage point of truth,
i.e. of the v&ole, to consider the problem of the other* He 
ooneiders the consciousness of others from the point of view of 
the absolute, rather than from within his own particular 
consciousness* Hegel has forgotten hie own consciousness but 
we, argues Sartre, oannot forget Hegel, Since Hegel 18 the #hole, 
he easily resolves the problem of oonsolousneasee, and he does 
so only because it was never a real problem for him* Sartre's 
own exposition of the problem on the other hand proceeds from 
within the ooglto - l*e* the problem of the other is posited 
solely in terms of my being*
Sartre grants that I oan undoubtedly transcend myself 
toward a whole but 1 oannot establish myself in this whole in 
order to contemplate myself and the other, because the 
multiplicity of consciousnesses is in principle unsurpassable* 
Ontology cannot overcome the soandal of the plurality of 
consciousnesses, it can only describe it, it can only "found 
it in the very nature of being* (2)* Sartre's phenomenological 
analysis/
1* Ibid pg* 243*2* Ibid pg* 244.
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analysis of the "Look'* is his o.vn answer to the problem* He 
make* it clear that although his phenomenological description 
of the presence of the other to me may seen to make the other 
necessary to my own being; it ia not an "ontological necessity", 
but a "contingent necessity"* It doea not belong with those 
"conditions of the possibility of our experience"; it ia a 
factual necessity (D*
Sartre means by this contingent or factual necessity a 
pro-ontological awareness of the other whioh ia present in tha 
immanenoe of the Cogito* It would probably have been wiser to 
avoid the word necessity here* I have always been aware that 
the other existed« and this comprehension is surer and deeper 
than all the theories that have been built around it (2)*
Sartre is undoubtedly correct to point to a primary awareness of 
the other which precedes all theory* but we oannot in that oase 
afford to forget an equally primary awareness of a lived 
synthesis of the conflict and contradiction which exists between 
myself and the other*
Hegel thought that 9even now9 we may speak of a genuine 
reconciliation of men with man through mutual recognition* 
though this new relation of man with man ia 9not yet9 a present 
reality* It is true that Hegel9s standpoint is that of the 
"even now"; but there are9 as we have seen9 a number of 
passages which show that he was aware of the "not yet"* The 
truth of the Whole was for him even now on the threshold of 
disclosure9 so that a phenomenological description of past 
aodes of being and consciousness seemed to him an important 
task/
1* Ibid pg* 250.
2* Ibid pg* 251*
task prior to the "sunrise" whioh "brings to view the form and 
structure of the new world" (1)# It is* however* essential 
to bear in mind* Hegel warns* that the new world is no more 
perfectly realised than the new-born child (2)* It makes its 
appearance in general outline* a whole lying concealed and 
hidden within a bare abstraction* whilst the wealth of bygone 
life (the subject matter of the Phenomenology) is still 
consciously present in recollection (3)*
Sartre may be right to criticise Hegel's later work which 
stems to take for granted what the phenomenology looks forward 
toward; but he is wrong to ignore our lived experience of new 
reconciled modes of relation with others on that account* It is 
true that these moments of truth may be few and far between* and 
that secure systems cannot be built upon them* But it is foolish 
to deny that our being with and for others does not at times open 
out toward a new transformed reality* a truely intersubjective 
spirit* But* as Hegel rightly reminds us* suoh a spirit is the 
result of a "chequered and devious oourse of development"* and 
is achieved only after "much struggle and effort" (4)* It is 
this new human reality whioh Hegel calls spirit* He refuses 
anything but a concrete God; the idea of God as love* when 
understood as a perfect aseity in undisturbed Identity above end 
beyond the world* is for him "abstreot generality" (5)* Sartre 
does not appear to see that Hegel's synthesis is a concrete, 
embodied synthesis* a human and worldly reality* at least in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit* He oalls all abstract, supra- 
historical* supra-mundane ideas of God "mere edification" whioh 
sinks/
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einke into insipidity", if they laok "the seriousness, the 
euffaring, the patience and the labour of the negative" (1), 
liegel'a synthesis is not achieved easily; it is only in death 
that spirit and freedom and mutual recognition of man by &an 
are found* Death is the truth of human life*
tfe oannot at this point discuss Sartre's alternative view 
to Hegel's; it rests upon a description of the look whioh 
discloses the Other to the Coglto, as "not being me" (2 )* At 
no point oan we adopt the point of view of the whole, and eo no 
"totalitarian and unifying synthesis of Other's is possible" (3)« 
In the look I encounter the other concretely, and it ie through 
ay immediate consciousness of the other (the Co^ito) rather than 
through my knowledge of him that a fundamental connection between 
myself and the other is manifested (4)* Nonetheless, we oannot 
"surpass" the other toward an inter-monad totality; "eo long as 
consciousnesses exist, the separation and conflict of conscioue- 
nesses will remain" (9).
Sartre, finally, seems unaware that Hegel launohes a 
formidable critique against formalism in the Preface to the 
'Phenomenology of Siirit', in which he criticizes those who always 
make a "survey of the Whole", assuming a "position above the 
particular existenoe about whioh they are speaking", "instead 
of making their way into the inherent content of the matter in 
hand" (6)* Hegel is as anxious as Sartre not to loee "hold of 
the living nature of concrete faot" (7)* Whilst Hegel explicitly 
rejects the totalitarian and unifying synthesis of whioh Sartre 
aoouses/
1. Ibid pg. 81.
2. Being & No thinness pgs. 252-302.
3. Ibid pg. £52.
4 . Ibid pg. 253.
5. Ibid pg. 244.6. P757 pg. 112.
7. P.S. pg. 110.
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aocuses him, he nonetheless creates the theoretioal conditions 
for a social philosophy such as the communist philosophy of the 
Party, or a philosophy of the church, or of the nation (Volk) (1), 
rather than of the individual, as in Sartre's existentialism* 
tterleau-Ponty makes this point in his essay on Hegel's existential­
ism* It is to him that we now turn for further olarifloation of 
Hegel's dialectic of intersubjectivity*
1. P.S. pg* 467 ffj 519ff.
271
C U A F 1 E H  XIII 
HEGEL AND VXRLEAU-PONTY
Sfierleau-Ponty Interpret© the life-death struggle ae a 
pheno menolcgioal description of the only experience which oan 
bring us to nn authentic awareness of death • If our awareness 
of life is to be sharpened we must integrate death into our 
consciousness of ourselves and the world* Consciousness, for 
Merleau ionty as for Hegel, implies the ability to step back 
from any given thing and to deny it* Life ia revealed only to 
a consciousness of life whioh oan and doea deny life* "An 
absence of being would have to come into the world, a nothingness 
from whioh being would be visible**, if life is to become a true 
oonsoiousness of life* Absolute knowledge for Hegel is achieved 
when oonsoiousness at last becomes equal with its spontaneous 
life and regains its self-possession* According to verleeu- 
lonty Hegel9a ihenomenology describes man9s efforts to 
re-appropriate himself, to regain his own self which had existed 
in an alienated determinate mode of existence* "Man**, writes 
Merleau-1 onty :*aa opposed to the pebble whioh ie what it le, 
is defined as a place of unrest (unruhe)* a constant effort to 
s.. M  and — (1. d.fln.d) *  M .  ^
refusal to limit himself to one or another of hisideterminatlona" 
The only experience whioh foroes me to confront rather than 
flee en authentic awareness of death ie my experience of, the othea 
I become conscious of life, and of myself as living,through 
consciousness of death, and I become oo.scioua of death through 
my experienoe of the life-death struggle in which Meaoh 
consciousness seeks the death of the other, whioh it feels 
dj.sgo^sea3es it of its const!tuive nothingness** (2)* I am a
1* Merleau-Pontyt Hegel9 a Existentialism in Sense and 
IMM M M I  pp.66-68*2* Ibid pg* 68,
pieoe of the world under the other's geze, nevertheless the 
presence of another does not threaten me unless "I remain 
aware of ay subjectivity at the very moment his gaae is reducing 
me to an objeot” (1)* A consciousness of death is disclosed to 
me in my being for this other, in that the other limits me 
to a determinate mode of existence for him. X am only what I 
am for him. This I deny. I am not what I am for him, I em 
not a thing! I am a being whioh is not this or that, a being 
whioh can and must deny its own given state of existenoe and 
the other who tries to determine me. I am not ••••• It is this,
my negative being, whioh disoloees to me that I am not in faot 
what I essentially am, that gives me no rest. This ia ths 
source of ay unrest and anxiety (2). I am not what 1 am.
I am negation.
This is revealed to me as the "immanent logic" of ay 
experience of the other. *ty experience of the other ia 
pregnant with meaning! and I e&inot understand this until 1 
forsake the traditional opposition of subjeot and object.
Both Hapirioista and Idealists share this opposition! the 
Hegel of the xhenomenology. and erleau-Ponty following him, did 
not. However, Merleau-Ponty oalls iiege 1 a olaasioal philosopher 
because ha believed that the ultimate meanlngfulnees of all 
reality is always assured, even if the achievement of meaning 
was possible only through death. Aooording to herleau^Ponty 
the Hegel of 1807 did not seek to reduoe event to idea, in the 
attempt to reduoe history to a system of logic, aa the later 
Hegel did. Kierkegaard's protest is relevant to the later 
Hagel alone (3)* On the oontrary, in the Phenomenology. Hegel 
"does/
1. Ibid pg. 68.2. of. - #S. pg. 133.3* Sense and Nonsense pg. 64*
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does not propose to oonneot oonoepta but to reveal the immanent 
logic of human experience in all ita sectors" (1),
"Experience” for Hegel, erleau-?onty reminds us, is no 
longer limited to an "entirely contemplative contact with the 
sensible world as it did In Kant; the word reassures the tragio 
resonance it has in ordinary language when a man speaks of what 
he has lived through. It ia no longer a laboratory test, but
a trial of life” (2)* Kant sought to disoover what oonditions
make scientific experience possible* Hegel sought to describe 
man's fundamental situation in the faoe of the world and other 
men, and eo to understand religions, ethics, works of art, 
economic end legal systems, as just so many ways for man to 
flee or to confront the difficulties of his condition (3)«
Thus, the phenomenological method employed by Kegel does 
not accept the opposition between oubject and objeot, between 
the logio of meaning, end aense-experienoe devoid of meaning, 
because for him every experience has a meaning, and there is 
no meaning apart from experience* Thus my experience of the 
other in thisjeense "means” that death without whioh I would 
not become conscious either of the world or of myself* &y 
consciousness of the other in the trial by death is the 
condition of all experienoe in Hegel's sense of the word*
One of the questions we have discussed in some detail is 
whetner my experienoe of the other ie the condition of all 
experienoe, and more particularly whether my experienoe of the 
other as understood with the help of the Lord-slave model is 
the condition of experienoe*
The/
The life-death struggle discloses to me my being toward 
death; for it alone reveals the negativity of my being in 
relation to myself* Z am other than myself; 1 can define who 
I am only by way of negations, I am not any of the determinations 
to whioh the other tries to oonfine me, I am not a determinate 
being at all, X aa self-determining. Thus, I transcend what 
X am (my factual existence) when I seek to become what I ought 
to be (ay essence); and X achieve this essenoe, aocording to 
Hegel, only if I freely choose to negate my own nature, deny 
what I am. A thing is what it is and nothing else* A 
philosophy whioh models itself upon our experlenoe of things in 
the objeot-wo rid can proudly claim that everything ia what it 
is and not another thing (0* £* Moore)* Man, on the other hand, 
la what ha ia not; his essence oontradiots his existence*
A philosophy of man must not confuse or equate fact and essence; 
nor must it try to speak of man's essenoe as a thing* Kan's 
essenoe, aocording to Hagai, la hie negativity, hla power to 
deny hla own given nature, aa wall as the given realities of 
the external world* We can define man's being only by 
defining what he is not; (an extension of Spinosa's proposition! 
OrcU-9 d»t«ralr,Btlo ssl nagatlo). Man's selfhood (eelbathelt) 
la nothingness because he la the being who beoomaa what ha la 
(essenoe), by denying what ha la (faot)*
However, just as consciousness of death reveals my own 
living selfhood to me, and through the negation of self enables 
me to become my self, so nothingness reveals being through 
negation* The pure identity of immediate existence ia mediated 
and so transformed into a new and free way of life* But 
transformed existence is not achieved whan consciousness la 
oomnianaurate/
commensurate with the real} rather it ie achieved when reality 
itself is changed to oonform to essence* Thua, it ie not on 
intellectual change9 but an aotual change} and mediation is not 
so such a logical -passing from one stage to another as a 
substantive one* Self-consoious action CXraxis or negative 
notion) 9 rather than a change of attitude ie shat Hegel means 
by being becoming transformed being (spirit) through death*
Self-eonsciouaness ie not just self-knowledge for Hegel9 although'
it of course includes this* It is assured eelf-exletenoe 
whioh is only assured9 and self-existent9 in so far as it 
consciously assumes responsibility for the world by negating 
the way things are, and by struggling to transform them* It 
does this through conscious negative action (1)*
We come now to one of the most important points raised by 
Merleau-Ponty’ 8 interpretation of Hegel* It la that both 
consciousness of death and the struggle with the other are for 
Hegel9 paradoxically9 a renewed oonsoiousnese of life and a new 
lntersubjeotive9 historical reconciliation of men with men*
The other does not threaten me unless I am aware of myself as 
a subject at the very moment hie gase reduces me to an object}
I do not reduce him to slavery unlees he continues to be present 
to me as consciousness and freedom precisely when he is on 
objeot in my eyes*
"We cannot be aware of conflict unless we are aware of our 
reciprocal relationship and our common humanity* £e do not ^  
deny eaoh other exoept by mutual recognition of our oonsoiousnese" 
Merlean-Ponty/
1* In Ch* VI of the P*S*9 Hegel turns from the passiveattitude of Reason9e enjoyment9 observation and analysis of the natural world (Ch*V) to man’s active creation of a oooial world* It is in the latter that the spirit*e 
developing eelf-oonsoiouanees finds fulfilment*2. Sanaa ..onaanac pg. 68.
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nerleau-. onty does not emphasise, aa others hove done, notably
Koyri and Wahl, that iiegel9s theological orientation shapes his
description of the genesis of selfhood* But he does observe,
as we have noted elsewhere, that a phenomenology of epirit makes
possible a communist philosophy of the party or a philosophy of
the church, rather than a philosophy of the individual suoh as
existentialism* Hegel9s notion of epirit, with its transcendence
of the confllot of subject with subject, takes us beyond
existentialism to broader intersubjsotlvs fields* In accepting
death, I decide to live, and so get a "new grip on our fortuitous
existence" (1); and this new style of life goes beyond my fear
of the other, and my attempt to dominate him, to a new form
of trustful co-existence* Merleau-Ionty does not himself use
the word trust, here, nor does he, like 1 euerbach, decide to
reflect upon love as a transformed mode of relation to the other*
But the ideal of the mutual co-existence and co-operation of man
with man is very muoh what Feuerbach meiuot by Cod, and kerleau-
i onty by the notion of a oommon interuubjective world*
Merleau-Ponty expresses this new unity of man with man in
his own words as followst
"So I live not for death but forever, and likewise
not for myself alone but with other people*
A more complete definition of what is called
existent!aliam than we get from talking about
anxiety and the contradictions of the human
condition might be found in the idea of s
universality whioh men affirm or imply by the
mere faot of their being and at the very
moment/
1* Ibid* pg* 69*
morient of their opposition to each other, 
in the idee of a reason immanent in 
unreason, of a freedom which oomes into 
being in the aot of eooeptlng limits end 
to which the least perception, the slightest 
move ent of the body, the smallest action, 
bear inoontestlble witness" (1).
This passage is a reply to, and criticism of, Sartre9a 
philosophy, and in particular his philosophy of absolute freedom 
and the dependence of all value upon freedom, his pre-occupation 
with the Individual, and above all his rigidly polar dualism of 
the Pour-eoi and the hn-soi* In the passage just quoted 
HerleaUf-Ponty suggests that the synthesis of oonsoiousness and 
being, which for Sartre ie a oontradiotion in terms, is 
everywhere disclosed in our etre-au-aonde* our being-within-the- 
world* According to :erleau-2onty Hegel moves from the 
individual to history through struggle and death, whereas for 
Sartre "there c m  be no remedy for the oontradlotions of the 
for-itself and the for-others, with the result that his 
dialectic is truncated" (2)* For Sartre, in other words, there 
le no possibility of traneoendlng the Lord-slave struggle 
between consciousnessesf unlike Hegel, he oan have no philosophy 
of spirit* Sartre meant by G<,d the synthesis of the pour-aol 
and the en-aoi, a contradictory notion whioh must be rejected*
For Serleau-Ponty, this Cartesian dualism must be overcome, and 
is overcome in our lived experienoe of the bodty and the world* 
Spiegelberg quotes two sete of brief formulas whioh 
illustrate/
1* Sense f&a P6* 70*
2* Se&ae £&& ; ,9.M3Aa£ PS* 69*
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illustrate the oppoeitlon9 between herleau-ionty and Sartre 
over the Lord-slave diaieotio 9 whioh we have in mind (1)*
Where Sartre in * being and Nothimaiess* had said •* We are 
condemned to freedom" f ' erleau-Nonty in hie Theno. .enolo/ty of 
ercertlon* eoyst "rfc are condemned to meaning" * erleau-Ionty 
follow3 hegel in refusing to truncate consciousness and being, 
and agrees with Hegel when he avoids the now common-place 
opposition of faot and value. For both, the task of phenomenology 
is to disclose the meaning in every human experience* It is 
not that the objeot has no meaning9 and that the subject must 
give it meaning if experience is to be meaningful* The 
phenomenon of the world in our lived experience is already a 
meaningful unity of subjeot and objeoti their separation ia an 
abstraction*
In Sartre *s play Huis Cloa. he says "Hell is other people** • 
ierleau-. onty in hia paper *StOL Si perception* wrote«
"History is other people*** Again Merleau-Ponty agrees with 
hegel against Scrtre* (2)* The life-death struggle ie 
transcended in Hegel when the intersubjective category of epirit9 
meaning transformed being-with-others9 emerges from it* Sartre 
oannot get beyond his truncated dualism in •being and Nothingness1 • 
In his review of •Beifig end Nothingness** :4erleeu-lonty argued 
that once man is defined as consciousness (as Sartre so defines 
him) he becomes out off from all things9 from his body and from 
his effective existence* He is then defined ae a relation to
instruments and objects* Hence the 8Ubjeot*»objeot dualism which
results is too exclusively antithetical* "The antithesis of 
my/
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ay view of ayaelf and the other*s view of me* the antithesis of 
the for-itself end the in-itstlf often seem to be alternativea 
instead of being described aa the living bond and communie&tion 
between one term end the other” (1)# Dreyfus quotes Sartre's 
response* ”It was r erleau--Jonty who oonverted ae •••• he 
taught me concerning that action which since Hegel and Harx haa 
been oalled , raxia” (2)*
Thus* Sartre tries to transcend hia original dualism in hie 
later neo-.arxist phase* and in particular* in the 'Critique of 
dlaleotioal Reason'• He chooses the path which . erleau-ionty had 
suggested he might take* namely a communist philosophy* For 
Merleau-j onty there was another alternative t a philosophy of the 
church*
But Merleau-’Ponty's criticism of Sartre ie consistent with 
& broad measure of agreement between them* To say that 
'hell is other people9 is not* says Kerleau-Ponty* to say that 
'Heaven is me'* If other people are the instruments of our 
torture* it ie because they are essential to our salvation* In 
hia orltiolsn of Sartre* :.lerlesu-lonty stands very close Indeed to 
Hegel's position* Both are reflecting upon the dynamics of 
lntersubjeotlvlty rather than subjectivity* and both speak of a 
genuine synthesis of the oontr&diotiona between the in-itoelf end 
the for-itself• For both* every contradiction is relative to a 
certain identity* and for both* oontradiotlon and unity are 
historical (3). For both* the "social is not collective 
consciousness* but intersubjeotivity* a living relationship and 
tension among individuals" (4)* The Co/rito. says Merlean-Panty
w _________________________________________________________________________
I* 611(1 ^oasenes Intro* p* XX
3* Both points are discussed in relation to formal logio byLefobur«t Jlal.otlonl latyriallBn pga. 58-59.
4* Herleau*:ontyi >cnse n<jl nonsense pg* 90*
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is false only in that it shatters our inherence in the world*
The only way to do away with it is to fulfil it, that is, to 
show that it is eminently contained in interpersonrl relatione* 
Hegel is not wrong, he ie true from end to end, but he la 
abstract (1), Kegel's logio ie, as someone has said, "the 
algebra of the revolution", and Irn'i Dae Capital a concrete 
I'henoaenolQCT
Similarly, Herleau^Ponty'a understanding of oonsoiousness 
owes muoh to Kegel* He desorlbes the experienoe of being a 
conscious subjeot as follows* It is worth our while quoting him 
at length*
"There is a perpetual uneasiness in the atate of being 
oonaolous* At the moment I perceive a thing, I feel that it was 
there before mo, outside my field of vision" •••• Yet "it is
I who bring into being thie world whioh seemed to exist without
me, to surround and surpass me* I am therefore a consciousness, 
immediately present to the world and nothing oan claim to exist 
without somehow being oaught In the web of my experienoe* I am 
not thie particular person or face, this finite beings I am a 
pure witness, placelesa and ageless, equal in power to the 
world's infinity" (2)* The metaphysioal idee here expressed is 
that whilst on the one hand ray experienoe is not commensurate 
with all reality - there may be kinds of faot whioh I oannot at 
this time and place conceive - j on the other hand reality 
as far as I am concerned ia co-extensive with the totality of 
ray experience* We have discovered this epietemologioal paradox 
in Hegel*
In/
1. I£i4 pg. 133.2* Paper on Metaphysioa and the novels ^enae and Kaasenaepgs* 28-9*
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In the same paper as the passage quoted above,
Merleau-J onty discusses the experience of the other* "Amongst 
Kantian consciousnesses", he says "harmony can always be taken 
for granted” (1)* The Kantian Oogito is assured a priori of 
being identical to every other possible Co;:itQ (2)* iiegel#s 
philosophy suooeeds in grasping and describing "inherent 
individuality”, the self aa subject which must* because it is 
subjeot, seek the death of the other (3). Kant had asked how 
the physical nature of Newtonian physics (in whioh he implicitly 
believed but realised could not be derived from observations) 
was possible. His philosophy In the *Critique ?ur« Reason* 
is a philosophy of natural science, not a philosophy of nature*
All knowledge begins with experience, though for him there were 
some kinds of knowledge which cannot be derived from experience* 
Kant9s notion of experience, and eo his formulation of the 
conditions of this experience, remain confined to the Newtonian 
physicist9s experience of the natural world, and doee not 
pretend to grapple with that same physicist9 s experience of other 
persons, or of the social world* Hegel had asked how our 
experience of ourselves and the world we live in ohangea as we 
change| his philosophy is a phenomenology of ways of experiencing 
the world and other people* It ie also a philosophy of human 
aotion, for hegel describes how man works upon and transfozms 
nature, end so how men interact with one another in their social 
life*/
Ibid pg* 32* In John Oman’s terminologyt Kant9s 
problem is that of the Individual ~ iai what belongs to man as manf Hegel9 e that of Individuality - what is distinctive and personal in each men* Natural and 
supernatural, pg* 152,
2* Ibid pg* 93.
3* Xbiff pg* 32*
life* Merleau-i onty ie asking Hegel's questions when he finds 
the experienoe of the other a problem (1)*
"We easily escape from transcendence as long as we are 
dealing only with things" (2)* If the other is consciousness* 
then I am for him (though not necessarily for myself) only a 
finite objeot* determinate* visible at a certain place In the 
world* If he ie consciousness then it seems I must oease to 
be myself* But I cannot deny that most certain and immediate 
awareness of myaelf whioh is the condition of my experiencing 
anything whatever* The truth that erleau-Ionty seeks to 
persuade ua to oomprehend* ie that "our perspectives merge into 
each other* and we co-exist through a common world ••• My 
thought and hie are Interwoven into a single fabric" (3)*
Before any voluntary adoption of a position* we are all of us 
already situated in an intersubjactive world* For the struggle 
between consciousnesses* each seeking the death of the other* 
ever to begin* they "must necessarily have some common ground 
and be mindful of their peaceful co-existence in the world of 
childhood" (4)* "Solitude and communication cannot be the two 
home of a dilemma* but two momenta of one phenomenon* since in 
faot other people do exist for me" (3)* This deeply Hegelian 
formulation of the dialectic of lntersubjeotlvlty will not be 
discussed farther here* since we are about to disouse the same 
dialectic in Hegel* Merleau-Ponty is probably the finest 
example/
1* Similarly Karl Popper* in his 'Open Sooletv and its enemies' 
sides with the Kantian a priori Identity of every Cogito when he seeks to refute Hegel'e "pathological" philosophy of lntersubjeotlvlty* Popper's rationalism has a kind of naive insensitivity to the problems of social conflict and alienation*2*
3.
4*
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example, however, of a thinker who has grasped the spirit of 
Hegel's philosophy, and who undertakes his own philosophical 
activity in the seme spirit, without repeating the outworn 
slogans, or the tortuous style of the 'dead letter' of Kegelianiscw
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GEISTt HEGEL.
Gelet 1st Selt* for Hegel. in that Gelst incompaaaes the 
fixed and abstract opposition between finite and infinite in the 
Act of its self-descloeure. aa a Living integrated temporality, 
in whioh all ha.an being*in-time participates in ao far aa it 
participates in THE truth. In Geiat* finite and infinite, being 
and not-being are united in such a way that the need for a 
deceitful belief in a life beyond life and a time beyond time 
ie overcome. For Geiat is death, but not the death that ends 
our life, the 9not-belng anymore9 we dread so much. Geiat ia 
death in life and life in death, a being-in-tiiue for which life 
end death are one. THE truth, for Hegel, ie to be found in time, 
and in history, as that integrated self-becoming whioh is present 
in every Aot. secure in its self-oonsoiousness in every Aot of 
coning-'to-be and oeasing-to-be. The Act is the Truth. The 
Aot is neither revealer nor revealed, nor the one by whom the 
aot of revelation is received. It is the aot of revealing 
itself, whose content ia united with form, and so in radioal 
discontinuity from all being. Ae Aot. Geiat ia not being, it 
is not-being. Some have said that all being is becoming. We 
must warn that Geiat9a self-becoming, the coming-to-be and 
oeaslng-to-be of the self-determining subjeot In and through the 
substance of being9a infinite determinations, this all- 
encompassing becoming cannot be understood in terms of the 
natural, continuous growth from like to like whioh corresponds, 
before we choose to displace the metaphor, to the becoming of 
natural being. Natural growth le not self-becoming* neither
W
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ia nature spirit. The Act ie not being, nor is the self a
part of the world* Self-becoming does not have the kind of
continuity which makes it predictable* Spirit is not nature* 
Reason ie not being, it is negative aotion* The spirit alone 
ie the actual, and only the rational is aotual, and nothing 
whioh is not actual ia rational* Ke&aon is aotion - though not 
every aotion is rational even if we believe, with Freud, that 
much that appears irrational has an unapparent rationality of its 
own* Hegel believed this too* For him, it was all too often 
our confined end one-sided conceptions of the rational whioh 
were Irrational, though along with their arbitrary use of the 
ooncept irrational, they too can be comprehended if reason becomes 
dialectical.
For Hegel, we normally do not comprehend what we know, or 
notloe what we see, or heed what we hear* We fail to recognise 
the truth (wahrfaelt even though the vast body of our
correct opinions (truth as correctness, riohtigkeit )
continues to grow at en enormous pace* Hegel• e distinction
between comprehension (which is dialectical) and knowledge which 
accords with conventional oategorial structures (whioh ie 
analytioal) is like and yet not like tho dlstinotlon between 
conscious knowledge and immediate experience* There may be sooh 
a thing as subliminal awareness, or experience which is not 
dlreotly known to consciousness, but the dietii.otion between this 
and knowledge is not like the one Hegel is .eking between knowledge 
and comprehension* We shell return to this point, and argue it 
in detail, when we oome to our final disousslon of dlaleotioal 
thinking* Philosophy begins with experlenoe, immediacy is a 
neoesaary *moment9, for Hegel* Philosophy is both concrete and 
universal*/
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universal* The science of the experience of oonsoiousnese does 
not u peculate concerning reo.llties that are not normally 
experienoed* not to apeak of the self-con tradiotory entities 
whioh are not* in principle* experleneahle* The highway of 
deapair does not despair of experienoe* but incorporates it* as 
a moment in the self-becoming aot of spirit* Absolute knowledge 
ie the dialectical gathering of the many opinions whioh together 
belong* each aa an essential* unforgettable moment* to the truth 
of the tShole*
We have seen that for Hegel genuine human lntersubjeotlvlty 
is actual only as aot* or rraxlo* not ee ideal synthesis* nor as 
a static concept of being* We have seen dartre argue that we 
oannot surpass the other towards on intersubjeotive totality* 
thou, h by way of Merleau-Ponty• s influence* he later began to 
appreolate the Hegelian notion of negative action or j2E£&Li* 
whioh eo profoundly influeneed arx* Feuerbaoh has no oonoeption 
of praxis* end consequently* his social philosophy oannot 
transcend abstract ideas of universal love* or essence of the 
species* Marx returns to Hegel's notion of the aotive trans­
formation of reality (reelltat) into rational actuality 
(wirkllohkelt)* through negative aotlon* or work* This enables 
arx to found his later economic theory on a oouorete philosophy 
of man's eooio-historlo life* giving his work a strength that 
has stood it in good stead ever slnoe* Hegel's "concrete 
universal"* or "community of the spirit or notion" becomes in 
Marx* a revolutionary vision of a new and genuinely human 
community* :.arx is taking an essentially Christian notion of 
transformation when he employs Hegel's notions of alienation 
end negative aotlon* and the relation of lord and sieve; though* 
of/
of courset hie economic theory is of a different logical order 
altogether* But it ia not arxist economics that concerns us in
this study* Our concern is9 rather, with the great theological
p
end philosophical themes of liberation, redemption and healing, 
because for Hegel, aa for Plato or Wittgenstein, the philosophioal 
task, though differently conceived, is nonetheless a liberation, 
a kind of redemption or healing* It is difficult to determine 
how such metaphors are to be understood, and fortunately, our task 
here is not ao large* We are committed here to discussing only 
the Issues which our analysis of Hegel raises in connection with 
them* So we return now for a final look at Hegel • s notion of 
hntfremdung (alienation) and hie notion of redemption and liberation 
in Seist (spirit), Ws are widening the discussion to include 
the cultural, literary, religious, end linguistic dimensions of 
alienation whioh Hegel discusses, but whioh Marx subordinates to 
his conception of die entfremdete arbsit, or alienated work*
In hlo early essay on '1M Spirit o£ Christianity iSfi 
Fete' we diaoover Hegel In prooeoe of formulating hie notion of 
the hidden connection between the divine and the human in Geiat*
For Hegel, the Aoyo^ whioh connects the opposing oontrariss 
of human existence is Geiat or spirit* Hsgel speaks of the 
reality of man's sooial and historical life in the light of a 
harmony ( * C* ) of oppositee, but never of a statio identity 
of oppoeiteat , for Hegel, ie always a living,
dynaalo • This harmony is Geiat* It is not being
but aot, not identity but temporal disintegration and reintegration* 
Consequently, it oannot be defined in terms of any exclusive 
either/or* It ie neither subjeotive nor objective, neither 
knowledge nor being, neither thought nor reality, but ie the 
ooinherenoe/
coinherenoe of all these*
We have already discussed the first part of this early 
essay9 and we found that* for hegel* Israel9s faith is condemned 
to a form of religious repression and alienation not unlike the 
alienation Feuerbaoh ascribed to Christianity* Neither Hegel 
nor Feuerbaoh have grasped the diaieotio of the Judaeo-Chrietian 
tradition at this point* nevertheless9 their critique is a 
helpful analysis of degenerate forms of Jewish and Christian 
faith* Hegel9 s conception of the Jew)Le of a man condemned to be 
a slave in relation to his Lord God* The fate of Judaism* 
aocording to Hegel* was to remain flxatedly bound to the 
destructive dynamics of a Lord-slave dualism* Jesus was the 
victim of the cruelty* repression and rigidity of this dualism* 
The dialectic we learn from the life* death* and resurrection of 
Jesus is that "opposition is the possibility of reunification* 
and the extent to which in affllotion life is felt as an opposite 
is also the extent of the possibility of resuming it again*•••• 
The trespass whioh Issues from life reveals the whole* but as 
divided* and the hostile parts can coalesce again into the 
whole" (1)* Jesus confirms "our endeavour to unify the discords 
necessitated by our developmentjand our attempt to ahibit the 
unification in the 9ideal9 as full 9existent9* as no longer (2)
opposed to reality* end thus to expressjaad confirm it in a deed" 
The deed is the connection whioh integrates the 9ought9 and the 
9i89* Jesus is broken by the fractured dualism whioh in its 
many forms (reflected In Jewish faith as well as the contra­
dictions of the enlightenment) threatens to dissolve all 
coherence and meaning ( Aoyos ) in complete disintegration 
and/
Spirit of Xnitv pg* 232* 2* Ibid pg* 206;
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and fragmentation. Jeans is afflicted by the sane disease, 
subjected to the sane enslavement» condemned to the same 
alienation as the rest of humanity. It is only because this is 
so that in his resurrection, Jesus gathers broken humanity to 
himself, and a new, integrated, redeemed, heeled humanity is 
bom in the spirit. Hegel first expresses this notion of 
reoonoiliation in a notion of Love. In love "all one-sidedneao, 
all exclusiveness, all restricted virtues are annulled" (1).
“Only through love is the might of objectivity broken, for love 
upsets its whole sphere" (2). Love, says Hegsl, is a harmony 
in which there is no abstreot universality, sinoe in harmony ths 
particular is not in discord but in concord. "It is no 
universal opposed to a particular, no unity of ths oonoept, but 
a unity of spirit, divinity" (3)* "A living bond, a living 
unity, is quits different from the unity of the oonoept", for 
"it appears even in the most variegated mixture of relations, 
untom, and unitary. Its external shape may be modified in 
infinite wayst it will never have the same shape twice" (4).
This is expressed for Hegel in the Eucharist or love*feast (3).
(§>•Ths bread and the wine are "not just an objeot for the intellect",
for the oonneotion which they symbolise is the spirit of a new 
Covenant, a new united humanity. Thus Jesus opposes the Jewish 
"principle of subjection", and with it the "infinite sovereign 
Lord of the Jews". For Jesus Cod is the loving Father not the 
Lord of slaves (7). hegsl writes: "In the moments of happy love,
     __________
1.2.
3.4.
5.6. 
7.
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pg. 247.pg. 246. pgs. 240*232. 
pg. 253. pg. 253.
there ie no room for objectivity* yet every reflection ennui® 
love* restore® objectivity again* end with objeotivity we are 
onoe more within the territory of restrictions* What is 
religious* then* le (fulfilment) of love" (1)*
"'an can believe in God only by being able to abstract from 
every deed* from everything determinate* while at the same time 
simply clinging fast to the soul of every deed and everything 
determinate" (2)* The dialectic emerges clearly here* 
indicating the hope that the endless fixated dualism of Lord and 
slave is truly overcome* Jesus is the Lord* who is Lord only 
as the slave* and who la slave only as Lord* Here the dualism 
is broken open* and becomes diaieotio* Redemption is possible*
Hegel draws many interesting conclusions concerning 
Christian Ilfs and language from the diaieotio* "SJLnoe the 
divine is pure life* everything and anything said of it must be 
free from any (Implication of) opposition"* "Hence* it ie only 
in inspired terms that the divine can be spoken about" (3)*
Because God is not one of two or more related teras but
relatedness Itself* no ordinary language can oomprehend him*
A language incapable of connecting subject and object in a living 
relation of unity in difference will be lnoapable of any speeoh 
concerning God* Hegel criticises the ohureh for falling away 
from speech expressing God as love to the false objectivity of
creeds and dogmas and so* once again* to the pagan subject-objeot
dualism*
Hegel argues* for example* that "faith in Jesus means more 
than knowing his real personality* feeling one9® own reality as 
inferior to his in might and strength* and being his servant* 
Faith/
1. Ibid p g .  253.
2. Ibid p g .  254.
3. Ibid p g .  255.
Faith ia a knowledge of epirit through epirit" (1). Here 
Hegel, in facing up to the consequences of historical criticism 
for Christian ontology» sets the scene for our oan discussion 
concerning the historical Jesus initiated by Kierkegaard*
He sees only too well, and in this anticipates many theologians 
in our own time, that a fixated subject-objeot dualism, employed 
in historical research, is of a logically different order from 
the oolnherence of subject and objeot in man'a concrete 
historical existence, the logical order to which the language of 
faith indissolubly belongs* Hegel argues that "to consider 
the resurrection of Jesus as an event le to adopt the outlook 
of the historian, and this has nothing to do with religion*
Belief or disbelief in the resurrection as a mere faot deprived 
of its religious interest is a matter for the Intellect whose 
occupation (the fixation of objectivity) is just the death of 
religion, and to have recourse to the intellect means to abstraot 
from religion" (2)*
In his discussion of the nature of theological language, 
and in particular of the language of the Fourth Gospel rrolo^ue, 
Hegel argues that "nowhere more than in the communication of 
the divine is It neeeseary for the recipient to grasp ths 
communication with ths depths of his own spirit* Nowhere ie it 
less possible to learn, to assimilate passively, because 
everything expressed about the divine in the language of 
reflection is eo ipso contradictory •••• This always objective 
language hence attains sense and weight only in the spirit of 
the reader and to an extent which differs with ths degree to 
whioh/
Ibid pg* 239*
£• Ib id  pg. 292.
whioh the relationships of life, and the opposition of life and 
death, have oome into hie oonsclouaness" (1), The Jewish 
principle of opposing thought to reality, reason to sense, 
involves the rending of life and what Hegel oalls "a lifeless 
connection between God and the world" (2)* "<§hat is a contra­
diction in the realm of the dead is not one in the realm of life"*
It is Hegel•© belief that it ia only by God that God ia 
known, that faith ia a living comprehension of spirit by spirit* 
Gsist is a living relatedness between what even conventional 
Christian thinking opposes end separates* There are echoes 
of lather in some of what Hegel is saying, and of Boehm© in 
much elBe* Hut our interest, here, is not with the thinkers who 
may or may not have influenoed Hegel's thinking* There remain 
six brief points that deserve to be stressed before proceeding 
further*
We shall formulate them in prepositional form in the 
interests of clarity*
1* Development necessitates contradiction (or as Hegel himself 
formulated this in his Greater logici "everything is 
Inherently contradictory", this is "the truth and the essential 
nature of things", "contradiction is the root of all movement 
and vitality", "only when terms have been driven to the point 
of contradiction do they become aotive and lively towards one 
another, receiving in contradiction the negativity whioh is the 
indwelling pulsation of self-movement and spontaneous activity" 
etc* (4)*
(3)
2./
1*2*
3.4* Science of lo^io pgs* 439-442
2* The common measure between subject end object is self- 
mediation, (the negative activity of Geist). ( lediationi 
Veraittlunir. is that whioh defines the nature of subject as 
subject as well aa that which makes the real subject into an 
aotual subject. It is action, (negation) whioh transforms 
the real as given, into essence, into actuality. Aotion is 
negativity, is mediation, is the way to freedom and spirit).
3. The Jew (and the Kantian man) is a slave under the law, 
subjected to an alienated, repressed mode of existence by hie 
sovereign Lord, God. (1). (or Reason for Kant).
4. /ill men are slaves, like the Jews, as long as they do not 
transcend their determinate existence, (i.e. natural existence, 
immediacy, what is the oase, the established order) (2).
5. The meaning of Jesus is the meaning of hie life, desth
and resurrection which in prinolple integrates all oontradiotlon, 
heals all illness, asking all things thole.
6. Faith is a knowledge of spirit through spirit, end as suoh 
overcomes the antagonism between subject and object, and so 
between Lord and slave. The concepts of subject and object 
are abstractions from the living, concrete totality of Geist.
God as Geist oannot be known directly, not because God is a 
transcendent beyond, but precisely because resurrection faith 
is bom only and death, that is, by way of the negative detour. 
The Via Negative cannot be by-passed.
We argued in Chapter One that Hegel sow his own time es a 
time of crisis at the dawn or birth of a new age, and that his 
oonoept/
1. Or Reason for Kant.2. The Lord who has mastered hie o.vn nature and natural inclinations by Reason, has not overcome nature.
This Kantian Lord (according to hegel) ie in another sense a slave to natural passions, in that he depends upon them to be Lord. of. Lord-slave dialectio•
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oonoept of Geiat haa not only the general connotation of 
encompassing meaning and complete coherence and health, but also 
the specific connotation of an eostatio awareness* The new 
world, and a new humanity was at hand, and the last task that 
was left was to comprehend end so regain the past from forget* 
fulness* He calls the birth of the new age a "qualitative 
change”, whilst warning us that It is no more actualized than 
a newly-born child (1)* In moving from his early theological 
(or anti-theological ae eome would prefer) essays to the 
1 henoiaenology. we find that the oonoepts of life and love have 
been supereeded* Geiat* (spirit), and Be tariff (Notion or 
Logoe) take thsir place, encompassing both their meanings, but 
bearing e broader, and in many ways more ambiguous range of 
interconnected meanings*
The term Geiat is closely associated, in Hegel*a mind with 
the notion of J*,:rlfr. bef-reifen. be^rimichkelt. (which we 
translate in turn as Notion, or t\oyos , to comprehend, and 
comprehensive notion or oonoeption), and with the notion of 
recollection* Both recollection, and comprehension, reason 
dialeotioally, by way of mediation, or the way of negation (2)*
For Hegel, philosophy is a kind of remembering* He cells it 
"recoilaction”f he also calls it the ”Golgothe of absolute 
spirit” (3)* Reoollection (Krlnnsrung/ is ths negative wayiirou^i 
which spirit is finally "engulfed in the night of its own 
self-coxt8ciouaness” in order to be "born anew from the womb of 
knowledge as a new atage of existence, and a new world, and a 
new embodiment or mode of epirit” (4)* These passionate 
passages/
1* P*b* pg* 75*2. P.S. p. 82-83.
3. Ibid pg. 808.4* i'oiu pg* 807*
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passages art very difficult to understand* It would seem, 
however, that he oonoelved philosophy to he a unifying 
Integrating activity, undertaken in the light of the esohatologioaL 
hope that a new age was at hand* Absolute knowledge is simply 
all experience remembered and preserved in an encompassing 
conception* For Kegel, "the need for philosophy arises when 
the unifying power (&£ leoht d££ VerelniauncO hae disappeared 
from the life of men, when contradiotlons have lost inter-,. 
relation and interdependence, and assumed an independent form" (1)« 
The philosopher thinks through the eontent of our living 
experience of the world so that experiences are comprehended in 
their living unity* Hsflsoted experience is given the form of 
spirit in recollection, whioh means that alienation is overcome* 
This see os to mean that for Kegel, the principle of the 
German He formation and of the Frenoh Revolution, the freedom of 
spirit, is achievable only in the mediation of thought, only 
in that death with can alone transform the experiences of the 
past into the form of the spirit* In the H.cAomenoloKy of 
Spirit, a vast gallery of different ways of experiencing the 
world are "lived through" and so remembered in reoolleotion*
In this way thought transforms experience into a coherent whole 
or totality ( oXov ) whioh is Truth* In this way alienation 
is overcome, the causes of anxiety and tension removed* Hegel 
believed that just as the French nation was liberated from the 
institutions it had outgrown, so mankind ss a whole will be 
liberated from the fetters of the status quo, dead and devoid of 
spirit, in the community of spirit, whioh achieves freedom in 
the reoolleotion of experience by dialeotioal Reason* He did 
not/
1* Marcuses Keaaon and ^evolution* from harly Study of the philosophiesor 3 chel1ingand Fiohte•
not however seem to believe that our social world must be 
aotively changed by us, unless we antake be, re1fen, comprehend, 
to mean the active regaining possession of an alienated self or 
substance in which case he was advocating revolutionary aotlon. 
Hegel was only too aware, particularly in his earlier work, of 
the fundamental estrange ent whioh necessitated a criticism of 
the existing order. Lbwith argues that Hegel’s reconciliation 
with "what la" iteelf developed out of the eame thing which it 
gave rise tot a fundamental estrangement from the existing 
order" (1). philosophy, for Hegel, ia an integrating activity 
not least because he hli&self experienced the alienation and 
estrangement whioh is at the heart of the romantic yearning. 
According to Lbwith, the young ».arx of 1641 unknowingly referred 
baok to the Hegel of 1796, just as Feuerbach's religion of love, 
and Bauer'8 criticism of Christianity go baok to Hegel's early 
theological writings (2/. Thus, for Lbwith, the oritloiea 
of the young Hegelians repeated the oriels whioh Hegel had gone 
through himself before overcoming it in the integrating, 
unifying activity of dialectical reason. Hegel sought to 
make the idea of "unity of life" or "living-unity" a reality, 
not by oh&nging the world but by transforming the way we 
comprehend the world, which is to ohange the world indirectly or 
dialectioally.
Hegel therefore sought to integrate the multiplicity of our 
experiences into a coherent totality of experiences. Experience, 
in times of aoute alienation and loss of meaning, appears 
devoid of meanings what is, seems merely to happen to be.
Hegel thou{£it that by doing philosophy he could restore meaning 
to/
1* H n  Kietzaohe pg. 162.
to experience by integrating what had become dieeooiated and 
alienated. Marx thought that the same purpose would only be 
achieved in revolutionary j raxis. The issue re tains with us to 
this day. Lowith draws our attention to the hidden dishonesty of 
Hegel*8 ambiguous challenge to the existing order and 
accommodation to it, for Hegel makes use of the fundamental 
ambiguity of ths notion of 9what is* or creality*9 in order to 
pass from the notion of what happens to be (realitat; to what is 
truly real and rational (wlrkliohkeit) (1). Estrangement from 
the former oan become a reconciliation with the latter only if 
the former ie actually changed into the latter, which it 
manifestly was not in Hegel*a own life-time, or if the former 
is treated as identical to the latter. Thie is what many 
people suppose Hegel to have done in the total synthesis of 
his system, though as we have seen, there are passages in the 
system whioh do not confuse or identify the two, and so point in 
a wholly different direction.
The total view aohleved in the absolute synthesis ie well 
expressed in the famous passage toward the end of the Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Eight. According to this view, philosophy 
always comes on the scene too late to give instruction as to 
what the world ought to be. "As the thought of the world, 
it appears only when actuality is there out and dried after its 
process of formation has been completed”. (2). Philosophy,
"the owl of Minerva, spreads its wings only with the falling of 
the dusk” (3). Here, Hegsl argues that ths Ideal appears over 
against/
1. i'roa herel ia Nietgaeha pg. 162-168.2. {-hiloaorfo of Kiriit (or pg. 12.
3 . Philosophy or Right Ibid p g . 1 3 .
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against the real only when actuality ia mature9 when* in other 
words 9 the real has been transformed into the rational and aotual9 
when all deeds are done* Then philosophy recalls the experience 
and the worlds of the past and builds them into the shape of an 
intellectual realm (1)* Or in the language of the *|henomenolo/cy 
of Spirit*9 the "entire wealth of spirit" is endowed in each form 
of the world or way of experiencing* so that each appears with the 
others as a slow "procession and suoosssion of spiritual shapxes” 
(Geistern).like a gallery of pioturee* This historical succession 
is ths path to absolute knowledge* "Spirit knowing itself as 
Spirit" (2)*
"Spirit alone is the actual"* said Hsgsl* earlier in the 
phenomenology (3)* by which he seemed to mean that spirit is 
reality transformed through negation and death* so that it 
emerges eventually as truly rational* Thus* when he says that 
spirit is the "inner being of the world* that whioh essentially 
is and is per ae"* (4)* he does not mean that spirit lies behind 
reality as a static thlng*in»itself* Spirit is primarily a 
temporal and so historical category* it is only through man’s 
transformation of nature into an historio world* into a commodity 
he uses or consumes* that the concept of spirit oan be correlated 
to those of nature and spooe* This does not mean that spirit is 
immediately manifest in particular historical events* or embodied 
in certain historio individuals* for Hegel* For it is only 
"de"* the philosophers* the thinkers* those who "lift the series 
of experiences through which oonsclouaness passes into a 
scientifically/
3* P*S* pg* 66*
4* 1*6* pg* 86*
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scientifically constituted sequence", who know the epirit. And 
since for ilegel it is only by the spirit that spirit is known 
(a reformulation of the proposition that God oan be known only 
through God), $e, the philosophers, are epirit knowing itself ae 
spirit (1). "Spirit", aaya Hegel, "is its own Community" (2),
ilegel explains what he means by the community of the spirit 
in Chapter VII on Revealed Religion. Spirit is transcendence, not 
in the static sense of that which ia always beyond and thus never 
directly experienced, but in the sense of a continuing dying to 
what is and birth of new being. For Hegel, God and the world 
are integrated in the incarnation, so that the transcendence of 
God is now to be understood as a continual dying and rising of 
the community of spirit. Christ becomes the religious communion, 
and in the power of his death, "death oeases to signify what it 
means directly - the non-existence of this individual, - and 
becomes transfigured into ths universality of the epirit, whioh 
lives in its own communion, dies there daily, and daily rises 
again" (3).
Hegel's exposition of the Christian faith in ter os of the 
relation between substance and subject ie at once a critique of 
the oonventlonal "pictorial" way of thinking, by whioh he meons ths 
conventional ploture of Jesus as the Christ, and a critique of 
abstract metaphysical theology. In spite of the difficulty and 
ambiguity of his language, Legal seams to be formulating a 
oonorete theology of history in which the full implications of the 
incarnation are recognised. In the incarnation, he writea,
"the Divine Being has come to itself in ths sensuous present| the 
immediate/
1. The famous "We” passages are to be found on pgs.
66, 96, 141, 2, 3, and 4, 162-3* 192, 212, etc. of P.S.2. P.S. pg. 778.
3. P.S. pg. 780.
Immediate existence of aotual reality has ceased to be something
alien or external to the Divine by being aublated, universal *
this death of immediacy is therefore its rising anew as spirit”(1)*
1*0r Hegel, the oonsoiousness of the Christian “does not set out
from itsjown inner life, nor does it start from thought, and in
itself combine the thought of God with existences rather it sets
(2)out from immediate present existence, and recognizes God in it.
At first sight this chapter seems to be advocating a 
speculative metaphysic designed to transpose •historical events9 
Into 'eternal truths9. On closer examination, however, the 
opposite searns to be the case, although we must admit that the 
extreme difficulty of the text does not permit easy or straight­
forward interpretation* For the believer, God is present to him 
in Jesus, (3)t but the Homans crucified Jesus, which deprived 
the disciples not only of their Lord, but also of their God* In 
the resurrection, however, God is bom again as Koly Spirit, 
in the new community of those who have participated in his death* 
In this new community, the disease of mankind la healed, the 
contradlotlona of his existence integrated, so that the world is 
no longer broken by the split between subjeot and object* The 
self of man is at last integrated with the environment, nature 
has been worked into en historic, human environment, and sooiety 
redeemed from alienation.
For fcure, Hegel's trinitarian solution to history dissolves
the/
1,2,
5,
pg. 775. pg. 758, pg. 762.
the antinomies of the Kantian moral consciousness in a Protestant 
synthesis (1)* However* Hegel*s synthesis has in some respects 
more in comnon with Orthodox Christianity than I’roteatant (2)*
It ia a philosophical esohatology of the spirit* in which God ie 
perpetual transcendence* God transcends his abstract* static* 
eternal otherness by becoming concrete* living man* He suffers 
and dies* He rises again* and lives* thus overcoming the 
antinomy of suffering and doing* passivity and activity. The 
Christian’s Lord ia the suffering slave* God is nowhere more 
aotlve than in the Passion* in his suffering and death*
Christianity achieves the only true ooinoidsntla oppositortim#
Hegel saw his philosophy as the final and definitive hermeneutic 
of this deed* the integration of faith and praxis.
If the meaning of spirit is death to alienation* that is* 
the negation of the negation* then why is faith still dlsaooiated 
from action* words from deeds* ideals from reality? The new
creation is delayed* Is it* then* vain illusion? Hegel does
not answer us. His philosophy develops from a catching mood 
of hope in his earlier work* (including much of the iTheao&enolQigr 
of Spirit*) toward a darker pessimism later on. His early 
thought was undertaken at a tine of urgent transition* following 
the Trench -evolution* and It shares the almost apocalyptic hopee 
typical of such times. The mature Hegel* determined to heal the 
contradictions he had known and felt in his youth* proceeded to do 
so in abstract ideality* Thus* ft! arx was right to respond to Hegel 
with a Tea and a Ko; a yes to his ideas* and a no to the abstract 
idealism/
1. m r e i -;&Ug&9,£M fl& PH* 102* 108* etc.2* Khomiakov’s notion of aobomost has much in common with the
notion of Geiat outlined in this ohapter* Ths Sobornost of the Church* according to Soloviev* consists in the synthesis of unity and freedom in the community of those who 
love one another in God*
302
idealism of his last writing}
George luk&oa* criticise of Ilegel ie essentially the sa .e as 
that of ^arx, outlined in •The Holy Family* of 1Q43* Though 
Hegel had recognised that history is made through human action, 
he relegated the understanding of human action and its fashioning 
of history to the past only* The present, for Hegel, can only 
be grasped philosophically and contemplatively* Thus, Hegel 
fails, according to Luk£os, to trausoend objectification* He 
fails to achieve a true dialectic of the present as "history in 
the making”, but relapses instead into a "conceptual mythology 
of the Absolute spirit” (1)* "Hegel9a Absolute Spirit”, writes 
Zitta, "where-in past history culminates in his system, was a 
supra-historieal entity, oapable of being comprehended in 
speculative Philosophy only* Hegel expressed the dominanoe of 
the Absolute Spirit in history through the term "cunning of 
reason", whereby fate frequently intervenes to deflect the 
consequences of human actions from their original intentions”*
Hegel scrutinizes this cunning contemplatively by bringing his 
philosophy to a knowledge of absolute spirit (2)*
In Chapter VIII of the ” henomenolcny of Spirit”* we find a 
general analysis of ths way "self-consciousness externalizes 
itself” (3), in the creation of a social and historic world, 
the manner in whioh this world ie alienated from self-co sclousnes? 
and the negative dialeotioal way whioh alone redeems that world 
from alienation, re-appropriating it on behalf of self- 
oonsoiousnasa* This philosophical esohatology puts its trust 
in a salvation from slavery through slavery, a liberation from 
death through death* This is the meaning of Hegelian dialectic*
1. of. Zltt*« c. ^ a c a '  r.rxloa. Alteration. ajtol+attiM a m
W
In it, the mystic and the revolutionary meet in a common 
negativity, separating from one another when one ohooses a 
negative attitude but does not act, and the other, a negative 
action united to negative, critical theory. Hegel's philosophy 
includes a description of the experienoe of both, for his 
dialectio of passivity and aotlvity, suffering and doing, hope 
and deed, traces a way from one to the other with the final 
intention of uniting them. It is for this reason impossible 
to define Hegel's own position in this matter, at least as it 
onn be Inferred from the »: henoaenoloar a£ M l U ' *  *• 
to be both passively contemplative and oritleally revolutionary 
at the same time. For some, he ie the father of revolutionary 
Marxism, for others a speculative mystic, a builder of an 
Idealist system divorced from reality*
Perhaps Hegel is closer to.Freud than is commonly 
recognized if for both, oonsoious recollection of the experiences 
of the paet is the only way man oan escape from being a prisoner 
or slave to his past* For both, remembering what has become 
dismembered is the only way slavery ie overcome* Both Freud and 
Hegel sought to make the unoonsoious conscious, Freud through an 
analysis of ths individual in the context of the communal or 
sooial neurosis, and Hegel through en analysis of ths ways in 
whioh men have been neurotic* There ie a sense in whioh both 
would have agreed with James Joyce that, “History is a nightmare 
from whioh I am trying to awaken” (1). If Hegel saw in 
philosophy a kind of therapy whereby man is freed from the 
domination of hie past, freed for a new future, then Lukaos' 
criticism/
1* Ulysses pg* 35. of. Brown Lile arainat Death pg. 15.
criticise may have missed the point* Zt might be that to 
understand the past is the only way to create history* or at 
any rate new history in the present* Perhaps* the present oan 
never be free for human action without the contemplative thera­
peutic • remembering9 • For Freud* analysis breaks the power of 
the compulsion to repeat; or in Brown’s wordst "The function 
of analysis was to auustitute recollection ("hletorioal truth") 
for repetition in the present" (1)* Philosophy for Hegel was a 
"long and laborious Journey" (2)* of reoolleoting every "shape" 
that was once assumed by mind and now laid aside" (3)* It 
involved* as we have already seen* "a scepticism directed to 
the whole compass of phenomenal oonsoiousness"* "which makes 
mind for the first time qualified to test what truth is; since 
it brings about a despair regarding what are called natural 
views* thoughts and opinions" (4)* For Hegel* these natural 
attitudes and ways of thinking are all under the dominion of 
alienation* they arise when man is Imprisoned by his past* 
condemned to passivity like a thing* Hegel sought to traneoend 
them in an all-embracing human way of knowing* one whioh overoame 
all relfioa ion, and so all falae-oonsciousnasa* Husserl had 
tried to do this in a oonfined area* by developing the 
phenomenological method* a method designed to bracket the false 
objeotlfloatlon and determinism of various kinds of soientlsm* 
'arx thought that they oould be overcome only when the conditions 
whioh give rise to them are overcome* Merleau-Ponty synthesised 
the views of all three in his phenomenological studies*
It/
1*2*
3.4*
If Spirit* for Hegel* is the transcendence of alienation* 
and Philosophy the means to this end* then it would bs 
misleading to disousa the last chapter of the w}henomenoloror of 
Spirit" aa anything other than an eaohatalogioal vision of 
redemption* It is one answer to the perennial questions How 
is man to be redeemed? Hegel's answer 1st Through the bitter 
Golgotha of remembering the past* The goal of the human straggle 
can be aohieved* aocording to Hegel* only when every experienoe 
is consciously remembered* and so integrated into self-oonsolous- 
ness* Hot even our worst experiences can be forgotten* for if 
they are* they will dominate us* We shall be compelled to 
repeat* even if we are unaware that we do so* unless we can 
redeem the experienoe* in all its oontradiotion* from oompulsivs 
forgetfulness* To disown an eperienoe* to deny the opposition or 
to forget the oontradiotion* is to give to these things an 
autonomy of their own* an autonomy whioh destroys our freedom*
In Hegelian reoolleotion* we re-member what was dia-membered* we 
integrate what has become dissociated} we* as subjeot* enter into 
and repossess the alien substance* It is in remembering that we 
undertake the truly revolutionary theoriat it ie in re sobering 
that we become free for praxis. The emergence of self- 
consciousness is a reoolleotion* in Ao^es * the enduring collect­
ing or gathering whioh is the primary meaning of the root Xty 
(leg* Isfialn,. In the gathering presence of Aoyos * or the 
speeoh whioh integrates what has been lost in forgetfulness* 
thought and being* theory and practice* word and deed* faith 
and aotion* promise and fulfilment are decisively united*
This* then is the revolutionary element in Hegel's 
philosophy* Comprehension is not passive contemplation; it is 
negative/
negative aotlon* It ie the essential partner of revolutionary 
aotlon* This oannot be emphasised enough* Of oourse, some 
would say that some experiences are always too destruotlve of 
our ontological security to be comprehended, or repossessed, or 
remembered* Slavery is never Acceptable9* The slave does not 
dare comprehend* Like the z^stlo or the adolescent he may be 
unable to aot despite his negative attitude to the world* He 
may be in love with his enslavement* There is a sense in whioh 
he oannot help being in love with his chains* He finds that he 
is compelled to repeat aotlone which he does not intend to do, 
and he finda that ha oannot do what he desperately wants to do*
We ahall return to a discussion of this compulsive bondage, 
described end understood so well by St* ?aul and luther, from 
whom Hegel learned it, when we come to diecuss these issues in a
broader context* We continue our analysis of some of the main
themes of Chapter VIII of the 1 henomenology of Spirit*
Hegel begins this chapter by recalling the "moments whioh
compose the reoonoillation of spirit with its own consciousness 
proper"* By themselves, he says, each moment is single and 
leolated* "It is their spiritual unity alone which furnishes 
the power for the reconciliation" (1)* The synthesis whioh for 
Hegel "winds up this series of embodiments of spirit" is ths 
synthesis of "in Itself and for itself" (2)* This synthesis 
is achieved in the "form of implicit Immanence" in the trinitarian 
beliefs of Christians | all th&tjls required now is that it take 
the final "form of explloit aelf-exiatence", that ie, in aelf- 
oonaolousness not mere consciousness* For, the figurative 
picturing/
1* r .s* pg* 793*
2* IJaia pg. 794*
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picturing activity of the Christian’s consciousness will not allow 
him to transcend the subject-object structure of consciousness*
He continues to believe In Father9 Son and Holy Spirit as external 
realities* "The unification still a-wanting", says liegel*
"la the simple unity of the notion" CD* What we must realise 
Is that our oonsoiousness of God is God’s consciousness of himself* 
Consciousness of the absolute must become absolute self-conscious- 
ness through what Hegel calls the negative* Through death to 
both eelf-exlstence and to the lifeless self of inert universality* 
spirit as the simple unity of knowledge emerges* "It is through 
aotlon (namely this aotlve dying to one then another determination) 
that spirit is epirit so as definitely to exist"; •••••• so that
what for the Christian was a "way of imagining another is here the 
action proper of the self"* (2)* Hegel calls this the knowledge
of subjeot as substance and of substance as this knowledge of its
action*
"The last embodiment of spirit - spirit whioh at once gives 
its complete and true content the foxia of self* and thereby 
realizes its notion, and in doing so remains within its own notion - 
this Is Absolute Knowledge" (3)* We notice* here* that Absolute 
Knowledge remains an embodiment; it is not a disembodied ideality* 
but the integration of both abstract* empty form and concrete 
exlstenoe* The universal la conorete universal* oonorete 
totality* concrete wholeness* The notion for Hegel is neither 
subjeotive nor objective but both, eaoh transformed to form a new 
unity* althoughthis unity oan emerge only through mediation 
(vermlttlung)* that is* death to the subjeot as subjeot and to the 
objeot/
1* Ibid pg* 794*2* P.S. p^ t* JO 7*
3. T E H  pg. 797.
object as object* According to Hegel# we retain imprisoned 
within a dungeon of alienation for aa long aa a static opposition 
rather than a living interaction between subject and objeot 
remains* Freedom is possible only in the unity of aubject and 
object, a concrete, actual unity* Geist* for Hegel, is ths 
negation of the antagonism between subjeot and objeot, it is ths 
cor orete unification of appealtee* It is the heeling of ths 
diseased splits between . en end himself, between man and his 
environment, between man and nature, between roan and God* Spirit 
as notion Is a new wholeness, a new fcolesoaenass; it is the 
truth of the whole* Our world oeases to be an alien world, 
reified end so hostile to us* It becomes our home* Ths 
llfe-death struggle which pervades our world is overcome; the 
lord-slave dualism become a a dialeetlo leading to a new self- 
oonscious freedom*
Hegel reminds us that for him "nothing ie known which does 
not fall within experienoe" (1)* An absolute knowledge,spirit 
is a comprehensive redemption of self from death through death, 
a new relation between subject and objeot in experience* It 
does not consist of a change in the subject in order that subject 
may adjust to the objeot, nor of a change, in the objeot, for that 
would leave the subjeot oelf-righteoualy regaining just what he 
is* And anyway for Hegel, the interpenetration between subject 
and object in every experience means that ultimately, the one 
crumot be divorced from the other in this way* Hegel describee 
this comprehensive Integration of experienoe as a transformation 
of "su* stance into subjeot, of the objeot of oonsoiousnese into
V* f *
the objeot of aelf-oonsclouanees *•• i*e* into the notion" (2)* 
This/
1* ?*3* pg* 800*2. Ibid pg* 801*
This transformation is a cycle, he says, whioh presupposes its 
bet inning, and reaches its beginning only at the end* Our 
original paradise, in other words, is really a vision of a new 
future} our original health, that from whioh we have fallen, 
ie really the consummation of our esohatalogioal hope*
Originally, that ie to say, in the end, there is no antagonism 
between substance and subject* Hegel attempts to describe, 
albeit dialectically, the fulness and oomplstsnsss of integrity, 
or aelf-oonsclouanees* Hegel asks the Christian to "descend 
from the ideal, intelligible world", and thus to give it life 
with "oonorete selfhood"* Hs asks everyone to return to 
themselves from alienation* The 'Phenomenology of bilrlt' 
desorlbea a multitude of ways men lose themselves in gaining 
this or that in the world, in order to show us how we may find 
ourselves again*
How then does Hegel describe this oomprhenslve experiencing 
he oalls spirit knowing Itself as spirit? first, he tells us 
what it is not* It is not the Ego "taking its stand on the 
form of self-oonsciousnees in opposition to the form of 
substantiality and objectivity, as if it were afraid of 
relinquishing or externalising itself" (1)* It is not, in other 
words any sort of subjectivism, be it intelleetuallstlo, 
pietistio, mystical, or ethical* Hor is it, says Hegel, the 
Ego "oaatlng distinctions baok into the Abyss of the Absolute, 
declaring them all to mean the same there"* Kather "the power 
of the spirit lies rather in remaining one with itself when 
giving up itself, and because it is self-contained and self- 
subsistent, in establishing as mere moments its explicit self­
existence as well as its implicit Inherent nature" (2)* Earlier
In the Phenomenology* Hegel had described it aa followsi 
"The life of the epirit ia not that life which shrinks from 
death and seeks to keep Itself olear of all corruption, hut 
rather the life whioh endures the presence of death within itself 
and preserves itself alive within death1' (1)* This is ths 
meaning of Hegel’s dlaleotlo* It is the "prooess of releasing 
itself from the form of its self", and as such is freedom (2)* 
Tillich argues that the dlaleotlo of life in death and 
death in life, and redemption from death through death, ia the 
ultimate criterion of true revelation, a criterion whioh is 
derived from revelation itself and from nothing else* "The 
first and basic answer theology must give to the question of the 
finality of the revelation in Jeeus as the Christ is the 
following! A revelation is final If it has the power of negating 
itself without losing Itself" (3)* This formulation comes very 
close to Hegel’s and both derive from the belief of the first 
Christians that new life is given them in their dying in and 
with the body of their Lord* This oan be seen most olearly 
in the Christian doctrine of baptism* For Hegel, as for 
Xlllloh, ths truth of ths Whole is Spirit creating new life in 
continuing death* Both adopt as the ultimate criterion of 
revealed truth the apophatio negation, a negation whioh even 
God hl^aelf underwent in his death on Calvary, whioh alone 
preserves life in death, resurrection in destruction, hope in 
despair* And this negation includes every finite medium of 
revelation, including Jesus himself* Tillich spells this out 
in/
1* P*3. pg* 93, translation from Henri Lefebure,
-ftWrtUIWi PS*
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in his concept of the demonic* "The claim of anything finite 
to be final in its om  right ie demonic" (1)* God ie God only 
by way of negation*
Of oouree» Hegel ie trying to describe not merely a new 
way of experiencing, a new relation between subjeot and objeot, 
self and world, nor merely a new apophatio language-game with 
new logical conventions, though he desoribes all these things*
He is also recommending a new fora of life, a new way of being in 
the world, a new way of relating to others in a new kind of 
social world* That ia why Hegel9a language ia so difficult to 
pin down* He intends us to recognise that our social conventions 
are diseased and require healing* He tries to show us that our 
legieal conventions in every mode of descourse, the very language 
we use, are diseased* For we have forgotten that everything 
oo-inheres with everything else, that there is a lived unity in 
plurality, that our perspectives interconnect* *e have allowed 
fragmentation to get out of hand so that communication, community 
and communion become well nigh impossible* We need new social 
conventions, nsw logical conventions, new ways of describing and 
communicating* Ws need new forms of life* This Hegel tried 
to give us* That ia why those who insist that existing logical 
conventions and common usage are normative and cannot be 
changed, eey they do not understand Hegel* He is after all 
trying to establish new logioal rules, and a new social order* 
For him, the way we use words, and the way we live our life, and 
the way we relate to one another, are all diseased* tie all 
participate in ajoommon sickness in every sector of our huam 
world* Philosophy, for Hegel, is therefore a redemptive 
ther&peutlo/
1. Ibid pg. 149.
therapeutic activity* It ia a way of healing through death*
Kegel concludes the ♦ihenoaenolofj si Spirit* by saying 
that the self-abandonment of Spirit in externalization oooure 
in apaoe as Nature and in Time aa History* We have already 
approved lukaos* arguments for oonflning the use of the dialectic 
of spirit to sooio-historlo reality, that ia, to time and history, 
and not to extend its use to the relation between eubjeot and 
object in our observation of physical nature* For it ia quite 
olear that Hegel sought to unite subject and object into new 
forms of experiential relations whioh would be nonsensioal to 
undertake in the oase of our oo&iltion of the material objects 
of physical nature* Indeed he diagnosed our practice of 
treating aocio-historio reality as though it were external 
nature as one of the symptoms of our disease* That is why he 
argues in the Introduction that he seeks to peraade us to 
"despair regarding what are oalled natural news, thoughts and 
opinions'1 (1); and to reject the empty formalism of the 
understanding which "has lost hold of the living nature of 
concrete faot" (2)*
Finally, Hegel reminds ua that the new embodiment of spirit 
at the beginning of the new age ie that of Recolleotion 
(Irinnerung), a slow and painful remembering of the long history 
of past experience* Absolute knowledge Is complete knowledge of 
all experience, the truth of the Whole* For the history of 
experience is like a alow procession and succession of forms or 
shapes of consciousness, ways of organizing experienoe, forms of 
life./
1* I.S. pg* 136*
2. Ibid pg. 110*
life* It ia like a gallery of pioturea, "eaoh of which", says 
Hegel "ie endowed with the entire wealth of spirit" (1)* 
Knowledge of this history is aohieved slowly beoause "the self 
has to permeate and assimilate all t is wealth of its substanos” 
(2)* Hegel calls this concentration of spirit on itself in 
the recollection of the history of experience, the "night of 
its self-oonsoiousness", a death in whioh it nonetheless 
preserves its life, eventually to "bom again from the womb of 
knowledge", a "new stage of existence, and a new embodiment or 
mode of spirit" (3)* In recollection, spirit learns from its 
experienoe ready for a new world* The oontemplation of past 
experienoe is undertaken in eager expectation of a new oil^. 
Phenomenology, as ths scienoe of the "ways in whioh knowledge 
appears" is "at onoe the reoolleetion and the Golgotha of 
Absolute Spirit", the work of the evening hour prior to the 
dawn of a new day (4)*
1. Ibid pg. 807.
2* ?.S. pg* 807*
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C H A P T E R  XV 
LOGOS AND DIALECTIC
We have learned that for Hegel, diaieotio ie both redemptive 
and therapeutlo, At the heart of the diaieotio, we discover a 
oritioal esohatalogioal awareness, vividly conscious of 
oontradiotion and alienation, and equally conscious of the 
responsibility of man in the active, practical task of trans~ 
oendenoe and transformation* In the case of the diaieotio of 
Lcrd and elave, redemption is to be a redemption from slavery 
through slavery. In this, the Hegelian-^arxist diaieotio 
corresponds to the same paradoxical dynamics as does the 
diaieotio of the Christian hope and praxis* For the Christian, 
redemption from death is a redemption through death. The death 
of the suffering slave liberates idolatrous, sinful man from 
himself and his world, freeing him for a new social order, the 
Kingdom of God, For man as he is, the old man who is both in 
and of this world, the slave of the powere of the old order, is 
dead. His death is not less a death beoause he is physioally 
alive. He la redeemed from his living death through death.
This aeoond death is seoond birth, baptism, resurrection. In 
the case of the hegelian*. arxist diaieotio, the slavee are the 
siok who restore health to the whole, not by escaping from or 
evading their slavery, but through living their slavery to the 
death. The death of slavery, the negation of the negation, ia 
the redemption of all. It ie the birth of a new world.
In philosophy, Plato had sought to "heal the lie in the eoulw, 
for man is diseased, he is imprisoned. Philosophy, for Plato, was 
a healing, liberating activity. It was both redemptive and 
therapeutic. For Hovalls, philosophy can begin only when man 
experiences/
experiencea an aoute homesickness, Conse iuently, it is "the
drive to be at hone everywhere" (1) • The attempt to understand
philosophy aa a healing, redemptive activity is the essenoe of 
the Hegelian dialectic. But dialeotio goes about the task in 
a paradoxical manner, Hegel learned the nature of dialeotio and 
paradox from luther who learned it from St, Paul, Hegel liked 
to think he was a good Lutheran, He was far from that. But 
he did learn that alienation oannot be overcome directly or 
easily, and he learned why thie was to from Luther, For Luther,
ae for St, Paul, man oannot do what he Intends to do, and hs
does what he does not went to do. For man may will life ( )•
but all his doing end in death( ), Man la eplit,
fractured, alienated, Man may sssk to do what hs knows is 
good (ocyot&ov ) and right (vcocx&v ) j he oan and does will Ilfs, 
But he achieves not good but evil. Thus, for Faul, though we 
oan delight in the law, because in keeping it we will life, we 
must nonsthsleas rejoice in our liberation from it, beoause ths 
deed when done achieves death not life. The dlaleotlo of 
liberation must bs therefore e paradoxical double negation. 
Redemption oan never oome about direotly or immediately. For 
Faul, it is in death that death is overcome, not in life.
Life is given not in our effort to aohieve it, but in death, 
in the death of Christ, and in our death in Christ, Thus, 
death is the hell from whioh we seek redemption, and the way by 
whioh we must go to receive it. This is ths meaning of baptism 
and eucharisti redemption from death through death, the 
oo-inherenoe of death and resurrection.
We/
1, I owe this quotation, as well as much of ths matsrlal ofthis section to V, Zitta's brilliant study of Georg
R a v n ? u t i ' £ - ‘‘jff
We have argued that the way of salvation for Hegel and 
Marx la essentially dialectical. It is always a way of negation. 
For tfarx, redemption from slavery through slavery is a redemption 
of humanity os a whole; for Hnrx, as for Hegel, it is a 
redemptive community that achieves radical transformation of given 
realities through the dialectic of thought and action. Hegel 
does not indicate the exact nature of the redemptive community, 
he opeaka of Geist, or Volk, but in the - henomenolora he does 
not commit himself to an existing social community as undialect- 
ioally as Popper and others have argued he does. For : arx, 
the redeeming community is the proletariat, ths "dissolution 
of all classes", the olass with "radioal chains" (1). This 
community is a radioal transforming power in the world, and 
through it, all mankind is to be redeemed. A new world, and 
a new humanity, is bora in the death of the lord-slave 
polarisation, a death which ends the old order, and brlnge the 
new into aotuallty. The diffsrenoe between Hegel and harx 
seems to ms to bs ons of smphaals and oonorstlon. ttarx 
concretises Hegel’s vision, & vision which may be concretised 
in many different ways, and stresses practice rather than theory. 
But Hegel and uiarx both share the theoretioal attitude of one 
seeking genuine human community, of communion as opposed to 
divielon between man and man. Feuerbaoh, too, shares this 
theoretical commitment, although this meant for him a return to 
a natural existence of loving oo-existenoe. This original 
paradise would be possible after man has withdrawn his own 
projected essence from alienation. God, or the ideal essence 
of man, alienates man from man. Feuerbaoh concretizes theory in 
advocating liberation of man from God. For ttarx, the God we
.     .I,.,—     —   ......................... — . ...  .............I,
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really worship is *oney, Lord Capital, private property, a God 
who alienates us from genuine human life* The destruction of 
this God entails the destruction of oapitalism, the liberation 
of the slaves, and consequently of all men from alienation* We 
have tried to establish that none of these oonoretizatlons of 
Hegel*e theory can be adequately understood apart from Hegel9s 
own hope, formulated in hie metaphysical esehatology, a hope 
that all things will be redeemed and reoonoiled in Celat* 
genuine human community, the aooiety of oAKy©*,
The eeohatologioal dimension of dialectic is essential*
That ie why the accusation of Topper and many others that Hegel 
comes to rest in an undialeotical compromise with the i russlan 
State does not come to gripe with diaieotio itself* If Hegel 
did argue that the Prussian State is the Kingdom of God on 
earth, then he ia no longer speaking dialectioally* Of thie 
we can be certain*
Our method in the oourse of the following disouaslon of 
diaieotio will be to move in a circular fashion through our 
subject, returning to the fundamental points of exploration 
a number of times in a number of different ways* This we 
have discovered to be the only satisfactory way of dealing with 
diaieotio* For onoe we try to abstract diaieotio from the 
aubjeot-matter with whioh it ie in reality united already, we 
have transformed it into a formal and so undialeotloal conceptual 
schema* This does not, of oourse, mean that diaieotio is 
unanalysable or beyond orltiolam, for there ie no doubt whatever 
that there ie auoh a thing asfan irrational use of dialectic.
One of the tasks that still remains to us la ths task of showing 
some of the criteria whioh would enable us to distinguish 
bstween/
between rational and irrational dialectic, even if thie will 
itself be an activity of dialectical reasoning. The 
paradoxical nature of such an activity will be familiar enough 
to philosophers not to require further comment here.
In the simplest terms, we have understood dialeotio to bs 
a way of speaking which acknowledges that no single proposition 
can express the whole truth, no single attitude or point of view 
is the point of view of completeness, no single action oan 
actualize the Wholeness and health of spirit absolutely, Ths 
truth of ths particular and the singular is a partial truth, ths 
truth of the whole is dialeotioal, Dialeotioal thinking and 
speaking recognises that whilst man desires completeness, his 
nature, as man, oan be defined only as radical incompleteness, 
an is on ths way, hs does not arrive. He oan aohieve no final 
solutions. Indeed the olaim to have aohleved the final 
solution is the surest sign of irrational speeoh, thought or 
action. The absolute truth-olaim dismembers man, destroying 
what measure of s*lf-*ntegratioa hs may manage to achieves the 
only cure is a re-membering of the fragmented, dissociated 
experiences whioh hs forgets in dls-membenaent, . Dialeotio is 
therefore not only a relativization of all truth-claims; itjls 
also a relating of these truth-olaima, Dialeotio speaks in 
accordance with a kind of situational or experiential rather 
than purely formal logio, Thie is usually attacked from the 
vantage point of those who make the distinction between formal 
and factual questions into an absolute, or ultimate distinction* 
iiegel argues that although this distinction is perfectly valid at 
ti^ e level of formal mealing, or veratand* it is not an ultimate, 
or fixated distinction in life, living experienoe breaks tiie 
conventional/
conventional structures of formal understanding. Vernunft. 
or reason, is dialectical because it has resolved not to make 
the formal distinctions of the understanding into absolute 
metaphysical principles, but to follow ths unstructured becoming 
of life. Formal and faotual questions belong together in the 
question of spirit or Geist. because Spirit is living spirit. 
This is no final answer to this familiar attack, but it is 
along these lines that dialeotical thinking defends itself.
Dialectic entails an alert esohatologloal awareness.
In philosophy, undertaken in the mood and epirit of tiegel, 
we think things over, ws think things through. The substantial 
content of our philosophical reflection is our living 
experience of the world. Hegel seeks, in his philosophy, 
to persuade us to change our minds. He is trying to show us 
that our comprehension of what ws know is inadequate, unworthy 
of the trust we are accustomed to give it. He thinks we have 
been "out of our mind'*, "beside ourselves", unable to be or to 
become ourselves, unable to gain possession of ourselves. we 
are dispossessed of our humanity, insane, diseased, enslaved. 
Hegel’s oonoeption of philosophy reconnects us to the older 
Western philosophical traditions, and for that matter tote 
tradition of the hast, in that it la conceived as a way of 
liberation, a way of enlightenment (1). Philosophical 
questions are not empirical questions ooneerning what is ths 
oase, nor logical questions, concerning what by convention is 
necessarily the oase, nor ethioal questions, ooneerning what 
ought to be the case. The philosopher’s reflection is a kind 
of/
1. Hegel’s connection between self-oonsciouaness, integrity, freedom and the Spirit of Gog has its counterpart in the encompassing conceptions of At.ion-.r^.on. >ao is ths 
dialectloal way in whioh opposites belong together, like Hegel*a He, riff, or the Western conception of .The oonoept of Uiarma. with the dual meaning of ought 
and is, is what negel oalls a conorete universal.
of recognition, a kind of re-raemtaring• He thinks through 
our experience of the way things are, when all the f&ota are 
known, remembering the experience that all too easily is lost to 
us in compulsive forgetfulness, liis reasoning ia an integrating 
aotivlty, and the TeXos of his activity ie the truth of the 
Whole ( oXov ), Absolute /laaen* in hegel9 a use of the tens, 
is not a complete knowledge of all that is the case, but rather, 
ia a comprehension of shat we know, in limited ways, in the 
light of completeness, We shall explore this idea in what 
follows.
Dialectical thinking ie a reoolleotion of experienoes in all 
their oontradiotlng variety, rlohness and oreatlve instability*
In philosophical reflection, our thinking lives through our 
experience ae human beings in order to transform every fragment 
of experience into a related part of an integral whole. The 
philosophical task ia in this sense closely related to the task 
of personal integration. The notion of metaphysioe using 
espoused here is that metaphysios is the unification of the 
given multiplicity of dissooiated experiences whioh comprise our 
living relation to the world, netaphyaica is committed to 
diaieotio in so far as it never completes its task, as long as 
our ongoing experience continues. It becomes dialectical in 
its determination to learn from experience, Hegel is arguing 
that we do not at present recognise Cerkannt) what we know 
(bekaant). because we have not learned to think and speak with 
the plastio flexibility of dialectical comprehension. The 
term comprehend ie chosen, here, because of its connotations. 
Comprehensibility,/
Comprehensibility, and comprehensiveness are both inherent in 
comprehension. We spoke, a moment ago, of comprehending the 
truth of the whole, ( oXov ), and we distinguished this, from 
knowledge of all that is the oase. This distinction corresponds 
to the distinction between o A w  and ir£u/ , to turn and 
compos!turn, whioh as Heidegger argues, has been familiar slnoe 
the time of ilato and Aristotle (1), The term o 9 whole,
is related to our words holy, hell, heal, health, hale, with the
(2)general meaning of wholeness, and wfaoleeo.aeneas, rather than sum. 
For even if we knew all that is the oase, the sum total of all 
that is in principle knowable, we would not necessarily be any 
nearer to what we mean here by comprehension, or wholeness,
«ie oannot disown our experience without a loss of integrity or 
wholeness. To comprehend experienoe is not to discover 
something we did not know before but to regain what we had 
known but forgotten, onoe owned but sinoe lost, Ths ~reAa> 
of our struggle to comprehend is, according to Hegel, freedom 
of spirit. It is in this sense that we are to understand 
Hegel*s propositions Das <Vahre 1st das Ganse (3),
Our explorations into the logio of dialectic encounter, 
here, the ancient Christian oonoeption of the U)Coctom • For 
we are arguing that ths TtAo* of philosophical dialeotio is 
the truth "whioh ie only at the end what it is in very truth" (4), 
If tiie truth of the whole ( oAov ) le esohatologioal, this is 
the most important reason why ths philosophical searching after 
truth must become dialeotioal. If the oonauni atio is even now 
present to us as ths TeAos of our struggle to eouprehend our
expcrlTOO*./____________________________________________________________
1, Beim.: and Time pg, 494* Division Two Chapter Cne note ill2, a , Lowiffii jte t n ln ,  in history pg, 225 note 1,3, German fcd, i-h&noraenolo/:* Geist pg, 21, haillie pg, 61,
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experience, and yet ie not actualized in full completion until 
the end ( &*X‘*TovO» then ther^As no question of the diaieotio 
ooming to rest in a final synthesis so long as we remain sen, 
and our incompleteness is the essenoe of our humanity, the 
sine <..ua non of our desire for self-transcendence. We seek
freedom of spirit, personal health through social integration, 
and social health in personal integration, We are condemned 
to incompleteness for as long aa we are human beings, for humanity 
is defined by its desire for completeness. To achieve 
completeness is to become a god or a stone, depending on whether 
we lose our power of negation (in which case we become stones) 
or succeed completely in negating the negation (in whioh oase we 
become gods). Dialectical thinking, tended and nurtured on the 
tension of an eeohatological awareness, speaks of man in the 
light of his desire for completeness, knowing full well that if 
man*s desire were satisfied he would no longer be man, but god.
The Whole oannot be exhaustively regathered, the truth remains 
esohatologioal.
We learn, however, from our Christian tradition, that the 
coming ocLiw of Cod, the new world and God9* new humanity, ia 
bom only in death, the death we die, when, aa slaves, we die 
in and with the body of the slave who is our Lord, Our death 
in isolation from his body would be dissolution, our death in 
him is the end whioh ie also a new beginning, the death whioh 
ie rebirth. The destructive dynamics of every form of Lord- 
alave dualism is overoome, according to the tradition, by way 
of the diaieotio of negation. The tradition speaks of the 
decision to settle down to be what we are ae the undialectical 
deoielon for life, which ends in inevitable death. It also 
speaks/
speaks of the dialectical decision to die to what wear© in our 
becoming what we are not, as the narrow way, hard and difficult 
to find. Our task ia to sharpen our awareness, in order that 
we may discern the way of negation from both the undi&lectical 
way of immediacy, and the irrational dialectic in whioh a complete 
loss of meaning and coherence is experienced. There ia the man 
who persists in deciding to be what he is and not something else. 
He makes Aristotle's law of contradiction, Identity and the 
excluded middle into a metaphysical principle, a principle that 
governs all his life. Then ther^is the man who surrenders 
himself to death, in war or suicide. Then there is the man who
surrenders himself to death to what he is, in order to become 
what he is not. For him death is birth, for his esoh&tological 
awareness of death in life and life in death, of the co-inhereuoe 
of being and no t-being in integrated self-becoming, entails a 
radically dialectical mode of comprehension not achieved by the 
first two. iiegel is trying to show us how and why it is the 
third man, and he alone, who is truly rational. To be 
rational is to think and live dialectloally, that is eschato- 
loglcally, or between the tl^es. The man who thinka^nd lives 
di&leoticnlly has no continuing oity here, nor one to come, if 
by that he means a oity seoure in some unattainable beyond, to 
whioh he is asoured of attaining. For dialectic does not rest 
with absolute opposition, it involves the living tension of 
the Interaction, or interfusion of opposites. tie shall oome 
to the notion of ooinoidentia oppositorum in a moment. All we 
need say at this point is that when dialectic speaks of the 
co-inherence of opposites, and so of ooherence and meaning in 
becoming, it does not apeak of opposites aa identical.
Dialectical/
Dialectical thinking is not monlstio. It is e way of living 
with radioal dualism without total disintegration and fragment­
ation. It enables us to hope in not hoping in the conventional 
sense anymore, for hope and despair (de-sParana) are no longer 
oppoeitee that mutually exclude one another, but opposites that 
belong together in the same dlaleotloal attitude. The 
irrational expression of dlaleotlc in this oase would be the 
assertion that hope and despair are the same, and consequently, 
that it makes no difference whether we hope or despair. A 
rational formulation of dialsotlo would hare argue that to fail 
to distinguish between hope and despair makes nonsense of 
both oonoepts, whilst at the same time, the failure to show 
the oonnections between them makes equal nonsense of them.
Dialectic is neither monismror absolute dualism.
With kliot, we recognize that we had the experienoe but 
missed the meaning. Our task is to approach the meaning whioh 
recalls and so restores the experience in a different form. for 
kliot, as for Hegel, the past experienoe revived in the meaning 
is not the experienoe of one life only, but of many generations^* 
The dialectic is a dlaleotlc of remembering and forgetting.
We forget what we know we know; in order to remember what we 
know but do not know we know. Or as Wittgenstein reminds us:
"The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden 
because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to 
notice something - because it is always before one's eyes)".(2).
We do not, incidentally, have to aay we are thinking dialect- 
loally in order to think dialeotioally.
There/
1. T. S. kliot« The Dry Salvages lit uoilacted poems pg. 208.
2. Ihil. Investigations 129 pg. 30.
Theryla meaning. There ie coherence• There ie A6yos; 
intelligibility. That thie ia eo ie not immediately apparent.
We speak of the co-inherence of birth and death, we apeak of 
the unapparent connection between coming-to-be end ceasing-to-be, 
the connection whioh ie stronger than the apparent connections 
between like and like. This does not mean that everything is 
something else, but that in life, in beooming, our logio of 
identity and oontradiotion breaks down unless we leern to 
discern when to think analytically (by distinguishing or 
setting apart) and when to think dlaleotioelly (by gathering 
what was scattered in our distinguishing). In s world where all 
is beooming (h «*vtol p»3ts Heraolitus), the immediately 
apparent connections do not last. They are not true, or worthy 
of our whole-hearted trust", "An unapparsnt connection is 
stronger than sa apparent one" i$*cvrjs
Kf>£cTru>y)i Heraolitus (1), Ths way things really are Closes) 
loves to hide ( e e <J>cXfcC) (2), For heraolitus,
there is a connection or joining (conjunotios Cot ) by
way of opposite tensions, whioh means thatws oan rely upon a 
genuine cohere ce, meaning or Aoyo* in the opposing tension 
of contraries, tie had the experience but missed the meaning.
Or in Heraolitus1 wordet "Of ths Aoy**, which is as I 
deseribe it, men alway©prove to bs uncomprehending, both before 
they have heard it and when once they have heard it. For 
although all things happen according to this A& y©s , non are 
like people of no experienoe, even when they experienoe suoh 
words/
1. ivirk and Havens rcsooratics Fragment 210 pg, 193 
Ibid Fr 211 pg, 193#
words and deeds as 1 explain, when I distinguish each thing 
according to its constitution and declare how it is; but the 
rest of men fail to notice what they do after they wake up just 
ms they forget what they do when asleep" (1). The Aoy«*is not 
known after the manner of ordinary knowledge. Aoyo* is truth 
not opinion. It is like something we know when no-one asks 
us, hut no longer know when we are supposed to give an account 
of it (2), like yet not like. For the traumatic loss of 
Intrinsic trust in the meaning end ultimate ooherence of things 
( Aoyo* ), a losa which in our time ia experienoed with 
unprecedented anguish, means that we are farther than ever from 
comprehending our experience in the light of it. We spoke 
earlier of Hegel*s fundamental problem as the problem of meaning 
( Aoyo* ) in an age of violent becoming ( ), We have
recognised the strong connection between the Heraelitean, stoic, 
early Christian and Hegelian diaieotio of A£y©s , and periods of 
traumatic social change and the breakdown of the 'apparent 
connections' which our social, religious, cultural, end logical 
conventions would normally give us in mors stable ti;»es.
In the prologue to St. John's Gospel we read that Christ la 
the Aoyos , through whom all things come into being (tt* vto*
St orJtoo eyfco tto ). Aocording to Heraclitus, as ws have 
just seen, all things happen aocording to this 
yif ttowtcov v c - t o n j  k/y©^/). let us reflect upon 
this Idea in relation to dialectic. We are not, of oourse, 
able to disouss the numerous points of historical interpretation 
which/
1. kirks The £oamjLg -flail 1<2B> pg. 33.Wheelwright'Heraclitus• pg. 19.
kirk and Raven Ibid Fr. 197 pg. 137.2. cf. Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations 39 pg. 42 e
which can be raised concerning the notion of Aoyos in Heraclitu 
on the one hand, and the Fourth Gospel prologue on the other*
Such a study could be relevant here, but beyond the compass of 
our exploration at present* »e have been attempting to focus 
our attention upon Hegel's dialectic in general and the dialectic 
of Lord and slave in particular* The early Christian tradition 
is quite clear that the Aoy©s is both Lord and slave, the 
A£yo* in whom these contradicting opposites at leaet are 
gathered* The A©y«s , ae redeemer, the ransom for many, is
the one who ca:ie not to be served but to serve (1)* The Aoyos 
becomes a servant, the suffering slave, and in so far as his 
ohuroh accords with his will, the greatest shall be servants, 
the leaders shall serve* To serve is to be free* In baptism 
we put on Christ, which means there is neither Jew nor Greek, 
neither slave nor free, neither male nor female* For we are 
all one in Chriet Jesus (2)* Here, above all, we encounter the 
indissoluble connection between the notions of alienation in 
fixated dualism and of redemption through a dialectical way of 
negation that is the subject-matter of this study, and the 
notions of sin and redemption in the Christian tradition*
Further attempts to establish the connection are surely 
unnecessary* Our discussion in this chapter takes this 
connection for granted, without Insisting on any historical 
theses concerning the origins of Hegel's thinking or ooneerning 
the/
X. Matthew 20
2. Oalatlona 3^^“28.
the relation between Heraclitus* notion of Aoy©* and that of 
the Fourth Gospel prologue (1), This said, we return to our 
argument*
Our philosophical concern is to speak of the < * j > , 
the measure of all things, that which in principle, in the 
beginning and for all time, gathers all things into meaning, 
coherence, and comprehensible intelligibility* The A©y©s of 
Hegel, synthesizes ths Greek phllosophioal traditions, and in 
particular Heraclitus' notion of Aoyos , with the Christian 
theological traditions, and in particular the Ady©* doctrine 
of the St* John prologue* Heidegger rejects this synthesis (2)* 
The most important aspect of this rejection in our context is 
that Heidegger reinterprets ths A©y0* in an undl&lsotioal way* 
For Hegsl, thinking and being belong together in Aoy©s ; and  
there is no sense in trying to talk of Being apart from beings, 
or of beings apart from Being* A.©yos oonueots beings and 
being beoause speeoh concerning A©yo* must bs dialeotioal* 
Whereas Heidegger argues that speech concerning ths Aoyos. in 
this sense ia not possible* Vie must think away beings, and 
conventional speeoh concerning beings (and Heidegger here appeers 
to include the Christian notion of Adyos ), in order to think 
Being/
1* A genuinely dialeotioal oonoeption of A©y©* oannot beoategarized aa either impersonal or personal, either abstract
or concrete* Some Biblical Scholars have attempted todistinguish ths Grssk from the late Jewish notion of Aoyos
by calling tiie former impersonal end abstract, and the latterpersonal and concrete* Of course, a dialectical notion of
Ady«* is not either personal or Impersonal, either abstractor concrete* Hegel's Be;.riff* or boros is not one of theseopposites as opposed to another, for tne simple reason thatthe Aoyo* is God* God cannot be opposed to anything else, without becoming conditioned by it* God encompasses all
opposing contraries* Aoyos , as a concrete Universal,as the Word made flesh, gathers these opposites in himself*In this oase, we would have to speak, aa Hegel does, of
writing the Greek and Judaee-Christian traditions in a notion
of Adyo* whioh comprehended both* This was undertaken by
the majority of the Greek Fathers in the early centuries*
2* Introduction to metaphysics pg* 107*
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Being* Whether Heidegger is justified in claiming he ie 
following Heraclitus at this point t ie extremely doubtful (1)*
By way of contrast, however, we recognise that diaieotio doee 
not proceed to apeak of the ontological completeness of Being 
except by wuy of the ontological (or ontlc) incompleteness of 
beings* Speech conoeming the «*f X»\ of all things9 the A«yoS 
without whom nothing comee into being, or oeaaee to be, ie not 
a direct, or itself a complete speech* It oan achieve no final 
completeness, even though we are trying to speak of beings in 
the light of the encompassing completeness of this A£yo& •
Hegel speaks of our social and historical life in the light 
of a living harmony ( o<f|jiox/tot }, or common measure, or 
unapparent connection, between opposing contraries, a harmony 
which in actuality is always instable and incomplete• His 
notion of c^f^owlaL, or Bsxriff or Ao%/o& » is never s static 
solution or final state, nor ie the diaieotio brought to rest 
in an absolute synthesis, at least in his earlier thinking, 
if not later on* The«ffAc>xc* ie a living ye^o <rus*» ifijUt* 
rather than Sein. Harmony entails a tending apart and a coming 
together, a stretching in both directions as in the bow or 
lyre, as Heraclitus puts it (2)* For Heraclitus, God ( o )
is the encompassing of all opposites (3), yet things taken 
together are whole and not whole ( vc*t )# ft
tending apart and a tending together, a scattering and s 
gathering (4). Hegel*a notion of God is similarly conceived 
except/
1* For a detailed study of Heidegger in this connectionof* Eosent Nihilism oh* II*2* Hirk and Bavsn Ibid Fragment 212 pg* 193*
3. Ibid 207 pg. 191.4. Tbid 206 pg. 191.
except that for him the di&leotio ia trinitarian through and 
through* The consequence of this dialectic for frith seeking 
comprehension is that the aeoroh for completeness oan be 
undertaken only from the standpoint of continuing incompleteness* 
The Whole is not intelligible in itself, nor is the partial 
intelligible except in its relatedneas to the Whole* The 
partial reflects but is not the Whole* The Whole is present in 
but not exhaustively comprehended in the part* There is no 
complete ontology* There is only the dialectical ontology of 
the apophatio or negative way* Ontology does not, we have 
argued, deal directly with Being as the whole, or with God aa 
the encompassing harmony of all opposing contraries* It con 
speak neither immediately (without mediations vermittlun#) 
nor completely* We can speak of relatedneas in division, and 
of division in relatedneas, but not of the one without the other* 
It is by way of opposition and oontradiotlon that intelligibility 
is secured*
Dialectical thinking, even when it speaks of the Aoyo* , 
must remain dialectical if it is not to -scorns irrational 
nonsense* It is concerned with Reciprocity, and relatedneas, 
but only so long as the tension, the eechatologioal tension, is 
not dissolved, and the dialectic brought to an undialectical 
final solution* There is no final solution. Toted relatedneas, 
whioh is one of the things we mean by Ao y0& * cannot be totally 
comprehended, if only because to oomprehend it totally would 
entail our taking up an absolute standpoint external to, and 
unrelated to, the totality* Despite Hopper, therejle no danger of 
dialectic becoming totalitarian as long as it remains dlaleotio&l* 
an belongs to Aoyos in so far as he ie rational, but the 
AoyoS /
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Adyo& never belongs to him, either as of right or by nature* 
Aoyoft ia that comprehensive relatedness toward whioh an 
atrivss to look, and in the light of whioh he seeks to oomprehend 
what he is ooming to know of the world* But he oan never relate 
to ths Aoyo& in direct immediacy, for A©y©i oannot be reduced 
to the finite status of a single term in a relation* Aoy0* is 
relatedness itself*
We are arguing, in short, for a dialeotioal logio of Aoyos , 
a logio of spirit* On the one hand we wish to speak in the light 
of the completeness and the encompassing relatednesa of this 
Aoyos # and on the other, we recognise that Incompleteness 
and instability are essential to the dialeotio, for a completed 
dialeotic is no longer dialeotio*
Consequently, we should warn, here, against oonveivlng the 
Aoyos , ths unapparent connection or relatedness, as a kind of 
thing, or third entity lying between or beyond opposing contraries. 
To do so is to misuse the language of dialeotioal logic, and to 
reduce it to nonsenae* In comprehending the unzpparent 
connection we are not oomlng to know some new faot, or thing, or 
olass of objects, or olase of particular*! we are comprehending 
what we already know, in a new way* This is not to say that 
comprehension is subjeotive whilst knowing is objective, for in 
philosophical comprehension, we are comprehending the way things 
stand in the world, the way they belong with other things* The 
unap parent connection is no unknowable thing-in-itself, nor is it 
either cognitive or non-oognitlve* We might follow Hegel, here,
and argue that it is re-oognltive* As Wittgenstein says, we are
not, as philosophers, hunting out new faots, for ths essenoe of 
our/
our investigation, Ilka his, is not to learn anything new, but 
to comprehend what we already knew but had not recognized, 
already heard but had not heeded, already seen but had not 
noticed (1). It is to oomprehend what we do not mention, 
because language oannot contain it*
To speak of relatedneas is to speak of ths A 6y©* , and to 
speak of ths Aoyo* is to speak of God* Ths logio of this 
relatedneas is no conventional logic, though it includes our 
logical conventions as moments in a broader dialectical logic*
Not everything that ought to be said can be said clearly, and not 
everything that can be said dearly ie worth saying* In some 
kinds of philosophical discussion current today, it ceases to 
matter whether what we say is true, as long as we say it 
oorreotly* Indeed we have even redefined the oonoept of truth 
in terms of correctness, so as to exclude what in ordinary 
language generations of people of every culture have meant by 
truth* We then equate our philosophical redefinition with 
ordinary usage, and thus reduce our philosophical reflection to 
nonsense* The Aoyo* is true not because there is an 
sxperienoable entity, or state of affaire, corresponding to it 
in the world, but beoause it is wholly worthy of our trust, 
wholly faithful to its promiss, wholly genuine, and full of 
enduring integrity* This sense of the* word true is of course in 
common use, despite the faot that it unites- tvo of our most 
self-evident opposites, the "is" and the "ought", faot and value* 
But this is to indulge in polemio, rather than follow our 
argument on itaWay*
We spoke, a moment ago, of the connection in dialectical 
thinking/
1. tlttger.otcin: .hiloaophlcal Xnveatlgatlona Para 89 pg. 42*
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thinking between rclatedness, A©yo* » and God* There may 
also 9 however, be a connection between the kind of encompassing 
conceptions, (or ae lukecs describes them, 'floating concepts'), 
whioh are integral to dialectical thinking, and the encompassing 
conceptions of totalitarian thinking, whether of Church or state* 
For example, contemporary fascism end contemporary communism 
both claim Hegel as their Intellectual ancestor, although their 
undialectioal misuse of the dialectic makes this claim tenuous 
in the extreme* It may be true to say that Hegel hi iself fell 
from the unrest of dialeotionl tension to the conservative 
compromise of an undialectical 'final solution*, but this 
criticism does not begin to come to grips with hegel when he is 
thinking dialectically* By way of contrast, Fessard argues that 
foarx impoverishes the Hegelian diaieotio (of lord and slave;, by 
siding with the slaves against the lords, and by making an
absolute of huaan labour* By dissolving the state into society,
he makes it impossible to understand politios* For Fessard, 
arx brings the diaieotio to a premature close, and so becomes 
undlalectioal* &arx makes it possible, once again, to return to
a politics of domination, this time, Fascism* Fascist
philosophers, obsessed vdlth the "politieal struggle for 
domination over lower classes and conquered races1*, •••••••
"had loot sight of all human relations other than the master 
servant one*** Llohtheim concludess “To escape from this mortal
combat between the warring sides, mankind must find a middle
road, which for Fessard inevitably implied the reconciliation of 
social conflict in the Corpus muttwa Chrletl". (1).
The solution of the majority of anglo-saxon thinkers has 
been to distrust all encompassing conceptions altogether* with
& s Z ______________________________________________________________________
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the disastrous result that except in oertaln confined theological 
circles, true dialectical thinking was thrown out along with the 
undialeotical versions of dialectic which we mistook for genuine 
dialectic. The worst exaaple of this wholemeals misunderstanding 
of di&lectio ia to be found in Popper's "Open Society and ita 
enemies'. To begin withf Popper shows no sign, in this travesty 
of scholarship, of any adequate knowledge or understanding of 
Hegel. He regards his critique of her&olitus, blnto, Aristotle, 
Hegel and Marx, as enemies of the open sooiety, as his "war 
effort” (1). Popper tells us that he oan only regard Hegel's 
philosophy with s “mixture of oonteapt and horror” • He oould 
not, and would not ”spend unlimited time upon deep researches 
into ths history of a philosopher whose work (he; abhors” (2). 
Popper argues that Hsgel is "supreme only in his outstanding 
lack of originality •••• There is nothing in Hegel's writing 
that has not been said better before him •••• Hegel devoted these 
borrowed thoughts and methods with singleness of purpose, though 
without a trace of brlllianoy, to one alms to fight against ths 
open society, and thus to serve his employer, Frederick Villiam of 
Prussia” (3). Popper oalls Hegel s "paid agent”, a "servile 
lackey", & "charlatan", a "clown”, whose worke are a "farce", 
written in "gibberish", that is a "despicable perversion of 
everything deoent". Anderson appears justified in saying that 
Popper's discussion "recalls the idiom of the third reloh" •••• 
the "paranoia was genuine, it produced its own pathological 
Imagery" (4). Despite Kaufmann's word by word critique of 
Popper's chapter on Hegel (5)# Popper's reading of Hegel is
fre _________________________________________________________________
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freiuently accepted without examination*
He shall mention one example from Popper** interpretation
of Hegel9 one which relates directly to the principal topio
discussed earlier in this work* First9 Popper fails to see that
Hegel advocates a dialectic of Lord and elavef not an irredemoble
dualism* He accuses Hegel of an hysterical style of speech* and
suggests that he would be an excellent subjeot for psychoanalysis*
We quote this important footnote in full*
X'opper argues that he finds it difficult to "overlook an
element of hysteria in (Hegel * a) theory of hu.an relatione and
their reduction to mastership and servitude* 1 hardly doubt 
that Hegel*s method of burying his thoughts under heaps of
wordst which one must remove in order to get his meaning ••••
is one of the symptoms of his hysteria; itia a kind of escape*
a way of shunning the daylight* I do not doubt that this
method of hie would make aa excellent objeot for psycho-analysis
as his wild dream of domination and submission •**••• This
theory* I assert* oan be held only by the most violent enemies
of civilisation" (1)*
Ko amount of unreasoned assertion oan absolve Popper from facing 
up to the destructive dynamics of Lord-slave conflict which has 
threatened ths continuing history cf man over and over again* 
Popper is asking us to forget* or deny* or repress a history of 
human anguish* if he is saying anything at all* Hegsl does not* 
as we have shown only too olearly* reduo a all human relations to 
mastery and slavery; he seeks to find a wato of liberation from 
the exclusive either/or of this dualism* Similarly* karx doss 
not reduce all human relations to relations of oluss conflict* 
he seeks redemption from a class oonfliot whioh* -arx or no »arx*
W
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1* Oven Society XI pg. 2S7 note 25 to oh. 11.
is a fact of human life* It is true that some forms of 
Fascist and oomnunist party politics do reduoe human relations in 
the manner Popper indicates, but no true diaieotio, however aware 
it is of the situational character of human existence, oan be 
reductionist* Indeed, diaieotio is the only true opponent of 
reductioniam, for it alone oun take aecount of the facts which 
lead the reductionist to speak in the way he does, without 
confusing a part with the Whole, the incomplete with the 
complete (1)*
We turn, now, to reflect upon the form of dialeotioal 
speech, recalling that phenomenology, ae a dialeotioal description 
of experience, cannot make the separation of form and content into 
an ultimate* The dioti ction between form and ooutent, for 
dialeotioal speeoh, is an "abatrukte momenta” whioh ie "aufgehobenV 
preserved but transcended* Aocording to Hegel, the linguistic 
form employed in the oourse of dialectical descriptive activity la 
Inseparable, though distinct, from the experiential content*
We do not notice what we ordinarily experience, unless we oan 
describe the experience* We do not redeem experience from 
forgetfulness except in speech* We had the experience but 
missed the meaning, so that in Heraclitus* words, we are like 
people of no experience* uncomprehending, unaware of what we are*
Ac know the facts, but have not comprehended their meaning*
The Aoyo* , uncomprehended, passes into forgetfulness, into 
alienation* life becomes divorced from meaning* Hot only do we 
experience/
X. Conforth'e 'The Oj._eja a h U W B t a  oiei aoclety’defends Marxism from the standpoint of ingels and Lenin (or the Lenin of the earlier period before he hod studied Hegel)* Hie critique of Popper does not really come to 
grips with the diaieotio of larx and Hegel, but tends towards the undialectloal solutions of orthodox communism*
experienoe more than we can describe* and eo re member* but we 
also never exhaust experienoe in what we oan comprehend by way of 
dialectical descriptive activity* Despite this* Hegel is as 
sure as the linguistic philosophers that it is meaningless to 
try to speak about that whioh in principle transcends language*
All we oan do ie to struggle to describe and communicate as 
much of our experienoe as we oan* He do this not only to open 
up communication with others* but in order to communieate with 
ourselves*
Dialeotioal description* for Hegel* is a kind of oonetruotion 
of reality* We must be careful* here* to say what we do not 
mean* Of course* the world is there before we are; but it is 
present as reality* only In so far as we actively respond to its 
presence* In philosophy* we are concerned not with coming to 
know newfacts* but with comprehending our experience* our 
erlebnls* our "living through"* (The oonneotlon between Leben 
(life) and Krlebnia is impossible to translate into Kngllsh)*
We are concerned with the A6yo* * the meaning* not Immediately 
or necessarily apparent* the meaning which our experience both 
hides and reveals* There la a sense in which philosophical 
comprehension through dialectical description leaves everything 
as it is* in that the difference between knowing end comprehending 
iamot a differenoe as to the faota of our experience* In 
another sense* however* comprehension makes all the difference* 
This problematic differenoe is the "difference" already 
encountered in the difference between gn aloh (in-itself) and 
fug sich (for-itself)* potentiality in a confined and speeiflo 
sense* and aetuality* It is the differenoe between alienation 
and freedom of spirit* uncomprehending darkness or blindness* and 
enlightened/
enlightened, eelf-pooaeased awareness. To oomprenend * after the 
manner of the for»itself -is not simply to achieve an Integrated, 
self-oonsistent synthesis of our experiences, for this synthesis, 
(Kant's term ia combination or conjunotio), is what vie can 
ordinarily achieve in coherent knowledge. The difference lies 
in the fact that knowledge is in a broad sense immediate, 
whereas comprehension is dialectical. In comprehending our 
experienoe, we go by way of negation. f?e go by way of the detour 
°r uaweg. go baok in order to go on. The problem whioh
above all faces comprehension ia that of disintegration and 
discontinuity, a problem which the singular particularity of our 
various dimensions of knowledge tende to conceal. There oan be 
no talk of immediate synthesis for philosophical comprehension.
To oomprehend is not to oollect, but as Hegel says, to re-collect, 
not to know but to reflect, or recognise (re-know). When we 
undertake to oomprehend our experience, what man as man lives 
through, we desire a wholeness or completeness whioh would be 
lllogioal in the case of knowledge as knowledge. When we soy 
we desire wholeness or completeness or integration, we are not 
saying we desire a complete or whole knowledge of all that is the 
case, or of all we have experienoed and are experiencing. For 
even if all the facts were exhaustively known (whioh is just 
about logioally conceivable) we would not necessarily be one 
step nearer to the kind of wholeness or completeness we desire in 
the philosophical struggle to oomprehend. We begin by 
recognising that we had the experience but missed the meaning (1). 
In philosophy, we attend to the meaning, the meaning we have lost, 
and continually lose. Of course, a meaning apart from, 
external/
1. cf. Eliott Dry Salvages II: Collected 1oeua pg. 208.
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external to* or unrelated to the experienoe le of no uae to ue*
Hor ie mere talk or opinion* derived from our experience* 
capable of bearing the weight it would have to bear to couounioate 
the meaning* When we speak of dialeotioal description* we do not 
refer to any ordinary description of experience* We refer to 
the speeoh o&pable of communlo&tlng ASy©* * never exhaustively* 
never without paradox* but decisively nonetheless* Such a 
speeoh unites the meaning and the experienoe* so that the one no 
longer remains unrelated to the other* This* at any rate* would 
have to become our objective*
Every fundamental dtltude* or metaphysical standpoint* la a 
mode of philosophical comprehension* and every mode of compre­
hension is a form of life entailing the kind of social and logioal 
conventions whioh we overlook in unselfoonsoioua cognition*
We overlook them beoause they oan never come into our direct view 
except when a fundamental vchange of mind9 enables us to notics 
them. Then we see everything in a radically new way* For 
philosophical comprehension can sometimes give a wholly new 
meaning to what has become familiar* well-known experienoe; it 
oan create a nev; world* Hegel argues* as we have seen* that 
man makes himself in his struggle to comprehend what he lives 
through* To comprehend is to negate* and then to negate the 
negation* It entails a change of mind by way of a paradoxical 
double negative* Man changes and transforms himself by way of 
dialectical thinking and dialectical speech* hy describing 
fresh ongoing experienoe* or by finding new meaning in a new 
desoription of lo&t experienoe* we become aware* by negative 
action (Theorla and Praxis)* of ths extent of our brokenness and 
consequent self-alienation* Hegel is primarily oonoemed with 
new/
new descriptions of lost experience, but the dialeotioal task of 
finding new meaning in and through the tortuouc contradictions of 
present experience is consistent with hla fundamental method*
The goal of Hegel*a philosophical activity is not to aohieve the 
point of view of the Absolute, as has soaetimes been argued, not 
to achieve a complete knowledge of all the faots, but to 
ooaprehend our experience, as persons, and as members of a society* 
in the light of that A£yo* whioh leaves nothing bound over in 
alienation or lost in forgetfulness* Of course, if we completed 
this task of healing comprehension, and so overcame the 
eschatologlc&l tension between what is even now* and what is 
not yet* then we would no longer be men* We would have 
transcended that incompleteness whioh defines our being as human 
being* We would no longer participate in the dynamic self­
becoming of spirit, which is the essence of human rationality, 
as well as the point where faith reaches blindly, but intelligently 
toward wholly new potentialities of being* If we renounced our 
desire for wholeness, or for the truth that is utterly worthy of 
our trust, we would be no longer man, but animal* If our desire 
were satisfied, we would be no longer man, but god* This is 
what makes diaieotio the only rational speech*
We have noticed that there la a living unity of theory and 
practice, thought and aotion, in the dialectical struggle to 
aohieve a wholeness of bslng and meaning* in ti^es of fragment* 
alion and loss of meaning, life beoomes painfully unrelated to 
meaning* The task of the comprehending dialectic is to regain 
what was lost, and to unite life and meaning in a new reciprocity, 
a new relatednesa* . It is important that this relatedness 
(or Aeyos. ) be strong enough to retain its integrity in and 
through/
341.
through the violent, destructive coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be of 
personal and social becoming (ye>/e*c3). Everything is in fluxj 
the of relatedness must hold together what change tends
to part, and to part what, in our pathologioal search for meaning 
beyond or unrelated to life, we struggle to join. It is also 
true that any speech seeking to integrate experienoe in the light 
of the Aoyo* of relatedneee must be open to new language, and 
oapable of changing our logical conventions whilst at the same time 
retaining the continuity essential to an integrated rationality.
It is obviously true that past desoriptive for us, whioh onoe 
enabled people to desoribe their experienoe with coherence and 
genuine meaning, oan eventually militate against the desoriptlon 
of new experienoe. New experiences threaten past organisations 
of meaning and evaluation, so that so etimes a wholly new way of 
seeing and describing things is forced upon us, if life is not to 
become alienated from meaning. At other times, we suddenly see 
our experiences in a wholly new way, through finding new ways of 
describing them, for we are normally made very Insensitive to 
new experienoe if we refuse to discard old language forma and 
desoriptive models. That is why we must continually experiment 
with language. That ia why descriptive theorla ia negative 
praxis. Conventional meanings are indespenslble to rational 
speech, but they are not sacred. Ordinary usage can and must be 
changed if we are not to become isolated in closed circles of 
meaning, unrelated to life, or to living experience.
Critical thinking, the business of creating and discarding 
linguistic models, desoriptive forms, and logical conventions, is 
an essential part of dialectioal thinking. Every desoriptive 
form, every linguistic convention or rule oan become a dungeon, 
when/
when we allow it to become a permanent home beyond the 
impermanence of changing experience* He are trying to argue that 
it ia language whioh connects us to ourselves* to othere* and to 
our social and natural environment* It is by way of language 
that we are constituted by our environment* and by way of language 
that we* in turn* actively appropriate* comprehend and so transform 
the environment* «e mentioned that* for lukaos* alienation is 
the awareness that our self-created invironment is no longer our 
home but our dungeon (1)* The reciprocal interweaving of 
language and our sooio-historio existence means that all 
revolutionary thinking* whether Christian* Marxist or any other* 
must give close attention to the way we speak* as well as to the 
way we work* and to the way we own what we have worked to produce* 
He are perpetually engaged with the world; the world is in 
us and around us* Our co-soiousness is embedded in ths 
all-pervasive reality of the world* It is* however* with our 
social and historical world* that we are primarily concerned in 
this study* Kature relates to our discussion by way of history* 
and* in particular* the transformation of nature into a human 
world in negative action* Thus* in exploring the logio of 
dialectical speech and the kind of world that corresponds to it* 
we are «ploring man*a aocio-historic world* rather than nature*
It io for this reason that we are not going to discuss ths 
relation between dialectic and nature*
It follows* therefore* that dialectical thinking as we are 
formulating it entails a disengagement of some of our natural 
attitudes or modes of conscious experiencing* For example* we 
have argued that dialectical thinking cannot proceed with a 
rigid/
1* sittai Tukaco pg* 149*
rigid subject-object dualism* owing to its situational methodology* 
«e cannot* for instance* speak with ihixkheim of social faots as 
things* if by that we implicitly assume the standpoint of 
fatalistic determinism* or at least objeotiviaa* The living 
interaction and reciprocity of subjeot and object* severely 
shattered by the prevailing forms of personal and social 
alienation* is nonetheless the presupposition of any dialeotioal 
thinking whioh speaks also of alienation* To speak in this way 
may be to speak with a ’'plastic discourse"* whioh in its turn* 
demands "a plastic receptivity and understanding on the part of 
the listener" (1)* as Hegel argued* But the question is 
whether any other logic can retain an integrated relatedness 
between life and meaning* experience and speech* becoming and 
thought* lukaos' case for "flie a aende be^riffe"* or floating 
concepts, stands* Our concepts must be living* flexible* and 
capable of describing a lived reality which cannot be 
comprehended in terms of self-exoluding opposites* or unconnected 
contraries* ihere ie a ooinoidentla oppoaitorua* a oo-inhere ice, 
or living connection between opposites* whioh means that our 
language oan* with effort* approximate to living experience* 
bxperienoe both hides and reveals the meaning! the contradictions 
of experience* and elements of continuous coherence, belong 
together* eo that we need a loglo of the understanding (verstand) 
and a logic of reason (vemunft) to achieve a full diaieotio*
This meana that dialectic does not exclude but inoludee the 
analytical understanding* The thinking that gathers includes 
the thinking that sets apart by way of mutually exclusive 
distinctions* A theological diaieotio* for example* will 
include the analytio setting apart of the oonoepts of God* and 
of/
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of world; creator and created; life and death; faith and doubt; 
hope and despair and ao on; as well aa the finul etep which 
transforms ordinary thinking into dialectical thinking, namely the 
negation of the negation. iftuo abeoondltua sab contraria:
God ia hidden in the fora of hia own opposite. The separation 
of the oreator from the created entails a double brokenness9 
the cleavage of the original separation of man from God by God 
in creation, which is the gift of freedom to man, and the 
separation of God from man by man which is forever renewed in 
man's separating himself from God by sin. The double nature of 
this cleavage has certain important oonsequences for dialeotioal 
thinking, which Hegel falls to recognise. For hi*, the cleavage 
is not double, but single, so that the overcoming of man's act of 
separation from God is regarded as a final solution, at least in 
hia later work. This is one point where Hegel was not sufficiently 
serious about the precise loglo of dialectic.
The coincidentia oppoeltorum whioh is uncovered to dialectical 
speech is not an l_4en£i:$y 0f qpposites; dialectic ie not monistic. 
Nor, of course, is it inflexibly or flxatedly dualiatic. It i s  
a third way, open to anyone seeking ultimate meaning in, rather 
than beyond, living experience. For dialectical thinking, 
experienoe is not self-evidently intelligible; intelligibility is 
a task, open to us at every moment, but never completed. We 
do not seek meaning in the abandonment of multiplicity or
i/contingency; for the one ( ev ) is a mere abstraction apart from 
the isny ( *n£vtoc )# At the same ti.ae, the many remain 
incoherent, fragmented, and unintelligible, except as parts of a 
meaningful whole, or One. Being-itself is a worthless abstractbn 
when unrelated to beings in their becoming| v « t o  t o  o v  is 
oomprehen si ble/
comprehensible only in yeve^cs • Eor Heraclitus* God (o &eos )
is the unity in all opposition* the connection between apparently 
mutually excluding opposites* the hidden ooherence which is the 
common measure of all things* There is a connection through 
tension* a new meaning through contradiction* a new integrity 
through the endurance of disintegration* Just aa the tension 
in the string of bow or lyre is balanced by the tension exerted 
by the arms of the instrument* so thsre is & living owis
between every contrary* But just aa when the tension in the 
bow-string exceeds the tension in the arris* the whole complex ia 
destroyed (1)* so when the interconnection between contraries 
is broken* and ths ^ o m u  of the A l o s t *  thsn complete 
disintegration and fragmentation will ensue* This dialectic 
has immense* though obvious* importance for sooial and political 
theory* though it would take us too far from the preoent 
discussion to deal with this in full* We notice* here* merely 
that the kind of anslytio thinking which separates contraries 
into mutually exclusive opposites is the kind of thinking which 
is in large measure responsible for rending the human realities 
of self and the social and cultural worlds into torn and 
fragmented worlds * each dislocated and divorced from ths 
other in a pluralistic incoherence* The purpose of dialeotioal 
thinking* whether its roots lie in mystical or revolutionary 
traditions or both* io to nurture that fora of negative critique 
and negative action which o&n disclose the strong* but apparently 
hidden connection* which holds contraries together in living 
interaction* The contradictions of living our life between 
opposing contraries are contradictions which dialectic preserves; 
it is simply the discontinuity and destructive fragmentation it 
aeeks/
1. Kirk and Raveni rreaooratlca pg. 194.
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seeks to overcome* The Tt*®* of dialectic * wholeness and
completeness* is never finally achieved* and consequently a
oritioal* eschatologioel awareness of the living tension between
contraries is always possible* The penultimate of
dialeotioal thinking becomes* therefore* the dynamio
or coherent tension between contraries*
The problem* today* is that without the freedom and
flexibility of dialectical reason* the tension of new and
disturbing experienoe is forever exceeding the tension in our
conceptual and descriptive forms* The tension in the string
exceeds the tension in the lyre* ThiB results in a dramatic,
and painful failure of comprehension, a traumatic loss of
coherent meaning* The A<£y©<* Is silenced* The uSrTlff
(or notion) is broken* ie no longer comprehend the rclatodness
of things; our experience of war* tyranny, imprison ent, and
ti.o increasingly violent oontradiotion between what we are end
what we think we are* threatens to shatter all intelligibility*
all meaning* all value* Ontology* the speech whioh discloses
and brings to view* though never exhaustively* the relateuness*
or interconnectedness of all things* has broken down* All that
is left to us to say oan be said without reference to the A©y®*> •
Instead of reasoning in the light of the completeness of the
Acyos 9 we either claim to have comprehended Aoyos. completely
in a particular ideology* or refuse to allow that any kind of
complete speech is possible at all* Human rationality is
dissolved into incoherence either way*
Hegel’s philosophy is one of the very few significant
attempts to face up to the problem of meaning* and the breakdown
of our onoe well-established logic of meaning* at the seme time*
He/
He warns us against rationalistic abstraction, and unreflecting 
empiricism, in the course of the same dialectical argument. He 
argues that logioal rules are social practices, and consequently, 
however formal or empty they appear, they oan only be adequately 
comprehended when regarded as soolo-hietorio praxis, relative to 
particular situational contexts. Propositions do not correspond 
to reality in a simple, uniform way, nor do we speak in accordance 
with absolutely unchangeable logioal rules. For Hegel, logical 
rules are social conventions, deeply learned, but not 
unchangeable. For logical conventions, like every other form of 
social life, not only constitute who we are and what we are to 
become, but areaonatitutcd by who we are, and what we are 
becoming. The relationship is dialectical. We create, as well 
aa ere created by, social life. We not only think and speak in 
aooordanoe with rules of logioal practice, we live and aot in 
aooordanoe with them. We connect in aotlon what we connect in 
language. We do not diaoonneot in action what is indissolubly 
joined in conventional logioal usage. For example, we all know 
there is a difference between black and white. We see the 
difference. When this distinotion ia employed in certain 
oircuaatenoee, it matters very muoh whether the distinction is 
aoted upon or not. The white man who not only distinguishes 
between white men and blaok men, but who aote out the dietinetion 
in veiled or even open discrimination, makes a logical convention 
into a rigidly oppressive form of life. He argues that the law 
of identity and oontradiotlon shall not be broken. Everything 
is what it la and not another thing. white men arc white men 
and black men blaok men. Things shall remain aa they are, the 
dialectic of relatedneas must be silenced. Dualism shall be our 
frame/
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trmm of reference. Here we notice that the , the
common mtesure or essential relatednees of black and white, 
tiie common humanity, ia forgotten and denied. Dialectic ie 
silenced. The unapparent connection regains uncomprehended.
Other connections are established instead, such aa the connect on 
between white, might and right. Our logiool conventions 
constitute and are constituted by our 80oio<*hl8toric forma of 
life.
Ae Wittgenstein remarked, logical forme seem to have a 
compelling, necessary quality about them. Forme of life do 
too. We do not create but inherit the social conventions to 
which logical form has been given. :»e learn to think in 
accordance with them. Hegel's dialectic is an attempt to 
formulate a logio of spirit which radically contradicts our 
established logio, just as the freedom of spirit contradicts 
our prevailing bondage. Hegel is quietly trying to persuade 
us that it is within our power to ohose, or to refuse, to give 
to our sooio-hietorio forms of life and their corresponding 
logical rules, the status of ultimate, or normative principles.
We do not create or ohange them at will, of course. But they 
oan be slowly, and painfully unlearned. Language cannot be 
divorced from formsjof human life, nor forme of life from the 
logical conventions whioh uphold them. But both oen be changed. 
Our task is to strive towards a lasting integrity of logic and 
life. This demands from us an aot of comprehending dialeotio - 
encompassing the old contraries of thought and being, knowledge 
and reality, subject and objeot as well as the modem contra® 
logio and life. Dialeotic .»e*ms that both, and not onV one of 
the contraries, must be negated and transformed. A change of 
mind, as well as a ohange of social conditions, a personal death 
and/
■
and rebirth, as well as death to the old order and a birth of a 
new are necessary. Both thinking and being must be transformed. 
No theory that halts the dialeotio prematurely, where the first 
negation alone haa teen coupleted, is genuine dialectic. The 
complete act of comprehending matters more than any knowledge of 
what is or is not the oase. It is the aot by which we enter a 
freedom of spirit or a continuing bondage of death.
<e have argued that although comprehension desires 
completeness, it does so from a standpoint of continuing 
incompleteness. This means that the Aoyo* is never, in 
principle, exhaustively comprehended. The hidden connection 
retains its hiddennesa even in disclosure. Disclosure is 
partial disclosure. Aoyos is structure, but not the 
completed structure; it is comprehended in, but does not 
comprise the history of man's struggle for completeness.
It is, .erhaps, important to say tius, especially as Hegel 
reuina ambiguous at this point, to his own peril. He is in
danger of bringing the dialeotio to a triumhnnt close in a 
prematurely 'final solution'. We apeak of the Aoyos , the 
coherent measure in whom all things come to be and cease to be, 
but the Si eech that oan contain the coherence is not yet 
within our grasp. tfe may speak of the fulnes^and completeness 
of God, (Td'tr\rtfu>|A'* ToC &*oC ) (1), but our aoceaafto such 
speech is not direct or immediate: It is by way of the dialectic
of faith, whioh alone is truly rational, that we may apeak.
We can speak with sense, only in so far as we speak in aooordanoe 
with the Aoyos comuon to us all. Heraclitus argues that 
we have to rely on this Aoyo* just as the oity must rely on
its common law (2).
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OX course, there are a multitude of forms the relatedness 
of Aoyos may take; our ooneem here is to explore the moat 
§• :er- 1 oOMI BWC coincide.:tia o, | ooitoru. , :r the Aoyws 
In which all opposing contraries are gathered, oan be seen in 
the predication of opposites to the same subjeot (Christ is the 
Lord-Slave)• The same experience oan be comprehended in 
opposing ways by different persons* or the same experience oan 
affect different persons in opposing ways* what is good for 
some is not good for others* Lvery oontrary needs its opposite 
to have meaning at all. Opposites are interrelated; they oease 
to be opposites if this relation oould conceivably be broken. 
Opposites therefore complement one another. They co-inhere. 
There is no disease without health, no satlafaotion without 
hunger, no wealth without poverty. Chrlst9 as the Aoyos , is 
the health in the disease. He is the one in whom our 
oonventional satisfactions are disclosed to be neurotic flights 
from death. he is the one who satisfies the hunger we ere not 
even aware of. He is rich in his poverty. Some opposites 
belong together because they inevitably succeed one another* 
like night following day; some belong together in the integrity 
of God* like death and resurrection. we can see that some 
opposites are opposing modes of being* gathered in dialectical 
thinking; others are conceptual oppositions* or logical 
contradictions* which are reconciled in being. Aoyos encompasses 
both in bringing thought and being together.
There ere tinea when we must stress the dissociation of 
contraries* and at others their unity. Wisdom consist in 
discerning when the one is appropriate and when the other. 
Hlaleotio/
Dialeotic ie both analytic end synthetic. It brings together 
end sets apart. hver^thing is in tune and out of tuns, whole 
and not whole, says Heraclitus (1). Whether the connection 
between opposites is ths relativity of every contrary to its 
opposite, or the inevitable succession of one opposite into 
another, we oan say that the Aoyo* hides in the fora of related 
or successive opposites, (Deua absoonditus sub oontrarlo). Ths 
dissolution of the polarities of affirmation ( the v«*TaL<}«Tiic^ , 
affirm ativa) into the dialectic of negation («ttto^ octuvc^  s 
abnegatlva) discloses that even the moat aaored opinion hides 
as well as reveals the truth, beoause nothing can be ultimately 
relied upon to be what it seems to be, or to mean what is said. 
The paradox arises here; for every thing may be contrary to what 
immediately appears ( 6 or it aay hold its
integrity. We oan never be sure when we are dealing with the 
one, and when with the other. For example, we may distinguish 
life from death, set them apart, live life to the full and 
fear death. But things are not what they seem. Enduring life 
is to be found not in life but in death, eo that there is no 
longer anything about death that would justify our fear. 
Redemption from death is not a flight into forms of life, but ie 
a redemption in death. Thingaare not what they seem. Life 
and death oo-inhere in Aoyos . Dialeotio holds to tiie 
paradox by maintaining a negation of tiie negation. A single 
negation achievea dualism, the double negation the dialeotio.
Only dialeotic comprehends the being** in-the-whole ( Kot&oXou )
which is both universally concrete, and concretely universal.
This is ths lesson we have learned from Hegel. and B‘oc%/.cto.s
belong together in Aoyos • Even speeoh aust die to live, 
undergo/
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undergo the negative dialectic if it ie to speak the truth.
Cod is present only to the faith whioh refuses to confine hia to 
any one fixed determination, just ae nan ia reasonable only to 
the extent to which he negates every fixed determination of hie 
being-in-the-world • God end man have this common Aoyos ,
gathered in the life whioh is death, end the death whioh is life, 
e which destroys all absolute theological dualisue*
The meaning of incarnation lies somewhere here.
"The real constitution of things is accustomed to hide 
itself"f "if one does not expect the unexpected one will not 
find it out, einoe it is not to be searched out, and difficult 
to compass". (Heraclitus; (1). That A6y©* entails oontradiotion, 
that strife gives coherence and order to all things and so ia 
therefore not an injustice but justice iteelf, these are the 
unexpected things we must learn to expect, aocording to 
Heraclitus. That Jesus ie the Lord who serves the slaves, and 
the slave who is Lord of all Lords is unexpected to say the least. 
The ooinoidentia oppositorum shocks, but does not violate 
anything but a restricted rationality. For Heraclitus, it©* 
makes some gods and others nen, some slaves and others free (2). 
A6y»* gathers what TioXef^os scat tore, but only by way of 
the living oontradiotion. Aoyos. is logical, in its own ter .a, 
only in the endurtinee of oontradiotion, by which the irrational 
beco.es rational. Antagonism is transformed into mutual 
interaction, oonfliot into reciprocity. A©y©* , for Heraclitus
is like fire, forever changing, present whatever is burnt, 
enduring through destruction, a living catharsis, pet t
we/
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we can never step twice into the same river: Everything must
eventually cease to be, just es it has come to be, and has not 
always endured. Aoyos coheres through change, which means 
that the Aoyos , and the Aoyos alone, is worthy of our 
unoondittonal trust. When the Christian says the A©y0s became
flesh, that the Aoyos. came and dwelt among us, though ws 
comprehended him not, he is saying that the meaning he can trust 
unconditionally is now united to the life he knows as his own.
We had the experience but lost the meaning. life and meaning 
belong together in the integrity of the word made flesh.
Life has meaning in him. Meaning is alive in him. The two 
are not divorced in him. The A© y©s scatters ( ^
and gathers ( tfov&yat. ), comes together ( ©u\i Ccr.rrw-0 and 
flows away (inoXttlTfet )» approaches (itfosauxi ) and departs 
( iiiTfcuvt, ) (1). This, for Heraolitus, is the becoming of 
the Aoyos 9 whose integrity endures, not by being this or 
that, nor by not being this or that, but by becoming whet it is 
not. We say the same of the Christ.
We do not have the time or the space to work out further 
detailed formulations of this dialeotio: We have given close
attention to one instance of it in particular, the dialeotio of 
Lord and Slave. We have established its connection with the 
Christian tradition and with the philosophy of Heraclitus.
We have argued, as an introductory thesis, that the Truth wholly 
worthy of our trust is neither here nor beyond, neither finite 
nor infinite, neither immanent nor transcendent, but esohato- 
logically present ink the form of absence. It is a truth whioh 
endures though it be radioally temporal. It is an integrity 
achieved/
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achieved through the endurance of disintegration. It ie the 
health within the disease. It ie the truth of on enoompasaing 
coincidentla oppoaltorum, not of any fixed and so finite 
determination. It ie a wholeness in becoming, rather than a 
withdrawal into either being9 or not-being. It is the truth 
whioh even our oorreot opinions concerning what is or is not the 
case hide as well as reveal. We do not seek consistency and 
logical clarity in the deter-dutaUo whioh is always s ne>-atlo. 
and in this alonef although as an essential moment in the course 
of the dialectic9 this kataphatio method la valid enough. But 
no single affirmation, no single negation, can olaim to 
comprehend the truth. Dialeotioal logic, and it alone, 
comprehends completeness from the standpoint of radical 
incompleteness. Its spophatio method, entailing a double and 
not single negation, grasps the living movement of the 
ooincldentia oppoaltorm. It allows concepts to float. It 
allows the un&pp&rent connection to become manifest. It negates 
the negation as well as the affirmation, and so passes beyond 
the static abstractions of being and not-being. It speaks of 
ths Aoyoi as enduring rel&tedness in continual becoming, not 
from the standpoint of absolute rel&tedness itself, but from the 
standpoint of partial relatedness. It speaks of the wholeness 
and Wholesomeness of the truth of the Whole, not from s point 
external to the Whole, but from a point within its encompassing. 
Its ontology C on/T«- \OyC*0 is dlslsotio&l, and so dynamic, 
rather than static. It employs the logic of identity and 
oontradiotion in analysis, but doss not leave what it has set 
apart, unrelated, incoherent, or without life. The meaning 
it diaoovers in the experienoe is not alien to the experienoe, 
but/
but belongs indissolubly to it. The life it continues to live 
does not bsooae loet in compulsive forgetfulness, nor ie it 
allowed to fragment. Aoyos gathers what has been scattered, 
joins what has been broken. It eoatters what ha* been decept­
ively connected, and breaks what has been fixatedly defined.
These remarks, are, of course, only a beginning. They are 
an introduction, a preliminary exploration, no more. Our 
solution is that thsre is no final solution. Diaieotio must 
never be confused with final solutions. It arrives only when 
it does not arrive, when it knows it does not yet arrive.
Although even now it has indirect aocess to the truth, it does 
not claim that truth ae its own, in completeness. It ie 
always on the way. In order to go on, it goes back, recalling 
end comprehending what we had lost, though we were unaware of 
our loss. It teaches us that in becoming what we are not, we 
forsake the logic of exclusion, by which everything ie or is not, 
and we embrace the dialeotioal logic of inclusion. It teaches 
us that inclusion is not yet achieved, that the kingdom is not 
yet, that here we have no enduring city. It tenches us that 
knowledge imposes a pattern and falsifies, and that lifs 
continually oalls in questions the conventions of meaning to 
whioh we usually turn for coherence. It shows us how to live 
in time, and to work toward integrity at the same time. 
Dialeotioal thinking is a thorough-going /apophatic way of 
thinking, a thinking whioh unites with being through negative 
aotion. Diaieotio unites theory and praotioe, thought end 
notion, in the double negation which comprehends them both.
It unites thought end being, or in another idiom subject and 
objeot, in a temporary, ongoing oo-lnhere.noe, but it does not 
com#/
oozae to rest in absolute synthesis. It shows us ths 
unapparsnt A©y©* between man as the one who aots (homo agens) 
and man as the one who suffers (homo patiens). »Ve no longer 
ask whether it is aotlon or suffering that changes the world; 
our task, instead, is to discern when to aot and when to suffer, 
and such a discern ent demands from us a great freedom of spirit, 
There is no genuine either/or between Lordship and Slavery 
either. Therejls no question of our formulating an exclusive 
either/or between domination or submission. »e know that 
social revolutions alone do not change men, though we do not 
contradict a revolutionary insistence on radioal transformation, 
We know that we must aot as well as suffer, yet we know that 
violence breeds violence. fe may hate war, knowing that 
pacifism may be a passive adjustment to evil. Nonetheless, 
we do not ask, with the UEnhappy oousoiousnees, when will the 
kingdom come? We speak, instead, of what is already present, 
the unapparsnt A*yas , the living oolncldentia oppositorux 
of the Holy Spirit in our history. The presence of the Spirit 
of God, in whose Integrity we cure made fchole, ie even now at 
work in our time. This is the good news,
Perhaps Lessing's prayer will prove to mean as much to us 
as it undoubtedly did to Hegel,
"Go thine insorutlble way, Eternal Providence! Only 
let me not desp air of thee beoause of this insorutablenesa.
Let me not despair of thee, even if thy steps appear to be to 
be going backwards. It is not true that the shortest line is 
always straight" (1),
Or perhaps St. Paul speaks to the heart of the matter,
when/
1. Lessings The Education of the human race 1780.
yhftttlgfilfifil transl. Henry Chadwick pg. 97,
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when he aaysi
For we know In part and we prophesy in part; but when 
completeness coaes, the partial shall be done away Cl)«
Now we see only puzzling reflections in a mirror # but 
then we shall eee face to faoe* My knowledge now is partial» 
but then I shall know in completeness even as I also aa 
oompletely known (2)#
1. 12. 1 > 13 rr 9 end 10.> 13 T 12#
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